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to	 take	medieval	 theories	 of	 consequentiae	 as	 theories	 of	 logical	 consequence	 in	 a	 "proper"	
sense.	 Nowadays,	 more	 often	 than	 not,	 logical	 is	 taken	 to	 mean	 formal	 (in	 some	 sense);	
medieval	 theories	 of	 consequentiae	 deal	 also	 (if	 not	 mainly)	 with	 material	 consequences,	
whose	validity	 -	both	 from	a	contemporary	perspective	and	 from	the	point	of	view	of	some	
medieval	 theories	 -	 depends	 on	 the	 meaning	 of	 their	 categorematic	 terms.	 If	 we	 take	
consequence	narrowly,	 these	 logicians	and	philosophers	of	 logic	would	probably	be	right:	 in	
this	sense,	most	medieval	theories	appear	to	be	more	about	some	sort	of	linguistic	entailment	




immutable	 as	 some	 might	 like	 to	 believe:	 they	 have	 a	 history	 which	 could	 turn	 out	 to	 be	
relevant	or	possibly	even	enlightening	for	our	own	conceptions	and	endeavours.		
Therefore,	 I	 am	 going	 to	 argue	 that	 this	 kind	 of	 dismissive	 assessment	 might	 not	 be	





Cameron	 outlines	 four	 possible	 approaches	 to	 the	 study	 of	 the	 history	 of	 Medieval	 logic:	
"rational	 reconstruction",	 "historical	 reconstruction",	 "history	 of	 applied	 logic",	 and	 "social	
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contextualisation	and	a	philosophical	analysis	of	 some	of	 its	central	 features,	 I	am	pursuing	
both	historical	and	philosophical	aims.	From	the	historiographical	point	of	view,	I	am	making	
new	materials	available	to	a	wider	readership	-	materials	that	were	previously	available	only	
in	 manuscript	 form.	 By	 presenting	 a	 detailed	 reconstruction	 of	 Marsilius'	 life	 and	 works	
within	 their	 institutional	 and	 cultural	 context,	 I	 am	 suggesting	 also	 a	 more	 precise	
approximation	for	the	dating	of	Marsilius'	Consequentiae.	Furthermore,	 I	am	adding	a	tile	to	
the	complex	and	still	incomplete	mosaic	of	XIV	century	discussions	on	the	subject	and		giving	
some	 elements	 to	 call	 for	 a	 partial	 reassessment	 of	 the	 split	 between	 Parisian	 and	 English	
traditions;	a	need	 for	 such	a	 reassessment	emerges	also	 from	a	conceptual	analysis	even	of	
some	of	the	most	exemplificative	texts	belonging	to	either	tradition.		This	tile	may	be	a	small	












late	medieval	philosophers	worked	within	 their	 institutional	 contexts.	Furthermore,	a	more	
detailed	 analysis	 of	 Marsilius'	 life	 could	 shed	 light	 on	 some	 questions	 of	 interest	 for	 the	






Chapter	 II	 is	 an	 introduction	 to	 the	 edition	 of	 Marsilius'	 Consequentiae,	which	 follows	 the	
same	chapter.	
In	 preparing	 the	 present	 edition,	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 manuscript	 tradition	 and	 the	
palaeographical	 difficulties	 entailed	 a	 long	 editorial	 work	 and	 some	 substantial	 editorial	
choices.	In	order	to	justify	those	choices	I	am	introducing	the	structure	of	the	treatise	and	its	
manuscript	 tradition.	 In	 the	 manuscripts'	 circulation	 of	 Marsilius'	 works	 on	 the	 logica	
modernorum,	 there	are	some	 features	of	 interest	emerging	 from	such	analysis:	 for	example,	
they	 are	 often	 copied	 within	 anthologies	 of	 logical	 texts	 belonging	 mostly	 to	 the	 English	
tradition.	I	am	situating	the	Consequentiae	within	the	tradition	of	Marsilius'	other	works	in	the	







Insolubilia.	 Furthermore,	 I	 am	proposing	 a	 tentative	 dating	 of	 the	Consequentiae	with	 some	
supporting	philological,	 textual	and	doctrinal	arguments:	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	 late	1360s	are	a	
probable	date	of	composition.	
Finally,	I	am	presenting	the	choices	adopted	for	the	establishment	of	the	edition	of	the	text	in	
the	 selection	 of	 the	 basis	manuscripts,	 about	 the	 preferred	 lectio,	 and	 the	 orthography	 and	
syntax.	
	
In	Chapter	 III,	 I	have	 two	principal	aims.	First,	 I	am	rejecting	the	common	historiographical	
thesis	 that	 sees	Medieval	 Logic	 as	 logic	 only	 in	 a	 (partially)	 equivocal	 sense.	 Second,	 I	 am	
assessing	medieval	theories	of	consequentiae	 in	their	historical	development	and	conceptual	
framework,	 in	 order	 to	 tackle	 the	 question	 if	 they	 are	 theories	 of	 consequences	 at	 all	 and,	
therefore,	 to	 have	 a	 frame	 of	 reference	 for	 an	 analysis	 of	Marsilius'	 theory	 (chap.	 4).	 I	 am	
presenting	a	general	overview	of	the	profile	of	medieval	logic	and	of	its	study.	Starting	from	a	
minimal	 definition	 of	 logic	 as	 "what	 logicians	 do",	 in	 the	 first	 place	 I	 am	 examining	 who	
medieval	logicians	are,	in	which	institutional	and	cultural	contexts	they	operate	(especially	in	
the	 later	 Middle	 ages),	 and	 how	 they	 define	 themselves	 and	 their	 practices;	 I	 am	 briefly	
analysing	these	practices	against	the	ways	medieval	logicians	define	them.	I	am	then	outlining	
and	evaluating	some	common	takes	and	issues	in	the	historiography	of	Medieval	Logic.	I	am	
arguing	 that	 Medieval	 Logic	 is	 logic	 in	 an	 unequivocal	 sense,	 that	 it	 does	 not	 require	 any	
extrinsic	unifying	notion,	and	-	by	discussing	some	methodological	questions	-	that	the	study	
	 10	
of	Medieval	Logic	qua	 logic	 is	philosophically	relevant	also	 from	our	contemporary	point	of	
view.	 Finally	 I	 am	 giving	 a	 partial	 historical	 introduction	 to	 the	 XIV	 century	 debate(s)	 on	
consequentiae,	touching	upon	some	of	the	issues	which	are	going	to	be	the	main	focus	in	my	
analysis	of	Marsilius'	theory.	In	particular,	in	examining	the	most	common	classification	of	XIV	
century	 theories	 of	 consequentiae,	 I	 am	 paying	 particular	 attention	 to	 the	 split	 between	 a	
Parisian	tradition	and	an	English	tradition	on	the	subject,	highlighting	their	main	 features.	 I	
am	 arguing	 that	 the	 general	 classification	 is	 at	 least	 partially	 inadequate	 and	 that	 several	











of	 validity.	 In	particular	 I	 am	 concentrating	on	 those	which	he	deems	 satisfactory	 accounts	
and	on	some	aspects	of	their	articulation,	in	a	comparison	with	John	Buridan's	and	Albert	of	
Saxony's	 analogous	 discussions.	 Finally,	 I	 am	 focusing	 on	 Marsilius'	 take	 on	 the	 relation	












containing	 these	 terms.	 Therefore,	 even	 if	 I	 am	 focusing	 on	 the	 technicalities	 of	 Marsilius'	
treatment	of	 the	expositio	 of	 sentences	of	 this	 type,	 I	 am	contextualising	 it	within	 the	more	















or	 to	many	 other	 factors	 -	 particularly	with	 the	 help	 of	 time,	 a	 few	not	 completely	 reliable	
sources,	 and	 tradition.	 The	 preference	 for	 emblematic	 figures	 or	 the	 partisan	 approach	 of	





Villon's	verses	on	his	 supposed	execution	 "thrown	 in	a	 sack	 into	 the	Seine"	by	order	of	 the	
Queen	of	France	contributed	to	build	up	a	legend.	Marsilius	of	Inghen	is	not	legend	material.	
The	 only	 poems	 written	 about	 him	 are	 encomiastic	 exercises	 assigned	 to	 Heidelberg	
schoolboys	 to	 commemorate	 the	 founding	 rector	 of	 the	 local	 University	 shortly	 after	 his	
passing.3	
Marsilius'	life	is	neither	particularly	adventurous	nor	romantic:	he	was	never	condemned	for	
holding	 unorthodox	 positions;	 he	was	 a	 very	well	 respected	master	 for	most	 of	 his	 life;	 he	
seems	 to	 have	 entertained	 very	 good	 relations	 with	 popes	 and	 potentates;	 and	 when	 his	
																																																								
2	To	 date,	 the	 most	 extensive	 biography	 of	 Marsilius	 is	 still	 Ritter	 [1921];	 see	 also	 Bos	 [1983],	 Braakhuis	 -	
Hoenen	[1992a],	and	Courtenay	[1992].	Bos	[1983,	6-9]	gives	an	analysis	of	the	previous	literature	on	Marsilius'	





personal	positions	were	 in	conflict	with	 the	 line	held	by	his	University,	he	abandoned	Paris	
quietly	and	went	 to	 found	a	new	university	elsewhere.	However,	 this	does	not	diminish	the	
importance	 of	 Marsilius'	 philosophy	 and	 its	 influence:	 he	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 original	 and	
philosophically	sharp	nominalists	in	the	second	half	of	the	XIV	century;	and	the	via	marsiliana	





I	 will	 therefore	 present	 a	 picture	 as	 complete	 as	 possible,	 examining	 all	 the	 known	
documentation	concerning	Marsilius.	Such	an	account	of	Marsilius'	mostly	academic	life	gives	
us	at	 least	a	partial	 insight	 into	 the	circumstances	of	his	 intellectual	 life.	 I	will	proceed	 first	
with	 an	overview	of	Marsilius'	 early	 life	 (I.1.1).	 I	will	 then	give	 an	 extensive	 analysis	 of	 his	
time	 in	 Paris	 as	 a	 student,	 a	 young	 master	 and	 finally	 as	 a	 renowned	 philosopher,	 with	
particular	attention	to	Marsilius'	administrative	and	diplomatic	commitments.	In	this	section	I	
will	also	touch	upon	some	issues	of	more	general	interest,	as	for	example	Marsilius'	possible	
involvement	with	 the	 "Buridanian	 circle"	 (if	 there	were	 such	 a	 thing),	 and	 I	 will	 point	 out	
some	 clues	 for	 a	 tentative	dating	of	 the	Consequentiae	 (I.1.2).4	I	will	 then	examine	what	we	
know	of	Marislius'	time	as	an	envoy	at	the	papal	curia	just	on	the	verge	of	the	Great	Schism,	
and	of	his	 "missing	years"	after	he	 left	Paris	and	before	he	reappeared	 in	Heidelberg	as	 the	













Nicholas	 Prowin's	 Oratio	 Funebris	 to	 be	 a	 reliable	 source:5	indeed,	 according	 to	 Prowin,	




Ritter	 argued	 for	 a	higher	 age,	 because	 (a)	 already	 in	1363	Marsilius	occupies	 a	prominent	
position	in	Paris;8	(b)	he	is	mentioned	as	a	senior	of	the	natio	Anglicana	in	1376;	(c)	if	he	were	
born	in	1342	or	later,	Marsilius'	would	have	been	an	early	death.	9	







5	Prowin's	 Oratio	 Funebris	 was	 printed	 in	 1499	 in	 Vimpfelingius	 [1499,	 38	 and	 ff.].	 I	 could	 not	 find	 any	
manuscripts.		






















that	 Marsilius	 belonged	 to	 the	 neighbouring	 diocese	 of	 Utrecht.	16	On	 such	 basis,	 some	




the	 closer	 major	 city	 -	 like	 e.g.	 Groesbeek,	 that	 appears	 in	 the	 Chartularium	and	 is	 only	 5	
kilometers	from	Nijmegen.18		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Braakhuis	 and	Hoenen	 argue	 that	 'de	 Inghen'	was	 used	 commonly	 as	 a	
surname	 in	 that	 area	 and	occurs	 frequently	 in	 the	books	of	 the	universities	of	Cologne	and	
Heidelberg	during	Marsilius'.	19	According	 to	Braakhuis	 and	Hoenen,	 taking	 'de	 Inghen'	 as	 a	










[1921,	 7].	 In	 particular,	 Braakhuis	 -	 Hoenen	 [1992a,	 3]	 argue	 that:	 "no	 de	 Inghen's	were	 recorded	 in	 Inghen	
itself".	However	I	do	not	think	this	fact	proves	in	any	way	that	someome	called	'de	Inghen'	was	not	from	Inghen:	
even	 if	 in	 the	 second	quarter	of	 the	XIVth	 century	 'de	 Inghen'	has	developed	 in	 a	 family	name,	 its	 geographic	
origin	is	quite	clear:	it	is	not	unlikely	that	there	are	not	many	people	identifying	themselves	as	'from	Inghen'	in	
Inghen	itself.		It	should	also	be	noted	that	"Inghen"	means	something	like	"meadow"	and	is	not	just	the	name	of	a	




the	 Proctor's	 Book	 –	 that	 would	 otherwise	 simply	 be	 wrong.	 However,	 as	 Sara	 Uckelman	
notices,	 inherited	 family	names	developed	very	 late	 in	 the	Low	Countries	 and	only	became	
common	when	Louis	Napoleon	imposed	their	use.	Agreeing	with	Uckelman,	I	am	inclined	to	
interpret	 the	 apparently	 redundant	 "de	 Inghen	 de	 Novimagio"	 as	 a	 literal	 descriptive,	
clarifying	that	the	'Ingen'	Marsilius	comes	from	is	the	one	near	Nijmegen	-	rather	than	e.g.	the	
omonimous	village	in	France.20	Since	it	is	still	common	to	refer	to	the	closest	city	to	someone's	





The	 first	 known	mention	 of	Marsilius	 of	 Inghen	 in	 an	 official	 document	 is	 the	 entry	 in	 the	
Rotulus	 of	 the	Natio	Anglicana	 at	 the	University	 of	 Paris	 for	 27	 September	 1362:	 "dominus	
Marcelius	de	Inghen"	incepts	under	magister	William	Buser	of	Heusden21	and	is	"hired"	along	
with	five	other	masters.22		
Considering	Marsilius'	 provenience,	 the	 framework	 of	 his	 philosophy,	 and	 how	 quickly	 his	







Item	 incepit	 dominus	 Theodoricus	 de	 Oy,	 cujus	 bursa	 8	 sol.	 Item	 incepit	 dominus	Willehelmus	 de	Wic,	 cujus	
bursa	 8	 sol.	 Item	 incepit	 dominus	 Johannes	 Holtman,	 cujus	 bursa	 8	 sol.,	 et	 supplicavit	 nationi	 quod	 caperet	
pignora	ad	mensem,	quod	concessum	fuit.	Item	incepit	dominus	Symon	de	Beverwic,	cuius	bursa	8	sol.	[...]	Item	
anno,	 die,	 ut	 supra,	 omnes	 magistri	 pro	 tunc	 presentes	 nationis	 Anglicane	 pransi	 fuerunt	 in	 ymagine	 Nostre	
Domine,	in	quo	prandio	7	magistri,	scilicet	mag.	Nicolaus	de	Prucia,	mag.	Marcelius	de	Inghen,	mag.	Theodoricus	
de	Oy,	mag.	Wilhelmus	de	Wic,	mag.	Johannes	Holtan,	mag.	Symon	de	Beverwic,	mag.	Johannes	de	Suecia,	quilibet	








often	 an	 honorific	 epithet	 (akin	 to	 our	 "my	 esteemed	 colleague") 26 	not	 implying	 any	
institutional	intellectual	filiation.27	
Buridan	is	certainly	one	Marsilius'	main	references	through	all	of	his	logical	and	philosophical	





schools,	 etc.),	 but	 there	 was	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	 institutional	 flexibility	 and	 permeability	
among	such	institutes.	According	to	the	1290	statute,	any	student	of	the	faculty	of	Arts	could	
attend	 the	 lectures	 of	 masters	 outside	 of	 his	 nation.28	Furthermore,	 it	 is	 verisimilar	 that	 a	
																																																								
23	For	example:	according	 to	Ritter	 [1921	I,11]	Marsilius	was	a	pupil	of	Buridan's;	Kneepkens	[1982,	159]	and	
Braakhuis	 -	 Hoenen	 [1992a,	 7]	 consider	 a	 personal	 relationship	 between	 the	 two	 unlikely.	 A	 more	 cautious	
intermediate	positon	is	taken	by	Courtenay	[2004a]	and	Thijssen	[2004]	
24	Marsilius	 de	 Inghen,	Quaestiones	 super	 libros	De	generatione	et	 corruptione,	 ed.	 Venice	 1501,	 fol.	 106va:	 “Et	
quia	 hec	 opinio	 mihi	 probabilis	 apparet,	 nescio	 si	 passionatus	 ex	 opinione	 magistri	 mei	 magistri	 Johanni	
Buridani	qui	eam	posuit,	 ideo	eam	in	suis	partibus	persuadere	propono	et	eam	immediate	declarare	intendo..."	
Se	also:	Thijssen	[2004,	23]		
25	Magister	meus,	 for	example,	is	also	 the	Cistercian	 James	of	Eltville,	who	however	might	have	been	Marsilius'	




and	 John	Holzsadel	 (explicitly	 "a	 fellow	 sententiarius	with	Marsilius"	 -	 Courtenay	 [1992,40]).	 See:	Marsilius	of	
Inghen,	Questiones	super	quattuor	libros	sententiarum,	(ed.	Santos	Noya,	vol.	1,	6):	"quandoque	corollarie	arguam	










Even	 if	most	of	 the	 intellectual	 influence	 for	 a	 student	 in	Paris	probably	happened	 through	
reading,	 auditing,	 and	 personal	 interactions	 outside	 of	 the	 institutional	 mentorship	
relations,30	it	is	entirely	possible	that	Buridan	and	Marsilius	crossed	paths	in	the	late	'50s.	It	is	
generally	presumed	that	Buridan	was	dead	by	1361,31	one	year	before	Marsilius'	inceptio.	By	







Anglicana	 to	 which	 he	 belonged,	 petitioned	 to	 incept	 with	 the	 natio	 Picardie.32	Themon	
Judeus,	magister	artium	with	the	British	nation	and	notoriously	(along	with	Albert	of	Saxony,	
Nicole	 Oresme,	 and	 Marsilius	 of	 Inghen)	 part	 of	 the	 first	 generation	 of	 Buridanian	
philosophers,	refused	his	approval.33	The	controversy	was	not	settled	until	the	end	of	1358.	A	
																																																								




xi],	 [2014],	 [1998,	 131-32];	Michael	 [1985];	 Faral	 [1950];	 Flüeler	 [1999];	 Sobol	 [1984,	 x-xx];	Klima	 [2009,	 3];	
Courtenay	[1999]	and	[2004a].	
32	On	 the	 controversy	 see	 Boyce	 [1937];	 on	 Buridan's,	 Themon's	 and	 Albert's	 involvement	 specifically	 see	
Thijssen	[2004,	26-27].	
33	Denifle	-	Chatelain	[1894a,	206]:	“Item	19a	die	ejusdem	mensis	facta	erat	congregacio	apud	Sanctum	Julianum	
pauperum	 super	 quodam	 bacalario,	 nomine	 Johannis	 Mast,	 Leodiensis	 dyoc.,	 qui	 dum	 incipere	 volebat	 et	













who	 sign	 the	 settlement	 (specially	 chosen	 and	 summoned	 for	 the	 occasion),38	we	 find	 both	
John	Buridan	 and	Albert	 of	 Saxony.39	The	day	 after,	 the	masters	 from	both	nations	meet	 to	
celebrate	the	happy	resolution	of	the	controversy	at	a	local	tavern.	William	Buser	is	there	(he	
helps	with	 the	part	 of	 the	bill	 that	 the	nations	 funding	does	not	 cover),	Albert	 of	 Saxony	 is	







mensis	 Julii	 et	 sedentibus	 eis	 pro	 tribunali	 apud	 Sanctum	 Maturinum,	 Magister	 Johannes	 Buridan,	 ex	
approbatione	procuratoris	Picardorum	predictis	 judicibus	per	modum	 intendit	 seu	memorie	optulit	 quemdam	
rotulum,	cuius	copia	nobis	dabatur	petentibus..."	
36	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 233]:	 "Item	12a	 die	 Julii	 facta	 congregacione	 generali	 apud	 Sanctum	Maturinum,	
suplicaverunt	 nacio	 Piccardorum	 et	 nacio	 nostra,	 scilicet	 Anglicana,	 quatenus	 Universitas	 composicionem	
ipsorum	 contentam	 in	 instrumento	 ibidem	 lecto	 approbaret,	 et	 instrumentum	 sigillo	 Universitatis	 sigillaret,	
quod	fuit	concorditer	concessum.	Forma	autem	instrumenti	et	compositionis	inferius	annotabitur.	[...]	Factum	et	
sententiatum	 per	 judices	 per	 dictas	naciones	 ad	 hoc	 electos,	 videlicet	 magistros	 Guillelmum	 de	 Alckines,	
Robertum	de	Racourt,	Henricum	de	Olmen	ex	parte	nacionis	Picardorum;	 ex	parte	vero	Anglicorum	magistros	
Allardum	 de	 Lunne,	Geraerdum	 dictum	 de	 Wilde,	 et	 Johannem	 Wilhelmi,	qui	 tanquam	 tractatores	 super	
controversia	finium	predictarum	nacionum	tractaverunt	et	sententiaverunt..."	
37	Denifle	 -	Chatelain	 [1894a,	235]:	 "Anno	Domini	M°	CCG°	quinquagesimo	octavo,	die	duodecima	mensis	 Julii,	
indictione	 undecima,	 pontificatus	 sanctissimi	 in	 Christo	 patris	 ac	 domini	 nostri	 domini	 Innocentii	 divina	
providentia	pape	sexti	anno	sexto."	
38	Denifle	-	Chatelain	[1894a,	235]	




Sarcellis	 in	 decretis;	 Johanne	 dicto	 Mercurel,	 Gervasio	 Christiani	 in	 medicina;	 Johanne	 Buridan,	 Nycolao	 de	
Suessione,	 Roberto	 Godefridi,	 Alberto	 de	 Saxonia	 in	 artibus,	 et	 pluribus	 aliis	 fide	 dignis	 testibus	 ad	 premissa	
vocatis	specialiter	et	rogatis."	
40	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 235-6]:	 "Item	 die	 sequenti,	 secundum	 quod	 ordinatum	 fuit,	 magistri	 dictarum	
nationum	 pecuniam	 depositam	 et	 sequestram	 occasione	 dicte	 controversie	 consumpserunt	 in	 taberna	 ad	
grangiam,	ubi	consumpte	fuerunt	18	 libre,	scuto	valente	30	solidos,	de	quibus	nacio	Picardorum	solvit	2	scuta	








difficult	 negotiation,	 could	 support	 the	 thesis	 of	 their	 good	 standing	 with	 their	 respective	




as	 professional)	 network,	 transversal	 to	 the	 national	 divisions,	 to	 which	 Marsilius	 is	 very	
likely	connected.	Staying	within	the	institutional	boundaries,	Marsilius	must	have	personally	
known	Themon	Judeus	and	Albert	of	Saxony	within	his	own	nation.	Both	Themon	and	Albert	
are	 still	 in	 Paris	 in	 1361	 when	 Marsilius	 is	 probably	 preparing	 for	 his	 determinatio	 and	
inceptio:	 Albert	 succeeds	 Themon	 as	 procurator	 and	 serves	 his	 term	 before	 leaving	 for	




magister	 Johannes	de	Calore	de	magistro	Willelmo	Buser;	 item	2	scuta,	que	habuit	 receptor	noster	de	eodem;	






If	Buridan	had	an	actual	 "school",	 it	did	not	 leave	any	documentary	 trace,	but	 this	does	not	
mean	 that	 he	 did	 not	 gather	 an	 informal	 group	 of	 pupils	 and	 colleagues	 around	 himself,	
attracted	by	his	fame	and	sharing	a	common	"intellectual	physiognomy".44		
From	 a	 comparison	 between	 the	 development	 of	 some	 of	 Buridan's	 theories	 and	 his	 first	
class',	 we	 have	 enough	 evidence	 of	 a	 "small	 intellectual	 network"45	conducting	 a	 closer	
philosophical	dialogue,	sharing	a	philosophical	approach,	a	conceptual	framework,	and	many	
fundamental	positions,	but	also	diverging	on	important	specific	theoretical	issues.46	


















continencias	 de	 beneficiis	 ecclesiasticis	 seu	 aliis	 graciis	 specialibus	 misericorditer	 providendo,	 cum	
acceptacione...	Magistro	Marcilio	de	Inghen	de	Novimagio,	Coloniens.	dioc.	[de	can.	eccl.	S.	Severini	Colon.]"	
49	Denifle	-	Chatelain	[1894b,	188]:	"Urbanus	V	Marsilio	de	Inghen,	mag.	in	art.,	qui	ut	asserit	rector	Universitatis	
Paris.	 in	 artibus	 extitit,	 et	 in	 eisdem	 artibus	 per	 sex	 annos	 continue	 rexit	 [...].	 	 1369	 Maii	 29,	 apud	
Montemflasconem".	
50	Du	 Boulay	 	 [1665-1673,	 IV,	 376]:	 "Anno	 eodem	 [1363]	 die	 25	 Junij	M.	Marcelius	 de	 Inghen	Nouimagiensis	
Philosophiae	 Professor	 substitutus	 est	 M.	 Ioanni	 Scalpi	 in	 Subprocuratorem	 Nationis	 Anglicanae...";	 Denifle	 -	
Chatelain	 [1894a,	 285]:	 "Item	 facta	 congregacione	 nacionis	 apud	 Sanctum	Julianum	 26	 die	 mensis	 Junii,	
supplicavit	 magister	Johannes	 Scalpi	 tunc	 temporis	 procurator	 nacionis	 quatenus	 nacio	 concederet	 sibi	
pecuniam	 sibi	 debita	 procuratorie	 sue	 per	 vacaciones	 et	 quod	 ipse	 usque	 ad	 reditum	 suum	 de	 Flandria	
substitueret	 procuratorem	 (qui	 quidem	 subprocurator	 nuncupabatur	magister	Marcilius	 de	 Inghen)	 usque	 ad	
reditum.	Et	concessa	fuit	supplicacio".	
	 22	
holiday.51	Less	 than	 a	 year	 since	 his	 inceptio,	 Marsilius	 takes	 on	 the	 highest	 office	 in	 the	
nation:	the	procurator	or	proctor	is	to	the	nation	what	the	rector	is	to	the	university.52	Scalpi	
is	back	 in	August	but	he	has	 to	 leave	again	 for	Rome,53	hence	Marsilius	does	not	step	down	
until	 the	 end	 of	 the	 mandate	 (probably	 in	 the	 end	 of	 September	 or	 the	 beginning	 of	
October),54	but	in	the	meantime	he	is	duly	compensated	for	his	trouble.55	
A	few	months	later,	in	February	and	March	1364,	we	find	Marsilius	engaged	in	teaching	and	
supervising	 the	 determinantes'	 examinations	 side	 by	 side	 with	 his	 old	 master.56	In	 April,	
Theodoric	 Distel	 resigns	 from	 his	 office	 as	 receptor	 (bursar);	 his	 request	 for	 picking	 a	




Sanctum	 Julianum	pauperem,	magister	 Joannes	Scalpi	 supplicavit	nacioni	ut	possit	usque	ad	 reditum	suum	de	
Flandria	substituere	procuratorem.	Concessa	fuit	sua	supplicacio,	dummodo	tamen	talem	substitueret	qui,	si	ipse	









54	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 290]:	 "Anno	 Domini	 1363	 in	 die	 ...	 facta	 congregacione	 nacionis	 Anglicane	 ad	
Sanctum	Julianum	pauperem,	electus	fuit	in	procuratorem	magister	Albertus	de	Bavaria."	
55	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 289]:	 "Item	 anno	 Domini	 1363,	 mensis	 Augusti	 13	 die,	 mag.	 Johannes	 Neve	 de	
Gelria	 et	mag.	Marcilius	 de	 Inghen	 de	Novymagio	 ex	 integrali	 consensu	magistrorum	nacionis	 Anglicane	 tunc	
Parisius	 existentium	 solvebant	 quilibet	 13	 solidos	 VI	 denarios	 pro	 beyanyo	 eorum	 de	 prima	 procuratoria	
ipsorum,	in	platea	de	Cythara	in	hospicio	duorum	cignorum."	
56	Denifle	-	Chatelain	[1894a,	292-4]:	"Item	facta	congregacione	apud	Sanctum	Julianum	nacionis,	electi	fuerunt	
concorditer	 secundum	 modum	 consuetum	 in	 examinatores	 determinancium	 magister	 Wilhelmus	 Buser,	
Magister	Johannes	de	Saxonia	et	Magister	Mercilius	de	Novimagio,	V	Kal.	Februarii	[...].	 Item	die	XVI	kal.	Martii	
determinavit	dominus	 Johannes	Arnoldi	de	Novimagio,	Colonien.	dioc.	 sub	magistro	Mercelio	de	 Inghen,	 cuius	
bursa	 IX	 solidi.	 [...]	 Item,	 eadem	 die	 determinavit	 dominus	 Martinus	 Tienych	 de	 Aquis	 Leodiens.	 dyoc.	 sub	












nations,	 at	 an	 extraordinary	 general	 assembly,	 addressing	 a	 matter	 of	 "extreme	 urgency":	
some	layman	had	abusively	planted	some	grains	in	the	masters'	garden;	an	eviction	order	was	










sub	magistro	Marcilio	de	 Inghen,	 cujus	bursa	X	 solidi.	 Item	determinavit	dominus	Arnoldus	dictus	Neve	dyoc.	
Colonien.	 sub	 magistro	 Marcilio	 de	 Inghen,	 cujus	 bursa	 X	 solidi.	 Item	 determinavit	 dominus	 Ghiselbertus	
Groensbeec	dyoc.	Colonien.	sub	magistro	Marcilio	de	Inghen,	cujus	bursa	X	solidi.	[...]	Item	determinavit	dominus	
Heynricus	 Culemborch	 sub	 magistro	 Mercilio	 de	 Inghen,	 cujus	 bursa	 nichil.	 [...]	 Item	 determinavit	 dominus	
Jordanus	 Wanghe	 de	 Clivis	 sub	 magistro	 Mercilio	 dei	 Inghen,	 qui	 posuit	 literam	 officialis,	 quod	 solveret,	
antequam	caperet	alios	gradus,	cujus	bursa	X	solidi.	[...]	Item	determinavit	dominus	Nycolaus	de	Crucinaco	sub	
magistro	Marcilio,	cuius	bursa	V	solidi,	qui	posuit	literam	officialis	usque	ad	festum	Remigii."	
60	Denifle	 -	Chatelain	 [1894b,	135]:	 "Anno	Domini	1365,	die	 tertia	mensis	 Julii,	magistro	 Johanne	de	Dyodona,	
Belvae.	 dyoc,	 tunc	 temporis	 rectore	 Universitatis	 existente,	 fuit	 deliberatum	 in	 congregatione	 generali	
magistrorum	 regentium	 et	 non	 regentium	 ad	 hoc	 specialiter	 et	 per	 juramentum	 vocatorum	 apud	 Sanctum	
Maturinum	celebrata,	quod	quoddam	bladum,	quod	fuerat	a	quodam	laico	 in	villa	Sancti	Germani	commorante	
seminatum,	 penitus	 colligeretur	 seu	 extirparetur,	 quod	 eodem	 die	 fuit	 executum,	 scilicet	 in	 quadam	 portione	
prati	 clericorum,	 presentibus	 venerabilibus	 et	 discretis	 viris	 dominis	 et	 magistris,	 predicto	 rectore,	 magistro	
Roberto	de	Corbeia,	magistro	Johanne	de	Sancto	Medardo,	magistro	Johanne	de	Corbolio	carmelita,	[Johanne	de	
Cystercio]	priore	Sancti	Bernardi,	magistro	Amando	 fratrum	Minorum,	 cum	multis	 aliis	 tam	secularibus	quam	
religiosis	 doctoribus	 in	 theologia;	 item	 in	 decretis	 magistro	 Johanne	 de	 Fresneio	 cum	 multis	 aliis;	 item	 in	
medicina	 magistro	 Petro	 Lupi,	 magistro	 Johanne	 de	 Lovanio	 et	 magistro	 Walrando	 cum	multis	 aliis;	 item	 in	
artibus	 quatuor	 procuratoribus,	 magistro	 Dyonisio	 Flatonis,	 magistro	 Odardo	 Billeti,	 magistro	 Nicolao	 de	
Suessione,	 magistro	 Johanne	 de	 Crello,	 magistro	 Nicolao	 le	 Faulurdier,	 magistro	 Nicolao	 Jonglet,	 magistro	
Johanne	 Bouchim,	 magistro	 Thoma	 Durandi,	 magistro	 Thoma	 Mielle,	 magistro	 Michaele	 Wistomi,	 magistro	
Marsillio	[de	Inghen]	et	magistro	Guillelmo	Buserii	cum	valde	multis	magistris	omnium	nationum	et	scolaribus	
omnium	facultatum."	
61 	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894b,	 160]:	 "Anno	 Domini	 1366,	 die	 24	 mensis	 Martii,	 videlicet	 in	 profesto	
Annunciationis	 beate	Virginis	Marie,	 facta	 congregatione	 facultatis	more	 solito	 apud	S.	 Julianum	Pauperem	ad	
eligendum	novum	rectorem	per	venerabilem	et	discretum	virum	magistrum	Johannem	de	Trelon,	fuit	electus	in	
rectorem	Universilatis	 Parisiensis	magister	 Johannes	 de	Dunghen	de	Brabantia	 Leodiensis	 dyocesis,	 qui	 valde	
invite	onera	rectorie	acceptavit.	Et	 fuerunt	 intrantes	magister	Guillelmus	de	Marchia,	magister	Clemens	Calati,	
magister	Thomas	Durandi	et	magister	Marcilius	de	Ynghen."	







few	 reasons	 to	 doubt	 that	 Bos'	 assessment	 is	 correct.	 For	 example,	 the	 list	 of	 even	 only	
Marsilius'	surviving	philosophical	works	is	quite	extensive;	in	the	coming	years	he	will	have	
mostly	 teaching	 duties	 for	 months	 (an	 occupation	 quite	 conductive	 to	 the	 production	 of	
academic	 texts	 -	 such	 as	 commentaries	 on	 Aristotle's	 works	 commonly	 found	 in	 the	
Universities	curricula,	and	short	 treatises	on	 logical	or	philosophical	subjects);	 furthermore,	




At	some	point	 in	1366,	Marsilius	must	have	enrolled	 in	Theology:	when	he	 finally	obtains	a	
canonicate	in	the	spring	1369,	the	document	mentions	that	he	has	been	studying	theology	for	
three	years.	65		At	a	normal	pace,	Marsilius	would	have	completed	the	mandatory	five	years	of	
study	 by	 1371;	 then	 he	 would	 have	 read	 cursorily	 two	 books	 of	 the	 Bible	 and	 finally	
commented	upon	the	Sentences.66	But	Marsilius	does	not	complete	his	degree	in	Paris:	he	will	
only	 in	 Heidelberg	 -	 shortly	 before	 his	 death.	 Ritter	 assumes	 that,	 because	 of	 his	 many	
academic	 and	 administrative	 commitments,	 Marsilius	 was	 not	 seriously	 engaged	 in	 his	
theological	studies	while	in	Paris	and	that	his	real	theological	formation	began	in	Heidelberg.	





65	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894b,	 188]:	 "Urbanus	 V	 Marsilio	 de	 Inghen,	 mag.	 in	 art.,	 «qui	 ut	 asserit	 rector	
Universitatis	Paris.	 in	artibus	extitit,	 et	 in	eisdem	artibus	per	 sex	annos	continue	rexit,	 et	qui	 s.	 theol.	 a	 tribus	





make	 Marsilius	 a	 proper	 representative	 of	 German	 (and	 particularly	 Heidelbergian)	
theology.67	As	remarked	by	Courtenay,	it	is	undeniable	that	Marsilius'	Sentences	commentary,	
as	 we	 have	 it,	 was	 composed	 and	 read	 in	 Heidelberg.	 However	much	 of	 its	 content	 either	
matches	 Marsilius'	 philosophical	 works,	 probably	 from	 the	 Parisian	 period,	 or	 "appears	
somewhat	frozen	in	time"	(as	 far	as	contemporary	references	go)	to	1370s.68	Therefore	 it	 is	
quite	likely	that	the	materials	assembled	later	were	collected	around	that	time.	As	Courtenay	
suggested,	 it	 is	 probable	 that	Marsilius'	 theological	 studies	were	 delayed	 by	 his	 prolonged	
absences	from	Paris	on	diplomatic	missions.69	By	the	time	the	Great	Schism	began,	Marsilius	
was	 probably	 close	 to	 completion,	 but	 he	 was	 absent	 when	 the	 University	 of	 Paris	 took	 a	
stand	 for	Clement	VII	under	 the	pressure	of	 the	King	of	France.	With	 the	political	 situation	
deteriorating,	Marsilius	–	supporter	of	Urban	VI	-	probably	never	went	back	to	Paris	and	had	
to	complete	his	degree	later	on	in	Heidelberg.	
As	 a	philosopher	Marsilius	was	 certainly	well	 known	and	also	widely	 read	 in	 the	 faculty	of	
theology,70	but	we	do	not	know	much	about	his	time	as	a	young	theologian	in	Paris.	




with	 James,	 Marsilius	 shows	 a	 predilection	 for	 Cistercians	 and	 Augustinian	 authors	 as	 his	
acknowledged	sources	in	theology.	This	is	a	mere	conjecture,	but	it	would	help	to	account	for	









conceptual	 awareness,	 or	 even	 of	 textual	 correspondence) 73 	to	 some	 of	 the	 on-going	
developments	 in	English	 logic,	 since	 the	Cistercian	 library	held	one	 the	 largest	 collection	of	
English	logical	and	philosophical	texts	in	Paris	at	the	time.74	










is	 typically	 treated	 in	 treatises	 on	 Exponibiles.	 This	 structure	 is	 not	 common	 in	 the	 XIV	 cent.	 "Parisian"	 or	
"Continental"	tradition	on	consequentiae,	but	it	occurs	in	some	treatises	in	the	English	tradition,	e.g.	 in	Richard	
Ferrybridge	or	Paul	of	Venice.	See	Bertagna	[1994,	538].	See	Chapter	II.	
74	On	 the	Cistercian	 library,	 see:	Courtenay	 [2004].	On	 the	 circulation	of	English	manuscripts	 in	Paris	 see	also	
Genest	-	Vignaux	[1988].	
75	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 312-314]:	 "Item	 VI	 die	 mensis	 ejusdem	 [Junii	 1368]	 licenciatus	 sub	 magistro	
Marsilio	solvit	bursas	sue	licencie	dominus	Johannes	de	Venlo,	cujus	taxa	IX	solidi.	[...]	In	artibus	inceperunt:	[...]	
Item	 dominus	 Johannes	 de	 Venlo,	 cujus	 bursa	 exoluta	 prius	 est	 dicta	 sub	 magistro	 Marcilyo.	 Item	 dominus	
Gotfridus	de	Tijla,	sub	dicto	magistro	Marsilyo,	cujus	bursa	VIII	solidi	de	qua	eciam	caucione	fidejussoria	et	litera	
mediante	satisfecit.	[...]	Item	in	crastino	crastine	diey	sancti	Johannis	Baptiste	dominus	Geraerdus	dictus	Wilde	
licenciatus	 fuit	 sub	magistro	Marsylio,	 qui	 satisfecit	 pro	 bursis	 sue	 licencie	 IX	 solidos	 cautione	 fidejussoria	 et	
literam	domini	officialis.	Item	idem	incepit	sub	dicto	magistro	Marsilio	in	vigilia	sancti	Petri	Apostoli	de	carcere,	
satisfaccione	 obligatoria	 jam	 data.	 [...]	 Item	 3	 die	 mensis	 Julii	 licenciati	 fuerunt	 domini	 Hugo	 de	 Delf.	 Item	
Wolbrandus	Cesar,	Bartholomaeus	Wil[helm]y,	Alfardus	de	A,	sub	magistro	Marsilio,	quorum	satisfactio	dicta	per	
literas	jam	ad	archam	impositas.	Item	in	crastino	Divisionis	Appostolorum	magister	Marsilius	exolvit	pecuniam	
pro	 qua	 se	 obligaverat	 pro	 domino	 Johanne	 de	 Ledenberk".	 Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 320]:	 "Item	 pro	
distributionibus	magistrorum	in	festo	Katerine	in	missa	exposuit	receptor	XXXVI	solidos.	Item	incepit	dominus	




fuit	 electus	 magister	 Marcilius	 de	 Inghen	 in	 nuncium	 unanimiter	 nullo	 contradicente.	 Item	 in	 eadem	
congregacione	fuit	deliberatum	quod	ex	parte	officii	sui	esset	recepturus	C	et	LX	francos	per	istum	modum,	quod	
de	 quolibet	 magistro	 presente	 die	 predicto,	 scilicet	 XIIII	 die	 mensis	 Decembris,	 Parisius	 existente	 in	 rotulo	
ponendo	reciperet	duos	francos,	et	de	quolibet	superveniente	post	dictum	jam	prescriptum	reciperet	III	francos,	
et	residuum	summe	jam	taxate	reciperet	de	prompta	pecunia	nacionis,	et	hoc	si	nacio	residuum	summe	taxate	in	
prompto	 haberet,	 antequam	 exierit	 villam	 cum	 rotulo;	 quod	 si	 non	 in	 prompto	 plenariam	 summam	 habuerit	
nacio	 predicta,	 tunc	 predictus	 magister	 Marcilius	 defectu	 pecunie	 nacionis	 prompte	 carebit,	 quosque	 nacio	
complementum	illius	pecunie	defectus	prescripti	habuerit.	Et	ex	illo	complemento	defectum	pecunie	debite	sibi	
recipiet,	 et	 natio	 ex	 eodem	 sibi	 satisfaciet."	 Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 328]:	 "[8/III/1369]	 Item	 octava	 die	








request	 to	the	nation,	Marsilius	acts	as	proctor	 for	the	deliberation.79	By	mid-March	the	 last	
financial	issues	concerning	the	rotulus	are	being	settled.80	On	19	March	Marsilius	petitions	the	
nation	to	receive	a	one	franc	reimbursement	once	he	is	back,	like	the	other	national	envoys;	





78	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 324]:	 "Item	 incepit	 dominus	 Herdwicus	 sub	magistro	Mercilio	 de	 Inghen,	 cujus	
bursa	VII	solidi.	[...]	Item	incepit	dominus	Alfardus	de	Aa	sub	magistro	Mersilio	de	Inghen,	cujus	bursa	VII	solidi".	
Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 326-328]:	 "Primo	 determinavit	 domicellus	 Baldwinus	 de	 Bronchorst	 sub	magistro	
Mersilio	de	Inghen,	cujus	bursa	XI	solidi.	Item	determinavit	domicellus	Reynoldus	de	Vianne	sub	eodem	magistro	
Mersilio,	cujus	bursa	VIII	sol.	posuit	pignora.	[...]	Item	determinavit	dominus	Henricus	de	Tremonia	sub	magistro	
Mersilio,	 cujus	bursa	nichil,	quia	 juravit	statutum	paupertatis.	 [...]	 Item	dominus	Henricus	Sesarii	determinavit	
sub	magistro	Mersilio	de	Inghen,	cujus	bursa	VII	solidi.	[...]	 Item	determinavit	dominus	Johannes	de	Duren	sub	
magistro	Mersilio	de	Inghen,	cujus	bursa	VIII	solidi;	posuit	pignora.	Item	determinavit	dominus	Jacobus	de	Aquis	
sub	magistro	 Mersilio,	 cujus	 bursa	 VIII	 solidi;	 posuit	 pignora.	 [...]	 Item	 determinavit	 dominus	 Hermannus	 de	
Colberch		sub	magistro	Mersilio	de	cujus	bursa	III	solidi;	solvit	francum	cum	III	solidis,	pro	residuo	pignora.	Item	
subdeterminavit	 dominus	 Johannes	 Zinninghe	 sub	magistro	Mersilio	 de	 Inghen,	 cujus	 bursa	 IIII	 solidi,	 posuit	
pignora".	 Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 330]:	 "Item	 licentiati	 fuerunt	 domicelli	 Johannes	 et	 Baldewinus	 de	
Bronchorst	 sub	 magistro	 Marcelio	 de	 Inghen,	 quorum	 bursa	 XI	 solidi.	 [...]	 Item	 licentiatus	 fuit	 domicellus	
Reynaldus	de	Vianen	sub	magistro	Mercilio	de	Inghen,	cujus	bursa	IX	soldi".	Furthermore,	around	the	same	time,	
Marsilius	appears	again	in	the	Liber	procuratoris	because,	when	a	colleague	gets	sick,	Marsilius	asks	the	nation	to	
cover	 for	 his	 expenses.	 Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 324]:	 "Item	 eisdem	 die	 [25/I/1369],	 hora	 et	 loco	 facta	
congregacione	nacionis	ad	supplicandum	et	ordinandum	de	pecunia	nacionis,	supplicavit	magister	Mercilius	pro	




receptori	 IIII	 francos	et	XV	solidos,	ut	nacio	 tantam	pecuniam	velit	defalcare	receptori	 in	proximo	computo	de	







ituro	 cum	 rotulo	 ad	 curiam,	 exceptis	 tribus	 francis,	 pro	 quibus	 magister	 Petrus	 de	 Leydis	 supplicavit	 pro	
dilacione."		
81	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 329-330]:	 "[29/III/1369]	 Item	 XIX	 die	 dicti	 mensis	 Marcii	 facta	 congregacione	
nacionis	Anglicane	apud	Sanctum	Maturinum	post	sermonem,	supplicavit	magister	Mercilius	nuncius	iturus	cum	
rotulo	ad	 curiam	Romanam,	ut	 ipse	in	 reditu	 suo	a	quolibet	utiliter	 signato,	 videlicet	ubi	peteret	vel	ubi	daret	
reformacionem	suam,	haberet	unum	francum,	secundum	quod	nunciis	aliarum	nacionum	est	concessum,	cujus	
supplicacio	 erat	 concessa."	Denifle	 -	Chatelain	 [1894a,	341]:	 "[7/IX/1369]	 Item	7	die	mensis	 Septembris	 facta	




concessum	 quod	 ipse	 tamquam	 procurator	 constitutus	 ex	 parte	 antedicti	 magistri	 una	 cum	 bedello	 monere	







noted	 by	 Courtenay,	 it	 is	 the	 first	 time	 that	 the	University	 delegation	 has	 to	 undertake	 the	
longer	and	more	demanding	journey	to	Italy	for	the	rotulus.85	Furthermore,	the	mission	of	the	
representative	bringing	the	rotulus	could	usually	be	quite	prolonged	because	it	was	their	task	
to	 check	 that	 there	 were	 no	mistakes	 and	 reduplications	 among	 the	 requests.86	Given	 that	
Marsilius'	 absence	 was	 most	 likely	 going	 to	 be	 extended,	 	 he	 had	 entrusted	 the	 scholae	
assigned	to	him	for	the	year	to	Arnold	Neven	-	although	in	May	the	nation	reassigns	the	office	
to	Jordan	de	Clivis.87		Marsilius	is	certainly	not	back	by	25	April	to	sponsor	a	licentia,	as	it	is	
written	 instead	 in	 the	Liber	procuratoris:	 that	 sponsorship	was	 certainly	done	 in	absentia.88	
Marsilius	will	be	away	from	Paris	for	about	two	years,	probably	well	into	the	spring	of	1371.		
When	Marsilius	reaches	the	pontifical	court	in	April	1369,	he	probably	has	occasion	to	meet	
the	 emperor	Charles	 IV,	who	 is	 still	 in	Rome;	but	his	most	profitable	networking	 and	most	
meaningful	relationship	is	certainly	the	one	Marsilius	maintains	with	Urban	V	himself.	Indeed,	




consumpsit	VI	 libras,	de	quibus	dictus	magister	Mercilius	solvit	 ii	 francos	pro	suo	bene	valete;	 residuum	solvit	
receptor".	
83	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 331]:	 "[31/III/1370]	 Item	 ultima	 die	mensis	Marcii	 [...]	 licentiatus	 fuit	 dominus	













he	 belonged	 to	 an	 inner	 circle	 of	 those,	 outside	 the	 papal	 staff,	 who	 had	 access	 to	 the	
pope.90	








appointment	 near	 Cologne,	 bringing	 a	 canonical	 prebend.92 	Furthermore,	 in	 July	 1369,	
Marsilius	receives	an	invitation	and	a	licentia	docendi	at	the	faculty	of	arts	in	Montpellier	with	
the	 same	power	as	 a	 regent	master	 -	 basically	 as	 a	 "visiting	professor"	 for	 the	 autumn	and	
winter	terms	1369-1370.93		From	this	evidence,	the	amount	of	detailed	surviving	paperwork	
concerning	 this	matter	(the	 invitation,	 the	visiting	masters'	 rights	and	obligations,	 their	pay	





















the	 English	 nation	 in	 March	 1370,	 about	 a	 determinatio	 that	 was	 probably	 sponsored	 in	
absentia:98	Marsilius	 is	 still	 absent	 and	 exercising	 his	 duties	 as	 the	 nation	missus	 in	 August	
1370,	 since	 the	 nation	 decides	 to	 write	 to	 him	 once	 again	 for	 a	 matter	 concerning	 the	
rotulus.99		
Marsilius	 seems	 to	 have	 stayed	 away	 from	 Paris	 also	 for	most	 of	 the	 1370-1371	 academic	
year:	 we	 know	 that	 six	 (unlisted)	masters	 of	 the	 Anglican	 nation	 have	 been	 absent	 for	 an	
extended	 period	 of	 time	 in	 January	 1371100	and	 Marislius'	 name	 does	 not	 appear	 in	 the	






98	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 351]:	 "Item	 subdeterminarunt:	 dominus	Olavus	 de	 Zwecia	 loco	 domini	 Johannis	
Hoon	de	Harlem	sub	magistro	Mercilio	de	Inghen,	cujus	bursa	IIII	solidi	[...]".	
99 	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 359-360]:	 "Item	 facta	 fuit	 congregacio	 nacionis	 Anglicane	 apud	 Sanctum	
Maturinum	 ad	 supplicandum	 et	 pro	 facto	 nacionis,	 ubi	 fuit	 deliberatum	 quod	 factum	 nacionis	 maneret	 in	
suspenso	 usque	 ad	 recessum	 domini	 episcopi	 Glascuensis.	 In	 qua	 supplicavit	 magister	 Henricus	 Kemp,	 quod	
imponeretur	 in	 rotulo	 tamquam	presens,	 et	 concessa	 fuit	 supplicacio	per	modum	supradictum.	 Item	 facta	 fuit	
congregacio	 nacionis	 3a	 dominica	 mensis	 Augusti	 [=	 18/VIII/1370]	 apud	 Sanctum	 Maturinum	 super	 facto	
nacionis,	et	deliberatum	fuit	quod	scriberetur	magistro	Marcilio	ad	hoc	ut	expediret	factum."	






Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 570]:	 "[21/II/1379]	 Et	 supplicavit	 magister	 Hugo	 de	 Hervorst	 ex	 parte	 magistri	
Mercilii	 de	 Inghen,	 quod	 cum	 nacio	 sibi	 adhuc	 teneretur	 XX	 francos	 de	 legacione	 alias	 facta	 in	 Avinionem	








the	natio	 goes	 to	 the	 tavern	 "'ad	 ymaginem	 beate	 virginis'	 in	 vico	 Sutorum"	 to	 have	 those	
drinks.106	
Now	 that	 he	 is	 back	 things	 get	 once	 again	 quite	 busy	 for	 Marsilius.107	In	 June	 1371	 he	 is	
elected	 rector	 of	 the	University	 of	 Paris	 for	 the	 second	 time.108	He	will	 be	 in	 office	 until	 16	
December	1371.109	Among	other	things,	as	a	rector,	along	with	three	other	deputees,	he	has	to	




104 	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 397]:	 "[5/V/1371]	 Primo	 eodem	 die	 in	 dicta	 congregacione	 deliberavit	
concorditer,	quod	sibi	placeret	ire	ad	tabernam	et	propinare	magistro	Mercilio	de	Ynghen".	
105	Denifle	-	Chatelain	[1894a,	397-398]:	"Item	anno	Domini	quo	supra,	 facta	congregacione	nacionis	Anglicane	
14a	die	mensis	Maii	 immediate	post	 sermonem	apud	Cordigeros	ad	supplicandum,	 supplicavit	primo	magister	
Mercilius	 de	 Inghen	 nomine	 cujusdem	 bachillarii,	 Reynaldi	 nomine,	 quatenus	 nacio	 sibi	 concederet	 literas	
testimoniales	 de	 hoc,	 quod	 alias	 per	 annum	 studisset	 in	 facultate	 arcium	 et	 bachillariatum	 optinuit	 in	 eadem	
facultatem,	cujus	supplicacio	fuit	concessa".	
106	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 398]:	 "Item	 2°	 propositum	 erat,	 cum	 alias	 concorditer	 deliberatum	 fu[er]it	 per	
magistros	nacionis,	quod	vellet	de	pecunia	nacionis	propinare	magistro	Mercilio,	 cum	alias	 legatus	cum	rotulo	
nacionis	 tempore	 recessus	 sui	 nacioni	 propinasset,	 quatenus	protunc	nacio	 iret	 ad	 tabernam	 sibi	 propinando.	
Super	 quo	 concorditer	 omnes	 magistri	 presentes	 consencierunt,	 licet	 aliqui	 tamen	 dicebant	 quod	 in	 alia	
congregacione	preterita	illud	non	poterat	efficaciter	deliberari,	cum	nacio	non	fuisset	vocata	ad	ordinandum	de	
pecuniis	 suis,	 ut	 ipsi	 dicebant.	 Omnibus	 tamen	 ad	 hoc	 concorditer	 consencientibus	 ivit	 nacio	 ad	 tabernam	ad	
ymaginem	beate	virgini	in	vico	Sutorum,	ubi	consumpsit	2os	francos	cum	4or	solidis,	quos	receptor	solvit".	
107	Denifle	-	Chatelain	[1894a,	399-401]:	"Item	licentiatus	est	dominus	Johannes	Boisville	sub	magistro	Mercilio	
de	 Inghen,	 cujus	 bursa	 7	 sol.	 Satisfecit	 receptori.	 [...]	 Item	 incepit	 dominus	 Johannes	 Boysville	 sub	 magistro	
Marcilio	de	Inghen,	cuius	bursa	7	solidi.	Juravit	et	satisfecit	receptori".	










112	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 405]:	 "Item	 in	 die	 sabbati	 ante	 festum	 sancti	 Edmondi	 fuit	 facta	 congregacio	








Gerard	 of	 Hoynenghen.114	In	 the	 meantime,	 Marsilius	 keeps	 up	 with	 his	 ordinary	 teaching	
duties,	but	 things	seem	to	have	slowed	down,	since	 in	March	he	supervises	 the	 licentia	 and	
inceptio	of	only	one	pupil	-	and	one	with	no	scholarship	at	that.115	Courtenay	conjectures	that	
in	this	period	Marsilius	was	probably	completing	his	initial	theological	training	and	preparing	




recorded	 in	 the	 Liber	 procuratoris	 nationis	 Anglicane	 and	 in	 the	 Chartularium	Universitatis	
Parisiensis.118	The	 English	 nation	 disapproves	 of	 one	 of	 the	 articles;	 six	 deputees	 (and	 our	
Marsilius	 is	 among	 them)	 are	 named	 to	 raise	 the	 issue	 in	 the	 general	 assembly	 of	 the	
																																																								
113	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 408]:	 "[13/I/1372]	 Item	 in	 3o	 per	 tres	magistros	 antiquiores	 de	 nacione	 electi		
fuerunt	 in	examinatores	determinancium	et	 jurati	magister	Marsilius	de	 Ingham	[sic],	magister	Hermannus	de	
Bodtenburc	et	magister	Jordanus	de	Clyvis".	
114	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 410]:	 "[6/III/1372]	 Item	 super	 ordinacione	 debiti	 nacionis,	 deliberavit	 quod	
debitores	 monerentur	 et	 citarentur.	 Item	 super	 supplicacione	 magistri	 Edmari	 deputavit	 nacio	 magistrum	
Mercilium,	magistrum	Gerardum	de	Hoynghen	et	procuratorem	et	receptorem,	qui	corrigerent	literam	ejus	pro	
honore	nacionis,	ut	melius	potuerint,	antequam	sigillaretur".		










the	English	 nation	naming	 the	masters	 to	 bring	 up	 the	 issue	 in	 the	 general	 assembly	 is	 on	19	March,	 but	 the	
general	 assembly	 when	 the	 English	 masters	 (who	 are	 said	 to	 have	 been	 regularly	 elected	 by	 their	 nation)	
address	the	issue	is	on	17	March.	
	 33	
University.119	In	 the	assembley,	Marsilius	 is	 the	one	taking	 the	 floor,	addressing	 the	 issue	 in	
the	 name	 of	 his	 nation	 -	 and	 he	 repeatedly	 addresses	 the	 notary	 to	 witness	 and	 record	
everything.	Marsilius	asks	 the	assembly	 to	 remove	or	 revise	 the	article	under	discussion.120	
The	 rector	 remits	 the	 decision	 on	 how	 to	 proceed	 to	 the	 consultation	 of	 the	 masters	 and	
doctors	 in	 attendance.121	One	 nation	 sides	 with	 the	 natio	 Anglicana;	 two	 against.122	Master	
Peter	Lupi,	for	the	faculty	of	Medicine,	votes	for	sending	the	articles	as	they	are.123	The	dean	of	
the	 faculty	of	Law,	Lambert	de	Flore	Sicco,	 recommends	hearing	 the	 reasons	of	 the	English	
																																																								
119	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 411]:	 "Item	 facta	 congregacione	 nacionis	 Anglicane	 19a	 die	mensis	 Marcii	 ad	
deputandum	 et	 supplicandum	 ad	Sanctum	 Julianum,	 deputati	 erant	 sex	 magistri,	 magister	 Gherardus	 de	
Harderwiic,	 magister	 Bertoldus	 canonicus	 Sancti	 Salvatoris,	 magister	 Henricus	Lanchals,	 magister	 Adam	 de	
Catwiic,	magister	Mercilius	 de	 Inghen	 et	magister	 Jordanus	 de	 Clivis,	 et	cum	 istis	 procurator	 pro	 tempore,	 ad	
informandum	deputatos	facultatis	theologie	super	quodam	articulo	contento	et	sigillato	in	rotulo	quodam	pape	
Gregorio	mittendo,	 delendo	 vel	 corrigendo,	 si	 predicti	magistri	predictos	 doctores	 sufficientibus	 racionibus	 ad	
hoc	adductis	 informarent.	 Qui	 articulus	 erat	 in	 forma	 quod	 ordo	 rotuli	 servaretur,	 quod	 supplicare	 esset	 in	
perpetuum	prejudicium	nacionis	Anglicane."	
120	Denifle	 -	Chatelain	[1894b,	203-204]:	"1372,	Martii	17.	Parisiis.	 In	nomine	Domini,	amen.	Noverint	universi	
presens	 publicum	 instrumentum	 inspecturi,	 quod	 anno	 ejusdem	millesimo	 trecentesimo	 septuagesimo	 primo,	
secundum	usum	ecclesie	Gallicane,	die	decima	septima	mensis	Martii,	pontificatus	sanctissimi	 in	Christo	patris	
ac	 domini	 nostri	 domini	 Gregorii	 divina	 providencia	 pape	 undecimi	 anno	 secundo,	 apud	 Sanctum	Maturinum	
Parisius,	 venerabilibus	 et	 circumspectis	 viris	 doctoribus	 et	 magistris	 Parisius	 actu	 regentibus,	 videlicet	 in	
theologie,	decretorum,	medicine,	et	arcium	facultatibus,	ad	congregacionem	generalem,	prout	moris	est,	ibidem	
celebrandam,	 ex	 jussu	 venerabilis	 et	 circumspecti	 viri,	magistri	Mathei	 de	Hersino,	 tunc	 rectoris	Universitatis	
Parisiensis,	 convocatis	 sufficienter	 et	 congregatis,	 proposuit	 dictus	 rector	 utrum	 expediret	 mittere	 quosdam	
articulos	sigillatos	dicto	domino	nostro	summo	pontifici;	deinde	proposuit	idem	rector	ultimum	articulum	esse	
super	supplicacionibus	et	injuriis.	Quibus	propositis,	surrexit	venerabilis	et	discretus	vir	magister	Marcelius	de	
Inghen,	 magister	 in	 artibus,	 una	 cum	 pluribus	 magistris	 nacionis	 Anglicane,	 et	 nomine	 ipsius	 nacionis	




Deum	et	 justiciam	et	 in	maximum	sue	nacionis	prejudicium	et	gravamen.	Ad	quod	ostendendum	peciit,	 in	mei	
publici	notarii	et	testium	subscriptorum	presencia,	idem	magister	Marcelius	nomine	nacionis	predicte,	sibi	dari	
deputatos	 ab	 Universitate	 predicta,	 et	 qui	 nacionem	 suam	 predictam	 in	 suis	 racionibus	 et	 motivis	 haberent	
audire,	et	Universitati	predicte	refferre,	ut	per	eam	predicte	nacioni	breve	fieret	justicie	complementum.		
Qui	 quidem	 magister	 Marcelius,	 nomine	 et	 tanquam	 procurator	 sue	 nacionis	 prefate,	 ad	 hoc,	 ut	 asserebat,	
legitime	 constitutus,	 in	 mei	 publici	 notarii	 et	 dictorum	 subscriptorum	 testium	 presencia,	 protestatus	 fuit	 de	
appellando,	 nomine	 procuratorio	 predicto,	 in	 causu	 (sic)	 quo	 in	 suis	 racionibus	 non	 audiretur,	 et	 ad	 eas	
ostendendas	racionabiliter	non	admitteretur,	vel	alias	quoquo	modo	nacio	sua	predicta	gravaretur."	
121	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894b,	 204]:	 "Quibus	 sic	 actis,	 dictus	 rector,	 in	 dictorum	 doctorum	 et	 magistrorum	
deliberacione	 posuit	 et	 eisdem	 precepit,	 quod	 deliberarent	 super	 hiis	 que	 in	 eorum	 deliberacione	 posuerat,	
maxime	super	illis	articulis."	
122	Denifle	-	Chatelain	[1894b,	204]:	"Et	postmodum	dictis	facultatibus	et	quatuor	nacionibus,	videlicet	nacione	
Gallicana,	 nacione	 Picardorum,	 nacione	 Normannorum	 et	 nacione	 Anglicana,	 ut	 consuetum	 est,	 ad	 partem	
sustractis,	 et	 habita	 deliberacione	 inter	 ipsas,	 et	 postea	 ad	 deliberaciones	 suas	 reddendas	 iterato	 congregatis,	
deliberavit	 dictus	 rector,	 nomine	 facultatis	 arcium,	 primo	 per	 hunc	 modum:	 videlicet,	 quod	 due	 naciones	
deliberabant	simpliciter,	quod	mitterentur	dicti	articuli	sicut	erant	et	sunt	scripti	et	sigillati;	et	alie	due	naciones	
deliberabant	 et	 deliberaverunt,	 quod	 non	 mitterentur	 sicut	 sunt;	 sed	 ille	 articulus,	 dicte	 nacioni	 Anglicane	
prejudiciabilis,	totaliter	deponeretur."	





recommends	 three	 theologians	 for	 the	hearing:	 Simon	Frenon	 for	 the	French	nation,	Nicole	
Oresme	for	the	Norman,	and	Peter	Brevis	for	the	Picard.125	Marsilius	insists	for	everything	to	
be	 put	 on	 record.126	Apparently	 the	 assembly	 decides	 to	 hear	 the	 reasons	 of	 the	 natio	
Anglicana,	 and	 for	 that	 purpose	 the	matter	 is	 again	 on	 the	 table	 in	 another	meeting	 in	 the	
beginning	of	May.	 	The	same	notary	is	back	and	the	rector	requests	Peter	Brevis,	theologian	
from	 the	 Picard	 nation,	 to	 be	 there	 to	 bear	 witness.	 Marsilius	 seems	 to	 be	 once	 again	 the	




incriminated	 article	 and	 sending	 the	 rest,	 followed	by	 the	 Faculty	 of	 Theology.128	Marsilius'	
motion	seems	to	have	passed.	
																																																								
124 	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894b,	 204]:	 "Tercio,	 magister	 Lambertus	 de	 Flore	 Sicco,	 decanus	 facultatis	




sacre	 theologie,	 quod	 dicta	 nacio	 Anglicana	 in	 suis	 rationibus	 audiretur;	 et	 ad	 illas	 audiendas	 deputavit	
venerabiles	 viros	 magistrum	 Symonem	 Freron	 de	 nacione	 Gallicana,	 magistrum	 Nicholaum	 Oresme	 nacionis	
Normannorum,	 et	 magistrum	 Petrum	 Brevis	 nacionis	 Picardorum,	 sacre	 theologie	 professores:	 et	 postquam	
esset	audita	dicta	nacio,	tunc	fieret	de	articulis	secundum	quod	dicte	Universitati	videretur	expedire.	Et	finaliter	
deliberavit	 idem	magister	Nicholaus	de	Laingniis,	nomine	quo	 supra,	quod	 littere	 regie	 super	quatuor	milibus	
florenorum	ex	nunc	sine	ulteriori	dilacione	ad	curiam	transmittantur."	
126	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894b,	 204-5]:	 "De	 et	 super	 quibus	 omnibus	 et	 singulis,	 dictus	 magister	 Marcelius,	
nomine	quo	supra,	peciit	a	me	notario	publico,	in	dictorum	hic	subscriptorum	testium	presencia,	sibi	fieri	atque	
tradi	publicum	instrumentum,	sive	publica	instrumenta,	unum,	duo,	sive	plura,	dum	et	quando	sibi	et	nacioni	sue	
predicte	 fuerit	 oportunum.	 Acta	 fuerunt	 hec	 Parisius,	 anno,	 die,	 indictione,	 mense,	 pontificatu	 et	 loco	 quibus	
supra,	hora	 terciarum	vel	circiter,	presentibus	ad	hoc	venerabilibus	et	discretis	viris,	magistris	 Jacobo	 Juvenis,	
Guillermo	 Carnificis,	 Thoma	Mielle,	magistris	 in	 artibus,	 et	 pluribus	 aliis	 doctoribus	 vel	magistris,	 testibus	 ad	
premissa	vocatis	specialiter	et	rogatis.	Et	ego	Guerinus	de	Bochahou,	clericus	Briocensis,	publicus	apostolica	et	
imperiali	auctoritate	notarius,	etc."	
127 	Neither	 the	 Liber	 procuratoris	 nationis	 anglicanae	 and	 the	 records	 of	 the	 general	 assemblies	 in	 the	
Chartularium	mention	what	this	article	is	about.	
128	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894b,	 205-206]:	 "1372,	 Maii	 3,	 Parisiis.	 In	 nomine	 Domini,	 amen.	 Noverint	 universi	
presens	 publicum	 instrumentum	 inspecturi,	 quod	 anno	 ab	 Incarnacione	 ejusdem	 millesimo	 trecentesimo	
septuagesimo	 secundo,	 die	 tercia	mensis	Maii,	 indictione	 decima,	 pontificatus	 sanctissimi	 in	 Christo	 patris	 ac	









jussu	 venerabilis	 et	 circumspecti	 viri	 magistri	 Petri	 de	 Hersino,	 dicte	 Universitatis	 tunc	 rectoris,	 ibidem	
convocatorum	 et	 congregatorum	 ad	 deliberandum	 super	 quibusdam	 articulis,	 in	 eorum	 deliberacionibus	 per	
dictum	 rectorem	positis,	 nec	non,	 et	 ad	 audiendum	relacionem	deputatorum	alias	datorum	per	Universitatem	
antedictam	 ad	 audiendum	 raciones	 quasdam,	 per	 procuratorem	 et	 magistros	 de	 nacione	 Anglicana	 sibi	
propositas	 et	 in	 scriptis	 traditas,	 de	 et	 super	 quodam	 articulo	 in	 rotulo	 Universitatis	 predicte	 ad	 curiam	
destinando	 inserto,	 quem	 dicta	 nacio	 Anglicana	 alias	 sibi	 esse	 prejudicia[bi]lem	 asseruit,	 et	 contra	 juris	 tam	
divini	quam	humani	tenorem,	super	quo	etiam	dicta	nacio	Anglicana	deputatos	sibi	dari	cum	instancia	requisivit:	
in	 mei	 publici	 notarii	 et	 testium	 subscriptorum	 presencia,	 retulit	 venerabilis	 et	 circumspectus	 vir	 magister	
Petrus	 Brevis,	 sacre	 theologie	 doctor,	 nacionis	 Picardie,	 ad	 hoc	 requisitus	 per	 rectorem	 antescriptum,	 quod	
convocatis	 Universitatis	 predicte	 deputatis	 super	 premisso	 articulo,	 auditis	 propositis	 per	 illos	 de	 dicta	
Anglicana	 nacione,	 videbatur	 majori	 parti	 deputatorum	 predictorum,	 quod	 articuli,	 sicut	 essent	 sigiliati,	 non	
essent	 mittendi,	 donec	 super	 hiis	 per	 dictam	 Universitatem	 esset	 maturius	 deliberatum;	 nichilominus	 alii	 ex	
nunc,	ne	negocium	dicte	Universitatis	pateretur	dispendium,	mitterentur	dicti	articuli	 indilate.	Super	quo,	quid	
esset	 agendum,	 una	 cum	 aliis	 articulis,	 super	 quibus	 Universitas	 predicta	 pro	 tunc	 vocata	 fuit,	 in	 dicte	
Universitatis	 deliberacione	per	 rectorem	antedictum	propositis	 habitaque	 singularum	 facultatum	et	nacionum	
deliberacione	 ad	 partem,	 ac	 demum	 eisdem	 pro	 audiendo	 deliberationes	 congregatis,	 deliberavit	 rector	
predictus,	nomine	 facultatis	 arcium	 in	hunc	modum:	videlicet,	 quod	due	nationes	volebant	quod	articuli,	 sicut	
sunt	sigillati	et	ordinati,	mitterentur,	non	obstantibus	propositis	per	procuratorem	nacionis	Anglicane	predicte	







articulus	 de	 quo	 est	 sermo,	 dimitteretur,	 et	 alii	 cicius	 quam	bono	modo	 fieri	 posset	 ad	 curiam	destinarentur.	
Quarto	et	ultimo	loco,	magister	Petrus	Brevis,	nomine	facultatis	theologorum,	deliberavit	in	hunc	modum,	quod	
sicut	deputatis	videbatur	expediens,	super	articulo	sive	articulis,	nacionem	Anglicanam	predictam	tangente	vel	
tangentibus,	 fieri	 deberet	 et	 observari;	 videlicet	 quod	alii	 articuli	 quam	cicius	poterit	 transmitterentur,	 et	 iste	
vero	 articulus,	 donec	 plenius	 per	 Universitatem	 memoratam	 esset	 deliberatum,	 an	 expediret	 vel	 non,	
dimitteretur.	 De	 et	 super	 quibus	 omnibus	 et	 singulis	 magister	 Marcelius	 de	 Inghen,	 nomine	 dicte	 nacionis	
Anglicane,	peciit	 a	me	notario	publico	 infrascripto	sibi	 fieri	publicum	 instrumentum.	Acta	 fuerunt	hec	Parisius	
sub	 anno,	 die,	 mense,	 indictione	 et	 pontificatu	 predictis,	 hora	 terciarum,	 vel	 circiter,	 presentibus	 ad	 hec	
venerabilibus	 et	 circumspectis	 viris	magistris	 Johanne	 de	 Bornasello,	 priore	 de	 Carnoto,	 decretorum	 doctore,	
Matheo	de	Hersino,	 Johanne	Le	Dos,	Guillermo	Le	Dos,	 Johanne	de	Marsonno,	magistris	 in	artibus,	ac	pluribus	
aliis	doctoribus	et	magistris,	 testibus	ad	premissa	vocatis	specialiter	et	rogatis.	 	Et	ego	Guerinus	de	Bochahou,	
clericus	Briocensis,	publicus,	etc."	
129	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 414-415]:	 "Item	 XII	 die	 mensis	 Septembris	 facta	 congregacione	 nacionis	 hora	
prime	post	sermonem	apud	Sanctum	Maturinum	super	ordinacione	scolarum	pro	regentibus	et	rector[ibus]	 in	
ordinario	instanti,	-	et	quia	V	erant	instantes	pro	scolis,	qui	se	promiserant	lecturos,	et	V	sunt	scole	spectantes	ad	
nacionem,	 -	 	 deliberatum	 fuit	 quod	 quilibet	 haberet	 unam	 scolam,	manentibus	 actu	 regentibus	 in	 scolis	 quas	
iam	haberent.	 Supplicavit	 tamen	magister	 Thomas	 de	Clivis,	 quod	 in	 casu,	 quo	 ipse	 haberet	 plures	 audientes	
quam	magister	Wilhelmus	Wadenoye,	quod	tunc	ipse	magister	Wilhelmus	permutaret	scolas,	 in	quibus	 legerat	
magister	Marcilius.	"	
130 	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 415]:	 "[21/IX/1372]	 Item	 magister	 Marcilius	 de	 Inghen,	 quia	 nuper	
in	disposicione	 scolarum	 non	 fuit	 presens,	 supplicavit	 nacioni	 quatenus	 provideretur	 sibi	 de	 scolis,	 quia	
	 36	
Kalkar,	 is	once	again	elected	 to	examine	 the	determinantes;131	a	 few	days	 later,	he	 takes	 the	
mandatory	 oath	 required	 for	 that	 job.132	We	 know	 from	 the	 Chartularium	 that	Marsilius	 is	
elected	 to	 represent	his	nation	when	 the	Picard	 John	of	Beke	becomes	 rector,	 at	 the	end	of	
March	1373.133	Marsilius'	name	does	not	come	up	again	 in	 the	Liber	procuratoris	until	 June,	
when	he	 is	named	once	again	proctor.	On	the	 following	Tuesday,	 the	new	procurator	 -	with	
the	"leisure	 funding"	coming	with	his	office	 -	 takes	all	 the	masters	 to	 lunch.134	Marilius	 is	 in	
office	 till	 the	 end	 of	 August,	 when	 John	 of	 Priswalch	 relieves	 him.135	In	 the	meantime,	 two	
English	masters	in	a	row	had	been	elected	to	the	office	of	rector,	and	both	of	them	had	refused	
the	appointment;	we	only	have	a	mention	of	this	fact	in	the	Liber	of	the	natio	Anglicana	and	no	
further	documentation,	 so	we	do	not	know	who	 these	masters	are.136	Even	 if	we	wanted	 to	







131	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 419]:	 "Item	 facta	 congregacione	 nacionis	 in	 Sancto	 Maturino	 die	 6a	 mensis	




examinatorum	 determinancium,	 juravit	 magister	 Mercilius	 de	 Inghen	 et	 Gerardus	 de	 Calker	 prescriptus	 in	




intrantes	 Lambertus	 de	 Marchia,	 Jacobus	 Juvenis,	 Thomas	 Mielle	 et	 Marcilius	 de	 Inghen,	 Gallicane,	 Picardie,	
Normannie	et	Anglicane	nationum."	
134	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 426-427]:	 "[2/VI/1373]	 Item	 eodem	 [die]	 tunc	 electus	 fuit	 in	 procuratorem	
nacionis	predicte	magister	Marcelius	de	Inghen	nullo	penitus	reclamante.	In	cujus	procuratoria	acta	sunt	hec	que	
sequuntur.	 Primo	 deliberavit	 nacio	 quod	 die	 martis	 sequente	 fieret	 prandium,	 ad	 quod	 omnes	 magistri	
vocarentur	 et	 perpotarentur	 bejany	 nacionis;	 ad	 quod	 prandium	 idem	 magister	 Marcelius	 electus	 in	
procuatorem	dedit	22	 solidos	 sibi	 racione	officii	 a	nacione	debitos,	 quod	exercere	deberet	per	vacaciones.	 [...]	
Item	inceperunt	eodem	die	sub	eodem	magistro	Marcelio	de	Inghen:	Meynardus	Rodolfi	de	Tyla,	licenciatus	in	4a	












many	others,	but	also	 likely	 to	 refuse	 the	appointment	 -	especially	 if	he	was	devoting	more	
time	to	his	own	research	and	studies,		as	Bos	suggested.	This	is,	however,	mere	speculation.	
When	 in	September	1373	the	English	proctor	 is	summoned	to	appear	before	 the	provost	of	
Paris,	Marsilius	is	one	of	the	two	deputees	chosen	to	go	with	him.138		In	the	same	month,	it	is	
once	again	that	time	of	the	year	when	the	natio	has	to	reorganise	its	scholae.	Both	Marsilius	








Parisiensi	 [Hugone	Aubriot]	die	martis	proxime	 tunc	 sequenti	 [13/09/1373]	hora	primarum,	deliberatum	 fuit	
concorditer	 quod	 haberet	 deputatos,	 quos	 vocaret	 per	 juramentum	 eorum	 ad	 comparendum	 in	 predicta	 hora	
cum	procuratore	coram	preposito	adpetendam	causam	illius	citacionis.	Et	deputati	fuerunt	magister	Marcilius	de	
Inghen	et	magister	Johannes	Luczellenborch."	
139	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 430]:	 "Item	 facta	 congregacione	 nacionis	 per	 juramentum	 die	 XVIa	 mensis	
Septembris	 in	 primis	 apud	 Sanctum	 Maturinum	 ad	 ordinandum	 de	 scolis	 pro	 magistris	 regere	 volentibus	 a	
principio	magni	 ordinarii	 usque	 ad	 finem	 illius	 anni,	 a	 principio	magni	 ordinarii	 proxime	 affuturi	 incepti	 octo	
fuerunt	magistri	pro	scolis	instantes,	scilicet	magister	Marcilius	de	Inghen,	magister	Thomas	de	Clivis,	magister	
Jordanus	 de	 Clyvis,	 magister	 Walterus	 Ghyselberti,	 magister	 Gherardus	 de	 Kalkar,	 magister	 Wylhelmus	
Wadenow,	magister	Walterus	de	Delf,	magister	Hugo	de	Hervast.	Magister	Marcilius	 instetit	 pro	 scolis	nostris	
novis	superioribus,	et	pro	eisdem	instetit	magister	Thomas	de	Clyvis.	[...]	Major	pars	nacionis,	scilicet	secundum	








In	 January	 1374,	 the	 natio	 Anglicana	 is	 involved	 in	 another	 controversy	 about	 another	
garden;141	once	again,	Marsilius	has	to	exercise	his	diplomatic	touch142	and	the	matter	goes	on	
well	 into	February.143	In	the	meantime,	Marislius	is	once	again	charged	with	supervising	the	
determinantes'	 examinations.144	In	March	 1374,	 he	 and	 Jordan	 de	 Clivis	 are	 entrusted	with	
putting	"in	decent	form"	a	recomendation	letter	for	one	of	the	other	masters.145	When	there	is	














sicut	 eis	 videretur	expedire	ad	honorem	ecclesie	Upsalensis.	Et	deputati	 fuerunt	magister	G[uillelmus]	Scotus,	
magister	Mercilius,	magister	Johannes	Langhals,	Jordanus	de	Clivis,	magister	Henricus	de	Thenis.	Et	hoc	de	isto."		
143	Denifle	-	Chatelain	[1894a,	442-443]:	"Item	die	hunc	sequente,	videlicet	XIII	Fe[bruarii],	 iverunt	procurator,	
mag.	Mercilius,	mag.	 Henricus	 de	 Thenis,	 receptor	 nacionis	 protunc,	 una	 cum	 bedello	 nacionis	 ad	magistrum	
Adolfum	de	Praellis,	pro	tunc	in	Castileto	repertum,	dantes	sibi	unum	francum	per	bedellum	a	magistro	Petro	de	
Luca	 latum	et	receptum,	procuratore	quodam	substituto	ecclesie	Upsalensis	provincie	Suecie,	sibi	supplicantes	
quatinus	 vellet	 cedulam	 sibi	 porrectam	 perlegere,	 videndo	 utrum	per	 tales	 obligaciones	 et	 alia	 ut	 supra.	 Ipse	
respondens	dixit,	unum	de	nobis	sequenti	die	reversurum	et	cedulam	reperiendam	correctam	reportaturum".	
144 	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 440]:	 "[17/I/1374]	 Secundus	 articulus	 fuit	 ad	 eligendum	 examinatores	
determinancium	 et	 bachalariorum	 licenciandorum	 in	 Sancta	 Genefefa	 [sic].	 Electi	 fuerunt	 examinatores	
determinancium	magister	Mercilius,	magister	Jordanus,	magister	Thomas	de	Clivis."	Denifle	-	Chatelain	[1894a,	
443-444]:	 "[15/II/1374]	 Item	 in	 eadem	 congregacione	 recepta	 fuerunt	 a	 nacione	 juramenta	 examinatorum	
determinancium,	videlicet	magistri	Mercilii	de	Inghen	,	magistri	Thome	de	Clivis,	et	magistri	Jordani	de	Clivis.	[...]		
Item	determinavit	dominus	 Johannes	Coc	 sub	magistro	Mercilio	de	 Inghen,	 cujus	bursa	V	 solidi	 et	 IIII	denarii.	
Item	determinavit	dominus	Johannes	Gout	sub	magistro	Mercilio	de	Inghen,	cujus	bursa	V	solidi	et	IIII	denarii.	
Item	determinavit	dominus	Ricoldus	Milde	sub	magistro	Mercilio	de	Inghen,	cujus	bursa	V	solidi	et	IIII	denarii.	
145	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 447-448]:	 "[14/III/1374]	 Item	 in	 eadem	 congregacione	 supplicavit	 magister	
Gherardus	Kemyn	per	deputatos	 literam	testimonialem	sibi	alias	a	nacione	concessam	confecturos	et	 in	 forma	
decenti	 posituros;	 et	 erant	 sibi	 dati	 deputati	 una	 cum	 procuratore	 magister	 Mercilius	 de	 Inghen	 et	 magister	
Jordanus	de	Clivis."	
146 	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 448]:	 "[14/III/1374]:	 "Item	 in	 eadem	 congregacione	 fuit	 propositum,	
procuratorem	 seu	 collectorem	monasterii	 Sancte	 Genovefe	 velle	 citare	 procuratorem	 et	 receptorem	 nacionis	








is	 once	 again	 the	 time	 to	 organise	 the	 nation	 scholae	 for	 the	 new	 academic	 year.	Marsilius	
must	be	an	incredibly	renowned	and	popular	master:	we	know	that	he	has	so	many	students	
that	 they	 cannot	 fit	 in	 his	 classrooms	 and	he	 has	 to	 beg	 his	 colleagues	 to	 let	 him	use	 their	





quod	 magister	 Mercilius	 de	 Inghen	 adiret	 unum	 advocatum,	 cujus	 haberet	 noticiam,	 querens	 ab	 eo	 attente,	
utrum	racione	dicti	 juris	in	tali	casu	nacionem	ad	unum	illorum	faciendum	compellere	possent,	et	quod	postea	
videretur	quid	faciendum."	
147	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 450]:	 "Item	 facta	 tercia	 vice	 congregacione	 nacionis	 XXIIIa	 die	 Marcii	 hora	
primarum	 apud	 Sanctum	 Julianum	 in	 electione	 rectoris	 super	 eodem	 immediate	 prenarrato,	 ordinatum	 et	
deliberatum	fuit	penitus	secundum	quod	prius.	Et	fuit	in	eadem	congregacione	electus	in	intrantem	pro	electione	
rectoris	magister	Mercilius	de	Inghen.	Aliqui	alii	supplicaverunt,	verumptamen	nil	obtinuerunt,	etc.	[...]"	
148	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 450]:	 "[4/IV/1374]	 Item	 licenciatus	 est	 dominus	 Johannes	 Gout	 sub	 magistro	
Marcilio	 de	 Inghen,	 cujus	 bursa	 V	 solldi,	 IIII	 denarii.	 Posuit	 pignora."	 Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 451]:	











150	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 458]:	 "[23/IX/1374]	 Anno	 quo	 supra	 et	 die,	 facta	 congregacione	 nacionis	 ad	
audiendum	 computum	 receptoris,	 et	 ad	 eligendum	 procuratorem,	 electus	 fuit	 concorditer	 in	 procuratorem	
magister	M[arcelius]	de	Inghen,	nullo	penitus	reclamante."	




poneret,	 ibi	 alium	 nacionis	 predicte.	 Et	 si	 contingeret,	 quod	dictus	 magister	 Marcilius	 tot	 haberet	 scolares,	
quod	commode	non	possent	sedere	in	scolis	dictis	sibi	deputatis,	et	aliquis	aliorum,	in	cujus	scolis	scolares		dicti	
Marcilii	 commode	 intrare	 possent,	 ita	 modicos	haberet	 scolares,	 quod	 commode	 intrare	 possent	 in	scolas	
	 40	








Wadenoy:	 tunc	 magister	 Marcilius	 de	 Inghen	sepedictus	 supplicaret	 illi	 habenti	 paucos	 scolares,	ut	 sibi	 suas	
scolas	concedere	dignaretur,	et	alter,	quicumque	esset,	suam	supplicacionem	concederet."		
152	Denifle	-	Chatelain	[1894a,	460]:	"Item	facta	congregacione	nacionis	XIIIIa	die	Novembris	in	Sancto	Maturino	
ad	providendum	de	nuncio	pro	 rotulo,	 et	 ad	ordinandum	et	 disponendum	de	 festo	 sancti	 Eadmundi,	 videlicet	
quantum	 ad	 sollempnitates	 faciendas	 in	 ecclesia	 et	 in	 officiis	 divinis	 ipso	 die	 ejusdem	 sancti	 et	 quantum	 ad	
prandium	 faciendum	 pro	 magistris	 nacionis,	 ut	 si	 prandium	 fieri	 deberet	 provideretur	 concorditer	 de	 modo	
faciendi	 ipsum,	 et	 darentur	 sive	 deputarentur	 aliqui	 magistri	 ad	 procurandum	 oportuna.	 Et	 erat	 concorditer	
conclusum	 ut	 fieret	 condecens	 solempnitas	 in	 ecclesia	 in	 divinis	 officiis,	 et	 ut	 haberentur	 alieni	 cantores	 sub	
expensis	 nacionis.	 Ulterius	 tandem	 concorditer	 concludebatur,	 quod	 fieret	 prandium	 honestum	 pro	magistris	
nacionis	volentibus	interesse,	ita	tamen,	quod	quilibet	eorum		daret	antea	V	solidos	parisiens.	et	nacio	solveret	
residuum.	 Et	 deputabantur	 ad	 procurandum	 magister	 Henricus	 de	 Thenis	 receptor	 tanquam	 ex	 officio,	 et	
magistri	Marsilius	de	Inghen	et	Thomas	de	Harlem."	
153	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 462]:	 "[10/I/1375]	 Item	Xa	 die	mensis	 Januarii	 facta	 congregacione	 nacionis	 in	
Sancto	 Maturino	 ad	 eligendum	 examinatores	 determinancium	 et	 bacalariorum	 licenciandorum	 in	 Sancta	
Genovefa,	 electi	 fuerunt	 in	 examinatores	 determinancium	magistri	Marcilius	 de	 Ynghen,	 Jordanus	 de	 Clivis	 et	
Gherardus	Calker."	









communi,	 scilicet	 XV	 francos,	 mutuavit	 dominus	 receptor	 nationi	 tres	 francos,	 mag.	 Marsilius	 de	 Inghen	 III	
francos,	mag.	Limphardus	de	Dattlen	1	francum,	inag.	Thomas	de	Clivis	II	fr.,	mag.	Jordanus	de	Clivis	tres	fr.,	mag.	









instrumentis;	quo	non	obstante	prefatus	magister	 Johannes	 se	 intromitteret	de	 illarum	domuum	disposicione,	
allegans	se	substitutum	a	quodam	alias	ante	promocionem	moderni	episcopi	dicti	 in	procuratorem	constituto;	
cum	 tamen	 et	 predecessor	 illius	 episcopi	 obiisset,	 et	 modernus	 episcopus	 procuracionem	 factam	 a	 suo	
predecessore	 illi,	 a	 quo	 idem	 magister	 Johannes	 erat	 substitutus,	 publice	 revocasset,	 prout	 idem	 dominus	
Wynandus	 asseruit	 se	 docturum,	 si	 opus	 esset,	 velle	 sibi	 assistere	 nacio	 in	 prosequendo	 suam	 causam,	 ut	




Marsilius	 is	one	of	 them.158	In	February	1376,	we	 find	Marislius	among	 the	examinators	 for	
the	determinantes.159	A	few	weeks	later,	he	is	called	along	with	some	other	senior	masters	to	
testify	on	a	 financial	 issue:	Michael	of	Prussia,	who	owes	a	sum	of	money	to	the	nation,	has	
been	 claiming	 that	 his	 debt	 had	been	written	 off	 by	 a	 previous	proctor.	Marsilius,	Adam	of	
Catwijc,	 Jordan	 of	 Clivis	 and	 Gerard	 of	 Kalkar	 all	 agree	 that	 that	 is	 not	 the	 case	 and	 that	









157	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 477]:	 "[24/IX/1375]	 Item	 facta	 congregacione	nacionis	24a	die	mensis	 ejusdem	
apud	 Sanctum	 Julianum	 pauperem	 ad	 audiendum	 computum	 receptoris	 et	 ad	 eligendum	 procuratorem,	 de	




scolas	 in	 quibus	 essent.	 Ceteri	 vero	 si	 qui	 essent	 providerent	 sibi	 expensis	 nacionis,	 dum	 tamen	 fideliter	
continuarent	lecturam."	
159	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 481]:	 "[11/II/1376]	 ...	 electi	 fuerunt	 in	 examinatores	 determinancium	magistri	
Mercelius	de	Inghen,	Jordanus	de	Clivis	et	Gerardus	de	Kalker".	
160	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 482-483]:	 "[27/II/1376]	 ....	 Cum	 itaque	 hec	 proposuisset	 procurator,	 requirens	
magistros	 tunc	 presentes	 ut	 deliberarent	 qualiter	 esset	 ulterius	 procedendum	 super	 istis,	 deliberatum	 fuit	
saltem	a	majori	parte	nacionis	quod	vocarentur	aliqui	ex	senioribus	de	nacione,	quibus	melius	constaret	 istud	
factum,	et	specialiter	magistri	Adam	de	Catwyc,	Marcilius	de	Inghen,	Jordanus	de	Clivis	et	Gerardus	de	Kalker,	ut	
illi	 audirentur,	 et	 secundum	quod	 illi	 dicerent,	 ulterius	procederetur.	 Et	 quia,	 ut	 dicebatur,	magister	Marcilius	
ante	adventum	procuratoris	dixerat	aliquibus	magistris	nacionis	quod	bene	recordaretur,	quod	 idem	magister	
Michael	semel	supplicavit	pro	remissione	illius	pecunie,	et	tunc	sua	supplicacio	fuit	interempta,	dixerunt	plures		
ymmo	major	 pars	 nacionis,	 quod	 auditis	magistris	 prenominatis	 requiretur	 illa	 pecunia	 ab	 eo,	 nisi	 doceret	 se	
interim	satisfecisse	nacioni.		Item	eadem	penultima	die	Februarii	hora	nonarum	Nostre	Domine	vel	quasi,	vocatis	
per	 juramentum	 ad	 Sanctum	 Maturinum	 magistris	 Adam	 de	 Catwijc,	 Marcilio	 de	 Inghen,	 Jordano	 de	 Clivis,	
Gerardo	de	Kalker	et	Waltero	de	Delf	receptore,	procurator	quesivit	ab	eis	tunc	presentibus	quid	eis	constaret	
de	illa	pecunia	suprascripta.	Et	dixerunt	concorditer	quod	bene	scirent	eum	debere	nacioni	V	francos	aut	circiter;	
ymmo	 dicebant	 aliqui	 eorum,	 se	 bene	 recordari	 de	 hoc	 quod	 ipse	 supplicaverat	 nacioni	 pro	 remissione	 illius	
pecunie,	sed	sua	supplicacio	fuit	interempta,	et	interim	non	satisfecit."	
161		 Checking	 Marsilius'	 involvment	 in	 the	 administration	 of	 the	 Nation	 against	 the	 other	 senior	 masters',	 as	





student,	 Jacob	 of	 Berka,	 and	 the	 nation	 names	 two	masters	 to	 examine	 him,	 they	 also	 call	





the	 following	 day.163	On	 10	 March,	 Marsilius	 brings	 the	 request	 before	 the	 assembly;	 the	
Gallicans	 are	 against,	 the	 Picards	 in	 favour,	 	 the	Normans	 first	want	 to	make	 sure	 that	 the	
request	is	"sensible"	and	compatible	with	the	faculty	statutes.	After	a	brief	examination	they	







magistri	 ejus	assistencia	 indigerent".	Around	 the	 same	 time,	Marsilius	 is	 supervising	 several	determinationes	-	
Denifle	-	Chatelain	[1894a,	486-488]:	"Item	Wilhelmus	Danielis	sub	magistro	Mercilio	de	Inghen,	cujus	bursa	IIII	
solidi.	 Solvit	 receptori	 et	 juravit	 procuratori.	 [...]	 Item	Mertinus	 Giisberti.	 Item	 Petrus	 Jacobus	 de	 Catwiic	 sub	
magistro	Mercelio	de	 Inghen,	cujus	bursa	V	solidi	et	VIII	denarii.	Posuerunt	pignora	et	 juraverunt	procuratori.	
Item	Petrus	 Bartholomeus	 de	Aemsterdam	 sub	 eodem	magistro	Mercelio,	 cujus	 bursa	 V	 solidi	 et	 VIII	 denarii.	
Solvit	receptori	et	juravit	procuratori.	[...]	Item	Theodericus	Jacobi	de	Alcmaria	sub	magistro	Mercelio	de	Inghen,	
cujus	bursa	IIII	solidi.	Posuit	pignora	et	juravit	procuratori."	
163 	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 488-489]:"[9/III/1376]	 Item	 IXa	 die	 Marcii	 facta	 congregacione	 nacionis	
regencium	et	non	regencium	per	juramentum	post	sermonem	apud	Predicatores	ad	habendum	concilium,	et	ad	
supplicandum,	propositum	fuit	quomodo	in	magnum	prejudicium	nacionis	esset,	quod	temptatores	 in	examine	
Sancte	 Genovefe	 quosdam	 nolebant	 temptare,	 qui	 erant	 de	 nacione	 nostra,	 eo	 quod	 licet	 determinassent	 in	
artibus	in	alia	Universitate,	non	tamen	determinaverant	Parisius,	cum	tamen	iidem	temptatores	nullum	haberent	
ad	contrarium	 juramentum.	 [....]	Et	deliberavit	nacio:	primo	quod	essent	deputandi	aliqui	magistri	nacionis,	 et	





164	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 489]:	 "[10/III/1376]	 Insuper	 sequenti	 die,	 que	 erat	 dies	 Xa	 Marcii	[...],	 primo	
magister	Mercelius	de	Inghen	nomine	nacionis	ex	certis	motivis	per	 ipsum	tactis	supplicavit	 facultati,	quatinus	
injungeret	 temptatoribus	 examinis	 Sancte	 Genovefe,	 ut	 ipsi	 admittant	 ad	 temptamen	 eos	 qui	 alibi	
determinaverunt,	 dum	 tamen	 jurent	 juranda,	 solutis	 etiam	 solvendis.	 Que	 supplicacio	 interempta	 fuit	 per	
nacionem	Gallicanam;	 sed	 fuit	 concessa	 a	 nacione	 Pycardie.	Sed	 dicebat	 nacio	 Normannie	 quod	 vellent	 ut	
darentur	 deputati,	 habentes	 inquirere	 an	 illa	 supplicacio	 esset	 racionabilis	 et	 statutis	 facultatis	 compossibilis;	
quo	 inquisito	 ipsi	 concederent	 illam	 supplicacionem.	Et	 tunc	 procurator	 prout	 sibi	 injunctum	 fuit	 a	nacione,	
appellavit	nomine	nacionis	ab	interempcione	facta	per	nacionem	Gallicanam	de	illa	supplicacione	ad	facultatem;	
supplicans	 ecciam	 aliis	 nacionibus,	 ut	 dispensarent	 cum	 domino	 rectore	 ut	 sequenti	 die	 possent	 facere	 aliam	
congregacionem	facultatis	per	juramentum,	quia	periculum	erat	in	mora."		
	 43	
the	established	custom	in	 favour	of	 the	Anglicans'	request,	counteracting	point	by	point	 the	
Gallicans'	arguments.	At	the	end	of	the	day,	the	motion	is	approved.165		
Marsilius	is	by	now	a	senior	master,	well	respected	and	very	popular,	hence	it	is	quite	normal	






Around	 the	 end	 of	 March	 1376,	 Marsilius	 is	 chosen	 as	 the	 representative	 of	 the	 Anglican	
nation	 for	 the	 election	 of	 the	 rector	 -	and	 his	 colleague	 Gerard	 of	 Kalkar	 is	 elected	 to	 the	
office.167	We	know	from	an	entry	in	the	Liber	Procuratoris	dated	7	April	1376,	that	Marsilius	
had	 been	 loaning	 money	 to	 the	 nation	 and	 in	 particular	 to	 other	 masters	 in	 need,	 since	
Herman	 of	 Bottenbruec	 repays	 him.168	We	 do	 not	 have	 any	 record	 of	 any	 extraordinary	









ex	 consuetudinibus,	 dissolvendo	 eciam	 motiva	 allegata	 per	 nacionem	 Gallicanam,	 propter	 que	 eandem	
requestam	sive	supplicacionem	 ipsa	 interemit	die	precedenti,	 requisivit	 facultatem	et	supplicavit	eidem,	prout	
supra	scriptum	est.		Et	deliberando	dicebat	nacio	Gallicana	se	admittere	hujusmodi	supplicacionem	graciose	ista	




166	This	 is	quite	evident	 from	the	records	 in	 the	Liber	procuratoris	nationis	Anglicanae	and	 in	 the	Chartularium	
for	the	periods	of	Marsilius'	confirmed	presence	in	Paris.	
167	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 491]:	 "[24/III/1376]	 Ulterius	 electus	 fuit	 pro	 intrante	 ad	 eligendum	 rectorem	






research	 and	 possibly	 work	 on	 his	 theological	 studies,	 which	 are	 quite	 delayed.	 Anyway,	
through	the	spring	of	1376,	Marsilius	seems	to	have	mantained	his	financial	stability	and	good	








mandate	 -	 money	 that	 he	 will	 have	 to	 return	 personally	 if	 he	 does	 not	 deliver	 the	 results	
requested	 by	 the	 University. 172 	In	 February	 1377,	 Marsilius	 is	 busy	 with	 the	
determinationes,173	but	he	 seems	 to	 spend	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 spring	organising	his	 forthcoming	
																																																								
170	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 497]:	 "[18/V/1376]	 Propterea	 deliberatum	 fuit	 concorditer	 in	 nacione	illos	
magistros	 novos	 perpotare.	 Et	 intravit	 nacio	 tabernam	 in	 prandi	 nuncupatam	duo	gladii,	 sitam	 juxta	 parvum	
pontem,	in	qua	nacio	consumpsit	xxxviii	solidos,	de	quibus	solvit	magister	Henricus	Tuve	1	francum	pro	jocundo	







quod	 nuncio	 nacionis,	 videlicet	magister	Marsilio,	 darentur	 de	 pecunia	 nacionis	 xxv	 aut	 xxx	 franci,	 ita	 tamen	
quod	si	nacionem	contingeret	solvere	pecuniam	per	dictum	nuncium	pro	facto	Universitatis	exponendam,	quod	
ex	 tunc	 ipse	 nuncius	 tenebitur	 in	 hujusmodi	 facto	 per	 ipsum	 exponenda	 fideliter	 computare,	 et	 sibi	 super	
hujusmodi	 expositis	 fideliter	 computatis	 a	 nacione	 satisfiet;	 si	 autem	 pecunia	 pro	 ipso	 et	 aliis	 Universitatis	
nunciis	per	contribucionem	capitum	colligetur,	ex	tunc	debet	habere	tantum	quantum	alterius	nacionis	facultatis	
arcium	nuncius	habebit,	videlicet	C	francos."	
172	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 503-504]:	 "[30/IX/1376]	 Item	 facta	 congregacione	 nacionis	 Anglicane	 per	
juramentum	ultima	die	mensis	Septembris,	que	fuit	dies	sancti	Jeronimi,	in	primis	Nostre	Domine	apud	Sanctum	
Maturinum	 in	 domo	 capitulari	 ad	 ordinandum	 de	 scolis	 et	 avizandam	 quandam	 literam	 obligatoriam,	 in	 qua	
nacio	 prefata	 obligaretur	magistro	Mercilio	 de	 Inghen	 ad	 restitucionem	pecunie,	 quam	 consumet	 in	 legacione	
sua,	in	casu	in	quo	non	fieret	contribucio	capitalis	per	Universitatem	ordinata.	[...]	Pro	litera	predicta	dati	erant	
deputati	 magister	 Ricoldus	 de	 Trajecto,	 magister	 Jordanus	 de	 Clivis,	 magister	 Gherardus	 Pillich,	 magister	
Gerardus	Kalker	et	magister	Hugho	de	Hervorst,	quod	ipsi	ordinarent	literam	obligatoriam	pro	profectu	magistri	
Mercilii	et	nacionis."	And	Denifle	-	Chatelain	[1894a,	507-508].	
173	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 511-513]:	 "[10/II/1377]	 Item	 electi	 fuerunt	 in	 examinatores	 determinancium	
magistri	Mercilius,	Jordanus	[de	Clivis],	Gerardus	Kalkar.	[...]	[III/1377]	Item	determinavit	dominus	Nicolaus	de	






















competere,	 dimitto	 causa	 brevitatis	 quia	 esset	 nimis	 prolixum),	 quod	 sibi	 dicti	 XLI	 fr.	 deliberarentur,	 quia	
pecuniam	mutuavit	et	quia	iturus	esset	indilate	ad	curiam.	Ultra	supplicavit	quatenus	nacio	faceret	sibi	tantam	
graciam,	 quod	 illos	IX	 francos	 ultra	 recipere	 posset,	 et	 consequenter	 illos	 L	 francos	 totaliter,	 et	 eos	 expectare	
vellet	de	contribucione	ultra	fienda,	quia	iturus	est	ad	partes	longinquas,	et	nacio	melius	expectare	posset	quam	
ipse.	 Super	 quo	 articulo	 deliberatum	 fuit	 una	 cum	 supplicacione	 dicti	 Marsilii	 concorditer	 ab	 omnibus,	 quod	
dictus	 magister	 Mersilius	 reciperet	 dictos	 L	 francos	 totaliter;	 multi	 tamen	 dixerunt,	 qui	 minorem	 partem	
secuntur,	quod	XLI	franci,	quos	petebat	de	jure,	non	debebantur	sibi	de	ista	summa	de	jure,	sed	solum	XX	vel	XXI	
franci	 sibi	 debebantur.	 Tamen	 omnes	 concorditer,	 sive	 de	 jure	 sibi	 competerent,	 sive	 non,	 favorabiliter	 sibi	
concesserunt.	[...].	3um	articulus	fuit	ad	ordinandum	de	pecunia	nacionis.	Ordinatum	fuit	primo	de	pecunia	data	
magistro	Mirsilio,	de	qua	prius...."	
175	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 519]:	 "[5/V/1377]	 Item	2°	 supplicavit	magister	Mersilius	 de	 Inghen,	 cum	 esset	
iturus	ad	curiam	Romanam	ex	parte	seu	pro	factis	Universitatis	et	pro	communi	utilitate,	quatinus	si	contigerit	
ipso	existente	 in	 curia,	 etc.,	 rotulum	 fieri	 seu	papam	mori,	 quod	eidem	rotulo	 tanquam	presens	et	 in	 loco	 suo	
possit	imponi.	Cujus	supplicacio	fuit	reputata	racionabilis	et	concessa."	
176	Denifle	-	Chatelain	[1894a,	523]:	"[4/VII/1377]	Item	facta	congregacione	Universitatis,	 facultatis	et	nacionis	
apud	 Sanctum	Matulinum	 ad	 audiendum	 literam	missam	 per	magistrum	Mercilium,	 nuncium	 universitatis,	 et	
audita	fuit.	[...]	[26/VII/1377]	Item	facta	congregacione	nacionis	apud	Sanctum	Matulinum	ad	audiendum	nova	
per	magistrum	Mercilium,	tunc	Avinione	existentem,	 lecte	 fuerunt	 littere	misse	per	eundem.	[...]	 [7/VIII/1377]	
Item	 facta	 congregacione	 apud	 Sanctum	Matulinum	die	VII	mensis	Augusti	 pro	 rescribendo	magistro	Mercilio	
responsum	 et	 alia	 supra	 primitus	 scripta	 per	 eundem,	 dati	 fuerunt	 deputati	 ad	 ordinanudm	 idem	 magistri	
Jordanus	de	Clivis	et	Hugo	de	Hervorst."	
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November	 he	 is	 still	 in	 Avignon177 	and	 the	 following	 spring	 he	 is	 still	 serving	 as	 a	
representative	 of	 the	University	when	 the	 nation	 is	 preparing	 the	 new	 rotulus.178	However,	
whatever	 Marsilius'	 mission	 was	 supposed	 to	 be	 originally,	 it	 probably	 ended	 up	 going	
beyond	the	usual	duties	relative	to	the	rotulus.	In	the	meantime,	Gregory	XI	had	passed	away	
on	27	March	1378	near	Rome	and	in	April	the	Archibishop	of	Bari	Bartolomeo	Prignano	was	
elected	 pope	 with	 the	 name	 of	 Urban	 VI.	 Almost	 immediately	 Prignano's	 election	 is	
controversial	and	it	is	a	cause	of	discontent	particularly	among	the	French	cardinals.	We	are	
on	the	threshold	of	the	Western	Schism:	things	will	precipitate	within	a	few	months.	





the	University	of	Paris.183	The	news	he	 is	 sending	 is	dire:	a	group	of	 cardinals	opposing	 the	







ad	 Sanctum	 Matulinum	 super	 quatuor	 articulis.	 Primiis	 erut	 ad	 audiendum	 literas	 missas	 de	 Avinione,	 que	
fuerunt	lecte,	et	satis	fuit	concordatum	ut	rescriberetur	ex	superhabundanti."	
178	For	example,	Denifle	-	Chatelain	[1894a,	540]	
179	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 558]:	 "[10/VI/1378]	 Item	 determinavit	 dominus	 Heinricus	 Ludenschede	 sub	
magistro	Marsilio	de	Inghen,	cujus	bursa	sex	solidi	cum	dimidio."	
180	Denifle	 -	 Chatelain	 [1894a,	 558]:	 "[12/VI/1378]	 Super	 primo	 fuerat	 concorditer	 deliberatum,	 quod	 esset	









schism	 in	 a	 hundred	 years",184 	Marsilius	 writes.	 He	 will	 be	 proven	 right	 soon:	 on	 20	
September	 1378,	 with	 the	 support	 of	 Charles	 V	 of	 France,	 the	 French	 cardinals	 gather	 in	
Frondi	 and	 elect	 pope	 Robert	 of	 Geneva,	 who	 takes	 the	 name	 of	 Clement	 VII.	 He	 will	
eventually	move	back	to	Avignon.	185	
At	first,	despite	Charles'	pressures,	the	University	of	Paris	choses	to	stay	neutral:	apparently,	
at	 least	 in	 January	1379,	 they	cannot	reach	an	unanimous	agreement	among	all	nations	and	
faculties;186	therefore,	for	now,	
Relinquimus	ipsos	disputationibus	eorum	et	interim	quescamus.187	






the	matter.191	While	 the	 faculties	 of	Medicine	 and	Law	 immediately	 pronounce	 in	 favour	 of	
Clement,	the	faculty	of	Theology	asks	for	more	time	to	have	majorem	deliberationem,	and	the	
faculty	of	Arts	 is	divided:	 two	nations	are	 in	 favour,	 two	request	 to	adjourn	 the	meeting.192	
When	the	assembly	reconvene	two	days	 later,	 the	faculty	of	Theology	gives	 its	approval	but	
the	artists	have	not	found	a	common	line:	the	Gallicans	recognise	Clement	VII	as	the	only	true	
																																																								














pope,	 the	Normans	 are	 ready	 to	 follow	 the	 royal	 injunction,193	but	 the	 Picard	 and	Anglican	
nations	 are	 opposed,	 mantaining	 that	 the	 University	 should	 stay	 neutral.194 	With	 three	
faculties	 out	 of	 four	 agreeing,	 as	 of	 24	May	 1379	 the	University	 of	 Paris	 supports	 Clement	
VII. 195 	The	 consensus	 is	 not,	 and	 will	 not	 be,	 unanimous.	 The	 Anglican	 nation	 seems	
particularly	resilient	in	harbouring	a	diffuse	dissent:	most	masters	seem	cautiously	to	be	pro	
neutrality;	some	(like	Hugo	of	Hervorst)	seem	pragmatically	indifferent;196	those	who	support	
Clement	 are	 quite	 tepid	 about	 it;	 others	 (like	 Gerard	 of	 Kalkar)	 speak	 openly	 in	 favour	 of	




fired	by	 the	University,	 like	 the	 chancellor	 of	 Sainte	Geneviève	 Judocus	Ghisilius200	-	 in	 this	
case	despite	 the	 stern	opposition	of	 the	English	nation,	 flanked	also	by	 the	Picards	and	 the	
Normans.201	
We	know	from	a	letter	by	John	of	Jenzenstein,	archibishop	of	Prague	and	chancellor	to	King	
Wenceslaus	 of	 Bohemia,	 dating	 September	 1381,	 that	 several	 Parisian	 masters	 supporting	
Urban	VI	had	abandoned	Paris	and	were	hoping	to	transfer	to	the	University	of	Prague	-	or	to	
																																																								





















the	 dispute	 between	 the	 two	 popes	 has	 been	 getting	 more	 and	 more	 repressive	 of	 those	
masters	refusing	to	align	themselves	to	the	official	position:	accusations	of	heresy	start	to	rise	
against	 those	 supporting	Urban	VI204	-	 and	 it	 is	 probably	 still	 fresh	 in	 everybody's	memory	
how	easily	such	talk	used	to	lead	to	the	stake	through	most	of	the	century.	It	stands	to	reason	
that	most	masters	 in	 favour	 of	 Urban	 VI	would	 prefer	 to	move	 to	more	 friendly	 studia	 by	
1382.	
But	what	about	Marsilius	in	the	meantime?	We	had	left	him	in	Tivoli	with	Urban	VI	around	the	
end	of	 June	1378,	when	he	had	 just	 sent	a	quite	agitated	 letter	 to	 the	University	asking	 for	
instructions	on	how	to	proceed	in	the	rapidly	deteriorating	situation	concerning	the	pope.	We	
do	not	know	what	 the	University	replied,	neither	do	we	know	when	 -	or	even	 if	 -	Marsilius	
went	back	to	Paris.	Marsilius	 is	not	mentioned	in	the	new	assignments	of	 the	schools	of	 the	
Nation	in	September	1378.	The	only	other	mention	in	the	Parisian	surviving	documents	is	an	










205	Denifle	 -	Chatelain	 [1894a,	570]:	 "[21/II/1379]	Et	 supplicavit	magister	Hugo	de	Hervorst	ex	parte	magistri	
Mercilii	 de	 Inghen,	 quod	 cum	 nacio	 sibi	 adhuc	 teneretur	 XX	 francos	 de	 legacione	 alias	 facta	 in	 Avinionem	








would	 seem	 more	 probable	 that	 this	 letter	 expresses	 Marsilius'	 consolidated	 convinction	
instead	of	a	position	of	convenience	 -	held	while	 in	a	country	supporting	 the	pope	 in	Rome	
and	as	a	master	in	a	newborn	University	approved	by	the	Urban	VI.		
Did	 then	 Marsilius	 abandon	 Paris	 in	 1378	 or	 1379	 for	 his	 political	 and	 ecclesiological	
convictions,	foreseeing	the	line	the	University	was	about	to	take?	We	do	not	know,	nor	do	we	
have	 much	 information	 about	 his	 whereabouts	 between	 then	 and	 1386.	 For	 all	 the	
information	we	have,	he	might	have	retired	for	some	time	to	his	parish	of	Saint	Andrews	of	
Cologne.207	Ritter	 believes	 that	 there	 are	 traces	 of	 Marsilius	 in	 Prague	 and	 possibly	 at	 the	
monastery	 of	 Eberbach,	 but	 his	 hypothesis	 is	 not	 supported;208	completely	 unfounded	 is	
Amann's	convinction	that	Marsilius	came	back	to	Paris.209		
	All	we	can	say	with	some	degree	of	certainty	is	that	in	1382,	at	some	point	after	Easter	and	
before	 Pentecost,	 the	 city	 of	 Nijmegen	 provides	 an	 opulent	 dinner	 in	 honour	 of	 "master	
Marsilius	of	 Inghen".210	Since	 the	 title	of	 "master"	 lacks	any	of	 the	qualifications	 that	would	







207	This	 is	 not	unlikely	 at	 all,	 and	Marsilius	might	have	 indeed	been	 there	 for	 some	 time,	 since	 in	 a	document	









Nijmegen	 belongs	 to	 Duchy	 of	 Guelders,	 under	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire,	 and	 therefore	 is	







of	 the	 pope	 or	 the	 emperor.	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 such	 possibility	 does	 not	 preclude	 that	
Marsilius	 could	have	kept	 teaching	 in	 one	or	more	 schools	 or	 universities	 during	 the	 years	
between	Paris	and	Heidelberg.	For	example,	Maier	argued	that	Marsilius	had	been	teaching	in	
Pavia	and	held	him	responsible	(along	with	Blasius	of	Parma)	for	the	diffusion	of	the	English	
and	 Buridanian	 philosophical	 novelties	 in	 northern	 Italy.213	Her	 hypothesis	 is	 grounded	 on	
two	considerations.	In	the	first	place,	Maier	observes	that	in	his	'90s	letter	on	the	legitimacy	of	
Urban	V's	papacy,	Marsilius	shows	a	detailed	knowledge	of	the	Italian	events	during	the	time	
about	which	he	 is	writing.	 In	 the	 second	place,	Maier's	main	point	 is	based	on	a	passage	 in	
Giovanni	 Marliani's	 Tractatus	 de	 reactione	 (1448),	 where	 Marliani	 is	 referring	 to	 one	 of	
Marsilius'	commentaries	on	the	De	generatione	et	corruptione	and	he	calls	Marsilius	"Marsilius	
noster".	 Among	 the	 several	 authoritative	 philosophers	 quoted	 or	 mentioned	 through	 the	
																																																								








the	 "noster"	 is	more	 likely	an	honorific	 title	not	 to	be	 taken	 literally,	especially	after	such	a	
long	 time	 since	Marsilius'	 supposed	 visit.	 Nevertheless,	 as	 Maier's	 "noster"	 point	 is	 feeble,	
Courtenay's	 rejection	 might	 be	 rushed	 and	 Maier's	 first	 reference	 to	 Marsilius'	 '90s	 letter	
might	be	at	least	partially	on	track.	The	letter	shows	for	sure	that	Marsilius	is	not	in	Paris	after	
1379,	since	his	account	of	the	events	transpiring	there	in	the	following	years	is	partial	and	not	
in	 the	 right	 order.	However,	 it	 is	 true	 that	 the	 letter	 reports	 vividly	 some	 Italian	 events,	 in	
particular	 some	 episodes	 involving	 Urban	 VI	 or,	 for	 example,	 an	 observation	 by	 Barnabo	
Visconti,	lord	of	Milan.216	It	is	probable	then	that	Marsilius	spent	some	further	time	after	his	
mission	with	 Urban	 VI	 and	 travelling	 on	 his	 behalf,	 and	 it	 is	 furthermore	 possible	 that	 he	
interacted	with	the	lord	of	Milan.	Pavia	was	in	Milan	territory;	did	Marsilius	teach	there	then?	
We	cannot	say,	but	as	his	name	does	not	appear	in	the	registry	of	the	University	of	Pavia,	nor	





















We	 do	 not	 know	 who	 first	 conceived	 and	 planned	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 University	 of	
Heidelberg:219	it	 could	have	been	 the	Count's	own	 idea	or	 from	his	court;	 it	 could	also	have	
been	a	papal	 solicitation;	or	 it	 could	have	 come	 from	a	 third	party	entirely.	However,	quite	
early	on,	Marsilius	is	officially	called	in	by	Rupert	-	on	a	princely	stipend	-	as	a	member	of	his	
Council	to	act	as	"founding	rector"	and	to	organise	the	Faculty	of	Arts	in	particular	(pro	dicti	
studii	 incohacione	 in	 facultatem	 artium	 operam	 daret	 efficacem).	 Quite	 probably	 since	 that	
very	moment,	the	University	of	Heidelberg	becomes	Marsilius'	pet	project.220		
The	 request	 bearing	 Rupert's	 name	 for	 the	 foundation	 of	 a	 new	 studium	 generale	 in	
Heidelberg	 (in	 all	 the	 faculties	 and	 modeled	 on	 Paris)221	is	 presented	 to	 Urban	 VI	 on	 23	














222	AUH	 I,	 1	 ,	 nr.	 72,	 4-10:	 "ut	modus	 incepcionis	 dicti	 studii	 universis	 posteris	 innotescat	 utque	 statuta,	 que	
incepta	 et	 acta	 sunt	 pro	 eius	 bono	 regimine	 et	 ad	 que	 tenenda	 constringuntur	 et	 constringentur	 magistris	
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the	 standard	 rhetoric	 of	 founding	 statutes,	 in	 the	 following	 years	 he	 will	 show	 an	 honest	
commitment	 and	 a	 great	 investment	 in	 the	 project	 as	 it	 is:	 those	 rhetorical	 statements	 in	
Marsilius'	account	could	possibly	reveal	his	insightful	awareness	of	the	project's	fragility.		
After	 Urban	 VI's	 approval,	 and	 once	 all	 the	 required	 paperwork	 is	 ready	 and	 the	 due	
payments	 deposited,	 on	 24	 June	 1386	Rupert	 presents	 the	 official	 concession	 letters	 to	 his	
council.	 The	 following	 Thusday	 the	 council	 gathers	 again	 to	 start	 planning	 the	 details	
concerning	the	new	university	and	it	 is	then	that	Marsilius	of	Inghen	is	officially	brought	on	
the	project	and	welcomed	on	the	council	itself	-	in	Marsilius'	own	words,	"on	a	large	pay".223		





















elected.	 Marsilius	 specifies	 in	 his	 report	 that	 it	 was	 an	 exceptional	 occasion	 that	 does	 not	
constitute	a	precedent.	Marsilius	is	chosen	unanimously	as	the	first	rector	of	the	University	of	
Heidelberg.224	The	 following	 day,	 Marsilius	 goes	 to	 persuade	 Rupert	 of	 the	 necessity	 of	




university	 full-fledged	regulations	beyond	 the	programmatic	 intentions	of	being	 "like	Paris"	
(that	will	not	last).	Marsilius	records	faithfully	all	the	progress.		
Already	by	the	end	of		January	1387,	Marsilius	has	to	deal	with	the	first	internal	dissents	and	
attacks	on	 the	spirit	of	 the	statutes:	on	31	 January	a	newly	arrived	 theologian	 from	Prague,	
Conrad	 of	 Soltau,	 in	 his	 oath	 refused	 to	 subscribe	 to	 the	 article	 that	 the	 rector	 had	 to	 be	 a	
master	of	arts.226	We	do	not	know	the	details	of	how	the	situation	evolves:	Marsilius	tells	us	
only	 that	 there	have	been	 "many	altercations	and	 several	 changes	of	opinion"	by	16	March	
1387,	 when	 a	 general	 assembly	 gathers	 to	 discuss	 the	 issue	 once	 again,	 but	 this	 time	 it	
reaches	an	agreement	in	favour	of	keeping	the	statutes	as	they	are.227	This	paticular	entry	in	
Marsilius'	Rector-book	is	important	because,	in	addition	to	the	authoritative	point	threatening	











dictum	 statutum	 ...	 parvorum	 scholarium	 in	 promocionem	 et	 expedicionem	 esset....	
quodque	grave	 foret	 scholaribus	parvis	qualibet	de	 causa	magistrum	sacre	 theologie	vel	
alterius	facultatis	doctorem	forte	maioribus	inpeditum	in	sui	auxilium	invocare.228	
The	 issue	 clearly	 had	 risen	 from	 two	 opposite	 ways	 of	 conceiving	 the	 office	 of	 rector:	 in	
Prague,	 the	 rector	 is	 an	 honorific	 role	 of	 prestige,	 assigned	 to	 already	 affirmed	masters;	 in	
Paris,	it	is	an	office	entrusted	to	the	young	masters	in	arts,	who	have	more	time	to	attend	to	
the	 administrative	 tasks,	 to	 promote	 their	 carreer	 and	 help	 them	 financially.	 Since	 at	 this	
point	 the	 only	 two	 masters	 from	 Paris	 were	 still	 the	 theologian	 Reginald	 of	 Aulne	 and	
Marsilius	himself,	Marsilius	might	be	stating	his	own	position.229	This	passage	is	certainly	in	















habentibus	 in	 studio	 nostro.	 Nam	 voluit	 universitas	 quod	 in	 singulorum	 rotulorum	 ordinacione	 super	






with	a	group	of	six	Parsian	masters:	 they	had	gathered	 in	an	exclusive	meeting	 to	privately	
read	 some	 letter	 sent	 from	Paris,	 and	had	 therefore	 stirred	 the	distrust	 and	 the	hostility	of	
many	 of	 their	 colleagues.	 The	 incident	 is	 solved	 quickly	 with	 a	 questioning	 and	 a	 formal	
admonition	 by	 the	 University	 and	 the	 injunction	 to	 reconfirm	 an	 oath	 of	 alligiance	 to	
Heidelberg,234	but	 it	 shows	 that	 the	 internal	 divisions	 among	 the	 masters	 run	 deep.	 The	
official	 line	of	 the	University,	or	at	 least	Marsilius',	 is	 in	 support	of	 the	Roman	pope;	 this	 is	
repeatedly	 made	 clear	 on	 several	 occasions.	 Following	 the	 incident	 with	 the	 six	 Parisian	




and	Marsilius	 of	 Inghen.237	Futhermore,	Marsilius	 is	 once	 again	 the	 rector	when	 in	October	
1390	 the	 Palatine	 Count	 is	 entertaining	 envoys	 from	 the	 King	 of	 France:	 the	 University	 of	
Heidelberg	fears	that	they	are	there	to	convince	the	Count	to	join	the	anti-pope	and,	in	order	
to	 stop	 him	 from	 doing	 anything	 harmful	 to	 Boniface	 IX's	 cause,	 Marsilius	 is	 to	 intervene	
accompained	by	some	representatives.238	
However,	 the	 most	 dangerous	 ordeal	 that	 the	 fledgling	 University	 of	 Heidelberg	 has	 to	
undergo	 in	 those	 first	 uncertain	 years	 does	not	 seem	 to	be	 related	 to	 the	 Schism,	 although	
some	 internal	 divisions	 among	 the	 masters	 might	 have	 played	 a	 major	 role.	 In	 November	
1388,	the	rector	Berthold	Suderdick	abandons	the	University	of	Heidelberg	for	Cologne	while	
























of	 1394,	 as	 a	 bacalarius	 formatus.244 	Therefore,	 also	 in	 consideration	 of	 some	 internal	
references	of	 the	 text,	 it	 is	highly	probable	 that	Marsilius	 read	 the	Sentences	 between	1392	
and	1394	–	in	any	case	not	before	1392.245		















know	 that	 he	 is	 the	 first	 theologian	 to	 obtain	 his	 degree	 in	 Heidelberg.248	In	 August	 1395,	










Overall,	Marsilius	of	 Inghen	was	a	professional	philosopher	and	academic.	His	 life	 lacks	 the	
excitement	 of	 Ockham's	 or	 the	 legendary	 mystery	 of	 Buridan's,	 but	 it	 is	 a	 life	 of	 solid	





emperors,	dukes,	and	various	sorts	of	potentates,	his	 relationships	of	major	 interest	 for	 the	
history	 of	 philosophy	 are	 others.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 he	 came	 in	 direct	 contact	 with	 John	
Buridan;	 probably	 he	 was	 at	 least	 personally	 acquainted	 with	 his	 fellow	 Anglican	masters	











Oresme.	 	 The	 existence	 of	 a	 sort	 of	 "Buridanian	 circle",	 to	which	 he	may	have	 belonged,	 at	
least	intellectually,	is	not	unlikely.	
Furthermore,	 we	 have	 an	 extensive	 list	 of	 students	 that	 determined	 or	 incepted	 under	





studies	 could	 bring	 a	 more	 complete	 and	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 evolution	 and	




Marsilius'	 legacy	 is	 of	 enormous	 historical	 importance:	 the	 University	 of	 Heidelberg	 is	
probably	 the	 most	 tangible	 remnant	 of	 his	 talent	 for	 and	 life-work	 in	 diplomacy	 and	
administration.	The	historical	resonance	of	his	philosophy	is	long	and	deep,	as	testified	by	the	
diffusion	 of	 the	 so	 called	 via	 marsiliana,	 especially	 through	 central	 and	 eastern	 European	
Universities,	 in	 the	 Late	 Middle	 Ages	 and	 Early	 Modernity.254	The	 relevance	 of	 Marsilius'	
philosophy	and	the	breadth	of	its	influence	have	been	only	partially	studied	and	there	is	much	
still	 to	 be	 done.	 However	 Marsilius	 left	 also	 another	 inheritance,	 a	 material	 one,	 to	 the	





255	On	Marsilius'	 library	 see	 in	particular	Walz	 [1993a]	 and	Hoenen	 -	Ernz	 [2014,	10].	 See	 also:	Töpke	 [1884-
1893,	678-85],	Maier	[1942,	200-201].	
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Not	 long	 after	 his	 death,	 Marsilius'	 books	 were	 entrusted	 to	 the	 University	 library	 at	 the	
collegium	 artistarum:256	the	 list	 of	 those	 acquisitions,	 still	 preserved	 among	 the	 university	
documents,257	gives	us	a	very	good	 idea	of	most	of	 the	books	 in	Marsilius'	possession	 in	his	
Heidelberg	years.	Such	data	obviously	probably	does	not	exhaust	Marsilius'	library	(he	could	
have	 left	 some	 of	 his	 book	 to	 others),	 his	 readings,	 and	 the	 intellectual	 influences	 on	 his	
thought,	but	it	allows	us	at	least	a	partial	and	possibly	helpful	insight	on	what	he		was	working	
on	and	kept	close	at	hand	later	on	in	his	life.	




c) 34	 items	 catalogued	 as	 of	 ethical	 subject,260	including	 titles	 such	 as	 Plato's	 Timaeus	
with	 Calcidius'	 commentary, 261 	Isidor	 of	 Seville's	 Ethimologiae, 262 	Cicero's	 De	
inventione	and	De	oratore,263	and	possibly	the	Rhetoric	ad	Herennium;264	
d) merely	6	entries	on	metaphysical	matters,		including	Buridan's	Quaestiones	in	XII	libros	
Metaphysicorum	 Aristotelis,	 Thomas	 Aquinas'	 Super	 XII	 libros	 Metaphysicae,	 and	 a	
























We	 do	 not	 know	 if	 the	 internal	 thematic	 divisions	 in	 the	 collections	 were	 established	
arbitrarily	 by	 the	 master	 librarian,	 or	 if	 they	 mirrored	 Marsilius'	 own	 arrangement	 of	 his	
library.		
What	 can	we	 learn	 from	 this	 list?	The	preponderant	number	of	 theological	 entries	 is	 easily	








Ysaac	 in	 pergameno	 [Isaac	 ben	 Salomon	 Israeli].	 (183)	 Item	 (462)	 lilium	 medicine	 bonum	 in	 pergameno	
[Bernard	 of	 Gordon,	 Lilium	 medicinae].	 (184)	 Item	 (464)	 liberum	 [sic]	 Galieni	 ad	 Glauconem	 in	 pergameno	
[Galen,	Ad	Glauconem	de	medendi	methodo].	(185)	Item	(465)	aliquos	alios	libellos	et	sexternos	in	medicina	parvi	
valoris."	
268	AUH	 I,2	 nr.	 466:	 "(335)	 Primo	 (582)	 logica	 Alberti	 in	 papiro.	 (336)	 Item	 (583)	 antiquas	 questiones	 super	






(595)	 commentum	Boecii	 super	 predicamenta	Aristotelis	 in	 pergameno.	 (347)	 Item	 (596)	questiones	magistri	




269	AUH	 I,2	 nr.	 467:	 "(353)	 Primo	 (602)	 secundum	Prisciani	Minoris.	 (354)	 Item	 (603)	 recepta	 ex	 2o	 eiusdem.	
(355)	Item	(604)	poetriam	novam	et	syonima.	(356)	Item	(605)	unum	librum	cum	multis	vocabulis.	(357)	Item	
(606)	diversos	tractatos	de	arte	metrificandi	et	rigmatizandi.	(358)	Item	(607)	quendam	librum	metricum.	(359)	
Item	 (608)	 hystoriam	 Alexandri.	 (360)	 Item	 (609)	 poetriam	 novam.	 (361)	 Item	 (610)	 unum	 tractatum	




librum	 metaphysicorum.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 quite	 possible	 that	 Marsilius	 had	 been	
working	and	lecturing	on	ethical	subjects	at	some	point	in	Heidelberg	and	on	at	least	some	of	









[=	 Super	 Porphirium?,	 Super	 Praedicamenta?,	














270	In	 addiction	 to	Marsilius'	 known	or	preserved	works,	 the	presence	of	 several	 titles	 in	his	 collection	on	 the	






















It	 is	 likely	 that	 most	 of	 Marsilius'	 logical	 works	 have	 been	 composed	 at	 an	 earlier	 date,	
especially	his	treatises	in	the	so-called	logica	modernorum.272	This	could	be	supported	also	by	
the	 lack	 of	 any	 of	 these	 works	 by	 Marsilius	 in	 this	 collection	 and	 the	 presence	 only	 of	
(presumably)	Albert	of	 Saxony's	Perutilis	Logica	 out	of	 the	 summae	 and	 the	 treatises	 in	 the	
same	genre.	Most	of	 the	volumes	 in	 this	 group	are	expensive	parchment	 codices,	objects	of	
value	in	their	own	right,	some	are	even	"antiques".	Several	among	these	are	commentaries	on	
the	logica	vetus.	This	is	not	enough	to	conclude	that	Marsilius'	Quaestiones	in	artem	veterem	(a	
paper	 copy	of	which	 is	 in	 the	 list	 too)	have	been	composed	or	 revised	 in	Heidelberg,	but	 it	
could	bring	some	support	 to	 this	kind	of	hypothesis.	Certainly,	according	 to	 the	complier	of	
the	catalogue,	Marsilius	had	at	least	lectured	on	this	text	at	some	point	in	Heidelberg.	On	the	
same	 uncertain	 ground,	 we	 tentatively	 put	 forward	 a	 similar	 hypothesis	 for	 Marsilius'	
Quaestiones	on	the	First	and	Second	Analytics,	of	which	too	we	find	paper	copies	in	the	same	







working	 notes	 by	 Marsilius.	 This	 is	 a	 wild	 guess,	 but	 it	 could	 have	 some	 gounding	 since	
several	 of	 the	 other	 volumes	 in	 Marsilius'	 library	 are	 indeed	 on	 topical	 matters	 or	 on	 the	
Sophistical	refutations,	which	shows	at	 least	an	active	interest	on	his	part	on	the	subject.	On	




his	 other	 projects.	 Sadly,	 we	 do	 not	 have	 enough	 data	 to	move	 beyond	 the	 realm	 of	mere	
conjecture.	





sake	 that	 this	absence	 is	meaningful	and	 that	Marsilius	does	not	have	many	 tecnical	 logical	
works	beforehand	in	his	last	few	years:	such	lack	would	still	not	be	surprising	because	of	the	
earlier	 dating	 of	 Marsilius'	 logica	modernorum	 treatises,	 but	 it	 would	 not	 prove	 a	 shift	 in	





Despite	having	 led	a	 life	 full	of	 institutional	engagements,	Marsilius	of	 Inghen	seems	to	be	a	


























274	The	 attribution	 to	Marsilius	 is	 doubtful	 at	 least:	 according	 to	 a	 later	marginal	 addition	 in	 the	 only	 known	
maniscript	containing	 	 this	 text,	 the	Questiones	are	attributed	to	a	certain	"master	Simon".	See	Weijers	 [2005].	
The	Doctrinale	 is	 a	 handbook	 of	 latin	 grammar	 and	 arithmetics	 in	 leonine	 verses	 composed	 by	 Alexander	 de	
Villadei	around	1200.	The	text	is	edited	in	Reichling	[1893].	
275	Lists	 of	Marsilius'	works	usually	 add	 also	 a	Quaestio	utrum	qualitas	suscipit	magis	et	minus;	 however	 some	
very	 convincing	 arguments	 against	 its	 authenticity	 and	 a	 plausible	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 origin	 of	 this	
misattribution	have	been	put	forward	by	Bakker	[2000,	121-123]	and	Kaluza	[1995,	197,	n.	1]	
276	I	take	Marsilius'	Abreviationes,	available	also	in	an	early	modern	edition	[Venice	1521]	to	be	authentic	untill	
proven	 otherwise:	 from	 what	 I	 could	 see,	 the	 content	 is	 compatible	 with	 Marsilius'	 philosophical	 positions;	





























280		The	 insertion	of	Aristotle's	Rhetoric	 among	moral	works	was	quite	common	 in	 the	Middle	Ages,	as	argued	
already	by	Murphy	[1969]	and	[1981].	However,	a	more	nuanced	assesment	would	be	more	appropriate	-	see	for	
exampe	Briggs	 [2007].	Roughly,	 the	 insertion	of	Rhetoric	 (and	Poetics)	among	either	 logical	or	ethical	matters	
depends	 on	 each	 author's	 take	 on	 how	 the	Organon	 should	 be	 defined:	 either	 in	 an	 "extended"	 way	 (e.g.	 as	
Thomas	Aquinas	did)	or	in	a	"narrow"	way.	In	the	last	quarter	of	the	XIV	century	in	the	curricula	of	most	central	
European	Universities,	Aristotle's	Rhetoric	is	considered	as	a	moral	text	and	in	the	same	way	it	is	listed	in	the	XIV	







































In	preparing	 the	 following	edition	of	Marsilius	of	 Inghen's	Consequentiae,	 the	 complexity	of	
the	manuscript	 tradition	 and	 the	 palaeographical	 difficulties	 entailed	 a	 long	 editorial	work	
and	some	substantial	editorial	choices	(II.4).	In	order	to	justify	those	choices	I	will	introduce	





Marsilius	of	 Inghen's	Consequentiae	 is	divided	 in	two	books	clearly	conceived	as	continuous	
parts	of	a	unitary	project	 -	as	shown	by	several	 internal	 references	 to	 the	other	pars287	and	
confirmed	by	the	manuscript	tradition.288	
The	 first	 book	 is	 on	 consequentia	 in	 general	 and,	 as	 it	 is	 quite	 common	 in	 the	 genre,	 it	 is	
structured	 in	 three	 macro-sections	 respectively,	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 consequentia,	 its	
subdivisions,	and	the	rules	controlling	it.	
After	 a	 short	 introduction,	 Marsilius	 deals	 with	 the	 matter	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 what	 a	
consequentia	is	and	what	the	notion	of	consequentia	is	supposed	to	capture.		
Once	 Marsilius	 has	 chosen	 a	 preferred	 account	 of	 consequentia,	 after	 an	 extensive	
examination,	he	distinguishes	between	formal	and	material	consequentiae	and	offers	a	further	
























out	 to	 be	 is	 quite	 controversial	 -	 both	 for	 the	 medieval	 authors	 and	 the	 contemporary	
interpreters.290	In	 any	 case,	 exponibiles	 are	 the	 subject	 of	 a	 specific	 "genre"	 in	 the	 logica	
modernorum,	 that	 comes	 to	 be	 codified	 in	 the	 XIV	 century.	 The	 second	 book	 of	 Marsilius'	
Consequentiae	presents	the	same	subdivisions	usually	found	in	these	treatises	on	exponibiles:	
																																																								
289	This	approach	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	"Continental"	 tradition;	on	 the	other	hand	the	"English"	 tradition	 tends	 to	

















the	kind	of	 exponible	 sentence	discussed	 in	 that	 chapter,	 its	 subspecies	 and	how	 to	 expose	
them;	 and	 the	 second	 one	 stating	 the	 specific	 rules	 for	 inferences	 involving	 that	 type	 of	
exponible	 sentence.	 Such	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 exponibiles	 is	 not	 common	 in	 consequentiae	
treatises,	especially	 in	those	belonging	to	the	Continental	tradition	(e.g.	Buridan's	 in	primis).	
However,	 it	 is	not	unique	 to	Marsilius'	work:	some	discussions	of	expositiones	or	 inferences	
involving	exponibiles	are	included	both	(in	nuce)	in	some	older	treatises	and	(sometimes	more	
systematically)	 in	 some	contemporary	ones	 focusing	on	consequentiae	 especially	within	 the	
English	tradition	-	as,	for	example,	in	Richard	Billingham's	De	consequentiis291	or,	later,	in	the	
section	De	conditionali	et	rationali		in	Paul	of	Venice's	Logica.292	




292	Paulus	Venetus	 [1990]	 counts	 the	kind	of	 inference	holding	 "ab	exposita	ad	alteram	suarum	exponentium"	
among	his	modi	simplices	arguendi.	See	Bertagna	[1994,	538]	
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as	 part	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 consequentiae	 properly	 speaking)	 are	 not	 commonly	 found	 in	













Ulm.	 The	 codex	 contains,	 among	 other	 texts,	 also	 Marsilius'	 Suppositiones,	 Ampliationes,	
Appellationes,	Restrictiones,	Alienationes.	At	 the	end	of	his	 transcription	of	 the	Suppositiones,	
Albrecht	notes	that	the	treatise	was	composed	in	Paris;294	he	does	not	do	as	much	for	any	of	
the	other	treatises.	
Furthermore,	 the	 codex	 contains	 also	 some	 Quaestiones	 parvorum	 logicalium	 (Q.	 de	
suppositionibus,	Q.	de	ampliationubus,	Q.	de	appellationibus,	De	septem	regulis	appellationibus,	






Book	 I	 -	 incipit:	 "Tractaturus	 de	 consequentiis	tenebo	Dei	 iuvamine	istum	 modum	
procedendi...".	-	Excipit:	"Excipit	prima	pars	consequenciarum	reverendi	Magsitri	Marsilij	anno	
domini	1436		3o	nonas	Iunij	ante	horam	quartam	postmeridiem.	Johannes	de	Constantia.	(?)".	
	Book	 II	 -	 incipit:	 "Circa	 secundam	 partem	 consequenciarum	 vi.	 Circa	 secundam	 partem	
consequenciarum	videndum	est	de	consequenciis	ab	exponentibus	ad	expositas...".	Excipit:	"Et	
sic	 de	 exposicionibus	 ly	 ita	 et	 sic	 sufficiant	 et	 sic	 est	 finis	 consequenciarum	de	 exposicione	
proposicionum	 reuerendi.	 Excipit	 2a	 pars	 consequenciarum	 reuerendi	 magistrij	 Marsilij	
scripta	per	me	Alberchtum	Loeffler	 tunc	 temporis	Ulme	 sub	anno	domini	1436	pridie	 ydus	
Iunij	indiccionum	14o."	
Alternate	Book	I	(253ra-262vb)	-	incipit:	"Utrum	diffinicio	consequencie	sit	bona	qua	dicitur	







contains	 Book	 I	 and	 Book	 II	 (incomplete)	 and	 among	 the	 other	 texts	 also	 Marsilius'	
Suppositiones,	Ampliationes,	Appellationes	et	Restrictiones.	
Incipit:	"Tractaturus	de	consequentiis	tenebo	Dei	adiutorio	istum	modum."	Excipit:	"ita	et	suis	
consequenciis	 et	 ex	 consequenti	 de	ultimo	 capitulo	principali	 dicta	 sufficiant	 et	 sic	 est	 finis	








Origin:	 Erfurt	 (?).	 Material:	 thick	 pigskin	 cover.	 Date:	 first	 half	 of	 the	 XV	 century.	 The	







Origin:	 Germany	 -	 Ulm;	 Italy	 -	 Brescia.	 	Material:	 paper.	 Date:	 XV	 sec:	 1423	 for	 part	 of	 the	
manuscript;	 the	 Consequentiae	 dates	 1438.	 The	 manuscript	 contains	 Book	 I	 and	 Book	 II,	
following	 Marsilius'	 Suppositiones	 (1423),	 Ampliationes,	 Appellationes,	 Restrictiones	 et	
Alienationes,	all	under	the	common	title	of	Parva	Logicalia.	




























Origin:	 ?.	 Material:	 paper.	 Date:	 1429	 (f.	 231v).	 The	 manuscript	 contains	 part	 of	 the	



















Origin:	 Germany;	 previously	 at	 St.	 Matthias'	 Abbey	 Library.	Material:	 paper;	 leather	 bound	






of	 Book	 II,	 however	 separated	 by	 Marsilius'	 Suppositiones,	 Ampliationes,	 Appellationes,	 and	
Restrictiones	et	Alienationes;	Book	II	is	followed	by	Marsilius'	Obligationes.306	
Incipit:	 "Tractaturus	 de	 consequenciis	 tenebo	 dei	 adiutorio	 istum	 modum	 procedendi..."	 -	








306	It	 is	not	Marsilius'	 Insolubilia	 as	Bos	 [1983,	25]	writes	and	not	Pierre	d'Ailly's	Obligationes	 as	 the	 tentative	
attribution	 by	 Adersson-Schmitt	 -	 Hallberg	 -	 Hedlund	 [1993,	 191].	 The	 incipit	 and	 excipit	 of	 this	 treatise	
correspond	to	those	of	Marsilius'	Obligationes	as	in	ms.	Vienna,	Österreichische	Nationalbibliothek,	V.P.L.	5162,	








from	 the	 English	 tradition,	 including	 among	 other	 things:	 Ralph	 Strode's	 Consequentiae;309	
Richard	Ferrybridge's	Consequentiae;310	Peter	of	Candia's	Consequentiae;311	the	first	particula	
of	 Burley's	 De	 puritate;312	William	 Buser's	 treatise	 on	 Obligationes;313	Richard	 Billingham's	
Conclusiones;314	and	a	treatise	on	Insolubilia	ascribed	to	Bradwardine.315	












Incipit:	 "Tractaturus	 de	 consequentiis	 tenebo	 dei	 adiutorio	 in	 factu	 modo	 procedendi."	 -	
Excipit	 (119r):	 "quod	deus	non	est	maius	bonus	quam	dyabolus	et	hoc	<de>	expositionibus	
																																																																																																																																																																																								

















Origin:	 Vienna?	 Date:	 XV	 -	 1449	 (f.	 117v);	 1437	 (f.	 137v).	 The	manuscript	 contains	 Book	 I	
(1449)	and	an	older	copy	of	Book	II	(1437),	along	with	Marsilius'	Suppositiones,	Ampliationes,	







Material:	 paper.	 Date:	 1401	 and	 second	 quarter	 of	 the	 XV	 century;	 the	 section	 including	
Marsilius'	Consequentiae	dates	1401.	The	manuscript	contains:	Book	I	and	Book	II,	Marsilius'	
Suppositiones,	 Ampliationes,	 Appellationes,	 Restrictiones	 et	 Alienationes,	 Obligationes	 and	
Insolubilia;	partial	double	copies	of	the	Suppositiones	and	Ampliationes	in	another	hand;		and	
several	other	logical	fragments	and	anonymous	treatises.	
Incipit:	 "Tractaturus	 de	 consequentiis	 dei	 tenebo	 adiutorio	 istum	 modum	 procedendi."	 -	
Excipit:	"quod	deus	non	est	minus	bonus	quam	diabolus	tamen	non	debet	negari	in	praesentia	
loicorum	 eo	 quod	 male	 sonat	 haec	 de	 exponentibus	 sicut	 et	 ita	 et	 suis	 consequentiis	 et	







magistri	Marsilii	de	 Inghen	pro	quo	 laudetur	Deus	noster	 Jesus	Christus	sine	 fine	 in	saecula	




Origin:	 Vienna,	 previously	 at	 Vienna	 Old	 University	 Library.	 Material:	 paper.	 Date:	 second	
quarter	of	 the	XV	century.	Among	other	things,	 the	manuscript	contains	Book	I	and	Book	II,	




ipsorum	 sicut	 et	 ita	 et	 suis	 consequentiis	 sufficiant	 et	 per	 consequens	 de	 ultimo	 capitulo	
principali	 istius	 libri	 dicta	 sufficiant	 et	 sic	 est	 finis	 presentis	 tractatus	magistri	Marsilio	 de	






Ms.	 Date	 Origin	 Supp.	 Ampl.	 App.	 Rest.-Al.	 Cons.	 Oblig.	 Insol.	















W	 Cons.	 Germany?	 f.	 72r- f.	 85r- f.	 93r- f.	 101r- I-II:	 f.	 f.	 140r- (part.)	 f.	
																																																								























































































































































































F	 First	 half	 Erfurt?	 f.	 132r- f.	 141r- f.	 147r- 	 I-II?:	 	 	
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Most	 of	 Marsilius'	 known	 treatises	 on	 the	 logica	 modernorum	 are	 grouped	 by	 the	 early	
modern	 commentator	 Conrad	 Pschlacher	 under	 the	 title	 of	 Parva	 logicalia	 (little	 logical	
matters)	and		presented	in	this	order:	Suppositiones,	Appelationes,	Ampliationes,	Restrictiones,	
Alienationes,	Consequentiae.320	The	 text	 is	 strongly	abbreviated	and	of	 little	or	no	use	 for	an	





et	 clarissimi	 philosophi	 Marsilii	 dialectices	 documenta	 cum	 utilissimis	 commentariis	 per	 virum	 preclarum	






(Suppositiones	 prodierunt	 sub	 nomine	 Marsilii	 Parisiensis),	 but	 I	 was	 unable	 to	 obtain	 a	 copy	 of	 the	 volume.	
Moreover,	 Marsilius'	Obligationes	 is	 printed	 under	 Peter	 of	 Ailly's	 name	 as	Tractatus	 de	 arte	 obligandi	 (Paris	
1489).	
	 82	
critical	 edition	 of	 the	 Treatises	 on	 the	 Properties	 of	 Terms	 (as	 his	 volume	 is	 aptly	 titled),	
including	 the	 works	 up	 to	 the	 Alienationes.322		 I	 am	 presenting	 here	 an	 edition	 of	 the	
Consequentiae.		
	
Were	 these	 treatises	 conceived	 as	 separate	 works	 or	 as	 a	 continuous	 project	 with	 some	
degree	of	unity	-	of	the	kind	that	might	be	shared	by	a	series	of	lectures,	or	the	notes	for	the	
same	class?		
It	 is	 probable	 that	 later	 on	Marsilius	 lectured	 on	 these	 treatises	 in	 succession,	 for	 example	
possibly	 for	 the	 first	 class	 he	 taught	 in	 loycam	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Heidelberg	 in	 1386.323	





Ms.	 Date	 Sup.	 Ampl.	 App.	 Rest./Al.	 Cons.	
I	
Cons.	II	 Obl.	 Ins.	
1)		Erfurt,	Ampl.		Q.	326	 End	XIV	 x	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2)		Pistoia,	Archivio	Capitolare,	61	 End	XIV	 x	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
3)		Vienna,	Osterr.	Nazion.	4698	 End	XIV	 x	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
4)		Sion,	Bibl.	cant.	du	Valais,	73	 XV	 x	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
5)	 Kremsmünster,	 Bibl.	
Cremifanensis,	C	81	
XIV-XV	 	 	 x	 	 	 	 	 	
6)		Workław,	Bibl.	Un.	IV	Q	6	 1423	 	 	 	 x	 	 	 	 	
7)		Krakow,	Bibl.	Jag.	2054	 1428	 	 	 	 x	 	 	 	 	
8)		V		 1400-1404	 	 	 	 	 x	 	 	 	





Ms.	 Date	 Sup.	 Ampl.	 App.	 Rest./Al.	 Cons.	
I	
Cons.	II	 Obl.	 Ins.	
10)	Vat.,	Pal.	Lat.	995	 1457	 	 	 	 	 	 	 x	 x	
11)	Erfurt,	Ampl.	Q	30	 End	XIV	 x	 x	 x	 	 	 	 	 	
12)	Erfurt,	Ampl.	Q	283	 1450	 x	 x	 x	 	 	 	 	 	
13)	 Turin,	 Bibl.	 Naz.	 1009	 [III	 G	
12]	(Pasini	lat.	449)	[a]	
1406	 abbr.	 abbr.	 abbr.	 	 	 	 	 	





[16] 15)	 Turin,	 Turin,	 Bibl.	 Naz.	 1009	
[III	G	12]	(Pasini	lat.	449)	[b]	
1406	 x	 x	 x	 x	 	 	 	 	
16)	Göttingen,	Univ.,	Lün.	66	 1414	 x	 x	 x	 				x*324	 	 	 	 	
17)	Prague,		Metr.	Kap.,	1388	 Beginning	XV	 x	 x	 x	 x	 	 	 	 	
18)	Krakow,	Bibl.	Jag.,		1906	 1446	 x	 x	 x	 x	 	 	 	 	
19)	 Cologne,	
Erzdiozesanbibliothek	57		
XV	 x	 x	 x	 x	 	 	 	 	
20)	F	 First	half	XV	 x	 x	 x	 	 x	 x	 	 	












23)	Kr	 XV	 x	 x	 x	 	 x	 X	 	 	
24)	E	 1421	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x	 X	 	 	
25)	N2	 1429	 x	 x	 x	 x	 part	 Part	 	 	























Ms.	 Date	 Sup.	 Ampl.	 App.	 Rest./Al.	 Cons.	
I	
Cons.	II	 Obl.	 Ins.	
29)	Y	 XV	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x	 X	 	 	







31)	M	 1412	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x	 X	 	 part	
32)	W	 1401	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x	 X	 x	 part	
	









2.3.1	 The	 Manuscript	 Circulation	 and	 the	 Initial	 Core	 Block	 (Suppositiones,	 Ampliationes,	
Appellationes)	






325	Bos	 [1983,	 98]:	 "Dictum	 de	 suppositionibus	 dicendum	 est	 de	 ampliationibus."	 Bos	 [1983,	 128]:	 "Dicto	 de	
ampliationibus	 dicendum	 est	 de	 appellationibus."	 Bos	 [1983,	 160]:	 "Postquam	 determinatum	 est	 de	
appellationibus,	restat	nunc	determinare	de	restrictionibus	et	de	alienatione	termini	a	sua	suppositione."	
	 85	
XV	 c.)	 contains	 a	 single	 copy	of	 the	Appellationes	 [n.	 5	 in	 the	 table	 above]	 and	 two	 codices,	
both	dating	from	the	1420s,	have	the	Restrictiones	et	alienationes	alone	[n.	6-7].	The	treatise	
on	Ampliationes	always	circulates	with	the	Suppositiones	and	with	the	the	Appellationes	[n.	11-
13],	 sometimes	 with	 the	 addiction	 of	 the	 Restrictiones	 et	 alienationes	 [n.	 15-19],	 or	 the	
Consequentiae	 [n.	 20-23],	 or	both	 [n.	 24-29].	One	of	 the	oldest	manuscripts,	U	 [n.	 30,	 1388,	
Prague],	 has	 the	Suppositiones,	Ampliationes,	Appellationes,	 both	books	 of	 the	Consequentiae	




then	Book	 I	 (f.	23r-31v),	and	 the	Obligationes	 (f.	32r-61r).	This	manuscript	 requires	 further	
studies,	but	it	seems	unlikely	that	its	peculiar	internal	ordering	is	the	result	of	the	incorrect	
binding	 of	 unbound	 peciae:	 the	 blank	 page	 between	 Book	 II	 and	 the	 Suppositiones	 (f.	 13v)	
would	lead	us	to	think	instead	that	the	latter	was	copied	first	and	the	other	treatises	followed.	
Another	 fairly	 good	 manuscript,	 M	 [n.	 31,	 1412],	 contains	 all	 the	 treatises	 up	 to	 the	

















This	 kind	 of	 circulation	 is	 paralleled	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 at	 least	 three	 principal	 versions	
(without	 counting	 the	 abbreviated	 one)328 	of	 the	 treatises	 on	 the	 properties	 of	 terms,	
individuated	 by	 Bos: 329 	the	 textual	 and	 conceptual	 differences	 are	 more	 evident	 and	
consistent	 in	 the	 Suppositiones	 and	 basically	 negligible	 in	 the	 other	 treatises.	 Textually,	
Version	 I	 is	generally	more	concise	 than	Version	 III:	 it	has	 fewer	examples,	 it	omits	at	 least	
three	 extended	 passages	 present	 in	 Version	 III,	 and	 its	 opening	 passage	 is	 different	 and	
shorter.330	Conceptually,	 the	 main	 theoretical	 difference	 between	 Version	 I	 and	 Version	 III	
concerns	the	supposition	of	(grammatically)	relative	terms.	For	example,	Version	I	embraces	
Buridan's	position	on	 two	 issues:	on	 the	verification	of	 the	 term	taking	 the	relative	 (i.e.	 the	
antecedent	 to	 that	 relative);	and	on	 the	effect	of	universalization	or	of	 the	negation	 (e.g.	by	
means	 of	 terms	 like	 onmis	 and	 nullus)	 on	 the	 supposition	 of	 relative	 terms.331	Version	 III	
shows	a	marked	shift	from	Buridan's	position	to	a	theory	closer	to	Albert	of	Saxony's.	332	For	




partial;	 Ralph	 Strode's	Consequentiae	 [f.	 5r-13v];	 Johannes	 Venator	 Anglicus'	De	 terminis	 et	propositionibus	 [f.	
15ra-75ra];	Walter	Burley's	De	primo	et	ultimo	instanti	 [f.	78rb-80rb];	Richard	Billinham's	Speculum	puerorum	










relative	 supposits	 only	 for	 that	 of	 which	 its	 antecedent	 is	 verified	 in	 the	 main	 clause.	 In	
Version	II,	Marsilius	holds	that	we	can	speak	of	verification	also	for	the	relative	term	itself	and	
not	 only	 for	 its	 antecedent,	 therefore	 a	 negation	 or	 a	 universalizing	 syncategorematic	
applying	to	the	relative	term	does	change	its	supposition	compared	to	the	supposition	of	its	
antecedent	 in	 the	main	 clause.	Textually	Version	 II	 is	 in	between	Version	 I	 and	Version	 III;	
conceptually	it	is	in	line	with	Version	III.333	
Version	I	is	preserved	in	two	manuscripts	[n.	11	and	N1,	n.	14],	both	from	the	end	of	the	XIV	
century	 and	 containing	 also	 the	 Ampliationes	 and	 the	 Appellationes. 334 	Version	 II	 is	








(the	 oldest	 witnesses	 respectively	 of	 Version	 I	 and	 Version	 III),	 Bos	 indicates	 1382	 as	 the	
terminus	 ante	 quem	 for	 Version	 I	 and	 1388	 for	 Version	 III;	 the	 terminus	 post	 quem	 is	
Marsilius'	inceptio	in	1362.336		










might	 be	 shed	 in	 the	 future	 by	 the	 on-going	 edition	 project	 of	 Marsilius'	 philosophical	
works.337		
The	 situation	 is	 similar	 for	 Version	 II	 and	 Version	 III.	 Since	 the	 manuscript	 circulation	 of	
Version	 I	 is	 limited	 to	 only	 two	 specimens,	we	might	 guess	 that	 an	 updated	 edition	 of	 the	














consideration	 is	 only	 in	 Version	 III.	 If	 this	 is	 actually	 a	 "revised"	 version	meant	 for	 wider	
circulation,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 general	 etiquette	 of	 "Parisian"	 refers	 to	 a	 commonly	 shared	
philosophical	position	in	Paris	and	is	intended	to	be	recognisable	by	a	more	extended	public.	
Nevertheless	 this	 does	 not	 exclude	 in	 principle	 Marsilius'	 institutional	 affiliation	 with	 the	
																																																								
337	Paul	 Bakker	 and	 Hanna	 Wojtczak	 are	 preparing	 editions	 of	 Marsilius'	 Parva	 Naturalia,	 Questions	 on	 the	








Sed	 diceret	 aliquis:	 'Tu	 in	 Suppositionibus	 [=	 Version	 I]	 tuis	 dixisti	 oppositum.'	 Secundo	 diceret	
aliquis:	'Communiter	scola	Parisiensis	dicit	oppositum.'		
Ad	 primam	 respondeo	 quod	 protunc	 dixi	 sicut	 magistri	 mei	 de	 universitate	 Parisiensi,	 nec	 ad	
modum	loquendi	ita	precise	adverti	sicut	postea	feci.	Nec	reputo	inconveniens,	si	autem	prius	dicta	
nunc	in	melius	mutavi.	




responsio	 on	Marsilius'	 own	Parisian	 education	would	 be	 still	 justified.	Moreover,	Marsilius	
talks	here	of	 the	"manifesto"	of	 the	Parisian	school	 in	the	present	 tense	(vult),	which	would	
probably	 be	 incorrect	 by	 the	 time	 he	 is	 in	 Heidelberg	 -	 especially	 after	 the	 exodus	
(particularly	evident	in	the	English	nation)	of	Marsilius'	masters	and	colleagues	in	the	wake	of	
the	Western	 Schism.342	Marsilius'	 estrangement	 from	 the	 "Parisian	 school"	 looks	 primarily	
intellectual,	a	parting	from	the	Parisian	way,	but	not	necessarily	institutional.		
As	for	Bos'	point	(b),	most	of	the	Version	III	manuscripts	are	of	German	origin	and	it	would	
not	 be	 unlikely	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 German	words	 is	 due	 to	 the	 copyists'	 choice	 of	more	
common	and	familiar	terms	-	especially	for	words	referring	to	currency.	Moreover,	the	use	of	
marcha/marcae	is	standard	in	examples	about	dialectical	inferences	like	the	one	it	appears	in	




you	 have	 asserted	 the	 opposite'.	 Secondly,	 someone	 might	 argue:	 'Generally	 the	 school	 of	 Paris	 says	 the	
opposite'.	To	the	first	doubt,	I	answer	that,	the,	I	spoke	like	my	teachers	of	the	University	of	Paris,	and	I	did	not	
pay	 attention	 to	 the	 general	 usage	of	 language	 as	 accurately	 as	 I	 have	been	doing	 since.	And	 I	 do	not	 think	 it	
improper	to	change	what	I	have	said	before	for	something	better.	To	the	second	doubt,	I	say	that	the	school	of	
Paris	does	not	have	 in	mind	something	other	 than	that	a	relative	of	 identity	supposits	exactly	 for	 those	things	
concerning	which	the	proposition,	in	which	its	antecedent	occurs,	is	verified."	
342	See	I.1.3	
343	See	Marsilius	 of	 Inghen,	Consequentiae	 I.3.5	 <7>:	 "…	 'velle	 esse	 in	 luto	 pro	 centum	marcis'	 non	 est	 pars	 in	
modo	ad	'velle	esse	in	luto',	quia	isto	modo	marcae	diminuunt	a	voluntate	simpliciter."	There	is	nothing	unusual	
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his	 inaugural	 course	 of	 lectures	 in	 loycam	 in	Heidelberg	 in	 1386.	 Nevertheless,	 even	 if	 this	
were	 the	 case,	 it	 would	 not	 prove	 that	 Version	 II/III	 were	 reworked	 for	 that	 occasion	 or	
shortly	 before:	 the	 limited	 manuscript	 circulation	 of	 Version	 I	 could	 be	 pointing	 into	 a	
different	 direction.	 Furthermore,	 Marsilius	 played	 a	 paramount	 role	 in	 the	 founding	 and	
establishment	of	the	University	of	Heidelberg	-	a	role	that	 likely	took	effort	and	much	of	his	
time.344	Therefore,	if	he	actually	read	his	logica	modernorum	during	the	first	term	of	activity	of	
the	 new-born	 university,	 it	 would	 seem	 more	 likely	 that	 he	 revisited	 some	 of	 his	 already	
refined	"greatest	hits"	not	requiring	any	additional	work.		
If	we	wanted	 to	put	Marsilius	away	 from	Paris	 for	 the	writing	of	Version	 III,	another	viable	
candidate	could	even	be	Montpellier,	where	he	was	"visiting	professor"	between	the	autumn	
of	 1369	 and	 the	winter	 of	 1369-1370.345	The	position	 in	Montpellier	was	 quite	 prestigious,	
warranting	a	course	of	lectures	living	up	to	the	growing	reputation	of	a	young	Master	whose	
career	 has	 already	 taken	 off.	 However,	 it	 was	 a	 temporary	 position:	 not	 enough	 to	 ensure	
Marsilius'	institutional	detachment	from	his	alma	mater,	but	still	removed	from	Paris.		Hence	
it	 allowed	 a	 balance	 between	 belonging	 and	 estrangement	 -	 which	 would	 justify	 an	
intermediate	 reading	 of	 the	 passage	 from	 Version	 III	 of	 the	 Suppositiones	 discussed	 above.	
Furthermore,	 at	 this	 point	 Marsilius	 has	 enough	 notoriety	 to	 openly	 embrace	 a	 theory	
contrary	to	the	one	commonly	embraced	by	his	masters	at	his	home	institution.	Lastly,	since	
																																																																																																																																																																																								
here,	 neither	 in	 the	 use	 of	marcae	 nor	 in	 the	 example	 per	 se.	 A	more	 anomalous	 case	would	 be	 in	 Albert	 of	






there	 are	 some	 hints	 in	 the	 Consequentiae	 supporting	 that	 it	 was	 composed	 (or	 at	 least	
reworked)	 for	 the	 Montpellier	 lectures,346	such	 dating	 would	 put	 Version	 III	 in	 a	 closer	
chronological	proximity	and	conceptual	continuity	to	Marsilius’	Consequentiae	and	possibly	to	







seem	to	be	part	of	 this	 tighter	block,	even	 if,	 like	 the	other	 treatises,	 it	deals	with	a	 subject	
matter	 pertaining	 the	 supposition	 of	 terms.	 Conceptually,	 Bos	 noted	 that	 there	 are	 some	
differences	of	content	between	the	Restrictiones	and	the	previous	treatises:	in	particular,	here	
Marsilius	appeals	to	the	notion	of	status	(absent	in	the	previous	treatises)	to	give	a	definition	




because	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 minor	 anomaly	 in	 its	 content,	 its	 shortness,	 and	 its	 non-constant	














the	 connections	 among	 Marsilius'	 first	 four	 treatises,	 telling	 us	 a	 believable	 story	 of	 their	
development	-	even	if	the	details	concerning	the	dating	of	these	works	are	tentative	and	non-
conclusive.		
As	 for	 the	 second	 group	 of	 treatises,	 we	 should	 probably	 use	 the	 term	 "block"	 with	 some	
caution	or	merely	as	a	handy	tag:	these	treatises	seem	to	lack	the	textual	unity	of	the	"core"	
group,	 as	 it	 is	 reflected	 also	 in	 the	 manuscript	 circulation;	 the	 only	 apparent	 trait	 d'union	
among	them	are	the	(quite	loose)	conceptual	and	historical	connections	among	their	subject	




Then,	 for	 an	 overall	 assessment	 of	 the	 treatises	 in	 the	 second	 block,	 let	 us	 examine	 three	




modernorum	 treatises	 is	a	mention	of	the	Ampliationes	at	 the	end	of	Book	I.351	In	Book	II,	 in	
the	chapter	on	the	expositio	of	sentences	de	incipit,	Marsilius	talks	briefly	about	the	“time	of	
																																																								
350	The	 Consequentiae,	 Obligationes	 and	 Insolubilia	 do	 not	 consistently	 circulate	 together;	 when	 they	 do,	 the	




the	 obligation”,	 but	 makes	 no	 reference	 to	 his	 own	 Obligationes. 352 	In	 the	 working	
transcription	of	the	Obligationes	that	I	could	consult,	based	on	a	single	manuscript,353	I	could	
not	find	an	explicit	reference	to	any	of	Marsilius'	other	logical	works.	In	the	Insolubilia,	on	the	
other	 hand,	 there	 are	 at	 least	 two	 references	 to	 the	 Obligationes, 354 	but	 none	 to	 the	
Consequentiae	or	to	the	other	treatises	on	the	properties	of	terms	-	as	far	as	I	could	see.	355	In	
the	 core	 block	 and	 in	 the	 Restrictiones	 et	 alienationes	 there	 is	 no	 reference	 to	 any	 of	 the	
treatises	 of	 the	 second	 group.	Overall,	 an	 overview	of	 the	 internal	 references	 shows	 a	 split	
within	this	group,	with	the	Consequentiae	on	the	one	side	and	the	Obligtiones	and	Insolubilia	
on	the	other.	On	the	one	hand,	such	difference	between	the	Consequentiae	and	the	other	two	
treatises	 is	 also	 at	 least	 partially	 confirmed	 by	 their	 uneven	 circulation	 in	 the	 manuscript	
tradition.	On	the	other	hand,	the	closer	connection	between	the		Obligationes	and	Insolubilia	is	





primarily	 concerned	 with	 validity	 in	 several	 inferential	 contexts.	 The	 Consequentiae	 deals	
with	the	definition,	the	kinds	and	the	rules	of	valid	logical	inference/consequence/entailment.	
The	 Obligationes	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 preservation	 of	 logical	 coherence	 and	 inferential	
validity	within	the	obligational	framework	-	in	the	Obligationes	Parisienses,	an	earlier	text,	357		
																																																								
352	Consequentiae	 II,	 3,	1	 [W	131r-v;	Y	109r;	M	53v]:	 "	 ...	 in	 tempore	obligationis	obligationis	patet	quia	omnis	
actus	respondentis	et	opponentis	imaginatur	esse	pro	eodem	tempore	adequate."	
353	I	thank	Bert	Bos	for	his	transcription	of	Marsilius	Obligationes	as	transmitted	in	W.	
354	M	 f.	 64v:	 "Et	 si	 dicatur	 quod	 talem	 casum	 admissisti	 in	Obligationibus	 quia	 dicis	 hanc	 esse	 impossibilem,	
respondeo	 quod	 in	 Obligationibus	 admissi	 hanc	 propositionem....";	 M	 f.	 66r:	 "Modo	 non	 oportet	 talem	
consequentiam	valere	ut	dictum	est	in	capitulo	secundo	obligationum".	
355	I	 thank	Bert	Bos	 for	 his	working	 transcription	of	Marsilius'	 Insolubilia	 as	 transmitted	 in	M	and	W.	 Further	
studies	are	required	on	this	text	and		I	plan	to	prepare	a	critical	edition	in	the	future.	
















from	 a	 set	 of	 premises	 in	 a	 "reliable"	 way)	 are	 at	 the	 very	 core	 of	 what	 we	 commonly	
understand	to	be	(a)	logic.	Nevertheless,	it	is	also	true	that	validity	and	inference	are	the	main	
object	 of	 analysis	 in	 consequentiae	 and	 (at	 least	 in	 a	major	 sense)	 in	 obligationes,	 and	 are	
essential	 for	 the	 analysis	 and	 resolution	 of	 insolubilia.	 However,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case	 in	 the	











propositions	whose	 singular	 terms	 are	 picked	 by	 the	 respective	 common	 terms	 in	 the	 universal	 or	 particular	












the	 Insolubilia	 appears	 alone	 in	 one	 manuscript	 [n.	 9]	 and	 the	 Obligationes	 in	 none.	 Both	
treatises,	but	none	of	the	other	Marsilius'	 logica	modernorum	works,	are	together	in	another	
codex	from	the	late	1450'.	U	[n.	30,	1388]	contains	the	Obligationes,	along	with	the	core	block	
and	 the	 Consequentiae.	 M	 [n.	 31,	 1412]	 has	 part	 of	 the	 Insolubilia	 following	 all	 the	 other	
treatises	but	 the	Obligationes.	W	[n.	31,	1401]	 transmits	 them	both	along	with	all	Marsilius'	
other	treatises.	All	the	manuscripts	containing	the	Obligationes	and	the	Insolubilia	along	with	
some	 other	 part	 of	Marsilius'	 logica	modernorum	 are	 specimens	 of	 Version	 III.	 Neither	 the	
Obligationes	nor	 the	 Insolubilia	 circulates	 exclusively	 with	 the	 Consequentiae	 in	 any	 of	 the	
manuscripts	that	I	know	of.		








362	However,	 as	we	have	 seen,	Book	 II	was	 copied	 first	 in	U	 [n.	30],	 and	all	 the	other	 treatises	 followed	 in	 the	
standard	order;	and	in	D	Book	II	is	older	(1437)	than	Book	I	(1449).	
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in	 both	 cases	 a	 later	 addition.364	With	 the	 exception	 of	 V,	 in	 all	 the	 other	manuscripts	 the	
Consequentiae	accompanies	Version	III.	So	 far,	 I	was	able	 to	 identify	only	one	version	of	 the	
text	of	the	Consequentiae	and	of	the	Obligationes,	but	this	result	could	be	non-definitive.	As	of	
now,	 I	 could	 only	 access	 two	 partial	 copies	 of	 the	 Insolubilia	 (as	 in	 M	 and	W),	 which	 are	




composition	 at	 least	 of	 the	 Consequentiae	 around	 the	 time	 of	 Version	 III	 or	 shortly	 after	 -	
although	a	more	precise	dating	 is	hard	to	achieve.	On	the	basis	of	the	codices	and	following	




of	 the	 "core	 block"	 on	 the	 properties	 of	 the	 terms.	 Another	 possible	 clue,	 even	 if	 not	 a	








only	 a	 single	 mention	 of	 Montpellier,	 in	 the	 chapter	 on	 propositions	 de	 desinit	 in	 Book	 II,	
recurring	 in	all	 the	manuscripts	consulted	 for	 the	present	edition.366	If	we	were	 to	 take	 this	
mention	as	a	possible	reference	to	the	place	of	composition	of	the	text,	we	might	tentatively	
suppose	 that	 the	 Consequentiae	 was	 completed,	 or	 at	 least	 revised,	 around	 the	 time	 of	
Marsilius'	sojourn	in	Montpellier	during	the	autumn	and	winter	terms	1369-1370.	
As	 for	 the	 dating	 of	 the	 Obligationes	 and	 Insolubilia	 (even	 for	 a	 merely	 relative	 one),	 the	





However,	 the	 lack	 of	 mention	 of	 either	 the	 Obligationes	 or	 the	 Insolubilia	 in	 any	 of	 the	
treatises	on	the	properties	of	the	terms		or	the	Consequentiae		(even	in	passages	in	which	such	
references	 would	 have	 been	 thematically	 appropriate)	 would	 weigh	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 later	
composition.	In	this	case,	also	the	feeble	support	of	geographical	references	is	of	 little	or	no	
help:	as	far	as	I	could	see,	there	are	no	geographical	references	in	the	Insolubilia	and	far	too	
many	 in	 the	Obligationes	 -	 as	 typical	 of	many	 common	 examples	 in	 this	 genre	 of	 treatises.	
Among	the	many	mentions	of	Paris	and	Rome	through	the	entire	treatise,	there	is	also	one	of	





368	Obligationes,	W	 f.	146r:	 "'ego	 sum	Colonie'	 est	de	 facto	 falso	quare	 impossibile	 secundum	quid	et	 si	 vadam	
illuc	 postquam	 ibidem	 fui,	 erit	 vera	 proportionaliter	 ista:	 'ego	 non	 fui	 Colonie'	 -	 est	 iam	 de	 facto	 vera	 et	 ex	
consequentia	necessaria	secundum	quid	et	posquam	ibidem	fuero	erit	falsa."	
369	"Ammone"	in	the	text	-	Obligationes,	W	f.	159r-160r:	"Aliud	exemplum:	denotatis	propositionibus	similibus	sit	
tale:	pono	 tibi	existenti	 in	Monte	Pessolano:	 'tu	es	 in	Monte	Pessolano.'	 Si	negas,	negas	verum	et	 impertinens.	
Eodem	modo	arguitur	si	dubitas	et	quod	sit	vera	motum	est,	et	quod	sit	impertinens	patet,	quia	non	sequitur	'tu	
es	in	monte	Pessolano,'	ut	notim	est	ex	corrolariis	capituli	secundi,	Si	condedis,	arguitur	sic:	tu	concedis	falsum	et	
impertinens,	 probatum	 est	 ante,	 et	 quod	 ipsa	 sit	 falsa	 probatur,	 quia	 ipsa	 est	 similis	 huic	 tu	 es	 in	 Ammone.	
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that	 do	 not	 have	 an	 exact	 match	 in	 Buser's	 work.370	However,	 if	 the	 isolated	 mention	 of	
Montpellier	 could	 be	 a	 weak	 clue	 in	 the	 Consequentiae	 along	 with	multiple	 and	 consistent	





Propositum	non	constat	quod	non	potest	esse	 similis	 illi	nisi	 in	 falsitate	 cum	 idem	non	potest	esse	 in	diversis	
locis,	ergo	quod	est	falsa.	Item	concessa	ea	proponitur	tibi	ista:	'tu	es	in	Ammone.'	Si	negas	vel	dubitas,	concedis	
unum	falsum	et	negas	vel	dubutas	reliquum	ergo	male.	Consequentia	 tenet	per	communem	regulam	dicentem	





similes	 intrinsece,	 ut	 ambe	 sunt	 vere	 vel	 in	 falsitate	 quod	 ambe	 sunt	 false.	Ad	 illud	 respondetur	 ab	 aloquibus	
premittendo	/f.	159v/	tamquam	pro	secunda	regola	regula	generali	observanda	in	positione	propositionumum	
similium,	quia	quandoque	posuit	aliquas	propositiones	esse	similes,	que	non	possunt	esse	similes	nisi	in	falsitate,	
tunc	 qua+m+cumque	 istarum	 praeposita	 primo	 loco	 est	 neganda	 quia	 falsa	 ex	 posito.	 Secunda	 tegula	 quod	
quando	 ponuntur	 aliqae	 propositiones	 esse	 similes	 que	 non	 possunt	 esse	 similes	 nisi	 in	 veritate,	 tunc	
quecumque	primo	loco	est	proposita	est	concedenda	quia	ex	posito	sequitur	ipsam	esse	veram.	Ex	quibus	multas	
regulas	 speciales	 concludunt	 de	 quibus	 hic	 propter	 brevitatem	 obticetur.	 Hiis	 premissis	 respondetur	 ad	
sophisma	admittendo	positum	et	negando	istam	propsoitam	'tu	est	in	monte	Pessolano'	iuxta	regulam	primam,	
quia	due	propositiones	predicte	non	possunt	 esse	 similes	nisi	 in	 falsitate,	 ut	 dicutum	est	 in	 arguendo,	 et	 ideo	
negant	earum	propositam.	Sed	ex	dictis	paptet	in	primo	istius	responsionis,	nam	ista:	'tu	es	in	monte	Pessolano'	
est	impertinens	et	extra	concederetur,	ergo	debes	eam	infra	concedere.	Ex	alio,	nam	esto	quid	regule	hic	starent	
adhuc	 suppositum	eorum	esset	 falsum,	 sc.	 quod	dicte	 propositiones	 non	possunt	 esse	 similes	 nisi	 in	 falsitate,	
nam	 per	 novam	 impositionem	 non	 excludunt.	 Ideo	 aliter	 +negatur+	 respondetur	 admisso	 posito	 concedendo	





sit	 infra	 tempus,	 ista	 conceditur	 tamquam	 sequens	 ex	 consequente	 ista	 tu	male	 respondes	 sicut	 si	 nunc	 extra	
tempus	fuerit.	Negatur	quod	fuerunt	similes	et	si	dicatur	ponatur	ipsas	esse	similes	sic	+sicut+	signifficande	sicut	
nun	 signifficant,	 tunc	 concedunt	quidam	hanc	 sicut	prius	 'tu	 es	 in	monte	Pessolano'	 et	 quando	eis	 arguitur	 tu	
concedis	 falusm	 et	 impertinens	 ergo	male.	 Negant	 consequentiam	 nisi	 addatur	 tu	 concedis	 impertinens	 quod	














The	 lack	of	an	autograph	copy	of	Marsilius	of	 Inghen's	Consequentiae,	 the	complexity	of	 the	
manuscript	 tradition	 and	 the	palaeographical	 difficulties	 entailed	 a	 long	 editorial	work	 and	
some	substantial	editorial	choices.	
	
The	 present	 edition	 of	 Marsilius'	 Consequentiae	 is	 provisional	 and	 it	 is	 based	 on	 four	
manuscripts:	 V,	 W,	 Y,	 M.	 V	 has	 been	 chosen	 as	 the	 basis	 manuscript	 for	 Book	 I,	 with	 a	
complete	collation	of	W	and	Y	and	spot-check	for	M;	W	is	the	basis	for	Book	II	(omitted	in	V),	
with	 a	 complete	 collation	of	M	and	Y.	 For	 the	difficult	 passages	 through	 the	 entire	 treatise,	
some	of	the	other	manuscripts	have	also	been	consulted	-	especially	E	and	F.371		
The	 critical	 apparatus	 gives	 all	 the	 variants	 for	 the	 basis	 manuscripts	 and	 the	 alternative	
readings	for	the	difficult	passages.	Following	an	approach	common	in	the	editions	of	medieval	
Latin	logical	texts,	among	the	alternative	readings	I	have	preferred	neither	the	lectio	difficilior	
nor	 the	 lectio	 facilior,	 but	 the	 lectio	 ad	 sensum,	 i.e.	 the	 version	 that	 most	 convincingly	
preserved	logical	coherency	and	the	required	sense.	
In	 order	 to	 make	 the	 text	 more	 accessible	 to	 a	 larger	 readership	 of	 non-medievalists,	 the	
language	 has	 generally	 been	 normalised	 to	 Classical	 Latin	 for	 the	 orthography	 (e.g.	
"consequentiae"	instead	of	"consequencie")	and	for	most	lexical	variations	(e.g.	"nihil"	for	the	
medieval	 "nichil").	However,	 some	medieval	 lexical	peculiarities	 typical	of	 logical	 texts	have	
been	deliberately	preserved	-	e.g.	"Sortes"	has	not	been	normalised	to	"Socrates".372	
The	medieval	syntax	has	been	maintained	through	the	text	without	any	significant	variations;	
the	 classical	 consecutio	 temporum	 or	 the	 use	 of	 modal	 attraction	 is	 accepted	 only	 on	
manuscript	basis.		
																																																								







on	 the	 grounds	of	 the	manuscript	 agreement,	 the	 clarity	 of	 	 the	 intended	meaning,	 and	 the	
"technicality"	and	consistency	of	 the	use.	The	major	example	of	 this	kind	of	editorial	choice	
concerns	 the	 construction	 of	 "antecedit"	 in	 Book	 I.3.1,	 in	 the	 fourth	 of	 the	 general	 rules	
holding	 for	 all	 consequentiae. 373 	In	 classical	 Latin	 antecedo,	 -is,	 antecessi,	 antecessum,	
antecedere	means	"to	precede",	"to	go	before	of",	"to	go	in	front	of",	and	is	a	transitive	verb.	
The	fourth	of	the	general	rules	states:	







the	 accusative	 of	 antecedens	 or	 of	 consequens.	 I	 take	 this	 use	 to	 be	 both	 technical	 and	
preferable	 for	 reasons	 of	 stylistic	 clarity.	 The	use	 is	 technical	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 relation	
signified	 by	 the	 verb	 is	 not	 of	 mere	 precedence	 but	 of	 "being	 the	 antecedent	 of":	 in	 this	
context,	 the	 unusual	 grammatical	 construction	 is	 not	 surprising	 since	 it	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	
trend	of	regimentation	of	Latin	in	medieval	logical	texts.	A	desire	for	clarity	could	also	play	a	
role,	 since	antecedens	 (and	 consequens)	 is	 a	 neutral	 name	 and	 therefore	 its	 accusative	 and	
nominative	forms	are	identical:	in	a	transitive	construction,	it	might	not	be	clear	if	antecedens	
is	 the	subject	or	 the	object	 term.	Antecedit	 in	construction	with	antecedens	or	consequens	 is	
recurring	through	the	rest	of	the	text	justifying	the	rule,	but	the	construction	is	not	constant	in	




intransitive	 construction	 has	 always	 been	 preferred,	 even	when	 the	 ad	 is	 omitted	 in	most	
manuscripts.	
	
Given	the	complexity	of	 the	manuscript	 tradition	transmitting	Marsilius'	 logica	modernorum	
treatises,		at	this	point	I	will	not	give	a	stemma	codicum	of	the	Consequentiae.	Bos	deemed	the	
endeavour	to	be	impossible	and	useless	for	the	treatises	on	the	properties	of	the	terms	-	also	
because	 of	 the	 four	 different	 circulating	 versions.374	The	 tradition	 of	 the	 Consequentiae	 is	
unavoidably	connected	to	the	other	treatises',	so	it	does	not	look	like	the	task	is	going	to	be	
much	easier	-	even	if	we	were	to	confirm	the	existence	of	only	one	version	of	our	text.	Overall,	
giving	 a	 stemma	 codicum	 for	 the	 Consequentiae	 tradition	 does	 not	 look	 like	 a	 completely	
impossible	 task;	 furthermore,	 if	 successful,	 it	 would	 yield	 relevant	 results	 also	 about	 the	
transmission	of	Marsilius'	other	 logica	modernorum	 treatises.	However,	 it	does	 look	 like	the	
length	and	difficulty	of	 such	a	venture	would	be	beyond	 the	scope	of	 the	present	work	and	







and	 readable	 manuscripts,	 and	 by	 trying	 primarily	 to	 preserve	 the	 sense,	 we	 managed	 to		
obtain	a	version	of	the	text	that	looks	reasonably	reliable	and	coherent.	As	of	now,	this	seems	
to	be	an	achievement	more	than	sufficient	to	give	us	an	insight	into	Marsilius	of	Inghen's	logic	





of	 the	 great	 majority	 of	 the	 manuscripts	 -	 however	 even	 that	 text	 will	 probably	 be	 only	
marginally	closer	to	the	author's	intention.	
In	 the	 meantime,	 we	 have	 some	 hints	 pointing	 at	 the	 relationships	 among	 some	 of	 the	
manuscripts	-	e.g.,	 from	their	respective	excipits,	 it	 is	clear	that	Kr	 is	somehow	related	to	U,	











transmits	 a	 couple	 of	 passages	 absent	 from	 the	 other	 manuscripts	 -	 e.g.	 several	 lines	 of	
explanation	 of	 rule	 12	 around	 the	 end	 of	 I.3.2.	 V	 is	 an	 interesting	 manuscript:	 its	 Latin	 is	
generally	more	refined,	more	grammatically	consistent	and	more	"classical"	than	the	language	
shared	by	the	other	manuscripts;	and	its	syntax	shows	more	elegant	constructions.	V's	copyist	
is	 probably	 copying	 from	 two	 or	 more	 manuscripts:	 for	 example	 at	 f.	 88ra,	 the	 copyist	 is	
transcribing	twice	the	same	rule,	once	calling	bona	the	consequentia,	i.e.	"good"	or	"valid",	the	
other	 time	 calling	 it	 necessaria,	 i.e.	 "necessary".375	The	 two	 formulations	 of	 the	 rule	 are	
																																																								
375	V	 88ra:	 "Sexta	 regula	 est	 haec:	 Omnis	 consequentia	 cuius	 antecedens	 est	 una	 copulativa	 composita	 ex	
partibus	 contradicentibus	 principalibus	 est	 bona.	 Probatur	 quia	 eius	 antecedens	 est	 	 impossibile	 ergo	
consequentia	est	bona	ut	tractum	est	ex	prima	regula	ubi	dicitur	quod	ad	impossibilem	sequitur	quilibet	<sic>.	




till	 now.	 Nevertheless,	 even	 if	minimal,	 the	 variations	 in	 the	 two	 versions	 prevent	 us	 from	
thinking	that	it	was	a	mechanical	mistake.	The	best	explanation	would	seem	to	be	a	deliberate	
choice	of	the	copyist	working	from	at	least	two	different	sources.	Our	copyist	might	have	been	
at	 odds	 with	 two	 different	 versions	 of	 the	 text,	 since	 bona	 or	 necessaria	 tend	 to	 be	
conceptually	 important	words.	Furthermore,	one	might	 say	 that	 there	 is	a	 small	 conceptual	
space	between	a	consequentia	bona	and	a	consequentia	necessaria;	if	we	accept	a	consequentia	
bona	that	is	not	tout-court	necessaria,	e.g.	for	example	a	consequentia	valid	only	ut	nunc	(as-of-
now),	 then	 that	 gap	 might	 become	 a	 veritable	 difference.	 Now,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case	 for	
Marsilius'	 theory,	 since	 for	 him	 the	 consequentia	 is	 the	 necessity	 of	 the	 inference	 -	 and	 the	
consequentia	 ut	 nunc	 is	 not	 a	 consequentia	 at	 all.376	However,	 in	 V	 we	 find	 also	 several	
treatises	 on	 Consequentiae	 holding	 different	 positions	 (namely,	 accepting	 consequentiae	 ut	
nunc)	that	are	in	our	copyist's	hand.	It	is	possible	that	our	fellow	was	quite	bewildered	by	the	
theory	 itself.	While	 facing	two	different	versions	of	 the	text,	he	might	have	assumed	that	he	
was	in	front	of	two	different	rules	and	that	each	of	his	sources	had	missed	one	-	or,	puzzled	by	
the	variation,	he	might	have	simply	decided	to	copy	both.377	Overall,	the	V's	copyist	seems	to	
be	 a	 smart	 one	 or	 at	 the	 very	 least	 an	 educated	 one	 -	 which	 could	 make	 V	 less	 reliable.		
Therefore,	when	in	disagreement,	the	other	versions	have	usually	been	preferred	to	V,	unless	




bona.	 Consequentia	 tenet	 per	 primam	 regulam.	Antecedens	 patet	 quia	 omnis	 copulativa	 est	 impossibilis	 quae	
componitur	ex	partibus	contradicentibus."	V	differs	from	the	other	manuscripts	also	in	numbering	the	rules:	this	











<>	 	 	 addition	of	the	editor	
__	 	 	 illegible	passage	
+	+	 	 	 deleted	in	the	manuscript	
[	]	 	 	 in	the	text,	mark	an	expression	that	should	be	deleted	
add.	 	 	 addidit	-	addition	that	has	not	been	included	in	the	collation	





ante	 	 	 before	










Tractaturus379	de	 consequentiis,	 Deo	 adiuvante,	 istum	 modum	 procedendi	 tenebo:380	primo	 ponam	
consequentiae 381 	definitionem	 necnon	 eius 382 	divisionem	 cum	 hoc	 definitiones	 aliorum 383	
terminorum384	subdividendo.385	Secundo	 ponam	 aliquas	 breves	 regulas386	consequentiarum387	cum	
notabilibus	illis388	regulis	deservientibus,389	supplicans	omnibus	audientibus	ut390	si	quae	minus	bene	






Consequentia	 est399	oratio	 habens	 antecedens	 et	 consequens	 et	 notam	 illationis	 consequentis	 ex	






380	add.	 quia	V,	add.	 quod	MY	 |	 tractaturus	 -	 tenebo]	Tractaturus	de	 consequentiis	Dei	 tenebo	 auditorio	 istum	



























propositio	 quae	 per	 notam	 consequentiae	 infertur412	ex	 alia,	 scilicet413	antecedente,	 ut	 in	 oratione	
|Y68v|	 prius	 posita	 haec	 propositio414	'animal	 currit'	 dicitur415	consequens.	 Et416	nota	 illationis417	
consequentis	 ex	 antecedente	 est	 haec 418 	coniunctio	 'ergo',	 vel	 'igitur', 419 	vel	 aliqua 420 	alia	 eam	
includens	 vel	 ei 421 	aequivalens.	 Unde	 generaliter	 coniunctio	 significans	 habitudinem	 sequelae	
necessariam	 unius	 propositionis 422 	ad	 aliam	 dicitur	 nota	 illationis.	 Unde	 apparet 423 	quod	 haec	







































<1>	 Primo	 aliquis	 diceret 440 	quod	 dictae 441 	descriptiones	 antecedentis	 et	 consequentis	 sint 442	
diminute443	positae.444		
<1.1.1>	 Probaretur445	sic:446	illae447	definitiones448	sunt	 malae	 quae	 sunt	 circulares;	 sed449	istae450	
definitiones451	sunt	 huiusmodi;	 igitur	 sequitur	 quod	 istae452	definitiones453	sunt	 malae.454	Maior455	
patet,456	quia	 si	 dicerem457	quod	 'a	 est	 illud	 cuius	 est	 b	 et	 -	 e	 converso-	458	b	 est	 id459	quod460	est	
ipsius461	a'	male	definirem.462	
Minor	 patet	 quia	 dicitur	 quod	 antecedens	 sit463	propositio	 ex	 qua	 per	 notam	 consequentiae	 infertur	










































proprietate483	|Y	 69r|	 bonae	 definitionis484	est	 notificare	 definitum.	Minor485	scilicet	 quod	 illae486	non	
notificant487	definita,488	patet.489	Declaratur,490	quia491	ponatur	 quod	 aliquis	 sit	 qui	 nesciat492	quid	 sit	
antecedens	nec	etiam493	sciat494	quid	est495	consequens	-	quod496	est	valde497	possibile.	Et	dicatur	ei498	












































|V	 84ra|	 ex	 antecedente.	 Iterum522	per	 istam523	definitionem	 non	 intelligit524	quid	 sit525	consequens,	
cum	 non	 sciet526	quid	 sit527	dicere528	propositio	 quae	 infertur	 ex	 antecedente;	 ergo529	apparet	 quod	
illae530	definitiones531	non	notificant	definita,532	quod	fuit533	declarandum.534	
<1.2>	 Secundo	 arguitur:535	communiter	 alii	 aliter	 definierunt536	consequentiam537|W	 103r|	 cum538	















































	<2.1>	Et	 arguitur	primo	ex	definitione	quod	 sit,556	quia557	in	 consequentia	mala	 est	 antecedens	et558	
consequens	 et	 nota	 illationis,	 igitur 559 	sequitur	 quod560 	consequentia	 mala	 est	 consequentia. 561	




<2.2>	 Secundo	 arguitur	 ad	 idem568 	ex	 communi	 fama, 569 	nam570 	communiter	 dicitur	 quando 571	


































quod	 illa	 est	mala.576	Et	 in	 hoc	 quod	 dicitur	 quod577	est578	consequentia	mala,	 innuitur	 quod579	sit580	
consequentia.	
	
<2.3>	 Tertio:	 nam	 si581	<non>	 sic,582	sequeretur583	quod	 esset584	aliqua585	propositio586	quae587	nec	
esset588	categorica	nec	hypothetica.	Consequens	est	inconveniens	et	contra	Philosophum589	primo	Peri	
hermeneias	et	contra	Petrum	Hispanum	expresse590	in	Summulis	suis.591	
Probatur	 consequentia592	capiendo	 conditionalem	 falsam,	 ut	 'si	 deus	 est,	 baculus	 stat	 in	 angulo',	
quae593	vel	est	conditionalis,	vel	non.594	Si	est	conditionalis,	sequitur595	quod	est	consequentia,	cum596	
ly	si,	ut	dictum597	est,	sit598	nota	consequentiae	vel599	illationis;600	|M	27r|		et	est601	mala,602	ut603	notum	







































sit 606 	conditionalis,	 et 607 	manifestum	 est 608 	quod	 non	 sit 609 	alterius	 speciei 610 	propositionis 611	
hypotheticae	 quam	 conditionalis,612	ergo	 non	 est613	propositio	 hypothetica	 nec	 categorica,614	prout	
notum	est;615	quod	tamen	sit616	propositio	satis	notum	est	de	se.617	





nulla	 consequentia	 mala	 est	 consequentia.	 Discursus	 est	 bonus,	 quia	 in	 secundo	 modo	 secundae	
figurae.629	Antecedens	pro	prima	parte	patet,	quia	omnis	consequentia	tenetur630	sub	aliqua	specie631	
argumentationis.	 Pro	 secunda	 parte632	manifestum633	est	 quia	 in	 consequentia	 mala	 non	 est	 debita	

































nec	 e	 converso636	in637	consequentia638	mala	 est639	necessaria	 illatio;	 ista640	tamen641	requiritur	 ad	
omnem	argumentationem,642	quocumque	modo	etiam643	|V	84rb|	acciperetur644	argumentatio.		
Et	confirmatur	hoc645	communi	|W	103v|	opinione	modernorum,	dicentium	consequentiam	malam	non	
esse	 consequentiam,	 cui	 concordat	 |Y	 70r|	 ratio	 quia646	sicut	 similitudinarie647	homo	 pictus648	hoc	






































664	in	 praedictis	 -	 bona]	 de	 consequentia	 bona	 in	 definitionibus	 praedictis	W,	 de	 consequentia	 bona	 in	 dictis	
definitionibus	M	
	 114	




nego674	illam;675	et	 huius676	causa677	est678	quia	 in	 terminis	 relativis,679	quemadmodum	 sunt	 isti680	
termini681	'antecedens'	 et	 'consequens',	 non	 est682	aliquod683	inconveniens684	definire685	terminos686	
circulariter,	 ut	 'pater'	 definitur687	'quod	 sit688	res	 habens689	filium'	 et	 'filius'	 definitur690	e	 converso	
'quod	sit691	res	habens	patrem'.692	






































confitetur	 quod698	'genus'	 et	 'species'	 sunt	 termini	 relativi,699	necesse700	est	 ergo701	in	 utrorumque702	
rationibus703	utrisque	terminis704	uti.		
Quod	autem	 'antecedens'	et	 'consequens'	 sint	 termini	 relativi	manifestum	est,705	quia	antecedens	est	
ad	aliquid	antecedens,	et	consequens	est706	ad	aliquid707	consequens.	Modo	tales	termini708	sunt709	de	
praedicamento	 ad	 aliquid,	 quia 710 	de	 se 711 	ipsis 712 	cum 713 	addito	 'ad	 aliquid'	 essentialiter	
praedicantur,714	ut	 patet	 per	 secundam715	definitionem	 ipsorum	 'ad	 aliquid'	 per	 Aristotelem716	in	
Praedicamentis717	'ad	aliquid'718	positam.719	
Ad	probationem	Aristotelis,720	quando	dicitur:721		 "si	definiendo	 'a'	dicerem	quod	 'a'722	esset	 ipsius723	
'b',	et	e	converso724	quod725	'b'	esset726	ipsius	'a',	male	definirem";727	b	negatur	illud	si	termini728	essent	








































<1.1.2>	Ad	 confirmationem	quando	dicitur:	 "illae732	definitiones	non	 sunt	bonae	quae	non	notificant	
definita",733	concedo734	istam735	-	 intelligenti736	ex	 communi	 modo	 loquendi	 quid	 nomina	 significant.	
Nam	 estimo737	quod	 ista	 definitio	 'homo	 est	 animal	 rationale'738	intellecto	 quod739	sit	 optima,	 tamen	
si740	uni741 	layco	 proponeretur,	 ei742	non743	notificaret744 	definitum,	 vel	 uni	 alteri	 non	 intelligenti	
quod745	hoc	nomen	'animal'	significaret.746	
Et	 ad	 minorem,	 quando	 dicitur	 quod	 "istae747	definitiones	 non	 notificant	 definita",748	hoc	 nego,749	
dummodo	 intelligitur	 ex	 communi	modo	 |W	 104r|	 loquendi	 quid	 nominis.750	Nam	 si	 ego	 vel	 aliquis	
iuvenis751	scirem752	vel	 sciret753	quod	 iste	 terminus	 'antecedens'	 significaret	 talem	 propositionem	
'homo	 currit'	 in	 hac	 totali 754 	oratione	 'homo	 currit,	 ergo	 animal	 currit'	 et	 quod	 iste	 terminus	
'consequens'	 significat	 ista	 'animal	 currit'755	in	 eadem	 oratione,	 et756	tunc	 nobis757	diceretur	 quod	



































Ad	 probationem	minoris,	 quando	 dicitur:	 "ponatur765	|V	 84va|	 quod	 aliquis	 sit	 qui	 ignoret766	quid	 sit	
antecedens	et	quid	sit	consequens,767	ita	quod	iste	ignoret768	quid	nominis",769	admitto	casum.	Et	dico	
ultra770	quod	 istae771	definitiones	 non772	notificant	 illi773	definitum774		 |M	 28r|	 qui775	ignorat776	quid	
nominis	terminorum,	quod	tamen777	oportet		eum778	scire	-	sicut	isti779	qui	ignorant780	quid	significaret	
iste	 terminus781 	'animal',782 	numquam	 ista783 	definitio784 	'homo	 est	 animal	 rationale'785 	aliquid786	
notificaret. 787 	Oportet	 enim	 si	 definitiones	 notificare 788 	debeant	 definitum 789 	quid	 nominis	
praecognoscere.	
Sed	 adhuc	 aliquis790	diceret:	 "tu	dicis	 quod	oportet	 quid	nominis791	ex	 communi	modo792	loquendi793	









































Respondeo801	quod	 multi	 sunt802 	qui	 bene803 	cognoscunt804 	ex	 communi805	usu	 loquendi	 quid	 sit	
consequens806	et	quae	propositio	vocatur	antecedens,	qui	tamen	nesciunt	convertibiliter807	describere	
antecedens	vel808	consequens.	
Unde	 si	 hoc	 ab	 eis	 quaeretur,	 deliberarent809	sicut	 unus810	puer811	scit	 quod812	virum	matris	 suae813	
vocatur814	ex	usu	 loquendi	 'pater',815	non816	tamen	sciret817	convertibiliter818	describere819	patrem.c	Et	
talem	definitionem	convertibilem820	manifestat	definitio	data.821	
Per	 hoc	 ad	 confirmationem, 822 	quando 823 	dicitur	 quod	 oportet	 ex	 communi	 modo	 loquendi	
























c	 sicut	unus	 -	describere	patrem]	Variants:	Sicut	unus	puer	bene	scit	quod	mater	matris	 suae	vocatur	Barta	et	
'pater'	 suus	Octo	 non	 tamen	 convertibiliter	 sciret	 describere	 patrem	V	 |	 sicut	 unus	puer	 'pater'	 vocans	 virum	
matris	suae	ex	communi	modo	loquendi	non	tamen	sciens	convertibiliter	describere	patrem	W	|	sicut	puer	qui	















quomodo 830 	definitiones	 deberent	 notificare, 831 	nego	 istud, 832 	quia	 definitiones	 non	 solum 833	
notificant834	quid	nominis,	sed	convertibiliter	quid	nomen	significat	exprimunt	et	ostendunt,835	et	hoc	
non	 oportet	 praescire.836	Quod	 autem837	ista838	sint839	bene	 dicta840	consonatur	 sive	 concordatur841	
auctoribus.842	Patet	 insipiciendo843	dicta844	Petri	 Hispani	 in	 principio	 suarum845	Summularum,	 in846	
capitulo	 de	 propositione,	 ubi	 definiens 847 	propositionem	 categoricam848 	totaliter	 per 849 	istum850	
modum	procedit.851	Dicit	enim852	quod	propositio853	est	oratio	habens	subiectum	et854	praedicatum	et	
copulam	principales	partes	 sui;	 et	 describens855	subiectum	dicit856	quod	 ipsum857	est	de	quo	alterum	














































est	 essentialis,	 sed875	bene	 possunt	 esse	 plures	 definitiones	 quid	 nominis	 eiusdem876	definibilis.877	
Modo 878 	iste	 terminus	 'consequentia'	 non	 definitur	 definitione	 essentialis,	 cum	 sit	 terminus	
connotativus	et	accidentalis,879	sed	solum880	definitione	quid	nominis.	Et	ideo881	non	est	inconveniens	
ipsius 882 	esse	 plures 883 	definitiones	 bonas	 quid	 nominis.	 Et	 ideo	 licet 884 	definitiones	 aliorum885	
magistrorum	de	hoc	nomine	'consequentia'	sint	|V	84vb|	bonae,	non	tamen886	sequitur	quod	praedicta	



































<2>	 Ad	 secundam	 dubitationem,	 quando	 quaeritur	 utrum	 consequentia	 mala	 sit	 consequentia,	
respondeo	iudicio	meo	quod895	non.896		
Et897	ratio	potest	assignari	duplex,	quia898	sicut	se	habet	homo	pictus	ad	homine,	ita	videtur	se	habere	
consequentiam	 malam	 ad	 consequentiam.	 Sed	 constat	 hominem	 pictum	 non	 esse	 hominem,	 igitur	
consequentia	mala	non	est	consequentia.	Consequentia	est	nota,899	et	prima	pars	antecedentis	videtur	
patere	ex	eo	quia	sicut	similitudinarie	homo	pictus	hoc	nomine	 'homo'	significatur	et	non	proprie,900	
ita	 videtur	 de	 consequentia	 mala,	 quae	 similitudinarie	 et	 improprie 901 	vocatur 902 	hoc	 nomine	
'consequentia'.	Quod	sic903	potest	persuaderi,	quia	ad	consequentiam	proprie	dictam	requiritur	illatio	
necessaria,	 modo	 |Y	 72r|904	in	 consequentia	 mala	 non	 est	 illatio	 necessaria905	sicut	 in	 consequentia	
bona,	 ergo	 solum	 similitudinarie	 et	 ordinarie	 ad	 consequentiam	 bonam	 consequentiam	 malam	
nominatur	consequentia.906	Consequentia	nota	est	de	se.907	Antecedens	pro	prima	parte	notum.908	Non	
enim	 esset	 consequentia	 nisi	 esset	 illatio.909	Pro	 secunda	 parte	 patet,	 quia	 in	 consequentia	 mala	
consequens	non	infertur	ex	antecedente	sicut	in	consequentia	bona.910	
Secunda	ratio	sumitur	ex	communi	modo	loquendi,	nam	communiter911	|	W	105r|	quando	aliqua	mala	





























quod	 in	 consequentia	 mala	 est	 antecedens	 et	 consequens	 et	 nota	 illationis,	 hoc	 negatur,	 quia	 nihil	
vocatur	 proprie 920 	consequentia	 nisi	 oratio	 in	 qua	 est	 habitudo	 necessaria	 consequentis	 ex	
antecedente.	Ita	nihil	vocatur	antecedens	proprie	nisi	propositio	ex	qua921	per	notam	illationis	infertur	
consequens	necessaria	illatione.	Ad	probationem	antecedentis,	quando	dicitur	quod922	in	ista	oratione	
'homo	 currit,	 igitur	 asinus	 currit',	 'homo	 currit'	 est	 antecedens	 et	 'asinus	 currit'	 est	 consequens,	
negatur	 hoc;	 sicut	 enim	 ista	 oratio	 non	 est	 consequentia,923	ita	 nec	 ista	 oratio	 'asinus	 currit'924	est	
consequens.	
	
<2.2>	 Ad	 secundam 925 	rationem, 926 	quando	 dicitur	 quod	 communis	 fama	 habet,	 quando 927	






























mala',938	nam	 non	 est	 aliud	 dicere	 consequentiam	 esse	 malam	 quam	 illationem	 consequentis	 ex	
antecedentem	non	esse	necessariam.	
	
<2.3>	 Ad	 tertiam	 rationem,939	quando	 dicitur:940	"sequitur	 quod	 aliqua	 esset941	propositio	 quae	 nec	
esset942	categorica	nec	hypothetica",	negatur	ista.943	Ad	probationem,944	quando	dicitur:	"capiatur	una	
conditionalis	 falsa,	 ut	 haec:	 'si	 deus	 est,	 baculus	 stat	 in	 angulo'",	 placet	mihi;	 et	 quando	quaeritur945	
utrum	sit	conditionalis	vel	non,	dico	quod	est	conditionalis	capiendo	'conditionalem'	large,	sed	non	est	
conditionalis	 capiendo	 'conditionalem'	 stricte	 et	 proprie.	 Ad	 improbationem,	 quando	 dicitur	 "si	 est	
conditionalis,	tunc	est	consequentia"	verum	est	si	esset946	|M	29v|	conditionalis	proprie	dicta,	sed	non	
oportet	 ita	 esse	 si	 sit	 conditionalis	 communiter	 dicta.	 Unde	 proprie	 non	 dicitur	 aliqua	 propositio	
conditionalis	nisi	sit	conditionalis	vera.	
Petrus	 Hispanus	 dicens	 propositionem	 conditionalem	 esse	 unam	 de	 sex	 speciebus	 propositionis	
hypotheticae	 et	 dividens	 eam	 in	 conditionalem	 veram	 et	 falsam	 solum	 intelligit	 hoc	 de	
conditionalibus947	communiter	acceptis,948	et	non	oportet	omnem	talem	esse	consequentiam.949	
	
<3>	 Ad	 tertiam950	|	 W105v|	 dubitationem	 quando	 dicitur:951	quid	 sit952	consequentia	 bona,953	solvi	

























Sed	 secundum	 istam	 rationem 959 	statim 960 	surgit 961 	dubitatio,	 utrum	 omnis	 propositio	 quae	
praecedit962	notam	illationis,	ut963	'ergo',	sit	antecedens,	vel	aliqua	talis	|Y	73r|	sic964	et965	aliqua	non.	Si	
dicatur	 primum,	 tunc	 statim	 sequeretur 966 	consequentiam	 malam	 habere	 antecedens	 et	 per	
consequens	consequentiam	malam	esse	consequentiam	-	quod	est	contra	dicta.	Si	dicatur	secundum,	
tunc	 statim 967 	dubitaretur 968 	quando 969 	propositio	 praecedens	 hunc	 terminum	 'ergo'	 debeat 970	
reputari971	antecedens	 et	 quando972	non,	 et	 quomodo	 debeat973	hoc974	cognosci.	 Si	 autem975	aliquis	
diceret976	quod	 antecedens	 esset977	propositio978	praecedens979	hunc	 terminum980	'ergo'981	vel	 huic982	








































propositio	 quae 993 	praecedit	 li 994 	ergo	 in	 consequentia	 bona. 995 	Et	 istae 996 	notificationes 997 	et	
declarationes998	essent	grossae	et	circulares,	et	ut	mihi	videtur	illud	non	sufficeret.999	
Et	 ob	 hanc	 causam	 respondetur	 ad	 argumentum	 seu	 dubitationem	 quod	 aliqua	 propositio	 quae	
praecedit	 hunc	 terminum	 'ergo'	 vel	 aliquam	 coniunctionem	 aequivalentem	 sibi,	 est	 antecedens	 et	






Sed	 fortior	 tunc	 oritur	 dubitatio	 inter	 omnes,	 et	 est1006	quomodo	 debeat	 cognosci	 quando	 illatio	 est	
necessaria	 et	 quando	 non.1007	Ad	 quam	 multi	 diversimode	 tamen	 respondent;	 eligatur	 aliqua	 pars	
melius	sibi	placens.	
Credo	 enim	 quod	 non	 sit1008	faciliter	 exprimibile,	 quando	 illatio	 est	 necessaria,	 et	 quando	 non.	 Sed	
tamen	unam	opinionem	eligam	quae	poterit	probabiliter	sustineri.	
	


























ubi	 dicit	 conditionalem	 esse	 veram,	 cuius	 antecedens	 non	 potest	 esse	 |Y	 73v|	 verum	 sine 1020	
consequente.	 Modo	 dictum	 est	 quod	 consequentia	 bona	 aequivalet1021	conditionali,	 et	 e	 converso	
conditionalis	 vera	 aequivalet	 consequentiae	 bonae,	 quia 1022 	omnis	 conditionalis	 vera	 est	
consequentia1023	necessaria.	 Et	 ideo	 pariter1024	sicut	 dicitur	 de	 conditionali	 vera,	 ita1025	debetur1026	
dicere1027	de	consequentia	bona1028	quia1029	consequentia	bona1030	est1031	cuius	antecedens	non	potest	
esse	 verum	nisi	 consequens	 sit	 verum	 supposito	 quod	 ipsum	 sit1032	-	 eodem	modo	 quod	 dictum	 est	
supra.1033	
Sed	 istud	 dictum	 non	 valet;	 declaratur	 sic:	 nam,	 si	 sic	 deberet	 describi	 illatio	 necessaria,	 tunc	
sequeretur	quod	ista1034	esset	bona	consequentia:	 'omnis	propositio	est	negativa,	ergo	Deus	non	est'.	
Consequens	 est	 falsum,	 et	 consequentia	 est1035	bona,	 ergo	 ista	 descriptio	 consequentiae	 bonae	 seu	























1032	cuius	 antecedens	 -	 ipsum	 sit]	 om.	 V,	 cuius	 antecedens	 non	 potest	 esse	 verum	 sine	 consequente	 M,	 quod	
consequentia	bona	est	eius	antecedens	et	consequens	non	potest	esse	verum	etc.	post	dictum	est	Y	






consequens	 sit	 falsum,	 patet,	 quia	 haec	 propositio	 'omnis	 propositio	 est	 negativa',	 est	 mere	
probabilis,1037	et	ista	'Deus	non	est'	est1038	impossibilis.	
Si	 autem	 essent	 solum	 tres1039	propositiones	 negativae	 et	 nullae	 aliae	 propositiones,1040	tunc	 ita1041	
esset	 sicut	 per	 istam1042	'omnis	 propositio	 est	 negativa'	 significaretur1043	igitur1044	ipsa	 est	 mere	
possibilis.1045	Sed	 quod	 ista	 sit1046	impossibilis	 'Deus	 non	 est'	 non	 oportet	 probari;	 quod	 autem1047	
consequentia	sit	bona,	demonstratur1048	faciliter,	quia	haec	propositio	'omnis	propositio	est	negativa'	
retenta	 significatione	 terminorum1049	non1050	potest	 esse	 vera,	 nisi1051	'Deus	 non	 est'	 |M	 30v|	 sit	
vera.1052	Ergo	 illatio	 est	 necessaria	 per	 definitionem	 necessariae	 illationis,	 et	 antecedens	 declaratur	
quia	haec	propositio	 'omnis	propositio	est	negativa'	non	potest	esse	vera.	Probatur	hoc,	quia	non	est	
vera	quando	est,	quia	tunc	est	aliqua	propositio	affirmativa,	ergo	tunc	falsum	esset	dicere	quod	omnis	
propositio	 est	 negativa,	 nec	 quando	 ipsa	 non	 est,	 quia	 quod	non	 est1053	non	 est	 verum.	 Ergo1054	non	
potest	 esse	 vera,	 igitur	 nullo	modo	 potest	 esse	 vera	 nisi1055	ista	 'Deus	 non	 est'	 sit	 vera.	 Sic	 apparet	































Sed	 tamen	 videtur	 mihi	 quod	 definiendo1063	sic1064	sit	 minus	 bene	 posita.1065	Causa	 est	 quia	 ipsi	
describunt	 idem	 per	 idem.	 Dicunt	 enim	 consequentiam	 bonam	 et1066 	illationem	 necessariam1067	
esse1068	ubi	 ex	 opposito	 consequentis	 infertur	 oppositum	 antecedentis,	 vel	 ergo1069	intelligunt	 de	
illatione	 bona1070	vel	 illatione1071	mala.	 Si	 dicatur	 quod1072	de	 bona	 illatione1073	tunc	 ita	 notum	 esset	
definitum	 sicut	 definitio1074	et	 e	 converso.	Nisi	 enim	quis1075	sciret	 quid1076	esset	 consequentia	 bona,	
quomodo	 ipse	 scire	 posset	 quando	 esset 1077 	necessaria	 illatio 1078 	consequentis	 ex	 antecedente?	
Manifestum	est	 quod	nullo	modo,1079	et	 ratio	 apparet	 quia	 si	 sic	 intelligitur	quod1080	illatio	 bona	 seu	
necessaria	 est	 ubi1081	ex	 opposito	 consequentis	 infertur	 oppositum	 antecedentis,	 est	 vera	 petitio	




































<3>	 Alii	 autem	 dicunt1098	quod	 antecedens	 bonae	 consequentiae	 est	 propositio	 praeposita	 notae	
illationis	 vel1099	sibi	 apposita1100	sic	 se	 habens	 ad	 aliam1101	quod	 |M	 31r|	 impossibile	 est	 sic	 esse1102	
qualitercumque	 est	 significabile1103	per	 eam,	 stante	 impositione	 terminorum,	 quin1104	ita	 sit	 sicut	
qualitercumque	significatur	per	consequens.		
Et	 ista1105	definitio	 antecedentis	 videtur	 esse1106	magis1107	exquisita	 et1108	elaborata.	 Tamen	 salva	
correctione	 eam	 ponentium	 non	 sufficit,	 quia,	 si1109	sic,	 sequeretur	 quod	 omnis	 consequentia	 mala	
esset	consequentia	bona,	quod	esset1110	inconveniens.	
Probatur	consequentia,	quia	proponatur	aliqua	consequentia	mala,1111	ut1112	'homo	currit,	ergo	asinus	
































est1116	qualitercumque	 est1117	significabile1118	per	 antecedens,	 stante	 impositione	 terminorum,	 sic	
esse1119	quin	 ita	 sit	 sicut	 est	 significabile1120	per	 consequens,	 ergo1121	consequentia	 est1122	bona	 per	
eos.	
Antecedens	 probatur1123	quia	 ista1124	dictio1125	'significabile'	 |Y	 74v|	 est	 ampliativa,1126	et	 ideo	 sensus	
antecedentis 1127 	est	 iste: 1128 	'impossibile	 est	 esse 1129 	qualitercumque	 potest	 significari	 per 1130	
antecedens 1131 	etc.', 1132 	modo	 istud	 manifeste	 est 1133 	verum.	 Nam	 ponatur	 casus	 quod,	 stante	
significatione1134	huius1135	termini	 'homo'	 quam	 iam	 habet,1136	addatur	 sibi	 significatio	 'asini',	 tunc	
manifestum	est	quod	adhuc	stat1137	significatio	termini	quam	a	natura1138	|	W107r|	habuit.1139	Constat	
tamen1140	quod	impossibile	est	sic1141	esse	qualitercumque	est	significabile	per	antecedens,	quin	ita	sit	
sicut	 significatur	 per	 consequens,	 nam	 in	 significatione	 antecedentis	 includitur	 significatio	
consequentis,	et	ita	posset1142	declarari1143	de	qualibet	alia1144	consequentia	|V	85vb|	mala.1145	
Secundo	 sequitur1146	quod	 haec	 consequentia	 esset	 bona	 'omnis	 homo	 currit,	 ergo1147	Sortes	 currit'.	


































existente	 falso,	 seu1149	posset1150	ita1151	esse	 sicut	 significatur	 per	 antecedens1152	sed	 tamen1153	non	
posset 1154 	ita 1155 	esse	 sicut	 significatur	 per	 consequens. 1156 	Antecedens 1157 	probatur: 1158 	nam 1159	
ponatur	 quod	 Sortes	 iam	 sit,1160	tunc	 manifestum	 est	 quod	 impossibile	 est	 esse1161	qualitercumque	
significatur1162	per	istam1163	'omnis	homo	currit',	quin	ita	sit	sicut	per	consequens	significatur,1164	nam	
hic	 antecedens1165 	'omnis1166 	homo	 currit'	 significat	 omnem	 hominem	 qui	 est1167 	currere,	 et	 ex	
consequente1168	significat1169	Sortem	currere,	cum	supponatur1170	Sortem	esse	hominem	qui	est,1171	et	
ex	 consequente	 in 1172 	significatione	 antecedentis	 includitur	 significatio	 consequentis.	 Et	 per	









































<4>	 Sed	 ista1182	definitio	 posset1183	sic	 corrigi	 quod	 consequentia	 bona	 |M	 31v|	 est	 oratio	 sic	 se	
habens	 quod	 impossibile	 est	 sic	 esse	 qualitercumque	 per	 antecedens1184	secundum	 eius	 totalem	
significationem	 pro	 nunc	 significatur	 sic	 esse 1185 	quin	 ita	 sit	 qualitercumque	 per	 consequens	
significatur	secundum	eius	significatione	pro	nunc,1186	et	per	consequens	antecedens	esset	propositio	
sic	se	habens	quod	impossibile	est	esse	qualitercumque	per	eam	significatur	pro	nunc	secundum	eius	






Ad	 probationem,	 quando	 dicitur:	 "formetur1190	talis	 consequentia	 'homo	 currit,	 ergo	 asinus	 currit'"	
placet	mihi;	 et	 quando	 dicitur	 quod	 impossibile	 est	 qualitercumque	 est	 significabile	 per	 antecedens	
stante	 impositione 1191 	terminorum	 etc. 1192 	concedo, 1193 	cum	 hoc	 tamen	 stat	 quod	 possibile	 est	























Ad	 secundam	 rationem,1197	quando	 dicitur:	 "sequeretur	 quod	 haec	 consequentia	 esset	 bona	 'omnis	
homo	 currit,	 ergo	 Sortes	 currit'",	 negatur	 consequentia.	 Ad	 probationem:	 quando	 dicitur	 quod1198	
impossibile	 est	 qualitercumque	 per	 antecedens	 significatur	 |V	 86ra|	 etc.,	 dicitur	 quod	 licet	 ita	 esset,	
tamen	manifestum	est	quod1199	possibile	 est	quod1200	qualitercumque	per	 antecedens	 significatur1201	
penes1202	eius1203	totalem	significationem	sic	esse,	licet	non	ita	sit1204	sicut	per	consequens	significatur.	
Et	ratio	est	quia	antecedens	secundum	eius	totalem	significationem	non	significat	Sortem	currere	sed	
solum	 significat	 omnem	 hominem	 qui	 est1205	currere.	 Modo	 manifestum	 est	 quod1206	possibile	 est	
omne	 hominem	 currere,	 licet	 Sortem	 non	 currat,	 ut	 puta1207	Sorte	mortuo.	 Et	 ideo	 dicta1208	ratio1209	
nihil1210	concludit		contra1211	secundam	definitionem.	
Possibile	 enim	 est 1212 	qualitercumque	 pro	 nunc 1213 	secundum 1214 	totalem	 significationem	 huius	
propositionis	 'omnis	 homo	 currit'	 significatur	 sic1215	esse,	 quamvis1216	non	 ita1217	sit1218	sicut	 per	 hoc	






























contrarium	prout	 secundum	 eius	 totalem	 significationem	huius	 propositionis	 omnis	 homo	 currit	 significat	 sic	
esse	lectio	dubia	posse	lectio	dubia	licet	non	sit	ita	qualitercumque	per	hoc	consequens	Sortes	currit	significatur	




Sed	 adhuc1224	alii1225	mirabiliter	 impugnant1226	istam1227	secundam1228	definitionem,1229	et	 hoc1230	sic,	
quia	 dicunt:1231	"si	 ipsa1232	esset	 bona,1233	sequeretur1234	|M	 32r|	 quod1235	ista1236	consequentia	 esset	
bona:	 'homo	 est	 et1237	asinus	 est,1238	ergo	 homo	 est	 asinus'".	 Istud1239	consequens	 est	 simpliciter1240	
falsum.	 Probant	 |Y	 75v|	 tamen	 consequentiam	 sic:1241	vel	 hoc	 consequens	 'homo	 est	 asinus'	 solum	
significat	 hominem	 esse	 et1242	asinum	 esse1243	vel,	 ultra	 ista	 duo,1244	significat1245	hominem1246	esse	
asinum.	
	Si	 dicatur	 primum,	 tunc1247	habetur1248	propositum,	 quia1249	antecedens	 et	 consequens	 precise1250	
significant	 idem.	 Sed1251	si	 dicatur	 secundum,	 inconveniens	 est,	 quia	 'hominem	 esse1252	asinum'1253	
nihil	 est	 nec1254	potest	 esse,	 et	 per	 consequens	 non	 potest	 significari.1255	Consequentia	 videtur1256	






































esse,1261	nihil1262	posset1263	esse	 aliud1264	quam	homo	existens	 asinus,	modo1265	hoc	 est	 simpliciter1266	
impossibile	quia1267	homo1268	non	potest	 existere	 asinus;	 quod	 autem	hominem	esse	 asinum1269	nihil	
aliud1270	posset1271	esse	quam	homo	existens	asinus	patet,	quia	hominem	esse1272	currentem	nihil	aliud	
est1273	quam	homo	existens	currens,1274	prout	isti1275	alibi	1276	determinate1277	supponunt.	
Tenendo	 definitionem	 priorem 1278 	quidam	 respondunt 1279 	ad	 argumentum	 quando	 dicitur:	
'sequitur1280	quod	 ista1281	consequentia	esset	bona1282	'homo	est	et	asinus	est,	ergo	homo	est	asinus,"	
negando	 consequentiam.	 Et	 quando1283	quaeritur1284	ab	 eis,	 quid	 significet	 consequens	 plus	 quam	
antecedens,	 scilicet	 utrum	 solum	 significet1285	hominem	 esse	 et	 asinum	 esse,	 dicunt	 quod	 non,	 sed	
significat	 |W	 108r|	 solum1286 	hominem	 esse	 asinum.	 Et1287 	quando	 eis1288 	arguitur1289 	contra1290	








































respondeo1306	ad	 argumentum,1307	quando	 dicitur	 quod	 illa1308	consequentia	 esset	 bona	 'homo	 est	 et	
asinum	est,	ergo1309	homo	est	asinus',1310	negatur1311	consequentia.1312	
Ad	probationem1313	quando	dicitur:1314	"vel1315	consequens	 solum	 significat	 asinum	esse	 et	 hominem	
esse", 1316 	dico 1317 	quod	 non.	 Immo	 secundum	 |V	 86rb|	 huius1318 	totalem1319 	significationem	 nihil	
istorum 1320 	significat 1321 	sed	 significat	 proprie	 loquendo 1322 	hominem	 esse	 asinum.	 Et	 quando	
dicitur1323	hominem	 esse	 asinum	 nihil	 esse1324	nec	 potest	 esse,	 conceditur;	 et	 quando	 infertur1325	










































imaginari.1330	Non	 enim	 oportet	 significatum1331	propositionis1332	esse	 vel	 posse	 esse,1333	sed	 sufficit	
quod1334 	possit1335 	imaginari1336 	esse.	 Intellectus1337 	enim	 extendit	 se1338	ad	 imaginabilia.1339 	Quod	
autem1340	possit	 imaginari1341	'hominem	 esse	 asinum'1342	patet,1343	quia1344	si	 forma	 humana	 cum1345	
forma	asinina1346	|M	32v|	imaginarentur	simul	in	eadem	materia,	licet	hoc	naturaliter	loquendo1347	sit	
impossibile,	 tamen 1348 	imaginabile	 est 1349 	hominem	 esse	 asinum,	 nam	 forma	 humana	 dat	 esse	
hominem	 et1350	forma	 asinina	 dat	 esse	 asinum.	 Et	 quemandmodum	 illud1351	argumentum	 solutum	
est,1352	ita1353	possit1354	solvi	 quodlibet	 simile	 per1355	modum	 proportionalem	 quoniam1356	multa1357	











































sic	 se	habet	quod	 impossibile	est	qualitercumque1368	per	 ipsum1369	significatur	sic	esse1370	secundum	
eius	 totalem	 significationem	 pro	 nunc,	 quin	 ita	 sit	 qualitercumque	 per	 consequens1371	significatur,	
secundum	 eius	 totalem	 significationem1372	pro	 nunc,1373	per1374	ipsum1375 	nunc	 significatur.1376 	Et	








Consequentia	 formalis	 est	 quae	 tenet	 in	 omnibus	 terminis	 et	 quibuscumque1393	qualitercumque	































'omne	 quod	 est1399	a	 est	 b,1400	omne	 quod	 est1401	c	 est	 a,	 ergo	 omne	 quod	 est1402	c	 est	 b'.1403	Forma	
autem	 consimilis1404 	propositionum	 est1405 	quando	 respectu	 eiusdem	 copulae	 propositiones	 sunt	
eiusdem	qualitatis	et	quantitatis.1406	Et1407	dicitur1408	notanter1409	"respectu	eiusdem	copulae",1410	quia	
si	 copula	 variatur1411	-	 esto	 quod	 |Y	 76v|	 maneret1412	eadem	 |M	 33r|	 qualitas	 et	 quantitas	 -,	 non1413	
maneret	eadem	forma,	ut	istae1414	non	sint1415	eiusdem1416	formae	-	sicut	istae:1417	'Sortes	potest	esse'	
et	 'Sortes	 est';1418	sed	 istae1419	'nullus	 homo	 est	 asinus'	 et	 'nullus	 deus1420	est	 diabolus'1421	sunt1422	
eiusdem	 formae,1423	nam1424	ibi1425	est	 eadem	 quantitas	 et	 qualitas	 et	 eadem1426	copula.	 Unde	 tria	












































Consequentia	 materialis1433	dicitur1434	consequentia	 bona1435	quae	 tenet	 in	 quibusdam1436	terminis	
gratia	certe1437	significationis	terminorum	et	non	in	omnibus	retenta	consimili	forma,	ut	'homo	currit,	
ergo	 animal	 currit',	 quae1438	tenet	 ex1439	eo	 quod	 iste1440	terminus	 'animal'	 est	 superior	 ad	 istum	
terminum	'homo',	sed	non	gratia	formae,	quia	non	sequitur	'homo1441	currit,	ergo	asinus	currit',1442	et	
tamen	 ibidem	 retinetur1443 	consimilis 1444 	forma	 -	 |V	 86va|	 scilicet1445 	eadem	 qualitas,	 eadem1446	
quantitas,1447	et1448	copula,1449	et	ideo1450	consequentia	materialis	nominatur.1451	
	
<2>	 Secunda1452 	divisio	 est	 haec:1453 	consequentiarum	 formalium	 alia1454 	syllogistica,1455 	alia	 non	
syllogistica.1456	






















1451	vocatur	ante	materialis	 Y,	add.	 et	 forte	 diceretur	 quod	 sic	 nulla	 esset	 consequentia	 formalis	 quia	 nulla	 est	
quae	tenet	in	omnibus	terminis	cum	nulla	fiat	 in	omnibus	terminis	responderetur	quod	verba	sunt	capenda	ad	













ex1465	antecedente	 et	 consequente	 syllogismi.	 Quomodo	 autem	 definiatur1466	syllogismus	 satis1467	





syllogistica,	 	 sicut	 a	 copulativa	 ad	 alteram	 eius1483 	partem	 vel	 a	 parte	 disiunctivae	 ad	 	 totam	
disiunctivam,	de	quibus	plus	dicetur1484	in	sequentibus.1485	
	
<3>	 Tertia	 divisio	 |M	 33v|	 est	 de	 consequentia	materiali,1486	sed	 propter1487	huiusmodi	membrorum	




































Circa	 consequentiae 1492 	divisionem	 tamen 1493 	est 1494 	sciendum 1495 	quod	 quidam	 dividunt 1496	
consequentiam	 materialem 1497 	in	 consequentiam	 materialem 1498 	simpliciter	 dictam	 et 1499 	in	
consequentiam	 materialem 1500 	ut	 nunc.	 Consequenter	 dicunt	 quod	 consequentia	 materialis 1501	
simpliciter	dicta	est1502	quae	simpliciter	loquendo	est	bona	et1503	sic1504	se	habet	quod	impossibile	est	
ita	 esse	 sicut	per	 antecedens	 significatur1505	pro	nunc1506	secundum	quod	prius	dicebatur,1507	nisi	 ita	
sit	 sicut	 per	 consequens	 significatur.	 Consequentia	 autem1508 	ut	 nunc	 secundum	 eos	 est	 quae	
simpliciter	 loquendo	 non1509 	est	 bona	 nec1510 	valet,	 immo	 impossibile 1511 	est	 sic	 esse	 sicut	 per	
antecedens	significatur,	 licet	non	sit	 ita1512	sicut	per	consequens	significatur.1513	Sed1514	consequentia	
ut	 nunc	 bona1515	sic	 describitur1516	ex	 eo	 quod,1517	rebus	 se	 habentibus	 ut	 nunc	 se	 habent,1518	non	
potest	 sic	 esse	 sicut	 per	 antecedens	 significatur, 1519 	quin 1520 	ita 1521 	sit	 sicut	 per	 consequens	





































Sed1527 	salva	 reverentia1528 	id1529 	ponentium,1530 	hoc	 non	 convenienter	 ponunt:1531 	nam	 isti	 idem	
dicunt	 solum1532	consequentiam1533	bonam	 |W	 109r|	 esse1534	consequentiam1535	et	 consequentiam	
dividunt	 in	materialem	 et	 formalem.1536	Ex	 quo1537	sequitur	 quod	 omnis	 consequentia	materialis	 est	
bona,1538	cum1539	omne1540	divisum	praedicatur1541	universaliter1542	de	quolibet	 ipsius	dividentium.1543		
Arguitur1544	ergo	ex	illo1545	sic:	"omnis	consequentia	materialis	est	bona,	consequentia	ut	nunc	non	est	
bona,	 ergo1546	consequentia	 ut	 nunc	 non	 est	 consequentia	 materialis".	 Discursus	 est1547	in	 Baroco,	





d	pro	nunc	 -	 currit]	Sed	dicitur	consequentia	ut	nunc	bona	ex	eo	quod	 in	rebus	se	habentibus	ut	 sic	 se	habent	




valet	 immo	 impossibile	 est	 sic	 esse	 sicut	 per	 antecedens	 significatur,	 licet	 non	 sit	 ita	 sicut	 per	 consequens	
significatur.	Sed	dicitur	consequentia	ut	nunc	bona	ex	eo	quod	rebus	se	habentibus	ut	nunc	se	habent	non	potest	
sic	esse	sicut	per	antecedens	significatur,	nisi	ita	sit	sicut	per	consequens	significatur.	Et	exemplum	poni	potest	


































declarata1553	et	 minor	 patet1554		 ex1555	eorum1556	defininendo1557consequentiam	 ut	 nunc.	 Propter1558	








































tamen1575	oportet	 e	 converso,	 quod	 ex	 opposito	 antecedentis	 inferatur	 oppositum	 consequentis.	 Et	
iterum,	si	ex	opposito	consequentis	inferatur1576	oppositum	antecedentis,	tunc	consequentia	est	bona.	
Pro	 hac	 regula	 declaranda	 supponitur	 primum	 principium	 omnium	 evidentissimum	 quod 1577	
contradictoria	 non	 possunt	 simul1578	stare.1579	Tunc	 probatur	 regula	 sic:	 si	 ex	 'a	 esse'1580	sequitur	 'b	
esse',	tunc	vel1581	ex	'opposito	ipsius	b	esse'	sequitur	'oppositum	ipsius	a	esse',	vel	non.	Si	sic,	habetur	
propositum.	Si	non,	tunc	'oppositum	ipsius	b1582	esse'	stat1583	vel	stare1584	potest	cum	'a	esse'	et	cum	'a	
esse'	 simul1585	stat	 ipsum1586	'b	 esse'	 per	 primum	 suppositum1587	ergo1588	'b	 esse'	 et1589	'oppositum	b	
esse'	possunt	simul1590	stare	cum	'a	esse';	et	ultra	 	sequitur	quod	contradictio	stat	simul,1591	quod	est	
contra	suppositum.	1592					
Ista	 ultima	 consequentia	 est	 nota1593	ex1594	prima,	 scilicet	 quod	 si1595	ex	 'opposito	 ipsius	 b	 esse'	 non	
sequitur	'oppositum	ipsius	a	esse',	tunc	'a	esse'	potest	stare1596	cum1597	'opposito	b	esse'.1598	Iterum1599	
patet1600	per	primum1601	principium,	quia	cum	quolibet1602	stat	alterum	contradictorium.	Cum	ergo1603	


































sequatur	 ad	 ipsum	 -	 sequitur	 quod	 eius1607	contradictorium,	 scilicet1608	'a	 esse';1609	tunc	 quando	




Simili	 modo1618	declaratur1619	secunda	 pars1620	regulae,	 scilicet	 quod1621	si	 ex	 opposito	 consequentis	
sequitur 1622 	oppositum 1623 	antecedentis,	 tunc 1624 	consequentia	 est	 bona.	 Da	 enim	 quod	
consequentia1625	non	valeat1626	quando	dicitur	'c1627	igitur1628	d';1629		et1630		quod	tamen1631	ex	opposito	















e	 cum	 non	 sequantur	 ad	 ipsum	 -	 quod	 est	 impossibile]	 cum	 non	 sequatur	 ad	 ipsum,	 sequitur	 quod	 illius	
contradictorium	 scilicet	 a	 esse	 non	 potest	 stare	 vel	 non	 stat	 cum	opposito	 b	 esse	 prius	 +posita+	 dicta,	 vel	 ---	

























oppositum	 d1640	potest	 stare	 cum	 ipso1641	c.1642		 Quia	 si1643	d1644	non	 sequitur,1645	tunc	 d1646	potest	
non1647	stare.1648	Ponatur	 ergo	 quod	 non	 stet;1649	tunc	 stabit	 oppositum1650	eius1651	-	 tunc1652	semper	
cum	 qualibet	 propositione	 stat1653	altera	 pars	 contradictionis.1654 	Possunt	 ergo	 simul	 stare	 c	 et	
oppositum	 ipsius1655	d;1656	cum1657	hoc	 simul	 infertur	oppositum	 ipsius	 c,	 igitur1658	c1659	et	oppositum	















































da	enim	quodnon	valet	 consequentia	quando	dicitur	ad	oppositum	potest	 stare	 cum	 ipso	quia	 si	non	 sequitur	
tunc	 d	 potest	 non	 stare	 ponatur	 ergo	 quod	 non	 stet,	 tunc	 stabit	 oppositum	 eius.	 Tunc	 semper	 cum	 qualibet	
	 148	
Exemplum	 huius1666	datur1667	in	 terminis	 significativis,	 nam1668	sequitur:1669	'homo	 currit,	 igitur1670	
animal	 currit',	 sic1671	e	 converso	 sequitur:1672	'nullum	 animal	 currit,	 igitur	 nullus	 homo	 currit'.	 Et1673	
dixi	 in	 prima	 parte1674	regulae	 quod	 non	 oportet	 e	 converso1675	ex	 opposito	 antecedentis	 sequi	
oppositum	 consequentis.	 Patet	 hoc,1676	nam	 haec	 'nullus	 homo	 currit'	 quae1677	est1678	opposita1679	
antecedentis,1680	scilicet1681	'homo	 currit',1682		 |V	 87ra|	 non	 infert	 hanc1683	'nullum	 animal	 currit'	 si	
enim1684	asinus	 curreret	 et	 nullus	 homo	 curreret,1685	tunc	 ita	 esset1686	sicut1687	antecedens	 significat	
esse1688	et1689	non	 tamen1690	sicut	 consequens	 significat	 esse.1691	Et	 intelligo	 idem1692	per	 oppositum	
et1693	contradictorium,1694	et	 ita	 capit	Philosophus	oppositum1695	Primo1696	Priorum	 capitulo	 tertio.1697	
|Y	78v|	
																																																																																																																																																																																								
propositione	 stat	 altera	pars	 contradictionis.	Possunt	ergo	 simul	 stare	 c	 et	oppositum	 ipsius	b,	 cum	hoc	 simul	




non	 stare	 cum	 c.	 Ponatur	 ergo	 quod	 non	 stet,	 et	 tunc	 stabit	 oppositum	 eius	 cum	 semper	 cum	 qualibet	
propositione	 stabit	 altera	pars	 contradictionis.	 Possunt	 ergo	 simul	 stare	 c	 et	 oppositum	 ipsius	d,	 et	 hoc	 simul	

































Ex	 hac	 regula	 faciliter	 redditur1698	causa1699	quare1700	syllogismus	 est	 bonus1701	quando	 ex	 opposito	
conclusionis1702	cum	 altera	 praemissarum	 infertur	 oppositum	 alterius	 praemissae.	 Nam	 ex	 hac1703	
regula1704	manifestum	 est,1705	quod	 tunc	 consequentia1706	est	 bona	 quando	 ex	 opposito	 consequentis	
infertur	 oppositum	 antecedentis;	 et	 per	 consequens	 consequentia	 est	 formalis	 quando	 ex	 opposito	
consequentis	 formaliter 1707 	infertur	 oppositum	 antecedentis. 1708 	Constat	 autem 1709 	quod	
antecedens1710	syllogismi	 est	 una1711	propositio1712	copulativa	 et	 per	 consequens	 cuiuscumque	 partis	
illius 1713 	copulativae 1714 	oppositum 1715 	inferatur, 1716 	oppositum	 antecedentis	 inferatur, 1717 	cum	
copulativa 1718 	contradicat 1719 	disiunctivae	 de 1720 	partibus	 contradicentibus.	 Et 1721 	ad	 veritatem	
disiunctivae1722	sufficit	unius	suarum	partium	veritas;1723	et	ad	 illationem	disunctivae	 illatio1724	unius	
partis.	 Quando	 ergo1725	ex	 opposito1726	conclusionis	 cum	 una1727	praemissarum	 infertur	 oppositum	











































<2>	 Aliud1738	correlarium	 sequitur	 ex	 prima1739	regula.1740	Et	 potest	 esse	 regula	 secunda1741	haec1742	
|W110r|	 quod	 quidquid 1743 	in	 consequentia	 bona	 repugnat	 consequenti, 1744 	etiam 1745 	repugnat	
antecedenti.	 Probatur	 ex1746	prima,1747	quia	 ex	 opposito1748	consequentis1749	infertur1750	oppositum	
antecedentis.1751	Modo	 illud1752	per	regulam	 infert	oppositum	antecedentis,	ergo1753	sequitur1754	quod	
illud1755	idem	repugnat1756	antecedenti,	|M	35r|	quod	fuit	probandum.	
Et	 confirmatur	 regula 1757 	sic:	 si 1758 	aliquid 1759 	repugnat 1760 	consequenti	 quod 1761 	|Y	 79r|	 non	




































sequitur1767	oppositum	 consequentis.1768	Consequentia	 tenet,	 quia	 alias1769	non	 diceretur	 repugnare	
consequenti.1770	Et	ultra	istud1771	oppositum	consequentis	statim	infert1772	oppositum	antecedentis	per	
regulam	 primam.1773	Et	 per	 consequens	 primum	 inferens	 semper	 stat	 cum	 opposito	 antecedentis,	
scilicet	 istud 1774 	quod	 infert 1775 	oppositum	 consequentis 1776 	et 1777 	illud 1778 	idem	 non	 repugnat	
antecedenti,	ergo1779	potest		stare	cum	antecedente	et1780	simul1781	stat	cum	opposito	eius,	quia	semper	
stat	 cum	 illo,1782	ut	 probatum1783	est,	 igitur1784	oppositum	 antecedentis1785	et	 antecedens1786	simul1787	
stare	 possunt1788	cum	 isto1789	quod	 repugnat	 consequenti,1790	quod	 est	 contra	 propositum,	 scilicet	
hoc1791	quod	contradictoria1792	non	possunt	simul	stare.1793	
Ultima	 tamen	 consequentia	 |V	 87rb|	 nota	 est	 de	 se,	 et	 prima1794	tenet	 ex	 eo	 quod1795	si	 aliquid1796	








































ideo	 cum 1801 	oppositum 1802 	consequentis	 illatum 1803 	inferat	 et	 simul	 stat 1804 	cum	 opposito	
antecedentis, 1805 	sequitur	 quod	 repugnat 1806 	consequenti	 inferens	 istud 1807 	oppositum 1808	
consequentis	 secundo1809	stabit	 cum	 opposito	 antecedentis.1810	Exemplum	 huius	 habetur	 hic:1811	si	




<3>	 Tertia	 regula	 est:1820	quidquid	 sequitur	 ad	 consequens1821	consequentiae	 bonae,1822	istud1823	
sequitur	ad	antecedens.1824	
Illud1825	declaratur	sic:1826	si1827	consequentia	esset1828	bona	'a	est,	ergo	b	est'	et	ad	hoc	consequens1829	











































'c	 est'1860	cum1861	illa1862	'a	 est'	 potest	 stare.1863	Consequentia	 tenet,1864	quia1865	non1866	oportet	 cum	













































'a1874 	est',1875 	ex	 eo	 quod1876	cum	 qualibet1877 	propositione	 stat	 alterum1878 	contradictorium1879 	et	
semper	 stare1880	oportet	 alterum.1881	Sequitur1882	quod1883	cum1884	opposito	 ipsius1885	'c1886	est'	 stat	 'a	
est',1887	sed	 ex	 opposito1888	'c	 est'1889	sequitur1890	oppositum	 ipsius	 'b	 est',	 quia1891	dictum	 est	 'b	 est	
ergo1892	c	est'	illam1893	consequentiam	esse	bonam	ergo	oppositum	ipsius	'b	est'1894		et	'a	est'	|	M	35v|	
possunt	 simul	 stare,1895	et1896	'a	 est'1897	infert1898	'b	 est'1899	in	 bona1900	consequentia,	 prout	 iterum	est	
suppositum	 ,	 ergo 1901 	oppositum	 'b	 est' 1902 	infert	 oppositum	 'a	 esse'	 per	 secundam	 regulam	
praecedentem,	 ergo	 'a	 esse'	 et	 suum	 oppositum1903		 stabunt1904	simul1905		 cum	 opposito	 ipsius	 'b	
esse'1906	quod	implicat	contradictionem.	









































etiam	ad	hanc	 'Sortes	currit',	quae	est	primum	antecedens,	 sequitur	haec	 'risibile	currit',1911	quae1912	
sequitur1913	ad	consequens.1914	Ergo	regula	vera.1915	
	
<4>	Quarta	 regula	 est	 haec:	 in	 omni	 consequentia	 bona,1916	quidquid	 antecedit	 ad1917	antecedens1918	
etiam	antecedit	ad1919	consequens.		
Et	 significat	 regula	 tantum	 quod,	 si	 aliqua1920 	consequentia	 fuerit1921 	bona,	 tunc	 ex	 quacumque	
propositione	 sequitur	 antecedens	 istius1922	consequentiae,	 ex	 eadem	 sequitur	 consequens	 illius1923	
consequentiae,	 ut1924	'homo	 currit,	 ergo1925	animal	 currit'.	 Consequentia	 est1926	bona.	 Modo1927	hoc	
antecedens	 'homo	 currit'	 sequitur	 ex	 ista1928	'Sortes	 currit',	 igitur1929	hoc	 consequens	 'animal	 currit'	
etiam1930	sequitur	 ex	 eadem.1931	Sequitur	 enim	 'Sortes	 currit,	 igitur1932	animal	 currit'.	 Probatur1933	ex	
praecedenti	 regula, 1934 	quia	 ad	 propositionem	 quae	 antecedit	 ad 1935 	antecedens	 sequitur	




































sequatur1940	consequens,	 prout	 supponitur,	 sequitur1941	quod	 idem	 consequens	 sequatur	 ad	 istam	
propositio	 ad	 quam	 antecedens	 sequebatur 1942 	per	 regulam	 praece-|Y	 80r|-dentem,	 |V	 87va|	
dicentem1943	quod	"quidquid	sequitur	ad	consequens	etc."1944	
Ergo 1945 	sequitur 1946 	quod 1947 	propositio	 quae	 antecedit	 ad 1948 	antecedens,	 antecedit	 ad 1949	
consequens,	 quod	 fuit	 probandum.1950	Exemplum	 ponitur1951	in1952	terminis,1953	ut	 si1954	'a	 est'1955	
est1956	antecedens	ad	'b	est'1957		in	bona	consequentia;	et	si	c	antecedit	ad	a;	tunc	a	sequitur	ad	c	et	ad	a	
sequitur	 b	 per	 propositum.	 Sequitur	 ergo	 per	 praecedentem	 regulam	 quod	 ad	 c	 sequitur	 b,	 ergo	




<5|1>	 Consequenter,	 videndum	 est	 de	 regulis 1959 	quae 1960 	vocantur 1961 	generales	 -	 non	 tamen	





















1958	in	 bona	 -	 vera]	 sequitur	propositum	per	praecedentem	 regulam	quod	 ad	 c	 sequitur	b,	 ergo	 sequitur	quod	
sicut	et	antecedit	ad	antecedens,	simul	ipsum	antecedit	ad	b	consequens,	quod	fuit	probandum	etc.	W	|	in	bona	
consequentia	si	sic	antecedens	c	ad	a	a	sequitur	ad	c	et	tunc	ad	a	sequitur	b	propositum	sequitur	per	___	rationem	
quod	 ad	 c	 sequitur	 b	 igitur	 sequitur	 quod	 ad	 c	 antecedit	 ad	 a	 antecedit	 etc.	 Y	 |	 in	 bona	 consequentia	 et	 si	 c	
antecedit	ad	a	tunc	a	sequitur	ad	c	et	quod	ad	a	sequitur	b	positum	sequitur	per	praecedentem	regulam	quod	ad	c	









descriptione	 bonae1969	consequentiae	 prius	 posita,1970	quia1971	impossibile	 est	 qualitercumque	 pro	
nunc1972	significatur1973	per	antecedens	secundum	eius	totalem	significationem	sic	esse,1974	quin	ita1975	
sit	 sicut	 significatur	 per	 consequens	 secundum	eius	 totalem	 significatione,	 quodcumque	 sit	 illud,1976		
|M	 36r|	 ergo 1977 	consequentia	 est	 bona.	 Consequentia	 tenet 1978 	per	 definitionem 1979 	bonae 1980	
consequentiae.1981	Et1982	antecedens	 patet,	 quia1983	cum	 antecedens1984	supponitur	 esse	 impossibile;	
impossibile	est1985	sic	esse	qualitercumque	pro	nunc1986	significatur1987	per	ipsum1988	antecedens1989	et	
per	 consequens	 impossibile	 est	 sic1990	esse	qualitercumque	per	 ipsum	significatur1991	pro	nunc,	 quin	







































<6|2>	 Sexta 1998 	regula	 est	 haec:	 quod	 omnis	 consequentia	 cuius	 consequens	 est 1999 	simpliciter	
necessarium,	est	bona.	Et	hoc	solet	dici	sub	istis2000	verbis:2001	"necessarium	sequitur	ad	quodlibet".	
Probatur	in	omni	tali2002	consequentia:2003	ex	opposito	consequentis	sequitur	oppositum	antecedentis,	
ergo	 omnis	 talis	 consequentia	 est	 bona.	 Consequentia	 tenet2004	per	 primam	 regulam.	 Antecedens	
patet,2005	quia	cum2006	consequens	talis	consequentiae	sit	 |Y	80v|	necessarium,	suum	contradictorium	
est	 simpliciter2007	impossibile.	 Consequentia	 est	 nota2008 	de	 se.	 Et2009 	tunc2010	ex	 isto2011 	sequitur	






Dixi	 notanter 2020 	in	 ipsis 2021 	regulis 2022 	de 2023 	impossibili 2024 	simpliciter	 et	 de 2025 	necessario 2026	




































<7|3>	 Septima2043	regula	 est	 haec2044:	 ex	 antecedente	 possibili	 numquam2045	sequitur	 consequens	
mere	impossibile.	Ista	consequentia	patet	per2046	Philosophum2047	Primo	Priorum.	Et	faciliter	potest2048	
declarari,	 quia2049	cum	 antecedens	 sit2050	possibile	 sic	 potest	 fieri2051	totaliter2052	sicut2053	per	 ipsum	
pro	nunc2054	significatur.	Alias	ipsum	esset	impossibile.	Sed	tamen2055	non	potest	fieri2056	sicut	per2057	








































antecedens2063	sit	 possibile	 et	 consequens	 impossibile,	 consequentia	 non	 est	 bona.2064	Consequentia	
clara	est,2065	et2066	totim2067	antecedens	notum	est2068	de	se.	|M	36v|	
Sed	diceret	aliquis:2069	'omne	currens	est	asinus,2070	homo	est	 currens,2071	igitur	homo	est	asinus'.2072	
Antecedens	 est	 possibile	 et	 consequens2073 	simpliciter2074 	impossibile,	 ergo	 regula	 fuit	 falsa. 2075	
Consequentia	 est	 nota,	 et	 antecedens	 pro	 prima	 parte,	 scilicet	 quod	 ista	 consequentia	 est	 bona,2076	




sit	 possibile.	 Ad	 probationem,	 quando	 dicitur2085	quod2086	tam	 maior	 quam	 minor	 est	 possibilis,2087	





































omne	 currens	 esset	 asinus,	 tunc	 semper2096	esset2097	minor	 falsa	 quae	 dicit	 quod	 homo	 esset2098	|W	
111v|	 currens,2099	nam	 si	 homo	 esset	 currens,2100	aliquod	 currens2101	non	 esset2102	asinus	 -	 quod	 est	
contradictorium	maioris	 -2103		 	 ergo2104	antecedens	est2105		una2106	copulativa2107	composita	ex	maiore	
et	 minore,	 quarum	 qualibet	 est	 possibilis.2108	Tamen	 copulativa	 est	 impossibilis,	 quia	 maior	 est	
incompossibilis2109	minore.	Quod	autem	istud2110	non	sit	 inconveniens,	patet	de	copulativa	composita	
ex	partibus	sibi	 invicem2111	contradicentibus,	quarum	partium2112	quaelibet2113	est	possibilis,	 sicut2114	
ista:2115	'Sortes	 currit,	 Sortes	 non	 currit';	 quaelibet	 enim	pars	 istius2116	est	 possibilis,2117	saltem	quae	
est	 propositio,	 sed	 tamen	 copulativa	 est	 impossibilis,	 quia	 prima 2118 	copulativae 2119 	est	









































<8|4>	 Octava2131 	regula	 est	 haec:2132 	numquam	 ex	 vero2133 	sequitur	 falsum.	 Probatur,	 quia	 cum	





<9|5>	 Nona 2144 	regula	 est	 haec: 2145 	si	 ad	 aliquam	 propositionem	 cum	 una 2146 	necessaria 2147	
copulativae2148	adiuncta	 sequitur2149	alia,	 ista2150	eadem2151	sequitur	 ad	 eandem	 propositionem2152	
sine2153	illa2154	necessaria	 sibi2155	adiuncta.	 Declaratur,	 quia	 vel2156	consequens	 quod	 sequitur	 est2157	
necessarium,	 vel	 non.	 Et	 si	 sic,2158	|M	37r|	 tunc2159	sequitur	 ad	quamlibet	 propositionem,	ut	 patet2160	




































qua	 cum	 ista2167	necessaria	 inferebatur,	 utrum	 ea	 |Y	 81v|	 stante	 semper	 stat	 alia;	 et	 si	 sic,2168	tunc	
alia2169	sequitur	 ad	 ipsam.2170	Ergo2171	regula	 est	 vera.2172	Vel	 ipsa2173	potest	 stare	 |V	 88ra|	 alia	 non	
stante;	 et	hoc	est	 impossibile,	quia	ea2174	stante	 semper	 stat	 alia2175	necessaria,	 et	 ex	 consequenti2176	
cum	 illa2177		 alia	 sequitur	 ad	 eandem2178	sumptam	 cum2179	alia2180	necessaria.	 Sequitur	 quod	 alia2181	
semper	 stat	 stante 2182 	prima	 propositione	 ex	 qua	 cum	 ista 2183 	necessaria	 alia 2184 	inferebatur.	
Exemplum	 huius	 potest	 poni	 hoc:2185	ut	 si2186	sequatur2187	'omnis2188	homo	 est	 risibilis,	 Sortes	 est	
homo,	 ergo2189	Sortes	 est	 risibilis';	 ubi2190	ista2191	'Sortes	 es	 risibilis'	 infertur	 ex	 illa2192	'Sortes	 est	









































sic	 tunc2199	sequitur	 ad	 istam2200	solam	 'Sortes	 est	 homo'	 ista2201	'Sortes	 est	 risibilis,	2202	quod	 est2203	
propositum	-	vel	quandoque	sine	illa2204	potest2205	stare.2206	Et	hoc2207	non,	quia	manifestum	est	quod	





<10|6>	2218Decima2219	regula	 est	 haec:2220	omnis	 consequentia	 cuius	 antecedens	 est	 propositio2221	























2218	add.	 sexta	 regula	 est	 haec	 omnis	 consequentia	 cuius	 antecedens	 est	 una	 copulativa	 composita	 ex	 partibus	














per	 quintam 2230 	regulam.	 Antecedens	 patet, 2231 	quia	 omnis	 copulativa	 est	 impossibilis 2232 	quae	
componitur	ex	partibus	contradicentibus.2233	
	
<11|7>	 Undecima 2234 	regula	 est	 haec: 2235 	arguendo	 a	 propositione 2236 	habente	 solum	 unam 2237	
causam2238	veritatis	ad	aliam2239	habentem	illam2240	eandem2241	causam2242	veritatis,	et	cum	hoc	aliam	
vel	 alias,	 est	 bona	 consequentia.2243	Exemplum2244	ut:2245	"quod	 fuit	 homo	 fuit	 album,	 igitur2246	homo	
fuit2247	albus',2248	nam2249	antecedens	 habet	 solum	 unam	 causam	 veritatis,2250	scilicet	 istam:2251	quod	
illud2252	quod	 fuit2253	homo	 fuit	 album;2254	sed	 consequens	 habet	 illam2255	et2256	cum	 hac2257	|M	 37v|		





































Probatur	 regula	 ex	 eo2263	quod2264	quando2265	non	 potest	 ita2266	esse	 sicut	 pro	 nunc	 per	 antecedens	
significatur2267	secundum	 eius	 |Y	 82r|	 totalem	 significationem	 quin	 ita	 sit	 sicut	 pro	 nunc2268	per	
consequens	significatur2269	secundum	eius	totalem	significationem,2270	tunc2271	consequentia	est	bona.	
Sed	sic	est2272	de	omni2273	tali	consequentia,	ergo	omnis	talis	consequentia	est	bona.	Consequentia	est	
nota.2274	Antecedens	 pro	 prima	 parte	 patet	 per	 definitionem	 bonae	 consequentiae;2275	|V	 88rb|	 pro	
secunda	parte	est	notum,2276	quia	antecedens2277	ex	quo	solum	unam2278	causam	veritatis	habet	quam	
etiam2279	habet	consequens,2280	si	 ita	sit2281	sicut	antecedens2282	significat,	 ita2283	erit	sicut	consequens	
significat.	 Quod	 fuit	 probandum.	 Sed	 tamen2284	non	 oportet	 e	 converso	 affirmative2285	arguendo,	 |W	
112v|	quia	non	sequitur	'album	fuit	Sortes,	ergo	quod	est	album	fuit	Sortes'	-	prout	de	se	notum	est.2286	
	
<12|8>	 Duodecima2287 	regula	 est	 haec: 2288 	omnis	 consequentia	 cuius	 antecedens	 et	 consequens	
sunt2289	de	eisdem	 terminis	et	 totaliter	eodem	modo	supponentibus,	non	amplius2290	in	una	quam	 in	


































quia	 in	 omni	 tali	 consequentia2294	antecedens	 includit	 consequens,	 immo2295	aequivalet	 consequenti,	
ergo2296	omnis	talis2297	consequentia	est	bona.2298	Consequentia	tenet.	Et2299	antecedens	declaratur,2300	
quia	si	non,	hoc	esset	ex	eo	quod	antecedens	et	consequens	non	essent	de	eisdem	terminis	vel	quod2301	


































enim	 sequitur	 semper	 omne	 animal	 homo	 non	 est	 prout	 homo	 est	 praedicatum	 igitur	 semper	 homo	 non	 est	
animal	prout	ly	homo	est	subiectum	et	tamen	termini	praecise	eodem	modo	aeque	ample	stant	apparet	vel	forsan	
oportet	 enim	 si	 praedicatum	 supponens	 confuse	 tantum	 vere	 negatur	 de	 subiecto	 |M	 38r|	 stante	 confuse	






Exemplum	 |Y	 84v|	 ut:2323 	'a	 est	 et	 b	 est,	 ergo2324 	a	 est'.2325	Consequentia	 est	 bona.2326 	Probatur	
regula:2327	impossibile	est	qualitercumque	per	antecedens	significatur	sic	esse	quin2328	ita	sit	sicut	per	
consequens	 talis	 consequentiae	 significatur. 2329 	Et	 cum	 haec 2330 	tenet	 in	 omnibus	 terminis	
qualitercumque	 dispositis,	 ergo2331	sequitur	 quod	 talis2332	consequentia	 est2333	bona	 et	 formalis.2334	
Tenet 2335 	consequentia 2336 	per	 definitionem	 bonae 2337 	consequentiae	 et	 formalis. 2338 	Antecedens	
declaratur,	 quia2339	ad	 veritatem	 copulativae	 requiritur	 sic	 esse2340	qualitercumque	 per	 utramque	
partem	principalem2341	pro	 nunc2342	secundum	eius	 totalem	 significationem	 significatur.2343	Modo2344	
non	 potest	 ita 2345 	esse	 qualitercumque	 per	 utramque 2346 	partem	 principalem 2347 	significatur 2348	






































secundum	 eius	 totalem	 significationem	 significatur2354	et	 nisi2355	ita	 esset2356	sicut	 per	 secundam	
partem2357	eius	principalem2358	pro	nunc2359	secundum	eius	totalem	significationem	significatur.2360	
	
	Ergo2361	regula	 est	 simpliciter	 vera.2362	Non	 enim	 potest2363	ita2364	esse2365	sicut	 per	 antecedens2366	
significatur2367	secundum	 eius	 totalem	 significationem	 nisi2368	ita	 sit	 sicut	 per	 eius2369	consequens	

































2378formaretur	 W,	 formatur	 Y	 |	 enim	 -	 retenta]	 non	 probatur	 in	 omnimus	 terminis	 formatur	 Y	 |	 consimili	 -	
retenta]	ratio	enim	consimilis	quod	in	omnibus	formaretur	M	




<2>	 Secunda	 regula	 est	 haec:2379	ab	 una	 parte	 disiunctivae	 principali2380	ad	 totam	 disiunctivam	 est	
consequentia 2381 	bona	 et	 formalis.	 Ut:	 'homo	 currit, 2382 	ergo 2383 	homo	 currit	 vel	 homo	 est 2384	
asinus'.2385	
Pro	 declaratione 2386 	regulae 2387 	supponitur	 quod	 disiunctiva	 et	 copulativa 2388 	compositae 2389 	ex	
partibus	 contradicentibus	 contradicunt,	 ut	 istae 2390 	contradicunt:	 2391 	'Deus	 est	 vel 2392 	homo	 est	
asinus',	 et 2393 	'nullus 2394 	Deus	 est	 et	 nullus 2395 	homo	 est	 asinus'.	 Ista 2396 	est	 bona 2397 	regula	
communis2398 	loicorum,	 et	 ideo	 hoc2399 	supponitur.	 Alibi 2400 	declarabitur. 2401 	Qua2402 	suppositione	
praemissa	 probatur	 regula 2403 	in	 omni	 consequentia	 in	 qua 2404 	arguitur	 a	 parte	 disiunctivae	
principali2405	ad2406	totam	 disiunctivam	 est2407	consequentia2408	sic	 se	 habens2409	quod	 ex	 opposito	







































nam	 si2415	sit	 ista2416	consequentia	 proposita:2417	'homo	 currit,	 igitur2418	homo	 currit	 vel	 homo	 est	
asinus',2419	et	declaratur2420	per	 suppositionem2421	oppositum	consequentis2422	-	 scilicet	 copulativa	de	
partibus	contradicentibus,		ut2423	'nullus	homo	currit	et	nullus	homo	est	asinus'	-,	tunc2424	sequitur	per	
praecedentem	 regulam	 formaliter:2425	'ergo2426	nullus	 homo	 currit',	 quia	 arguitur2427	a2428	copulativa	




partem	principalem",2440	quia	 si	non	arguitur	 |E	39r|	a	parte	principali	 ad	partem	principalem,	 sed	a	
minus	 principali	 ad	 minus	 principalem,	 non	 haberent	 regulae	 veritatem. 2441 	Exemplum,	 ut	 si	





























2441	quia	 si	 -	 veritatem]	 quia	 si	 non	 arguitur	 ad	 partem	 principalem	 sed	 ad	 minus	 principalem	 sed	 vel	 si	
argueretur		a	parte	minus	principali	et	non	principali	non	haberent	regulae	veritatem	W	|	quia	si	non	arguitur	ad	
partem	principalem	 sed	 ad	minus	 principalem	vel	 argueretur	 non	 a	 parte	 principali	 sed	minus	 principali	 non	
haberent	 regulae	 veritatem	 Y|	 quia	 si	 non	 arguitur	 a	 parte	 principali	 ad	 partem	 principalem	 sed	 a	 minus	





asinus,	 ergo2446 	homo	 est	 asinus	 et 2447 	deus	 est	 vel	 homo2448 	non	 est	 asinus', 2449 	constat	 quod	





Patet	 regula,	 quia	 numquam	 reperitur2459	instantia	 quin	 valeret,2460 	et	 causa2461 	est	 quia	 veritas	
universalis	praesupponit	veritatem	indefinitae.2462	
	
<4>	 Quarta	 regula	 est	 haec:	 arguendo	 a	 tota	 disiunctiva	 cum	 negatione2463	contradictoria2464unius	
partis	 principalis2465	|W	 113v|	 ad	 alteram2466	partem,2467	est	 consequentia	 bona2468	et	 formalis.	 Et	



































in	 terminis	 quibuscumque	 et	 qualitercumque2476	dispositis,	 ergo2477	omnis	 talis2478	consequentia	 est	
bona	 et	 formalis. 2479 	Consequentia	 tenet	 per	 definitionem 2480 	consequentiae 2481 	formalis. 2482	
Antecedens, 2483 	scilicet	 quod	 omnis 2484 	talis	 consequentia 2485 	teneat	 in	 omnibus	 terminis	
qualitercumque	 dispositis,	 |Y	 85v|	 patet,	 quia	 ad	 veritatem	 disiunctivae2486	|V	 88vb|	 requiritur	 unam	
partem	esse	veram,	et	ad	veritatem	copulativae	requiritur	ambas	partes	esse	veras.2487	Cum	igitur2488	
antecedens	 sit2489	una	 copulativa	 cuius	 prima	 pars	 est	 illa2490	disiunctiva	 et2491	secunda	 pars	 est2492	










































Demonstratur,2508	quia	 ad	 veritatem	 copulativae2509	requiritur	 illam2510	disiunctivam	 esse	 veram,2511	
cum	 sit2512	eius2513	altera	 pars	 principalis	 vera,2514	vel	 ergo2515	pro	 parte	 negata	 -	 et	 hoc	 non	 quia2516	
secunda2517	pars	 copulativae	 esset	 tunc2518	falsa	 |E	 39v|	 quia	 est2519	contradictoria2520	illi	 parti2521	
negatae 2522 	-	 vel 2523 	pro	 parte	 non	 negata.	 Et	 si	 sic,	 habetur 2524 	propositum.	 Sed	 aliae	 partes	
antecedentis2525	et	totus2526	processus	patent2527	de	se.	
	
<5>	 Quinta	 regula	 est	 haec: 2528 	ab	 interemptione	 unius 2529 	partis	 principalis 2530 	copulativae	 ad	
interemptionem2531 	totius	 copulativae2532 	est	 consequentia	 bona	 et2533 	formalis. 2534 	Exemplum	 ut	







































Circa2543	istam2544	regulam	 est	 advertendum	 quod	 |M	 39r|	 ad	 interimendum2545	copulativam	 oportet	
negationem2546	praeponi2547	totae	copulativae	et	non	in	medio,2548	ut	interimendo	copulativam,	de	qua	
ante	fuit	sermo,	non	debet	dici	'nullus2549	homo	currit	et	nullus	deus	est',	sed	debet	dici:2550	'non:	homo	
currit	 et2551	deus	 est'.2552	Non	 enim	 est	 verius	 dare	 contradictionem	 quam	 praeponere	 negationem	
toti, 2553 	ut	 dicitur	 in	 libro	 Peri	 hermeneias,	 et	 ex	 consequenti	 interimere 2554 	proprie	 contingit	
praeponendo2555	negationem	toti.2556	
Ex2557	hoc	 consequenter	 |W	 114r|	 apparet2558	quod	 non	 oportet	 negationem2559	similiter2560	se2561	
habere 2562 	interimendo 2563 	copulativam	 et	 alteram 2564 	eius	 interimendo 2565 	partem. 2566 	Nam	





































<6>	 Sexta	 regula	 est	 haec:2575	arguendo	 a	 copulativa	 negativa2576	ad	 disiunctivam	 affirmativam	 de	
partibus 2577 	contradicentibus	 partibus	 copulativae	 antequam	 negaretur 2578 	est	 formalis	
consequentia.2579	
Probatur	 sic:2580	arguendo	 in	 eisdem2581	terminis	 a	 propositione	 ad	 propositionem2582	sibi2583	gratia	
formae	 aequivalentem 2584 	est	 consequentia	 formalis. 2585 	Sed	 consequentia 2586 	de	 qua	 loquitur	
regula2587	est	 huiusmodi.	 Ergo	 etc.	 Maior2588	rationis	 est	 de	 se	 nota.2589	Minor,2590	scilicet	 quod	 talis	
copulativa	negativa	et	disiunctiva	affirmativa2591	simpliciter2592	aequivalent2593	|V	89ra|	declaratur,	quia	
ista	 copulativa	 negativa	 'non:	 homo	 currit	 et	 deus	 est', 2594 		 aequivalet 2595 	istae	 disiunctivae	
affirmativae2596	'nullus	 homo	 currit	 vel	 nullus	 deus	 est'	 |E	 40r|	 formaliter.	 Probatur,	 quia2597	vel2598	
aequivalet 2599 	istae 2600 	disiunctivae	 de	 partibus	 contradicentibus	 partibus 2601 	copulativae 2602 	vel	




































modorum 2609 	potest	 dici	 praeter	 primum. 2610 	Ergo 2611 	sequitur 2612 	quod 2613 	copulativa	 negativa	
aequivalet 2614 	formaliter	 disiunctivae	 affirmativae 2615 	de	 partibus	 contradicentibus	 partibus 2616	
copulativae	 non2617	negatae.2618 		 Consequentia	 ultima2619 	est2620 	nota.2621 	Prima	 pars	 antecedentis	
patet,	 quia	 non	 apparent 2622 	plura 2623 	quarum 2624 	alicui	 formaliter	 talis	 copulativa	 negativa 2625	
posset 2626 	aequipollere. 2627 	Sed 2628 	quod 2629 	nullo 2630 	aliorum	 modorum 2631 	posset 2632 	dici 2633	
declaratur.	 Primo	 enim	 modo 2634 	non	 potest	 dici	 quod	 copulativa	 negativa 2635 	contradicit 2636	
copulativae	 de	 partibus	 contradicentibus	 ambabus,2637	quia	 statim	 sequitur	 quod2638	contradictoria	















































negativa	 contradicat 2655 	copulativae	 de	 una	 parte	 contradicente 2656 	et 2657 	de 2658 		 alia 2659 	non, 2660	
quia2661	etiam2662	sequitur2663	quod	duo2664	contradictoria	essent	simul	falsa.	Si	enim	sit2665	prima	pars	
quae	debet	negari	ambae	erunt2666	falsae	pro	secunda2667	parte,2668	ut	hic:2669	'homo	currit2670	et	homo	
est	 asinus',	 'nullus	 homo	 currit2671	et	 homo	 est	 asinus'.	 Si	 sit	 secunda	 pars	 quae	 debet	 negari,2672	
tunc2673	falsae	essent2674	ambae2675	copulativae2676	pro	prima	parte,2677	ut	'homo	est	asinus	et	deus	est'	





























2672	falsae	 essent	 -	 negari]	 om.	W	 |	 falsae	 essent	 ambae	 pro	 secunda	 parte,	 ut	 hic:	 'homo	 currit	 et	 homo	 est	
asinus',	'nullus	homo	currit	et	homo	est	asinus'.	Si	sit	secunda	pars	quae	debet	negari,	V|	falsa	erunt	prima	parte	
















negativa	 ad	 affirmativam.	 	 Patet	 corrolarium,	 quia	 a	 copulativa	 negativa	 	 ad	 disiunctivam	
affirmativam2688	<est	consequentia	bona>.2689		
<6.2>	Secundo	sequitur	quod	copulativa	negativa2690	aequivalet	disiunctivae	affirmativae,2691	ut	 'non:	
homo	 currit	 et	 deus	 est'	 et2692 	'nullus	 |W	 114v|	 homo	 currit	 vel	 nullus	 deus	 est',	 ubi2693	haec	
disiunctio2694	'vel'	non	negatur.	Et	 ratio	 est2695	quia	alias	 ab	una	earum2696	ad	alteram2697	non	valeret	
2698consequentia.	
<6.3>	 Tertio	 sequitur	 probabiliter 2699 	quod	 propositio 2700 	negativa	 simpliciter	 aequivalet 2701	
affirmativae	in	hypotheticis.2702	Patet	per	probationem	regulae,	quia	copulativa	negativa	aequivalet2703	
formaliter2704	disiunctivae	affirmativae.	
<6.4>	 Quarto	 concedi2705	posset2706	quod	 in	 hypotheticis	 negativa2707	propositio	 esset	 affirmativa.	






























ita,2716	quia	 aequivalet2717	disiunctivae:	 ad	 eius2718	veritatem	 sufficit	 alteram2719	partem	 esse	 veram.	
Ergo2720	relinquitur	 quod	 talis	 est2721	disiunctiva	 quia2722	non	 est	 alterius	 speciei	 propositionis2723	
hypotheticis. 2724 	Vel 2725 	|V	 89rb|	 igitur 2726 	est	 disiunctiva	 affirmativa 2727 	(et,	 si	 sic, 2728 	habetur	
propositum	 quia 2729 	copulativa	 negativa 2730 	est	 disiunctiva	 affirmativa); 2731 	vel	 aequivalet	
disiunctivae2732	negativae,	 et	 hoc	 non	 est2733	quia	 disiunctiva	 negativa	 aequivalet2734	copulativae2735	
affirmativae	-	modo	ista2736	non	aequivalet2737	copulativae2738affirmativae.2739	
<6.5>	Quinto	notandum	est2740	quod,	sicut	haec	coniunctio	'et'	negata2741	aequivalet2742	disiunctioni2743	










































aequivalet2747 	copulationi2748 	affirmativae. 2749 	Et	 hoc	 posset	 probari	 ex	 eodem	 fundamento,	 quia	
alias2750	sequitur2751	contradictoria	simul2752	esse	falsa.	De	probatione	tamen	supersedeo.2753	
<6.6>	 Sexto	 est2754	notandum	 quod	 copulativa	 vel2755	disiunctiva2756	vel	 aliqua	 alia	 ypotetica	 non	
dicitur	 negativa	 vel	 affirmativa	 ex	 negatione	 primae	 partis	 suae2757	vel	 etiam2758	secundae	 vel2759	
ambarum,	 sed	 ex	 affirmatione	 vel	 negatione2760	copulae	 principalis;	 ut	 copulativa2761	affirmativa	
dicitur	quamdiu2762	haec	coniunctio	 'et'2763	non	negatur	ut	haec2764	'homo	non2765	currit	et	equus	non	
est	 asinus'2766 	est	 propositio	 affirmativa,	 quia	 haec	 coniunctio	 'et'	 |Y	 87r|	 non	 negatur	 sed2767	
affirmatur.	Ita	etiam	disiunctiva	affirmativa	dicitur2768	quando2769	haec	coniunctio	'vel'	non	negatur,2770	
nam2771 	copula	 dicitur	 formalis	 pars	 propositionis. 2772 	Propter	 hoc	 ea	 affirmata	 semper	 dicitur	







































propositionibus	 de	 inesse,	 nam	 haec	 est	 affirmativa	 'homo	 est 2778 	non	 asinus', 2779 	quia	 copula	
affirmatur,2780	et	 haec	 negativa	 'homo	 non	 est	 asinus',2781	quamvis	 praedicatum	 non	 negatur.	 Ex2782	




partibus	 contradicentibus	 partibus 2788 	disiunctivae	 negativae 2789 	antequam 2790 	negatur, 2791 	est	
consequentia2792	formalis,	 ut2793	optime	 sequitur:	 'non:	 homo	 currit	 vel	 homo	 est	 animal,2794	ergo2795	
nullus	homo	currit	et2796	nullus	homo	est	animal'.	Probatur	regula,2797	quia	tales	formaliter	inter2798	se	
aequivalent,	 igitur2799 	etc..2800	Consequentia	 tenet.2801 	Antecedens	 patet,2802 	quia	 ambae	 formaliter	
contradicunt	 disiunctivae2803	affirmativae,	 scilicet	 huic:2804	'homo	 currit	 vel	 homo	 est	 animal'.	 Quod	
autem	 ita	 sit,2805	patet	 de	 disiunctiva	 negativa,	 quia	 non	 est	 verius	 dare2806	contraditionem2807	quam	







































Exemplum	 ut	 sic	 arguendo:2819	'si2820	homo	 currit,	 homo	 movetur;	 sed	 homo	 currit,	 ergo2821	homo	
movetur'.		
Et 2822 	probatur	 regula:	 talis 2823 	consequentia 2824 	tenet 2825 	in	 omnibus	 terminis	 qualitercumque	
dispositis2826	retenta	 consimili2827	forma.2828	Ergo	 talis	 consequentia2829	est2830	formalis.	 Consequentia	
tenet	 et2831	antecedens	 patet,2832	quia	 qualitercumque	 essent	 termini,	 si	 prima	 pars	 antecedentis	





































vero2845	non	 sequitur	nisi	 verum.	 Igitur2846	si	 ita	 est	 sicut	 per	 antecedens	 significatur,	 quicumque2847	
fuerint	|V	89va|	termini,2848	ita	erit	sicut	per	consequens	significatur.	
Notandum	|Y	87v|	circa	regulam2849	quod	sic	arguendo	solet2850	vocari2851	syllogismus	hypotheticus	.	Et	
fiunt2852	multi	 tales	 in	 dictis	 materialibus,2853	ut	 patet2854	primo	 Physicorum,	 ut:2855	'si	 transmutatio	
substantialis2856	est,	 materia	 prima2857	est;	 sed	 transmutatio	 substantialis2858	est,	 ergo2859	materia	
prima	est'.	Et	proportionaliter	multi	sunt	huiusmodi2860	syllogismi	hypothetici.	2861	
	
<9>	Nona	regula	est	haec:	quod	ex	 formaliter	 impossibili	 -	sicut	ex	copulativa	composita	ex	partibus	
contradicentibus	 -	 formaliter2862 	sequitur	 quodlibet	 consequens.2863 	Per	 probationem,	 supponitur	
quod	 omnis	 ista	 consequentia	 est	 formalis	 in	 qua	 ex	 posito2864	antecedenti	 potest	 deduci	 suum	

































est',	 quia	 prima	 pars	 copulativae2866	illatae2867	sequitur	 formaliter	 ad	 primam	 partem	 copulativae	
inferentis;	 secunda	 sequitur	 formaliter	 ad	 secundam,	 igitur	 tota	 copulativa	 sequitur	 formaliter	 ad	
totam	copulativam.	
Tenet	 consequentia.	 Et	 prima	 pars	 antecedentis	 patet,	 quia	 sequitur	 formaliter:	 'Sortes	 est,	 igitur	
Sortes	est	vel	a	est',	quia	a	parte	disiunctae	ad	totam	disiunctivam	per	secundam	regula	huius	capituli.	
Et	 secunda	 pars	 	 |M	 40v|	 patet,	 quia	 eadem	 pars	 est	 secunda	 pars	 inferentis	 et	 illatae.	 Modo2868	in	









41v|	 est	 duarum	 propositionum	 cathegoricarum 2875 	utroque	 termino	 ordine	 converso	
























est	 aliena	 restrictio	 a	 parte	 subiecti	 vel	 a	 parte	 praedicati	 ad	 universalem	 negativam	 de	 terminis	
transpositis2881	praeponendo2882	praedicato	 eius	 hoc	 additum2883	'quod	 est'	 est2884	consequentia2885	
bona,	ut:	'nullus	homo	est	antichristus,	ergo2886	nihil2887	quod	est	antichristus	est	homo';	'nullus	homo	
est	 asinus,	 ergo	 nihil	 quod	 est	 asinus,	 est	 homo'.	 Patet	 ista2888	regula,	 quia2889	numquam	 reperitur	
instantia.	
Dico	 notanter	 "de	 modo	 loquendi	 consueto",	 scilicet	 ubi	 praedicatum	 sequitur	 copulam	 et	 non	
praeponitur,	 quia	 si	 praedicatum	 copulae	 praeponeretur	 regula2890	non	 haberet	 veritatem,	 quia	 non	
sequitur:	'omnis	sol2891	planeta	non	est,	ergo2892	omnis	planeta	sol	non	est'.	
Dico	 etiam2893	notanter	 "ubi	 non	 est2894	aliena2895	restrictio",2896	quia	 non	 sequitur:	 'nullus	 homo	 est	
mulier,	 ergo2897	nulla	 mulier	 est	 homo',	 nam	 propter	 hoc2898	quod	 hoc	 signum	 'nullus'	 secundum	
communem	 opinionem	 restringit	 hunc	 terminum	 'homo',	 scilicet2899	ad	 supponendum	 solum	 pro	





























sequitur,	2908		 ubi	 praedicatum	 esset2909	terminus	 singularis	 -	 quia	 non	 sequitur	 'nullus	 homo	 est	
antichristus,	ergo2910	nullus	antichristus	est	homo',	quia	consequens	non	est2911	propositio	eo	quod2912	
termino	 singulari	 non	 potest	 proprie	 addi2913	signum2914	distributivum.2915	Sed	 verum	 est:2916	ubi	
praedicatum	esset2917	terminus	communis,		illud2918	non	oportet2919	addi.2920	
	
<2>	 Secunda	 regula	 est	 haec:	 arguendo	 a	 particulari	 affirmativa	 de	 praedicato	 communi	 capto	 sine	
aliquo	signo	sibi	addito,2921	dummodo2922	non	fiat	maior	restrictio	in	una	earum2923	quam	alia,	 |E	42r|	
ad	 particularem	 affirmativam	 vel	 indefinitam	 affirmativam2924	de	 terminis	 transpositis,	 est	 bona2925	
consequentia	 -	 ut:	 'homo	 est	 animal,	 ergo2926	animal	 est	 homo',2927		 'quoddam	 animal	 est	 currens,	
ergo2928	quoddam	currens	est	animal'.	
Dico	 notanter	 "de	 praedicato	 communi",	 quia	 si	 praedicatum	 esset	 terminus	 singularis,2929 	non	


































oportet2935 	apponere2936 	praedicato	 eius	 hoc	 additum	 'quod	 est'.	 Exemplum2937 	ut:2938 	'homo	 est	
Johannes'	 |M	 41r|	 convertitur	 in	 illam:2939	'Johannes	 est	 homo'	 (quae	 est	 singularis);2940	vel	 in2941	
istam:2942	'quoddam	 quod	 est	 Johannes,	 est	 homo'	 |W	 116r|	 quae	 est	 particularis	 -	 sed	 haec2943	
consequentia	fit2944	apponendo2945	hoc	additum2946	'quod	est'.2947	
Dico2948	notanter	 "dummodo2949	non	 fiat2950	maior2951	restrictio	 in	 una	 quam	 in	 alia",2952	quia2953	si	
maior	 fieret2954	restrictio	 non	 valeret	 consequentia	 vel	 saltem	 non	 oporteret	 consequentiam	 valere.	
Unde	 non	 sequitur:	 'quaedam	 mulier	 est	 homo,	 ergo2955	quidam	 homo	 est	 mulier'.	 Nam	 in	 prima	
iste2956	terminus2957	'homo'	 non	 restringitur,	 et	 ideo2958	est	 vera;2959	sed	 in	 secunda	 restringitur,	





































Dico	 etiam	 notanter:	 "capto	 sine	 aliquo	 signo2965	sibi	 addito",2966	quia	 si	 apponeretur2967	sibi	 signum	
universale 2968 	forsitan 2969 	consequentia 2970 	non	 valeret	 in	 particularem 2971 	vel	 indefinita, 2972 	nisi	
praeponeretur2973	praedicato	 hoc	 additum	 'quod	 est',	 ut2974	si2975	diceretur:	 'planeta	 est	 omnis	 sol':	
si2976	convertitur2977	in	istam2978	'omnis	sol	est	planeta',	tunc	non	convertitur2979	in	particularem;	et	si	
in	 istam2980	'quoddam	 quod	 est	 omnis	 sol	 est	 planeta',	 tunc2981	additur	 hoc2982	additum2983	'quod	
est'.2984	
	
<3>	 Tertia	 regula	 est	 haec:2985	ab	 universali	 affirmativa	 de	 praedicato	 communi	 capto	 sine	 aliquo	
sincategoremate2986	addito	 sibi2987	ad	 particularem	 affirmativam	 de	 terminis	 transpositis2988	ubi	 non	
sit	maior	restrictio	in	una	quam	in	alia,	est	bona	consequentia.		
Ista2989	regula	probatur,	quia	ex	opposito	consequentis	infertur2990	oppositum	antecedentis.	Patet	hoc,	
si	 arguitur2991	sic:	 'omnis	 homo	 |E	 42v|	 est	 animal,	 ergo2992	aliquod	 animal	 est	 homo'.	 Da	 	 |W	 116v|	




































<4>	 Quarta	 regula	 est	 haec:3004	arguendo	 a	 particulari3005	negativa	 	 de	 praedicato	 communi	 capto	
sine3006	aliquo	 sincategoremate3007	addito,	 ad3008	aliam	particularem3009	negativam	de	modo	 loquendi	
inconsueto3010	est	 bona	 consequentia,	 sicut	 sequitur:	 'quoddam3011	animal	 homo	 non	 est,3012	ergo3013	
aliquis3014 	homo	 animal	 non	 est'.	 Patet	 regula,	 quia3015 	ex	 opposito3016 	consequentis	 infertur3017	













































<6>	 Sexta	 regula	 est	 haec: 3036 	arguendo3037 	a	 propositione	 particulari	 affirmativa	 vel	 universali	
negativam	 seu	 particularem	 affirmativam3038	de	 terminis	 |V	 90ra|	 transpositis	 |M	 41v|	 praeponendo	
subiecto	in	utraque	hoc	additum	'quod	est'	est	formalis3039	consequentia.3040	
Ista3041	regula	 patet3042	ex	 eo	 quia3043	formaliter3044	sequitur:3045	'nihil	 quod	 est	 homo	 est	 mulier,	
ergo3046	quod	est	mulier	non	est	homo	vel3047	nichil	quod	est	mulier	|Y	89r|	est	homo';3048	et	sic	in3049	













3038	particulari	 affirmativa	 -	 particularem	 affirmativam]	 universali	 vel	 particulari	 affirmativa	 vel	 universali	
negativa	ad	universalem	negativam	vel	ad	particularem	affirmativam	M|	universali	 affirmativa	vel	negativa	ad	
universalem	 negativam	 particularem	 affirmativam	 W|	 universali	 negativa	 vel	 affirmativa	 ad	 universalem	



















Et	 ex	 alio	 patet,3055	quia	 semper3056	ex	 opposito	 consequentis	 sequitur3057	oppositum	 antecedentis,	
prout	faciliter	patet	diligenter3058	intuenti.3059	
	
1.3.4.2	 <Regulae	 de	 conversionibus	 propositionum	 de	 obliquo	 et	 de	 propositionibus	 de	 terminis	
ampliativis>	
Circa	 istas	 regulas	 positas	 est	 notandum 3060 	quod	 omnes	 haec 3061 	intelliguntur 3062 	de 3063	
propositionibus	de	inesse,	nam	de	modalibus	postea	diceretur.3064	Etiam	ista3065	dicta	magis3066	sunt	|E	





































<obliquus> 3089 	se	 tenens	 ex 3090 	parte	 praedicati	 consideretur 3091 	ut	 rectus 3092 	et 3093 	etiam	
<obliquus>3094	se	tenens	a	parte3095	subiecti	ut	melius3096	possit	converti.	
Alias	 enim 3097 	talis 3098 	propositio 3099 	non	 posset 3100 	converti. 3101 	Et	 est	 ratio 3102 	quia	 ignoraret	
quomodo	terminus	deberet	transponi.3103	
	
<2>	 Secundo	 est3104	notandum	 quod	 in	 conversione	 talium	 propositionum	 de	 terminis	 obliquis3105	









































homine,	 ergo3117	omnis	 homo	 differt	 a	 Sorte',	 quia	 in	 antecedente	 ly	 homine3118	stat	 determinate	
propter	duo	signa	distributiva	et	in	consequente	ly	homo3119	supponit	confuse	et	distributive,	quia	est	
subiectum	propositionis	universalis3120	affirmativae.3121	
	 <2.2>Secundum	 est:	 ne	 arguatur	 a	magis	 amplo	 ad	minus	 amplum	 sine	 distributione,	 nec	 e	
converso,	 cum	 distributione.	 Et	 causa	 est	 eadem,3122 	quia	 non	 oportet	 talem3123 	consequentiam	
valere.3124	
	 Exemplum	primi,3125	ut	'homo	est	mortuus,	|Y	89v|	ergo3126	homo	qui	est	est	mortuus'.		











































In	 prima	 conversione	 restringendo3160	hunc	 terminum	 'homo'	 in	 convertenti3161	a	 parte	 subiecti	 ut	
solum	staret3162	pro	hiis	quae3163	sunt,	sicut	in	conversa	supponit	a	parte	|W	117v|	praedicati.3164		







































Respondeo3185 	quod	 per3186 	resolutionem3187 	in	 propositionem3188 	de	 verbo	 personali	 omnino3189	
<sunt>	aequivalentes,	et	per	conversionem	illarum.3190	
De	 prima:3191	'me	 pudet	 peccati'3192	resolvitur	 in	 istam:3193	'ego	 habeo	 pudorem	 de	 peccato'3194	et	
tunc3195 	convertitur:3196 	'habens	 pudorem	 de	 peccato3197 	est	 ego'.3198 	Secunda	 resolvitur	 in	 hanc:	
'anima	mea	 habet	 taedium	 de	 vita	mea';3199	et	 tunc3200	illa3201	convertitur3202	sic:3203	'habens	 taedium	
de	vita	mea	est	anima	mea'.3204	




















































































in	 quantum	 propositio,3237	ita3238	quod3239	si	 non	 esset	 haec	 propositio	 de	 qua3240	verificatur3241,	 non	
verificaretur	 de	 eo,	 sicut	 iste3242	modus	 'possibile'	 non	 verificatur3243	de	 hac	 propositione	 'homo	
currit',	nisi	esset	propositio.	Nihil	enim3244	vocatur3245	possibile	complexe	nisi	propositio.3246		
Sed	 propositio	 modalis	 de	 sensu	 diviso	 vocatur3247	ubi	 huiusmodi3248	modus	 ponitur	 ad	 copulam.	
Exemplum,3249	ut	 'Sortem3250	possibile	 est3251	currere';	 'hominem3252	contingens	 est	 videre',3253	et	 sic	
de	aliis,3254	|Y	90v|	ubi	talis	modus3255	additur	copulae.3256	Nam3257	ly	Sortem	in	prima	est	subiectum	|W	
118r||V	 90va|	 et 3258 	ly	 currens 3259 	praedicatum,	 et	 hoc 3260 	totum 3261 	'possibile	 est	 esse' 3262	











































<2>	 Secundo	 circa	 conversiones	 modalium3274	est	 notandum	 quantum	 ad	 illas	 de	 sensu	 composito,	
quod	ipsae3275	convertuntur	dupliciter.	
<2.1>Uno	modo	quantum	ad	transpositionem	totius3276	subiecti	et	totius	praedicati,	ut	ista:3277	'Sortem	
currere	 est	 possibile'	 convertitur	 in	 istam: 3278 	'possibile	 est	 Sortem	 currere'.	 Et	 de	 ista 3279	
conversionem 3280 	nihil	 plus	 |M	 42v|	 dicam, 3281 	quia	 satis	 manifestum	 est 3282 	quod	 istae 3283	
propositiones	 consimiliter	 convertuntur,3284	illa3285	conversione3286	sicut	 illae3287	de	 inesse,3288	quia	
modales	 de	 sensu	 composito	 vere	 sunt3289	de	 inesse,	 quia	 copula	 earum3290	non	 est	modificata3291	ut	
'est',	nam	ista3292	de	simplici	 inherentia	praedicati	ad	subiectum3293	-	ut3294	ista:3295	''Sortes	currit'	est	

















































































Exemplum	ut:3334	'nullum	hominem	 currere	 est	 possibile,	 ergo3335	nullum	 currens	 esse	 hominem	 est	
possibile'.	 Similiter	 bene	 sequitur:	 'nullum	 hominem	 esse	 asinum	 est	 necessarium,	 ergo3336	nullum	
asinum	esse	hominem	est	necessarium'.	3337	
Ista	 regula	 patet,	 nam3338	bene	 sequitur:	 'nullus	 homo	 currit,3339	igitur3340	nullum	 currens	 est	 homo'.		
Ergo 3341 	cum3342 	ex	 possibili	 non3343 	sequitur	 impossibile,	 ex	 possibilitate	 antecedentis	 sequitur	
possibilitas	 consquentis.	 Similiter	 bene	 sequitur:3344	'nullus	 homo	 est	 asinus,	 ergo	 nullus	 asinus	 est	
homo';	 ergo3345	cum3346	|W	118v|	 ex	necessario	non	 sequitur	 contingens,	 ex3347	hoc	quod	antecedens	
est	 necessarium,	 sequitur	 consequens	 esse	 necessarium.	 Ergo3348 	regula	 fuit	 vera.	 Consequentia	
patet.3349	Et3350	antecedens,3351	scilicet3352	quod	 tales	 consequentiae	 sunt	 bonae	 depositis	 signis,3353	
patet	per	regulas3354	conversionum	propositionum	de	inesse.	
<2>	Secunda	regula	est	haec:	arguendo	respectu	eorundem	modorum	a	dicto	universali3355	affirmativo	



































hominem	 est	 necesse'.	 Patet3361	regula,	 quia	 nusquam	 reperitur	 instantia.	 Et3362	sicut	 praecedens	
probatur.3363	Similiter	 sequitur:	 'aliquem	 hominem	 esse	 currentem3364	est	 possibile	 ergo3365	aliquod	
currens	esse	hominem	est	possibile'.3366		Probatur3367	|V	90vb|	nec	plus	nec	minus	sicut	praecedens.3368	
	
<3>	Tertia	 regula	 est	 haec:3369	arguendo	 respectu	 huius	modi3370	'impossibile'	 vel	 'falsum'3371	a	 dicto	
universali	 affirmativo	 vel	 particulari	 affirmativo3372	ad3373	dictum3374	particulare	 affirmativum3375	de	
terminis	transpositis,	non	oportet	consequentiam	valere,3376	ut	non	sequitur:	'impossibile	est	omne3377	
animal3378	esse	hominem,3379	ergo	impossibile	est	aliquem3380	hominem	|E	45r|	esse3381	animal'.3382	Nec	
sequitur:	 'falsum	 est	 omne	 habens3383	caput	 esse3384	hominem,	 ergo3385	falsum	 est3386	aliquem3387	
hominem	habere	caput'.		






































<4>	 Quarta	 regula	 est	 haec:3394	|M	 43r|	 arguendo	 respectu	 huius	 modi3395	'verum'	 a	 dicto	 |Y	 91v|	
universali	affirmativo	vel	particulari	affirmativo3396	ad	dictum	particulare3397	affirmativum,	vel	a	dicto	
universali	 negativo	 ad	 dictum3398 	universale	 negativum3399 	de	 terminis	 transpositis	 est	 bona3400	
consequentia,	ut3401	'verum	est	nullum	hominem	esse	equum,	ergo3402	verum	est	nullum	equum	esse	
hominem';3403	'verum	 est	 hominem	 currere,	 ergo3404	verum	 est	 currens3405	esse	 hominem'.	 Patet3406	
regula,	 quia	 deposito	 modo	 talis 3407 	consequentia	 valet,	 ut 3408 	dictum	 est	 in 3409 	conversionibus	
illarum 3410 	de	 inesse.	 Ergo 3411 	addendo	 antecedenti	 hunc	 modum	 'verum'	 etiam 3412 	valebit	









































<2>	 Secunda	 regula	 est: 3433 	quaelibet	 talis	 propositio 3434 	potest	 converti	 in	 particularem	
affirmativam3435	de	possibili	praeponendo	eius	praedicato3436	hoc3437	'quod	est	necesse'.	
Exemplum	huius:3438	'omne	lucens3439	in	sphaera	lunae	necesse	est	esse	 lunam,	ergo3440	aliquod	quod	
est	necesse3441	esse	 lunam3442	potest	esse	 lucens	 |E	45v|	 in	sphaera	 lunae'.	Similiter	haec:3443	'aliquod	








































<3>	 Tertia	 regula	 est	 haec:3464	|V	 91ra|	 arguendo	 ab3465	universali	 negativa	 de	 necessario	 de	 modo	




Probatur	 regula,3471	quia	 numquam3472	reperitur	 instantia.	 Igitur3473	regula	 est3474	vera.	 Consequentia	





































nullum	 lucens	 necesse	 est	 esse	 lunam'. 3488 	Patet,	 quia	 oppositum	 consequentis	 stat	 cum	
antecedente,3489	ergo3490	consequentia	non	valet.	Consequentia	patet.3491	Antecedens	patet,3492	|M	43v|	
quia	 istae3493	stant	 simul:	 'aliquod3494	lucens	 de	 necessitate	 est	 luna'	 et	 'omnem3495	lunam	 non3496	





































necesse	 est	 non	 esse	 hominem'.	 Probatur,	 quia	 numquam3506	reperitur	 instantia.3507	Ex	 alio,	 quia	 ex	








possibili	 universali	 vel	 particulari	 de	 sensu	 diviso, 3524 	in	 qua	 nulla	 ponitur	 negatio,	 ad	 aliam	
particularem3525	de	possibili	de	terminis	transpositis,	est	consequentia	bona.	
Exemplum,3526	ut	 bene	 sequitur:	 'Sortem	possibile	 est	 currere,	 ergo3527	currens	 possibile	 est	 esse3528	








































<8|3>	 Octava 3553 	regula	 est	 haec:	 arguendo 3554 	a	 propositione	 universali	 negativa	 de	 possibili,	









































Exemplum,3577	ut	 non	 sequitur:	 'quoddam3578	lucens	 non	 potest	 non	 |W	 120r|	 esse	 luna,	 ergo3579	
quaedam 3580 	luna	 non	 potest	 non	 esse	 lucens'.	 Nam 3581 	antecedens	 est	 manifeste 3582 	verum,	
consequens3583	autem	 simpliciter3584	falsum.	 Similiter	 non	 sequitur:	 'omne	 lucens	 in	 sphaera	 lunae	

































lunae'.	 Nam3590 	antecedens	 est3591 	verum	 et	 consequens	 simpliciter3592 	falsum,3593 	prout	 satis 3594	
potest3595	patere3596	ex3597	illis3598	de	necessario.3599	
	
<10|5>	 Decima3600	regula	 est	 haec:	 arguendo	 a	 propositione	 universali	 vel	 particulari	 de	 possibili	
habente	 unam 3601 	negationem	 additam	 modo	 et	 aliam 3602 	additam 3603 	verbo,	 ad	 aliam 3604	
propositionem3605	particularem	affirmativa3606	de	possibili,	ubi	nulla	negatio	ponitur	ad	modum3607	vel	
ad	 verbum,	 sed 3608 	praeponitur 3609 	praedicato	 conversae 3610 	a	 parte	 subiecti	 in	 propositione	
convertente3611	hoc	totum	ens	'quod	non	potest	non3612	esse',	est	consequentia	bona.3613	
Exemplum,	 ut	 optime	 sequitur:	 'aliquod	 lucens	 non	 potest	 non	 esse3614	luna,	 igitur3615	aliquod	 quod	





































lucente	 quod	 non	 potest	 non	 esse	 luna,	 hoc	 potest	 esse	 lucens.3623	Patet	 ista,3624	quia	 alias	 prima	
propositio	 convertanda	non	esset	 vera.	Ergo3625	est	 aliquod3626	quod	non	potest	non	esse	 luna.	Patet	
iterum	 per	 idem,	 quia3627	alias	 propositio	 convertenda3628	non	 esset	 vera.3629	Ergo:3630	'aliquod	 quod	
non	potest	non	esse	luna,	potest	esse	lucens'.	|Y	93v|	
	






convertuntur 3644 	ut 3645 	illae3646 	quae3647 	ponuntur	 in	 primo	 et 3648 	tertio 3649 	ordinibus. 3650 	Istae 3651	



































nisi 3661 	tunc 3662 	modo	 improprio 3663 	propositiones 3664 	quarti	 ordinis	 convertuntur 3665 	secundum	
modum3666 	dictum	 in	 regula	 praecedenti, 3667 	ut	 haec:	 'lucens	 impossibile 3668 	est 3669 	non3670 	esse	
lunam'3671	in	hanc:	'quod	impossibile	est	non	esse	lunam3672	potest	esse	lucens'.	
	
<2>	 Secundo	 notandum	 est3673	quod	 de3674	aliis	 modalibus	 in	 omnibus3675	aliis3676	modis	 -	 |V	 91va|	
ut3677	istis:3678	'scitum',	 opinatum3679	'dubitatum',	 'creditum',3680	etc.3681	non	 facio3682	mentionem,	 quia	
tales	infinitis	modis	possunt	variare3683	vel	saltem3684	valde3685	multi,3686	etiam3687	quia	non	est	solitum	











































<1>	 Circa	 propositiones	 de	 contingenti	 ad	 utrumlibet 3699 	est	 notandum3700 	quod	 contingens	 ad	
utrumlibet	 a	 Philosopho	 Primo	 Priorum	 definitur.3701	Sic	 describitur:3702	"'contingens'	 est	 quo	 non	
existente	necessario	posito3703	in	esse	nihil	sequitur	impossibile,	id	est3704	contingens	dicitur	|W	120v|	
quod	nec	est	necessarium	vel	impossibile".	




in	oppositam3714	qualitatem,3715	ut	 illa:3716		 |M	44v|	 'Sortem3717	contingit	 currere'	 in	 istam:3718	'Sortem	



































converti	 in	 veram3723	negativam	 sibi	 oppositam,3724	sed	 quod3725	ista	 quae	 habet3726	affirmativam3727	
figuram	debet	converti	in	istam	quae	habet3728	negativam.3729	
Et	 isto 3730 	modo	 intendit 3731 	Philosophus	 in	 Primo3732 	Priorum	 capitulo 3733 	de	 contingenti. 3734 	Et	




<3>	 Tertio	 notandum	 est3744	quod	 nulla3745	propositio3746	manet	 de	 contingenti	 proprie3747	ubi3748	
iste3749	modus	 'contingens'3750	negatur.	Et	ratio	est3751	quia	semper	ubi	 iste3752	modus	 'contingens'3753	
negatur	 sit 3754 	propositio	 de	 impossibili	 vel	 de 3755 	necessario.	 Exemplum	 ut:	 'hominem3756 	non	






































vel3762 	hominem	 necesse	 est	 esse	 album'.3763 	Et	 ratio	 huius	 est	 haec, 3764 	quia	 illa: 3765 	'hominem	
contingit	 esse	 album'3766	valet	 copulativam	 talem:3767	'homo	 potest	 esse	 albus3768	et3769	homo	 potest	
non	 esse	 albus.3770	Et	 ex	 hoc,3771	propositio3772	ubi	 iste	modus	 'contingens'3773	negatur,	 valet	 ista:3774	
'homo	non	potest3775	esse	albus3776	vel3777	homo	non	potest	non	esse	albus',3778	quia	cum	una3779	valet	
una3780	copulativa	ubi	modus	affirmatur,	alia	valebit3781	disiunctiva,	scilicet	ubi	modus	negatur.	
Ex	 quo3782	satis	 patet	 quod	 si	 aliqua	 propositio	 debeat3783	proprie	 esse	 de	 contingenti,	 requiritur3784	
quod	iste3785	modus	'contingens'3786	in	ea	non	negatur.	Quia,	si	negatur,	fit3787	de	necessario	vel	de3788	








































Ista3794	regula	 declaratur,	 quia	 non	 sequitur:	 'omnem3795	lunam	 contingit	 lucere,	 ergo3796	aliquod3797	
lucens	contingit	esse	lunam'.	Quia	antecedens	est	verum,	quia	omnis	luna	potest	lucere	et	potest	non	











































est	 quaedam3825	alia	 usitatio	 terminorum	 de3826	talibus	 propositionibus	 in	 graeco3827	quam3828	apud	
nos.	 Et	 ideo	 Philosophus3829		 |E	 48r|	 secundum	 illam3830	loquebatur,	 cum	 hoc3831	tamen3832	stat	 quod	




<2>	 Secunda	 regula	 est	 haec:	 quod	 affirmativae	 de	 contingenti3840	convertuntur	 in	 negativas	 et	 e	
converso;	 	 vel,	 secundum	quod	alii3841	dicunt,	quod3842	propositiones	de	 contingenti	 convertuntur3843	
in	oppositam	qualitatem.		
Exemplum	 regulae,	 ut:3844	'Sortem	 contingit	 ridere,3845	ergo3846	Sortem	 contingit	 non	 ridere'	 et	 e	
converso:	 'Sortem	contingit	non	 ridere,	 igitur3847	Sortem	contingit	 ridere'.3848	Probatur	 consequentia,	
quia3849	|Y	 95r|	 sequitur:	 'Sortem	 contingit	 ridere,	 ergo3850	Sortem	 non	 necesse3851	est	 ridere'	 per	


































et3855 	tunc3856 	ultra:	 'Sortem	 contingit	 ridere	 et	 Sortem	 non	 necesse	 est	 ridere,	 ergo3857	Sortem	
contingit	 non	 ridere'.	 	 Consequentia	 patet3858	per	 definitionem	 contingentis,3859	quia3860	sequitur:	
'Sortem	contingit	 ridere,	 ergo3861	Sortem3862	nec	necesse	 est3863	ridere	nec	 impossibile	 est	 ridere'.3864	
Ex	 hoc	 sequitur	 quod:	 'Sortem	 contingit	 non	 ridere'.3865	Simili	 modo	 sequitur	 e	 converso:	 'Sortem	
contingit	 non3866	ridere,	 ergo3867	Sortem	 non	 necesse3868	est	 non	 ridere';	 et3869	ultra:	 'ergo3870	Sortem	
possibile	 est	 ridere'.	 Et	 tunc	 sequitur:	 'Sortem	 contingit	 non3871	ridere,	 et	 Sortem3872	possibile	 est	






Quantum	 ad	 consequentias	 materiales	 primo	 praemittende	 sunt3882 	diversae	 regulae3883 	diversis	



































descriptione	 ad	 descriptum,	 a	 nominis	 interpretatione	 convertibili3890	ad3891	interpretatum3892	et	 e	
converso,	 terminis 3893 	eodem	 modo	 supponentibus	 et	 personaliter	 tentis,	 sine	 positione 3894	
verborum3895	actum	animae	interiorem	significantium,3896	est	bona	consequentia.3897	
Exemplum	 primi 3898 	ut: 3899 	'animal	 rationale	 mortale 3900 	currit,	 |Y	 95v|	 ergo 3901 	homo	 currit';	
exemplum	 secundi	 ut:3902	'animal	 risibile3903	currit,	 ergo	 homo	 currit'.	 Exemplum	 tertii3904	ut:3905	






































Et 3916 	dicitur 3917 	notanter:	 "terminis	 eodem	 modo	 supponentibus 3918 	et	 personaliter", 3919 	quia	 si	
termini	 non	 supponerent 3920 	eodem	 modo, 3921 	non	 oporteret	 consequentiam	 valere,	 ut	 non	
sequitur:3922	'animal	 rationale	 mortale3923 	est	 definitio,3924	ergo3925	homo	 est	 definitio'.3926 	Et	 non	
sequitur:	'animal	risibile3927	currit,	ergo3928	omnis3929	homo	currit'.3930	
In	prima	enim	definitio	supponit3931	materialiter,	ideo3932	non	valet	consequentia.	Et3933	in	secunda3934	
descriptio	 supponit	 determinate	 et	 descriptum	 confuse	 et3935	distributive,	 et	 propter	 hoc	 non	 valet	
consequentia.3936	
Secundo	 dicitur3937	notanter:3938	"a	 nominis	 interpretatione3939	convertibili",	 quia	 si3940	interpretatio	








































rationalis	 in	 quod	 est	 tale.	 Et	 hanc	 particularem3949	in	 postea	 dictis	 regulis	 saltem	 affirmativis	 et	
negativis	multis	volo	habere	pro	repetita.3950	|M	45v|	
	
<2>	Secunda	 regula	est	haec:	 arguendo	a	 synonimo	ad	 synonimum3951	est	bona	consequentia,	ut:3952	
'Marcus	 currit,	 ergo	Tullius	 currit'.	 Et	 intelligitur	 regula	 de3953	terminis	 personaliter	 tentis	 et	 eodem	
modo	supponentibus.3954	
Notandum 3955 	est 3956 	circa	 istam 3957 	regulam,	 quod	 nomina 3958 	synonima	 dicuntur	 nomina 3959	
convertibilia3960	eadem	 ratione	 et	 eodem	 modo3961	sua	 significata	 significantia.3962	Unde	 non	 sunt	
ista3963 	synonima:	 'homo'	 et	 'risibile',	 quia	 licet	 sint3964 	convertibilia,	 tamen	 non	 significant	 sua	
significata	eodem	modo,	sed3965	ly	homo	absolute,3966	ly	risibile	connotative.	
	































adiacentis3979	non	 valeret,	 ut	 non	 sequitur:	 'domus	 componitur	 ex3980	tecto	 et	 fundamento,	 ergo3981	
tectum	 |Y	 96r|	 componitur	 ex	 tecto3982	et	 fundamento'.	 Et	 est	 autem3983	propositio	 de	 'est'	 secundo	
adiacente3984	in	 qua3985	nullum3986	ponitur	 aliquod3987	praedicatum3988	ultra	 illud3989	verbum	 'est',	 ut:	
'homo	 est'.	 Sed3990	propositio	 de	 tertio	 adiacente	 est	 ubi	 ponitur	 aliquod	 praedicatum3991		 ultra	 hoc	
verbum	'est',	ut:	'homo	est3992	animal'.	










































<4>	Quarta	 regula	est	haec:	 arguendo	a	nomine	partis	 sine	qua4012	totum	non	potest	esse	ad	nomen	
totius	 negative	 respectu	 huius	 verbi	 'est'	 secundi4013	adiacentis,	 est	 bona	 consequentia,4014	et	 non	 e	
converso,	ut	bene	sequitur:	'cor	hominis	non	est,	ergo4015	homo	non	est'.	








































Dicitur4035	notanter:	 "affirmative",	 quia	 negative	 non	 tenet,4036	ut	 non	 sequitur:	 'Sortes	 non	 currit,	
ergo4037	homo	non	currit'.	Quod	autem	non	sequatur4038	patet,	quia	si	Sortes	non	esset	et	omnis	homo	
curreret,4039	antecedens	esset	verum	et	consequens	falsum.4040	
Dicitur	 etiam 4041 	'sine	 distributione',	 quia	 cum	 distributione	 arguendo	 |Y	 96v|	 non	 valeret 4042	
consequentia,4043	ut	non	sequitur:	'omnis	homo	est	risibilis,	ergo	omne	animal	est	risibile',4044	propter	
distributio	 huius	 termini	 'animal'	 in	 consequenti.	 Similiter	 non	 sequitur:4045'omne	 indi-	 |M	 46r|	 -
viduum	huius4046	speciei4047	est	asinus4048	(demonstrata4049	specie	asinina),	igitur4050	omne	individuum	
alicuius	 speciei	 est	 asinus',4051	quia	 ly	 alicuius4052	speciei4053	supponit	 confuse	 et4054	distributive	 cum	
alia	parte	subiecti,	scilicet	cum	hoc	termino	'individuum'.	
Nota	 quod4055	'superius'4056	vocatur	 terminus	 significans4057	omnia	 ista4058	quae	 significat	 alter4059	et	














non	 valet	 haec	 consequentia	 V	 |	 antecedens	 est	 verum	 et	 consequens	 falsum	 propter	 lectio	dubia	 a	 divisione	





















tales	 termini	 significant	 sua4064	significata	 aeque	 absolute	 et	 aeque	 connotative.	 Exemplum,4065	ut	
iste4066	terminus4067	'animal'	 est	 superior4068	ad	 istum	 terminum	 'homo',4069	quia	 ipse4070	significat	
plura	quam	ipse.	Et	 iste4071	terminus4072	'ad	aliquid'	est	superior4073	ad	 istum4074	terminum	 'idem',4075	
quia	significat	rationem	magis4076	ampla.	
	
<6>	 Sexta	 regula	 est	 haec:	 arguendo	 a	 superiori4077	cum	 distributione4078	ad	 inferius	 negative	 et4079	
affirmative	 cum	 constantia	 subiecti	 est	 bona	 consequentia,4080	ut	 bene4081	sequitur:	 'nullus	 homo4082	
currit,4083	igitur4084	Sortes4085	non	 currit'.	 Similiter	 sequitur:4086	'omnis	 homo	 currit,	 et	 Sortes	 est	
homo,4087		ergo4088	Sortes	currit.'	
Dico	 notanter4089	"cum	 distributione",	 quia	 sine	 distributione	 non	 valeret.4090	Nam4091	non	 sequitur:	
'animal	non	currit,	ergo4092	homo	non	currit'.4093	
Dicitur 4094 	etiam 4095 	notanter: 4096 	"affirmative	 cum	 constantia	 subiecti",	 quia	 sine	 constantia	


































currit',	 quia	 Sorte	 non	 existente4101	antecedens	 potest4102	esse4103	verum	 consequente	 existente4104	
falso.4105		





Pro	 ista4113	regula	 est	 notandum	quod	 "pars	 in	modo"	 dicitur	 dictio4114	determinabilis,4115	capta	 cum	
determinatione	non	distrahente	|V	92va|	vel4116	diminuente4117	vel	ampliante	nec	extendente	seu	etiam	
ab	aequivocatione4118	a	casu4119	restringente.4120	
Et4121	dicitur	 notanter	 "non	 diminuente",	 quia	 hoc	 quod	 est	 'velle	 esse	 in	 luto4122	pro	 centum4123	















































Et 4152 	breviter 4153 	dicam:	 'pars	 in	 modo' 4154 	est 4155 	quando,	 determinabili	 sumpto 4156 	cum	













































































Et	 dicitur	 notanter:4196 	"affirmative",	 quia	 si	 dictio	 supponens	 copulative4197 	pro	 omni	 tempore	
negaretur,4198	non	valeret	 consequentia,	ut	non	sequitur:	 'Sortes	non	est	 semper,	 ergo4199	Sortes	non	
est	 hodie'.	 Simili	 modo	 est,	 si	 talis	 dictio	 complectens4200	omne	 tempus4201	significaret	 negative,4202	
sic4203	enim4204	sequitur:	'chymaera	numquam	est,	ergo4205	chymaera	non	est	hodie'.	
	
<10>	 Decima	 regula	 est	 haec:	 arguendo	 a	 negatione	 partis	 in	 tempore	 ad	 negationem	 totius	 in	
tempore,	est	bona	consequentia.4206		
Ut	bene	sequitur:4207	'antichristus	non	est4208	nunc,	ergo4209	antichristus	non	est	semper'.		
Vocatur	 autem	 'pars	 in	 tempore'	 dictio	 supponens4210	pro	 aliquo	 tempore	 non	 copulative,	 ut	 'nunc',	
'aliquando',	'aliquo	tempore'	et	consimilia.4211	





































Exemplum,4216	ut	 bene	 sequitur:	 'Sortes	 est	 ubique,	 ergo4217	Sortes	 est	 hic';	 'chymaera4218	est4219	
nusquam,4220	ergo	chymaera	non	est	hic'.4221	Breviter4222	tenent	consequentiae4223	a	toto4224		in	loco	et	
a	parte4225	in	 loco	sicut	consequentiae4226	a	 toto	 in	 tempore	et	a	parte	 in	 tempore.4227	'Totum	in	 loco'	













































consequentiam	 valere,4254	ut	 non	 sequitur:	 'homo	 vel	 asinus	 currit,	 ergo4255	homo	 currit'.	 	 Posito	
enim4256	|W	 123v|	 quod	 asinus	 currat4257	|M	 47r|	 et	 homo	 quiescat,4258	antecedens	 est	 verum	 et	
consequens4259	falsum.	
	
<14>	 Quarta	 decima	 regula	 est	 haec:	 arguendo	 a	 parte	 disiuncti	 ad	 totum	 disiunctum4260		 sine	
distributione4261	disiuncti4262	est	 bona4263	consequentia.	 Ut	 bene	 sequitur:	 'homo	 currit,	 ergo	 homo	
currit4264	vel	asinus	currit',	nam	oppositum	consequentis	repugnat	antecedenti.	Si	enim	nec	homo	nec	
asinus	curreret,	tunc	nullus4265	homo	curreret.	
Et	 dico	 notanter	 "sine	 distributione"	 quia	 cum	 distributione	 disiuncti	 non	 oportet	 consequentiam	
valere,	ut	non	sequitur:	 'omne	quod	est	homo	est	risibile,	 igitur	omne	ens	quod	est	homo	vel	bos	est	






























secundi	 adiacentis 4269 	ad	 nomen	 effectus 4270 	respectu	 huius	 verbi	 'potest	 esse' 4271 	est	 bona	










































ad	 nomen	 effectus	 respectu	 huius	 verbi	 'potest	 esse',4297	est	 bona	 consequentia.	 Ut	 bene	 sequitur:	
'ferrum	est,	ergo4298	cultellus	potest	esse'.4299	
	
<19>	 Undevicesima	 regula	 est	 haec:	 arguendo	 a	 nomine	 effectus	 causae	 materialis	 respectu	 huius	
verbi	 'est	 vel	 fuit'	 ad	 nomen	 causae	 respectu	 eiusdem4300	verbi,4301	est	 bona	 consequentia.	 Ut	 bene	



























sequitur:	 'homicidium4309	est	 malum,	 ergo4310	latitatio	 in	 antris4311	propter	 homicidium	 est	 vel	 fuit	
mala'.4312	Et	ista4313	consequentia	tenet	e	converso	a	nomine	effectus	ad	nomen4314	causae.	
	
<21>	 Vicesima	 prima	 regula	 est	 haec:	 arguendo	 a	 nomine	 causae4315 	formalis	 substantialis	 vel	
accidentalis	 cum	 hoc4316	addito	 	 'sufficiens	 ad	 denominationem	 sui	 subiecti'4317	ad	 nomen	 effectus	
utrobique4318	respectu	 huius	 verbi	 'est'	 secundi	 adiacentis	 est	 bona	 consequentia.	 |M	 47v|	 Ut	 bene	
sequitur:4319	'forma	 hominis	 est,	 ergo	 homo	 est';	 'albedo4320	sufficiens	 |W	 124r|	 ad	 denominatione	




inesse	 et	 de	 praesenti4325	et4326	addendo	 in	 antecedente	 'pro	 toto	 tempore	 praesenti4327	et4328	pro	
qualibet	 parte	 eius' 4329 	ad	 propositionem 4330 	negativam	 de	 praedicato	 4331 	finito 4332 	est	 bona	
































Dicitur	 etiam4342	notanter	 "de4343	praesenti"	 quia	 in	 propositio4344	de	 praeterito	 et4345		 de	 futuro	 non	
valet.4346	|Y	99r|	Ut4347	non	sequitur:	'Sortes4348	erit	non	albus,	ergo	Sortes	non	erit	albus'.	Si	enim	cras	
deberet4349	esse4350	albus	 et	 post	 cras4351	niger,	 tunc	 antecedens	 esset	 verum	 et	 consequens	 falsum.	
Similiter	non	sequitur:	'Sortes4352	fuit	non	albus,	ergo4353	Sortes	non	fuit	albus'.4354	
Dicitur4355	etiam	 notanter	 "addendo4356	in	 antecedente	 'pro	 toto	 tempore	 praesenti4357	et	 pro4358	
qualibet	 parte	 eius',4359	quia	 isto4360	omisso	 non	 valeret	 consequentia.	 Si	 enim	 Sortes	 pro	 prima	
medietate	 temporis	 praesentis	 sederet	 et	 pro	 secunda4361	non,4362	tunc	 Sortes	 esset4363	sedens	 et4364	










































de	 praedicato	 infinito	 additis 4376 	circumstantiis	 in 4377 	praecedenti	 regula	 positis	 est	 bona	




coniunctum	 supposito 4385 	quod	 unum	 ipsorum4386 	non	 includatur4387 	in	 reliquo4388 	nec 4389 	ambo	
sint4390	accidentia4391	eiusdem	 tertii,	 est	bona	consequentia.	Ut	bene4392	sequitur:	 'Sortes	est	homo	et	
Sortes	est	albus,	ergo4393	Sortes	est	homo	albus'.	
Et 4394 	dicitur	 notanter	 "si 4395 	unum	 non	 includat 4396 	reliquum", 4397 	quia	 si	 unum	 includeret 4398	































albus	 et4402	Sortes4403	est	 albus,4404	igitur4405	Sortes	 est	 <albus>	 homo	 albus';4406	nec	 sequitur:4407	
'Sortes	est4408	Sortes	et4409	Sortes	est	homo,	ergo4410	Sortes	est	Sortes	homo'.	
Dicitur	 etiam	 notanter4411	"dummodo	 talia4412	non	 sint4413	accidentia	 eiusdem	 tertii",	 quia	 si	 essent	
accidentia	eiusdem	tertii4414	|W	124v|	non	valeret	consequentia.	Ut	non	sequitur:	 'Sortes	est	albus	et	
Sortes4415	est	musicus,	ergo	Sortes4416	est	albus	musicus",	quia4417	consequens	est	propositio	plures	et	
non	propositio	una.4418	Nec4419	sequitur:	 'Sortes	 est	 albus	 et	 Sortes4420	est	monachus,	 |Y	99v|	 ergo4421	
Sortes	est	albus	monachus',	quia	esto4422	quod4423	consequens	sit	propositio4424	una,	tamen	termini4425	
determinatio 4426 	variatur,	 quia	 in	 antecedente	 ly	 albus 4427 	determinat	 qualitatem	 Sortis	 et	 in	
consequente	determinat	qualitatem4428	vestium	seu	habitus.4429	
	
<25>	 Vicesima	 quinta4430	regula	 est	 haec:	 arguendo	 a	 coniunctis4431	ad	 divisa,4432	dummodo	 unum	




































nec 4436 	aliquod	 eorum4437 	sit 4438 	ampliatum 4439 ,	 nec	 aequivocum 4440 	a	 casu 4441 	est	 consequentia	
bona.4442	
Exemplum,4443	ut	 bene4444 	sequitur:	 'Johannes	 est	 homo	 albus,	 ergo4445	Johannes4446	est	 homo	 et	
Johannes	est4447	albus'.	
Dicitur 4448 	notanter	 in	 regula 4449 	"dummodo	 unum	 eorum	 non	 includat 4450 	oppositum	 alterius",	
quia4451	ubi4452	includeret	 oppositum,4453	consequentia4454	non	 valeret.	 Ut	 non	 sequitur:	 |M	48r|	 'haec	
figura4455	est	homo	pictus,4456	ergo4457	haec	figura4458	est	homo'.	
Dicitur	etiam	notanter4459	|V	93rb|	"dummodo	ambo4460	non4461	sint4462	accidentia	eiusdem	tertii",	quia	






































sequitur:	 'iste4466	est	 albus	 monachus,	 ergo4467	iste4468	est	 albus';	 nec	 sequitur:4469	'iste4470	est	 bonus	
cytharedus,4471	ergo4472	iste4473	est	bonus'.4474	
Dicitur	 etiam	 notanter 4475 	"ubi	 neutrum 4476 	sit 4477 	ampliatum",	 quia	 si	 unus	 terminorum	 esset	
ampliatus,	non	valeret	consequentia4478	ad	aliam.4479	Ut	non	sequitur:	'Adam4480	est	homo4481	mortuus,	
ergo	Adam4482	est	homo'.	
Dicitur	 etiam	 notanter:	 "ubi	 neutrum4483	est	 aequivocum	 a	 casu",4484	quia	 ad	 aequivocum	 a	 casu	
consequens	 fieret	propositio	plures	et	 sic	non	valeret	 consequentia.	Ut	non	sequitur:4485	'canis	 latrat	
ergo	est	canis'.4486	
	
<26>	 Vicesima	 sexta	 regula	 est	 haec:	 arguendo	 a	 propositione	 negativa	 de	 praedicato	 finito	 in	
propositionibus	 de	 inesse	 cum	 constantia	 subiecti	 ad	 affirmativam	 de	 praedicato	 infinito	 est	 bona	
consequentia.	Ut	bene	sequitur:4487	'Sortes	non	est	albus	et	Sortes	est,	ergo4488	Sortes	est	non	albus'.	
Dicitur	notanter	"cum	constantia	subiecti",	quia	sine	ea	non	oportet4489	consequentiam	valere,	ut	non	
































universalis	 affirmativa	 et4496	ubi4497	unus	 terminorum4498	|Y	 100r|	 infinitatus	 pro	 nullo4499	supponat,	
non	 oportet4500	consequentiam	 valere.4501	Ut	 non	 sequitur:	 'omnis	 homo	 est	 ens,	 ergo4502	omne	 non-
ens4503	est	 non	 homo'.	 Est	 enim4504	antecedens4505	verum	 et	 consequens	 falsum,	 quia4506	non-ens	
non4507	est	-	et	sic	consequens4508	est	propositio	affirmativa	cuius	subiectum	pro	nullo	supponit.4509	
Nota4510	quod4511	"conversio	 per	 contrapositionem"	 est4512	ubi	 |W	 125r|	 convertitur	 propositio4513	in	
unam4514	aliam	 eiusdem	 qualitatis	 et	 quantitatis,4515	terminis	 finitis	 mutatis	 in	 terminos	 infinitos,	
testante 4516 	Petro	 Hispano	 in	 principio 4517 	suarum 4518 	Summularum,	 4519 ut 4520 	in	 exemplo	 prius	
posito.4521	
	
<28>	 Duodetricesima	 regula	 est	 haec:4522	convertendo	 propositionem	 universalem	 affirmativam	 per	


































consequentia.4526	Ut	 bene	 sequitur:	 'omnis	 homo	 est	 animal,	 igitur4527	omne	 non	 animal	 est	 non	
homo'.4528	Notanter	dicitur4529	"dummodo	nullus	terminorum	supponat	pro	omni	existente"	quia	si4530	
unus	 terminus 4531 	supponeret	 pro	 omni	 existente, 4532 	iste 4533 	terminus 4534 	infinitus 4535 	pro	 nullo	






































<30>	 Tricesima	 regula4549 	est	 haec:4550 	arguendo	 a	 propositione4551 	particulari4552 	negativa4553 	de	




homo	 est	 non	 asinus,	 ergo	 omnis	 homo	 est	 non	 homo". 4568 	Modo4569 	istud 4570 	consequens	 est	
simpliciter 4571 	falsum. 4572 	Et	 istam 4573 	regulam	 et	 secundam 4574 	praecedente 4575 	intellexit	 Petrus	























enim:	 "omne	 non	 asinus	 est	 non	 homo,	 ergo	 omne	 non	 asinus	 non	 est	 homo',	 per	 regulam	 vicesima.	 Et	 ultra	
















inter4581	regulas4582	|Y	 100v|	 consequentiarum	 materialium,	 quia	 esto	 quod	 conversionem	 tangant,	
tamen	non4583	sunt	formales.	
	
<31>	 Tricesima	 prima	 regula	 est	 haec:4584	si	 fuerint	 duae	 contrarietates4585	sic	 se	 habentes	 quod	
cuilibet	 enti	mundi	 conveniat	 disiunctum4586	ex	 qualibet	 earum,	 si	 tunc4587	pars4588	unius	 infertur	 ex	
uno4589	alterius4590	universaliter,4591	et	 e	 converso,4592	tunc	 est4593	bona	 consequentia	 si4594	reliquum	
primae	infert4595	reliquum	secundae4596	universaliter,4597	et	e	converso.4598h		
Ut	 bene	 sequitur: 4599 	'omne	 ens	 mundi 4600 	est	 genitum	 vel	 ingenitum,	 et	 omne	 ens	 est 4601	
corruptibile4602	vel	 incorruptibile,4603	et4604	omne4605	genitum	 est	 corruptibile,4606	ergo4607	omne4608	





















consequentia	 reliquum	 primae	 infertur	 in	 reliquum	 secundum	 universaliter	 et	 e	 converso	 	W	 |	 si	 tunc	 unum	
unius	 infertur	 in	unum	alterius	universaliter,	 tunc	 in	bona	consequentia	reliquum	primae	 infertur	 in	reliquum	
secundae	 universaliter	 M	 |	 et	 una	 pars	 unius	 disiuncti	 verificatur	 ulter	 de	 una	 parte	 alterius	 disiuncti	 et	 e	

















ens4618	sit4619	corruptibile4620	vel	 incorruptibile4621	-	 quod	 ipsum	 est	 corruptibile;4622	et	 cum	 omne	
corruptibile 4623 	sit 4624 	genitum	 et 4625 	omne	 incorruptibile	 ingenitum, 4626 	sequitur	 quod	 idem	 est	




|W	 125v|	 in	 qua	 |E	 53v|	 nulla	 ponitur	 negatio	 de	 sensu	 diviso	 ad	 propositionem	 consimilem4636	de	
possibili	 est	 bona	 consequentia.	 Ut	 bene	 sequitur:	 'Deum	necesse	 est	 esse,	 ergo	Deum	possibile	 est	
esse',	sed	non	tenet4637	e	converso.4638	
	



































et	 non	 verbo	 est	 bona4644	consequentia.	 Ut	 bene	 sequitur:	 'chymeram4645	impossibile	 est	 esse,	 ergo	
chymeram4646	possibile	est	non4647	esse'.	
Istae4648	duae4649	regulae	 patent,	 quia	 ex	 opposito	 consequentis4650	cuiuscumque	 sequitur	 oppositum	
antecedentis.	
Exemplum	de	prima,4651	nam4652	sequitur:	'omnem	deum	non	possibile	est	esse,	ergo4653	omnem	deum	
impossibile	 est4654	esse',	 quia	 ambae	 sunt	 in	 tertio	 ordine.	 |Y	 101r|	 Et	 ultra	 sequitur:4655	'ergo4656	
omnem	deum	necesse	 est	 non	 esse',	 quod	 est	 oppositum	 contradictorium	primi4657	antecedentis.4658	




<34>	Trecesima	quarta	 regula	 est	 haec:4667	regulae	Petri	Hispani,4668	quas	ponit	 de	 consequentiis4669	
































constantia	 propositionum4672	per	 quibus	 supponant	 dicta.	 Exemplum,4673	ut	 non	 sequitur:	 'Sortem	
non 4674 	currere	 non 4675 	est	 possibile, 4676 	ergo	 Sortem 4677 	currere 4678 	est	 possibile', 4679 	quia	
supposito 4680 	quod	 ista	 propositio 4681 		 'Sortem	 non4682 	currere'	 non	 esset 4683 	possibile 4684 	et 4685	
supposito	 quod	 ista4686	propositio	 'Sortem4687	currere'4688	non4689	sit4690	in	 mundo,4691i	 tunc	 ita	 esset	
sicut	 per	 antecedens	 significatur,4692	tamen	 non	 esset	 ita4693	sicut	 per	 consequens	 significatur,4694	
prout4695	de	se4696	notum	est.4697	
Sed	omnes	hae4698	regulae	intelligendae	sunt	cum	constantia	propositionum4699		pro	quibus	supponant	
dicta,	 ut	 'Sortem	 currere	 non	 est	 possibile'	 |M	 49r|	 et	 ista	 propositio	 'Sortes	 currere'	 et	 sua	























i	 Sortem	 currere	 non	 est	 possibile	 -	 mundo]	 Sortem	 +non+	 currere	 non	 est	 necesse	 ergo	 Sortem	 currere	 est	
possibile	quia	posito	quod	nulla	propositio	esset	W	|	Sortem	currere	non	est	possibile	ergo	Sortem	currere	est	
impossibile	 quia	 supposito	 quod	 Sortem	 currere	 non	 possibile	 quia	 supposito	 quod	 ista	 propositio	 Sortem	
currere	non	sit	 in	mundo	M	|	Sorte,	currere	est	possibile	ergo	Sortem	non	currere	non	est	necesse	quia	posito	
quod	Sortem	non	currere	non	esset	necesse	ut	supposito	quod	 illa	propositio	Sortes	non	currit	 solum	esset	 in	












Et4701	ita	 etiam4702	intelligi	 debent	 regulae4703	de	 modalibus	 compositis4704	in	 prima4705	parte4706	de	
consequentiis	formalibus	positae.4707	
	
<35>	 Trecesima	 quinta	 regula	 est	 haec:	 arguendo	 a	 propositione	 in	 qua	 de	 aliquo	 affirmatur4708	
unum4709	contrariorum	incomplexorum4710	ad	aliam	propositionem	in	qua	de	eodem	negatur	reliquum	
est	bona	 consequentia.	Ut	bene	 sequitur:	 'Johannes4711	est	 albus,	 ergo4712	Johannes4713	non	est	niger'.	
Addi	tamen	potest	in	antecedente4714	hoc	totum4715	'pro	qualibet	parte	temporis	praesentis',4716	et	tunc	
regula	 nullam	 calumpniam4717	peteretur.4718	Et	 intelligitur	 regula	 de	 propositionibus	 de	 praesenti	
et4719	de	 recto4720	et	 in	 propositionibus4721	de	 inesse,	 nam4722	aliquo4723	istorum4724	interveniente4725	
non	 oportet4726	consequentiam	 valere.	 Ut	 non	 sequitur:	 'Sortes	 erit4727	albus,	 ergo	 Sortes	 non	 erit	











































de	 aliquo	 uno	 et 4748 	eodem 4749 	est	 bona 4750 	consequentia.	 Ut	 bene 4751 	sequitur:	 'Sortes	 est 4752	
caecus,4753	ergo4754	Sortes4755	non	est	videns'.4756		
	
<37>	 Tricesima	 septima	 regula	 est	 haec:	 arguendo	 ab	 affirmatione	 unius	 	 contradictoriorum4757	
incomplexorum	in	propositionibus	de	inesse	et4758	de	praesenti	et	de	recto,4759	ad	negationem	alterius	



































Et	 intelliguntur4764	haec4765	regulae	 eodem4766	modo	 circumstantionatae	 sicut	 est	 regula	 vicesima	




<38>	 Duodequadragesima	 regula	 est	 haec:	 arguendo	 in4775	terminis4776	proprissime	 disparatis4777	ab	
affirmatione4778	unius	 de	 aliquo4779	subiecto4780	ad	 negationem	 alterius	 est	 consequentia	 bona.4781	Ut	
bene	 sequitur:	 'Sortes	 est	 homo,	 ergo4782	Sortes	 non	 est	 asinus'.4783	Sunt	 autem4784	termini	 |V	 94ra|	
'proprissime	 disparati'	 qui	 nulla	 via4785	neque	 simul,	 neque	 successive	 possunt	 convenire4786	eisdem		
vel4787	pro	eodem4788	supponere.	
	



































oportet4802	consequentiam	 valere.	 Ut	 non	 sequitur:	 'quod	 non	 est4803	intelligitur,	 ergo	 	 non-ens4804	
intelligitur'.	 Antecedens	 enim4805	est	 verum4806	in	 aliquo	 casu	 quia	 Antichristus4807	potest	 intelligi,	
vel4808	'homo	qui	heri4809	moriebatur'.	Consequens	est4810	falsum4811	quia4812	significat	quod4813	aliquid	
quod	 nec 4814 	est	 nec 4815 	potest	 esse	 nec	 potest 4816 	imginari	 esse, 4817 	intelligitur. 4818 	Hoc 4819 	est	






























































et 4836 	quinto	 'desinit';	 sexto	 de	 propositionubus	 in	 quibus	 ponitur	 hoc	 verbum4837 	'differt'	 vel	
aliud 4838 ei 4839 	aequivalens; 4840 	septimo	 de	 hoc	 termino	 'infinitum';	 octavo	 de	 comparativo	 et	









































<3>	 Tertio	 est4869	notandum	 quod	 descendendo	 sub4870		 exceptiva	 mutari	 debet4871	dictio	 exceptiva	










































Et	 potest	 reperiri	 quinta 4891 	species, 4892 	sed 4893 	non	 est	 ista 4894 	consueta: 4895 	ubi	 subiectum	
distribuitur4896	et	ly	praeter	negaretur,	ut:	'omnis	homo	non	praeter	Sortem	currit'	vel4897	'omnis	homo	
non	preter	Sortem	non	currit'.	





























est 4908 	principale	 subiectum,	 et	 principale	 praedicatum	 est	 ly	 currens. 4909 	Tertium 4910 	dictio	
exceptiva,4911	ut	ly4912	praeter;	et	quartum4913	istud4914	quod	excipitur,	ut	ly	Sortes.	
	
<6>	 Sexto	 notandum	 quod	 exceptiva	 affirmativa	 scilicet	 prima	 debet	 exponi	 |M	 50r|	 per	 duas	
exponentes	 copulativae:	 prima	 propositio,	 in	 qua	 praedicatum	 affirmatur	 de	 subiecto	 principali4915	
sumpto	cum	alietate	excepti	universaliter,4916	ut	sit	per	hoc	signum	'aliud,	ut:4917	'omins	homo	praeter	
Sortem	currit'	exponitur:4918	'omnis	homo	alius	a	Sorte	currit'.	Secunda	propositio	erit	propositio4919	in	
qua	 praedicatum	 principale4920	negatur4921	de	 excepto	 universaliter	 si	 sit	 terminus	 communis,	 et	
singulariter	 si	 sit	 terminus	 singularis	 |Y	 103r|	 -	 ut:	 'Sortes	 non	 currit';	 	 vel4922	'omne	 animal	 praeter	
hominem	 est	 irrationale'4923	exponitur	 sic:	 'omne	 animal	 aliud	 ab	 homine	 est4924	irrationale4925	et	
nullus	homo	est	irrationalis'.4926		
Secunda 4927 	exponitur	 sic 4928 	per	 duas	 exponentes	 |W	 127r|	 copulativae	 quarum	 prima	 negat	


































Tertia	 exponitur4938	per	 disiunctivam	 de	 partibus	 contradicentibus	 partibus	 copulativae	 per	 quam	
prima	 exponebatur,	 quia	 est	 contradictoria	 primae	 -	 ut	 'non	 omnis	 homo	 praeter	 Sortem	 currit'	
exponitur	sic:4939	'aliquis	homo	alius	a	Sorte	non	currit	vel	Sortes	currit',	et	eodem	modo	de	qualibet	
consimili.	
Sed 4940 	quarta	 exponitur	 per	 disiunctiva	 de	 partibus	 contradicentibus	 copulativae	 per	 quam	
exponebatur	secunda,4941	quia	est	eius	contradictoria4942	-	ut	 'non	omnis	homo	preter	Sortem	non4943	
currit'	exponitur	sic:	'aliquis	homo	alius	a	Sorte	currit,	vel	Sortes	non	currit'.	
Quinta	 vero	 (et4944	satis	 inconsueta)4945	est	 ista,	 in	 qua	 ponitur4946	una4947	negatio	 ante	 dictionem	
exceptivam,4948	exponitur4949	per	 disiunctivam	 cuius	 prima	 pars4950	est4951	contraria,4952	secunda	 vero	
contradictoria,4953	partibus	copulativae	per	quam	prima4954	exponebatur	et	proportionaliter	ista4955	in	
qua	 duae	 ponuntur 4956 	negationes	 per	 talem	 disiunctivam	 oppositam	 copulativae 4957 	per	 quam	

































<1>	 Tunc	 de	 istis	 sit	 prima	 regula:4966	a	 qualibet	 istarum	 ad	 suas	 exponentes	 simul4967	captas	 vel	 e	





































<4>	Quarta	 regula	 est	haec:4989	ab	una	exponentium	 istarum	ad	expositam	est	bona	 consequentia	 et	
formalis.	 Patet,	 quia	 aequivalenter4990	arguitur	 a	 parte	 disiunctivae	 ad	 totam	 -	 et4991	cum	 ipsae	







<1>	 Circa	 quas	 primo	 nota	 quod	 exclusivae	 dictiones	 sunt	 hae:	 'tantum',5004	'solum',	 'tantummodo',	






























tantum	 animal'	 -	 et	 vocatur	 propositio	 de	 excluso	 praedicato;5012	quandoque	 adduntur5013	subiecto	
tantum,	 et	 tunc	 faciunt	 propositionem5014	de	 excluso	 subiecto;	 quandoque	 vero	 praeponuntur	 totae	
propositioni 5015 	et	 cadunt 5016 	super	 totam	 propositionem, 5017 	et	 tunc	 faciunt	 propositionem	
exclusivam.5018	
	
<3>	Nota	 tertio	quod	propositiones	de	excluso	praedicato	 sic	 exponuntur:	 'homo	est	 tantum	 |E	56v|	
animal:	 homo	 est	 |Y	 104r|	 animal	 et	 non5019	aliud	 quam	 animal'.	 Et	 est	 	 propositio	 cathegorica	 de	
copulato	extremo	exponens5020	istius.5021	
	
<4>	 Quarto	 nota	 quod	 propositio	 de	 excluso	 subiecto	 semper	 est	 distinguenda	 eo5022	quod	 potest	
esse5023	exclusiva	vel	de	excluso	subiecto,	ut	haec:5024	'tantum	homo	est	animal'.	Si	sit5025	exclusiva	est	
falsa,5026	sicut5027	postea	patebit5028	per	eius	exponentes.	Sed	si	sit5029	de	excluso	subiecto,	est	vera.	Et	





























exponens	 una	 propositio5033 	cathegorica5034 	de	 copulato	 subiecto.	 Unde	 consuevit	 sic	 syllogizari	
probando	 propositionem	 iam	 expositam:5035	'Sortes	 est	 animal	 et	 Sortes	 est	 tantum	 homo,	 ergo5036	
tantum	 homo	 est	 animal'.	 Quo	 argumento	 facto,	 semper	 est	 distinguendum	 de	 conclusione	 modo	









prout	 ly	 tantum	exponitur	per	plura,	et	sic	exponitur	per	copulativam	bimembrem	-5051	sic:	 'quinque	
sunt	praedicabilia	et	non		sunt5052	plura	quam	quinque	praedicabilia'.	Opposita	autem	huius,	ut5053	'non	
tantum	 quinque	 sunt	 praedicabilia'	 exponitur	 per	 |W128r||Y	 104v|	 disiunctivam	 de	 partibus	





























<6>	 	 Sexto	 nota	 quod	 tres	 sunt	 partes	 exclusivae	 praeter5058	copulam	 principalem,5059	ut	 'tantum	
animal	 est	 homo':	 praedicatum	 est	 ly	 homo,	 subiectum	 ly	 animal,	 tertia5060	dictio	 exclusiva	 ut	 ly	
tantum.	





animal	 est	 homo';	 secunda5068	negativa,	 ut	 'tantum	 animal	 non	 est	 homo';	 tertia5069	contradictoria	
primae,	ut	 'non	 tantum	animal	est	homo';	quarta5070	contradictoria	 secundae,	ut	 'non	 tantum	animal	
non	est	homo'.	
	
<8>	 Octavo	 nota	 quod	 prima,	 scilicet	 affirmativa,5071	exponitur	 per	 copulativam	 bimembrem	 cuius	
prima	pars	est	praeiacens5072	et	secunda	pars5073	universalis	negativa,	in	qua	praedicatum	negatur	de	
																																																																																																																																																																																								
























Secunda	 vero	 exponitur	 per	 copulativam	 bimembrem	 cuius	 prima	 pars	 est	 praeiacens	 et	 secunda	
universalis	 affirmativa5076	in	 qua	 praedicatum	 affirmatur	 universaliter5077	de	 subiecto	 sumpto	 cum	
hoc5078	addito	 'aliud'	 -	 ut	 'tantum	 animal	 non	 est	 homo'	 exponitur	 sic:5079	'animal	 non	 est	 homo	 et	
omne	 aliud	 ab	 animali	 est	 homo'	 vel	 loco	 eius	 ponatur5080	ista:	 'et5081	nihil	 aliud	 ab	 animali	 non	 est	
homo'	et	aequipollet5082	precedenti5083.	
Tertia	exponitur	per	disiunctivam	de	partibus	contradicentibus	partibus	copulativae	per	quam	prima	
exponebatur	 -	ut	 'non	 tantum	animal	 |Y	105r|	 est	homo'	 exponitur	 sic:	 'nullum	animal	 est	homo	vel	
aliquid	aliud	ab	animali	est	homo'.	
Sed	quarta	exponitur	per	disiunctivam	de	partibus	contradicentibus	partibus5084	copulativae	per	quam	
exponebatur	 secunda	 -	 ut5085	haec5086	'non	 tantum	 animal	 non	 est	 homo'	 exponitur	 sic:5087	'omne	




































<5>	 Quinta	 regula	 est 5102 	quod 5103 	consequentia	 est 5104 	bona,	 quando	 arguitur 5105 	ab	 exclusiva	
affirmativa	 vel	 negativa	 ad	 eius 5106 	praeiacentem. 5107 	Patet 5108 	per	 regulam	 secundam, 5109 	quia	
praeiacens	est	una	exponentium.	
	
<6>	 Sexta	 regula:5110	|E	 57v|	 ab	 exclusiva	 affirmativa	 ad	 universalem5111	de	 terminis	 transpositis	 est	
bona	consequentia	et	e	converso5112,	sicut	sequitur:5113	'tantum	animal	est	homo,	ergo	omnis	homo	est	
animal'.	 Nam	 da	 oppositum	 consequentis	 'aliquis	 homo	 non	 est	 animal'	 et	 'omnis	 homo	 est',	 ergo	
'aliquis5114	homo	 est	 aliud	 ab	 animali'	 et	 ultra5115	ergo	 per	 conversionem5116	'aliud	 ab	 animali	 est	































<1>	Sunt	autem	dictiones	reduplicativae	haec:5123	'inquantum',	 'secundum	quod',	 'prout',	 'ea	ratione',	




Quando5127	enim5128	tenentur	 specificative,	 tunc	 non	 est	 in	 eis	 difficultas	 in	 exponendo.	 Specificant	
enim	rationem	secundum	quam	principale	praedicatum5129	convenit	principali	subiecto5130.	Exemplum	
ut:	'diligo	Sortem5131	inquantum	mihi	bene	fecit',	ly	inquantum	specificat5132	rationem	secundum	quam	
principale	 praedicatum	 convenit	 principali	 subiecto	 et 5133 	secundum	 quam	 dilectio	 fertur5134 	in	































referri	 ad	 praedicatum.	 Unde	 si	 sequitur5149	copulam,	 Aristoteles	 Primo	 Priorum5150 	dicit	 eam5151	
esse5152	inintelligibilem.5153	Exemplum	debet	enim5154	dici	 'homo	inquantum	rationalis	est	risibilis'5155	
et	 non	 'homo	 est	 risibilis	 inquantum	 rationalis'.	 Notetur	 tamen5156	quod	 Aristoteles	 non5157	intendit	
quod5158	tales	 sint5159	simpliciter	 <in>intelligibiles5160,	 sed	minus	 proprias	 eo5161	quod	 sunt5162	magis	
inconsuetae.5163	Et5164	tales5165	non	 possunt	 intelligi	 bene	 |W129r|	 nisi	 capiantur5166	in	 eodem	 |E	 58r|	
sensu	in	quo5167	primae.	Vel	dico	-	et	magis	ad	intentionem	Aristotelis	-	quod	non	sunt	intellegibiles	in	
































inquantum	 risibilis',	 quia	 "sive5169	specificative	 sive	 reduplicative	 teneatur	 'inquantum'	 super5170	
alietatem	importat"	-	quae	non	est	eiusdem5171	super	se	ipsum.5172	
	
<4>	 Quarto	 nota5173	quod	 in	 propositione	 reduplicativa	 sunt5174	quattuor	 partes.	 Ut	 in	 ista	 'homo	
inquantum	rationalis5175	est	risibilis',	prima	pars	est5176	principale	subiectum,	ut	ly	homo;	secunda	est	
principale	 praedicatum,	 ut	 ly	 risibilis;	 |Y	 106r|	 tertia	 est5177	reduplicatio,	 ut5178	ly	 inquantum;	 quarta	
est	dictio	super	quam	cadit5179	reduplicatio	puta5180	ly	rationalis5181.	
	
<5>	 Quinto	 nota	 quod	 propositiones	 reduplicativae	 sunt	 in	 quadruplici	 differentia.5182	Sunt	 enim	
aliquae	in	quibus	nulla	ponitur	negatio,	ut5183	'homo	inquantum	rationalis5184	est	risibilis'.	Aliae	sunt	in	
quibus	 ponitur	 solum	 una 5185 	negatio	 sequens	 immediate 5186 	dictionem	 super	 quam	 cadit	
reduplicatio5187	ante	 copulam,5188	ut5189	'homo	 inquantum	 rationalis	 non	 est	 asinus'.5190	Aliae	 sunt	 in	
































<6>	 Sexto	 nota	 quod	 in	 qualibet	 istarum	 ly	 inquantum	 potest	 se5199	tenere	 ratione	 causae	 vel	
ratione5200	concomitantiae.	 Et	 est5201	talis	 differentia:5202	quod	 quando	 teneretur5203	ratione	 causae,	




istarum	et	 sibi	 consimles5210	(ut	haec:5211	'homo	 inquantum	rationalis	 est	 risibilis')5212	debent	 exponi	
per	copulativam	quadrimembrem.	
Prima	 exponens5213	est	 propositio5214	in	 qua	principale	praedicatum	dicitur5215	de	principali	 subiecto	








j	 Sunt	 enim	 aliquae	 -	 asinus]	 sunt	 enim	 aliquae	 in	 quibus	 nulla	 ponitur	 negatio,	 ut	 'omnis	 homo	 in	 quantum	
rationalis	est	risibilis'.	Aliae	sunt	in	quibus	ponitur	solum	una	negatio	sequens	immediate	dictionem	super	quam	




























principali 5218 	subiecto,	 ut	 'homo	 est	 rationalis'.	 Tertia,	 in	 qua	 praedicatum	 principale	 dicitur	
universaliter	 de	 dictionem	 super	 quam	 cadit	 reduplicatio,	 ut	 'omne	 rationale	 est	 risibile'.	 Quarta	
propositio5219	debet	 esse	 conditionalis	 necessaria,	 in	 cuius	 antecedente	 dictio	 super	 quam	 cadit	




copulativam	 quandrimembrem.	 Prima	 est 5227 	in	 qua 5228 	principale	 praedicatum	 negatur 5229 	de	
principali	 subiecto,5230	ut	 'homo	non	est	asinus'.	 Secunda	 in	qua	 |W129v|	dictio	 super	quam	cadit5231	
reduplicatio5232	affirmatur	de	principali	 subiecto,	ut	 'homo	est	 rationalis'.5233	Tertia	propositio	est5234	
in	qua	principale	praedicatum	negatur	universaliter	de	dictione	super	quam	cadit	reduplicatio,5235	ut	
'nullum	rationale	est	asinus'.	Quarta	conditionalis	necessaria	 in	cuius	antecedente	dictio	super	quam	
cadit5236 	reduplicatio	 affirmatur	 de	 hoc	 termino	 'aliquid',	 et5237 	in	 cuius	 consequente	 principale	





























Item,	 tertia5239earum	quae	 contradicit	 primae5240	exponitur	 per	 disiunctivam	quadrimembrem	de5241	
partibus	 contradicentibus	 partibus	 copulativae	 per	 quam	 prima	 exponebatur,	 ut	 'non	 homo5242	
inquantum	 rationalis	 est	 risibilis'	 exponitur	 sic:5243	'nullus	 homo	 est	 risibilis,	 vel	 nullus	 homo	 est	
rationalis,	vel	aliquod	rationale	non	est	risibile5244,	vel	non5245	si	aliquid	est	rationale,	istud	aliquid	est	
risibile'.	
Item	 quarta	 etiam5246	exponitur	 per	 disiunctivam	 quadrumembrem	 de	 partibus	 contradicentibus	
partibus	 copulativae	 per	 quam	 secunda5247	exponebatur,	 ut	 'non5248	homo	 inquantum	 rationalis	 non	
est5249	asinus'	 exponitur	 sic:	 'omnis	 homo	 est	 asinus,	 vel	 nullus	 homo	 est	 rationalis,	 vel	 aliquod	
rationale	est	asinus,	vel	non	si	aliquid5250	est5251	rationale,	istud	aliquid	non	est	asinus'.5252		
Et	 sic	 patent	 exponentes	 omnium 5253 	reduplicativarum	 in	 quantum	 ly	 inquantum	 tenetur	
reduplicative5254	ratione	concomitantiae.	
	
<8>	Octavo	 nota	 quod	 si	 ly	 inquantum	 teneatur	 reduplicative5255	ratione	 causae	 |Y	 107r|	 tunc	 in5256	
qualibet	 istarum,	 primae	 tres	 exponentes	 sunt	 eaedem,5257	sed	 quarta	 debet	 esse	 causalis.	 Unde	 ubi	




























causae	 ponatur5265	causalis	 affirmativa.	 Et	 ubi	 ponebatur5266	isto5267	modo	 conditionalis5268	negativa,	




alia	 affirmatur,	 subiecta	 communia	 conveniunt	 et 5276 	non	 differunt	 penes	 distributum	 et	 non	
distributum,5277		 si5278	in	 utraque	 subiectum	 forte5279	distribuatur,	 ut	 hic	 'omnis	 homo	 inquantum5280	
rationalis	 est	 risibilis'	 et	 hic5281	'nullus5282	homo5283	inquantum	 est5284	rationalis5285	est	 risibilis',5286	
tunc	duae	primae	exponentes	copulativae	 |W130r|	et	disiunctivae	non	dicuntur	esse	contradictoriae,	
sed5287	contrariae	 -	 ut	 in5288	copulativa	 dicetur	 sic:	 'omnis	 homo	 est	 risibilis	 et	 omnis	 homo	 est	
rationalis';	 in	 disiunctiva	 vero 5289 	sic,	 nam: 5290 	'nullus	 homo	 est	 risibilis	 vel	 nullus	 homo	 est	






































si	 diceretur	 sic5303	in	 copulativa:	 'homo	 est	 risibilis	 et	 homo	 est	 rationalis';	 in	 disiunctiva	 vero5304	
dicetur	 sic:	 'homo5305	non	 est	 rationalis5306	vel	 homo	 non5307	est	 risibilis'.5308	Ultimae5309	duae5310	






modo	 capi	 sicut	 in	 reduplicativa.	 	 Ut	 si	 in	 reduplicativa	 accipitur	 determinate	 etiam	 in	 suis5318	
exponentibus	debent	capi	determinate.	







































quod	 est	 risibile	 inquantum 5324 	rationale,	 est	 homo'.	 |Y	 107v|	 Et	 istae	 includunt 5325 	unam	
reduplicativam,	 saltem	 si	 sunt	 affirmativae,	 ut	 praedicta	 includit	 hanc	 'aliquod	 quod5326	est	 risibile	
inquantum5327	est	rationale',	et	ista	exponitur	sicut	prima	de	qua	fiebat	mentio.5328	
	
<11>	 Undecimo	 nota	 quod	 regulae	 positae	 de	 exceptivis	 etiam5329	nec	 plus	 nec	minus	 ponuntur	 de	
istis.5330	
	
<12>	 Duodecimo5331 	nota5332	regulam	 specialem,	 quod	 a	 propositione	 affirmativa	 de	 reduplicato	
subiecto5333	ad	 suam	 reduplicativam	est	 bona	 consequentia,	 sicut5334	sequitur:5335	|E	 59v|	 'aliquod5336	




























<13>	 Tertia	 decima 5344 	regula:	 a	 propositione	 de	 reduplicato	 subiecto 5345 	negativa	 ad	 suam	
reduplicativam	 non	 oportet	 consequentiam	 valere,	 ut	 non	 sequitur	 'aliquid	 quod	 est	 chymaera	
inquantum	 est	 antichristus	 non	 est	 homo,	 ergo 5346 	aliquid 5347 	est	 chymaera	 inquantum 5348 	est	


































<2>	 Secundo	nota	 quod	 hoc	 verbum	 'incipit'5368	potest	 poni5369	respectu	 terminorum	permanentium	
singulariter5370 	et5371 	respectu	 terminorum	 connotantium	 successionem	 aut5372 	explicite5373 	aut5374	
implicite.5375	|Y	 108r|	 Exemplum	primi:5376	'Sortes	 incipit	 esse	 homo',	 'Sortes	 incipit	 esse	 substantia'.	










































quod	 	 dicitur	 poni	 respectu	 terminorum	 connotantium	 successionem,5394	aut5395	implicite	 aut5396	
explicite.	
	




<4>	 Quarto	 ex	 hoc5404	nota	 quod	 communiter	 et	 sufficienter	 ponitur	 per	 loicos	 quod	 quando5405	ly	
incipit	 affirmatur	 respectu	 terminorum	 pure	 permanentium,	 ut 5406 	in	 propositione	 de	 subiecto	
singulari 5407 	non	 connotativo, 5408 	ut	 hic:	 'Sortes	 incipit	 esse	 homo', 5409 	ipsa	 exponenda	 est	 per	
copulativam	bimembrem,	cuius	prima	pars	debet	esse	positio	de	praesenti,	ut	'Sortes	nunc	est	homo';	
et5410	secunda	pars	debet	esse	remotio	de	praeterito,	ut	'Sortes5411	immediate	ante	hoc	non	fuit	homo'.	




























Secundo	dicitur	quod	quando	ponitur	 respectu	 terminorum	successivorum	 in	propositione	 respectu	
subiecti	 singularis	 |W131r|	 substantialis,	 ut	 'Sortes	 incipit	 currere',	 exponitur	 per	 copulativam	
bimembrem,	cuius	prima	pars	est	remotio	de	praesenti,	ut	 'Sortes	nunc	non5416	currit';	et5417	secunda	
est	positio5418	de	futuro,	ut	'Sortes	immediate	post	hoc	curret'.	|Y	108v|	
Contradictoria	 vero	 eiusdem	ut5419	puta5420	'Sortes	non	 incipit	 currere',5421	in	qua	 respectu	 talium5422	
terminorum	 ly	 incipit	 negatur,5423	exponitur	 per	 disiunctivam	de	 partibus	 contradicentibus	 partibus	
copulativae	 praedictae,	 ut	 'Sortes	 non	 incipit	 currere'	 exponitur	 sic:	 'Sortes	 nunc5424 	currit	 vel	
Sortes5425	immediate	post	hoc	non5426	curret'.		

































puta	 tempus	praesens	divisibile	 -	et	monentur	ex	eo	quod5441	non	est	ponendum	in	 tempore	aliquod	
instans	indivisibile,	sicut	supponitur	ex	dictis	Philosophi5442	sexto	Physicorum,	quoniam5443	per	 'nunc'	
non	 debet	 intelligi	 instans5444	indivisibile	 -	 et5445	tamen	 mihi	 apparet5446	quod	 maior	 subtilitas	 est	
ponendo5447	ly5448	nunc	 pro	 instanti5449	indivisibili.	 Et	 ita5450	capit	 maior	 pars	 logicorum:5451	nam	
fugere	 difficultatem5452 	non	 est	 subtilitas	 respondentis,5453 	immo5454 		 debet5455 	potius	 causam5456	
fortiter	 perquirere 5457 	et 5458 	dubitationem	 ostendere 5459 	et	 de	 aliis 5460 	propositis	 partem	 eligere	
veriorem 5461 .	 Modo	 multae 5462 	pulchrae	 difficultates 5463 	sunt	 imaginandae	 iuxta 5464 	instantia	
indivisibilia,5465	per	ly	nunc	demostrando	quae	nullae	essent,	illis5466	simpliciter	negatis,	et	specialiter	









































indivisibile.	 Hoc	 est	 bene5481	verum,	 tamen5482	nihil	 prohibet	 ea	 in	 tempore	 imaginari	 et	 secundum	
talem	 imaginationem	 loqui,	 quia5483	Aristoteles,	 secundum	 eam5484	opinionem	 quam	 allegant,5485	ea	
posuit5486	vel	ea	in	modo	loquendi	admittit:5487	|Y	109r|	nihil	minus	est	huiusmodi	'nunc',5488	prout5489	
ex	 sexto5490	Physicorum	 apparet.	 Et5491	secundo5492	immo5493	in	 tempore	 obligationis	 patet	 quia5494	
omnis	 actus	 respondentis	 et	 |W131v|	 opponentis 5495 	imaginatur	 esse	 pro 5496 	eodem	 tempore	
adequate. 5497 	Hoc	 tamen 5498 	est	 mere 5499 	impossibile,	 nisi	 secundum	 imaginationem,	 sicut	 in	
proposito5500	modo	proportionali.	5501	
	
<5>	 Quinto	 nota	 quod	 licet	 huiusmodi	 modus	 loicorum5502	sit	 moderatus	 de5503 	expondendo5504	





































ex-|E	 61r|-ponitur	 per	 disiunctivam	 cuius	 ambae	 partes	 sunt	 copulativae.	 Prima5512	pars5513 	erit	






Per	 oppositum,5530	contradictoria	 -	 puta	 propositio	 de	 tali	 subiecto5531		 in	 qua	 ly	 incipit	 negatur	 -	
exponitur	 per	 copulativam	 cuius	 ambae	 partes	 sunt	 disiunctivae	 primis 5532 	copulativis 5533	




































modus 5540 	sufficiens	 exponendi 5541 	omnem	 propositionem	 de	 'incipit'	 de	 subiecto	 singulari	













































fuit5575	Sortes	 (patet	 secunda	 exponens,5576	quia5577	Plato	 immediate	 ante	 hoc5578	non	 |E	 61v|	 	 fuit5579	
Sortes)5580	ergo5581	homo	 incipit	 esse	 Sortes	 -	 et	 sic5582	constat	 quod5583	antecedens	 est5584	verum	 et	
consequens	falsum.5585		
Similiter	|W132r|	probatur	per5586	secundum	modum5587	exponendi:5588	'homo	nunc	non5589	est	Sortes	
et	 homo	 immediate	 post5590	hoc	 erit5591	Sortes'.	 Patet	 prima5592	pars,	 quia	 Plato5593	nunc	 non	 est	
Sortes,5594	ergo5595	homo	 incipit	 esse	 Sortes.	 Patet5596	igitur	quod5597	in	 illis	de	 subiectis	 communibus	
modus	exponendi	prius	positus	non	est	sufficiens.5598	
Eodem	 modo	 non 5599 	valent	 istae	 exponentes 5600 	si	 subiectum	 fuerit	 terminus	 discretus	 et	








































sed5605	quod5606	immediate	 post	 hoc	 erit5607	albus.	 Tunc5608	probatur	 quod5609	hoc	 album	 incipit	 esse	
Sortes,	 quia	 hoc	 album	 nunc5610	non	 est	 Sortes	 et	 hoc	 album	 immediate	 post	 hoc	 erit	 Sortes5611	per	
casum,	 ergo5612	hoc	 album	 incipit	 esse	 Sortes.	 Antecedens5613	est	 verum,5614	sed	 quod5615	consequens	
sit5616	falsum	patet,	quia	nihil	 incipit	esse	Sortes	quia	quisquis	est	Sortes	vel	erit	Sortes	diu	ante	hoc	
fuit	 Sortes	 cum	 Sortes	 autem	 diu	 fuerat	 ante	 hoc	 tempus.5617	Ergo5618	patet	 quod	 cum5619	subiectum	
sit 5620 	terminus	 discretus 5621 	et 5622 	connotativus 5623 	dictus 5624 	modus 5625 	exponendi	 non	 est	
sufficiens.5626	
	
<2>	 Ex	 quo5627	secundo5628	sequitur	 quod	 in	 talibus	 superaddere	 oportet5629	tertiam	 exponentem5630	
praeter5631	duas	 prius	 positas.	 Unde	 si	 sit	 exponenda	 <per>	 propositionem5632	de	 futuro,	 ut5633	'hoc	




































nunc	 non	 est	 Sortes';	 secunda:5637	'hoc	 album	 immediate	 post	 hoc	 erit	 Sortes'	 -	 quarum5638	prima	
dicitur	 remotio5639	de	 praesenti,5640	secunda	 vero5641	positio5642	de	 futuro.	 	 Et	 tertia	 erit	 remotio	
presentis	a5643	futuro,	scilicet	haec:5644	'et	nihil	|M	54v|	quod5645	immediate	post	hoc	erit	hoc5646	album	
nunc5647	est	Sortes'.	Et	proportionaliter5648	dicatur5649	de	omnibus	consimilibus.5650	
Si	 vero	 fuerit5651	exponenda5652	per5653	propositionem	 |Y	 110r|	 de	 praesenti,	 ut	 'homo	 incipit	 esse	
Sortes',	 tunc	 etiam5654	per	 copulativam	 trimembrem	 esset5655	exponenda.	 Prima	 est5656	positio	 de	
praesenti,	ut	'homo	nunc5657	est	Sortes';	secunda	est5658	remotio	de5659	praeterito,	ut	'homo	immediate	
ante	 hoc	 non	 fuit	 Sortes';	 tertia	 est	 negatio	 paeteriti	 a	 praesenti,	 ut	 'nihil	 quod5660	nunc	 est	 homo	
immediate	ante	hoc	fuit	Sortes',5661	'ergo5662	|E	62r|	homo	incipit	esse	Sortes'.	
	
<3>	 Tertio	 sequitur	 quod	 negativa	 de	 'incipit'	 in	 praedictis5663 	exponenda	 est	 per	 disiunctivam	





































Verum	est	quod	quando	est	 subiectum	commune	de	praedicamento	 substantiae,	 tunc	posset	 solveri	
addendo	 secundae	 exponenti	 relativum	 idemptitatis,	 ut	 'homo	 nunc	 est	 Sortes	 et	 idem	 homo	
immediate	ante	hoc	non	fuit	Sortes':	illic5674	sufficiant	duae	exponentes.5675	
	
<4>	 Quarto 5676 	est	 notandum5677 	quod 5678 	diligenter	 est 5679 	advertendum5680 	de	 istis 5681 	terminis	
communibus	 quantum5682	ad	 partes	 disiunctivae	 per	 quas	 exponitur5683	negativa.5684	Nam	 si	 ipsa	
propositio	 de	 incipit 5685 	negativa	 |W132v|	 fuit	 affirmativae 5686 	de	 'incipit'	 subcontraria,	 partes	
disiunctivae	et	eaedem	partes	copulativae	debent	esse	subcontrariae;5687	si	autem	fuerint	contrariae,	
partes	 disiunctivae	 et 5688 	partes5689 	copulativae	 erunt	 contrariae; 5690 	si	 autem5691 	contradictoriae,	



































Sed	 forte5697	quaereret	 aliquis	 nonne	 sufficeret5698	in	 istis5699	de	 subiectis	 communibus	 absolutis5700	
et5701	subiectis5702	connotativis5703	eas	exponi	per	duas	exponentes	addendo5704	relativum	idemptitatis.		
Exemplum,	ut	exponendo	hanc	'homo5705	incipit	esse	Sortes'	ut:5706	'homo5707	nunc	est	Sortes,	et	idem	
homo5708	immediate5709	ante	 hoc	 non	 fuit	 Sortes'.	 Respondeo5710	quod	 sic	 in	 illis5711	de5712	terminis	
communibus	 absolutis,	 sed	 in	 illis5713	de5714	terminis5715	connotativis5716	non	 sufficit,5717	ut	 in	 ista5718	
prius	posita:5719	'hoc	album	incipit	esse	Sortes'.	Verum	est	dicere:	'hoc5720	album	nunc	non	est	Sortes	et	







































<1>	Prima	 est	 ista:5728	quod5729	arguendo	 a	 qualibet	 istarum5730	ad	 suas	 exponentes	 est	 |E	 62v|	 bona	
consequentia,	et	e	converso.	
	
<2>	 Secunda	 regula	 est	 illa:5731	quod5732	arguendo5733	ab	 illis5734	quae	 exponuntur	 copulative5735	ad	
unam	exponentium5736	est	bona	consequentia	sed5737	non	e	converso.5738	
	






































<6>	 Sexta	 regula:	 quod5756	arguendo	 ab	 'incipit'	 sumpto5757	cum	 aliqua	 determinatione	 ad	 ipsum5758	
sumptum5759	sine	 tali5760	determinatione	non	valet	consequentia,	ut	non	sequitur:	 'Sortes	 incipit	esse	
currens,	 ergo5761 	incipit	 esse', 5762 	'Sortes	 incipit	 equitare	 equum	 Platonis,	 ergo5763 	Sortes	 incipit	
equitare'.	
	



































<8>	 Octava	 regula:	 arguendo	 cum5779	'incipit'	 a	 dictione	 postposita	 ad5780	eandem	 praepositam	 non	







<1>	 Circa	 quas	 primo	 notandum5788	est	 quomodo	 exponantur	 propositiones	 de	 'desinit'.	 Circa	 quas	
sciendum5789 	quod	 secundum5790	imaginationem	 instantium	 indivisibilium	 in	 tempore,	 secundum	




Talis	 tamen 5798 	diversitas	 non	 redeat 5799 	in	 propositionibus	 de	 'desinit',	 quia 5800 	nullius 5801 	rei	



























exponitur	 per	 positionem5805	de	 praesenti	 et	 remotionem	 de	 futuro.	 De	 nullo5806	enim	 nomine5807	
substantiae5808	verum	 est5809	dicere	 'hoc	 nunc	 est	 et	 hoc	 immediate	 post	 hoc	 non	 erit',5810	quia	 si5811	
aliquid5812	nunc	 est	 quidquid	 sit5813	in	 	 praedicamento	 substantiae,	 etiam	 post	 hoc	 erit5814	ex5815	eo	
quod	 non	 est	 dari5816	ultimum	 instans	 esse	 alicuius	 rei	 |M	 55v|	 substantialis,5817	ut	 dictum	 est.	
Attende5818	tamen5819	quod	 si	 extensio	 ponatur	 res	 distincta	 a	 substantia	 extensa,	 concedo	 quod	
instans	 in	 quo	 incipit	 rarefactio5820	alicuius	 rei	 sit	 ultimum	 instans	 extensionis	 praecedentis.	 Et	
ergo5821	haec	 expositio	 possit	 habere5822	locum5823	sic	 dicendo:	 'haec	 extensio	 nunc	 est	 et	 immediate	
post	 hoc	 non	 erit',5824	sed	 hoc	 non	 est	 in	 substantiis	 vel	 qualitatibus	 resistens5825	de	 quibus5826	
communiter	loquitur5827	-	sed	haec	pertinet	magis5828	ad	quartum	Physicorum.5829	
	
<2>	 Secundo	 ex	 hoc5830	nota	 quod	 propositiones	 de	 'desinit'	 de	 subiecto	 singulari	 pure5831	absolute	







































subiecto	 comsimili, 5843 	quia	 exponuntur	 per	 disiunctivam	 de	 partibus	 contradicentibus	 partibus	
copulativae	 per	 quam	 exponebatur	 affirmativa,	 ut	 'Sortes	 non	 desinit	 esse'	 exponitur	 sic:	 'Sortes	





non	 est	 Sortes	 et	 homo5856	immediate	 ante	 hoc	 fuit	 Sortes	 ergo5857	homo	 desinit	 esse	 Sortes'.5858	

































'hoc	album	nunc	non	est	Sortes	et	hoc	album	 immediate	ante	hoc	 fuit	Sortes,	 sicut	patet	per	 casum.	
Tamen5870	non	 sequitur:	 'igitur	 hoc	 album5871	desinit	 esse	 Sortes'5872	quia	 cum	 isto	 casu5873	possibile	
est	Sortem	manere5874	et	tunc	nihil	desinit	esse	Sortes.5875	
	
<5>	 Ex	 quo	 sequitur	 quinto5876	quod	 in5877	talibus	 oportet5878 	addere5879 	tertiam	 exponentem5880	
dicendo	sic:	'hoc	album	nunc	non	est	Sortes,	et	hoc	album	immediate	ante	hoc	fuit	Sortes	et	nihil	quod	
immediate	 ante	 hoc	 fuit	 hoc5881	album	 nunc	 est	 Sortes,5882	ergo5883	hoc	 album	 desinit	 esse	 Sortes'.	
Et5884	similiter	si	subiectum5885	esset5886	terminus	communis.	
	
<6>	 Unde	 sequitur	 sextum	 notabile	 |M	 56r|	 quod	 etiam5887	contradictoriae5888	talium5889	per	 tres5890	



































vel5897	aliquid5898	quod	 immediate	 ante	 hoc	 fuit	 hoc5899	album	 nunc5900	est	 Sortes'.	 Et	 advertatur	
bene5901	ad	partes5902	oppositas5903	talium	disiunctivarum	respectu	partium5904	copulativarum,	nam	si	
propositio 5905 	de	 'desinit'	 negativa5906 	fuit 5907 	affirmativae	 subcontraria, 5908 	partes 5909 	disiunctivae	
debent5910	partibus	copulativae	esse5911	subcontrariae.	Et5912	si	autem	fuerint	contrariae,	tunc5913	erunt	
partes5914		 partibus	 copulativae5915	contrariae.	 Et	 si	 contradictoriae,	 erunt	 partes	 sibi	 invicem5916	
contradictoriae.5917	
	














































rerum	 permanentium	 quam	 in	 terminis	 rerum	 successivarum, 5941 	quod	 etiam5942 	alia 5943 	opinio	
concedit.	 Et	 sic5944	exponit	 prima	 opinio5945	'motus5946	incipit	 esse':	 'motus	 nunc5947	est	 et	 motus5948	
immediate	 ante	 hoc	 non	 fuit'.	 Et5949	demonstrant5950	per	 ly	 hoc	 totum5951	tempus	 per	 quod5952	ille	
motus	 fuit.	 Similiter	 dicunt	 ista	 'motus	 desinit'	 esse	 sic	 exponenda:5953	'motus	 nunc	 non	 est	 et	
motus5954	immediate	ante	hoc	fuit'.5955	Et	demonstrant5956	per	ly5957	hoc	totum	tempus	sequens	in	quo	






































remotionem	de	 praeterito.	 Et	 propositio	 de	 'desinit'	 per	 remotionem	de	 praesenti	 et	 positionem	de	
praeterito.5962	Et	haec	expositio	est	minus	bona,	quia	secundum	eam	oporteret	istam	concedere	quod	
Adam	primus	 homo	nunc5963	desinit	 homo	 esse;	 similiter	 quod	 villa5964	Montis5965	Pessolani	 |Y	 112v|	
nunc	 incipit	 esse,	 |W134r|,	 	 quod	 est	 falsum5966	-	 et	 consequentiae	 patent	 per	 exponentes	 earum	
subtiliter	intuenti.5967	
Alia	 opinio	 dicit	 aliter5968	quod	 ly	 incipit	 connotat5969	'nuper	 non	 fuisse'	 et	 ly5970	desinit5971	'nuper	
fuisse	 sed5972	in	 brevi	 tempore5973	praeterito',5974	et5975	ideo5976	exponunt	 sic5977	'motus	 incipit	 esse':	
'motus 5978 	nunc 5979 	est	 et	 idem	 motus 5980 	nuper 5981 	non	 fuit'	 -	 i.e. 5982 	in	 tempore	 parum 5983	
praeterito5984	tempus	praesens	breve,	quod	est5985	unius	horae	vel	momenti.	Et	'motus	desinit	esse'5986	


















































































<3>	Tertia	 regula	 est6025	quod6026	ab	 illis	quae	exponuntur	disiunctive	ad	unam	exponentium6027	non	
valet6028	consequentia.	
	
<4>	 Quarta	 regula,6029	quod	 arguendo6030	<in>6031	eisdem6032	ab	 una6033	suarum6034	exponentium	 ad	
expositam	est	bona	consequentia.	
	
	<5>	Quinta6035	regula,6036	quod6037	cum	hoc	 verbo	 'desinit'	 ab	 inferiori	 ad	 superius	 postpositum	non	
valet	 consequentia. 6038 	Ut	 non	 sequitur:	 'Sortes	 desinit	 esse	 albus,	 igitur	 Sortes	 desinit	 esse	
coloratus'.6039	
	
<6>	 Sexta6040	regula	 est	 quod6041	a	 propositione	 de	 'desinit'	 sumpta	 cum	 aliqua	 determinatione	 |Y	





























<7>	 Septima	 regula	 est	 haec: 6044 	arguendo 6045 	a	 propositio	 de 6046 	'desinit'	 postposita 6047	
determinatione6048	sumpta6049	cum	 signo	 universali	 ad	 eandem	 determinatione6050	sine	 tali6051	signo	
universali6052	non	 oportet6053	consequentiam	valere.6054	Ut	 non	 sequitur:	 'Sortes	 desinit	 scire	 omnem	
propositionem	igitur	Sortes	desinit	scire	propositionem'.6055	
	





































<1>	 Circa	 quod6067	primo	 est6068	sciendum6069	quod	 ista	 inter	 se6070	convertuntur	 et	 sunt	 quasi6071	
sinonima:6072	'differt',	'aliud',	'non-idem',6073	'alterum',	'diversum',6074	et	si	qua	sunt	similia.6075	
Et	 sicut6076	exponitur6077	propositio	 in	 qua	 ponitur	 unum	 istorum6078	ita	 exponitur	 quaevis	 alia6079	in	
qua	ponitur	aliud6080	ipsorum6081	ceteris	paribus.	
	
<2>	 Secundo	 nota 6082 	quod	 omnis 6083 	propositio	 de	 'differt'	 affirmativa 6084 	debet	 exponi 6085 	per	
copulativam6086 	trimembrem.	 Et	 erit 6087 	prima	 exponens 6088 	positio	 subiecti 6089 	i.e. 6090 	propositio	
affirmativa6091	in6092	qua	 de	 subiecto	 propositionis6093	de	 'differt'	 personaliter	 capto6094	affirmatur	






































propositio	 affirmativa	 in	 qua	 determinatio	 super	 quam	 cadit6101	|E	 65r|	 ly6102	'differt'	 personaliter	
capta6103	affirmetur6104	esse.6105	Tertia	 erit6106	negatio	 termini6107	super	 quem	 cadit6108	ly6109	differt	 a	
subiecto.6110	





<3>	 Tertio	 nota6121	quod	 si	 in	 propositionibus6122	de	 'differt'	 ly	 differt	 praecedit6123	terminum	 super	

































<4>	 Ex	 quibus6134	sequitur6135	quartum	 notabile6136	quod	 propositio	 negativa	 de6137	'differt'	 debet	
exponi	 per	 disiunctivam	 trimembrem	 de	 partibus 6138 	oppositis	 partibus	 copulativae	 per	 quam	
exponebatur6139	affirmativa,	ut	 ista6140	'Sortes	non	differt	 ab	asino',	 exponitur	 sic:	 'Sortes	non	est	 vel	
nullus	asinus6141	est	vel	Sortes	est	asinus'.	
	
<5>	 Quinto	 nota 6142 	quod	 in 6143 	capiendo 6144 	partes	 oppositas	 partibus	 copulativae, 6145 	dum	
exponitur6146	negativa	 de6147	'differt'6148	per	 disiunctivam,6149	est6150	diligenter	 advertendum	 utrum	
ista	 de	 differt	 affirmativa	 sit6151	contraria	 vel6152	contradictoria	 vel	 subcontraria.6153	Si	 enim	 fuit	
contraria6154	tunc	 exponentes6155	in	 disiunctiva	 in	 quibus	 ponitur	 subiectum	 affirmativae6156	debet	






















































6162	erunt	 contradictoriae]	 blank	 space	 M	 |	 proportionaliter	 -	 contradictoriae]	 si	 exponibiles	 affirmativa	 et	
negativa	 contradictoriae	 tunc	 exponentes	 earum	 debet	 esse	 contradictoriae	 si	 vero	 subcontrariae	 tunc	































quandoque	 multitudinibus,6196	quandoque	 durationibus,	 sed	 solum	 volo	 hic	 de	 eo	 loqui6197	prout	




























<2>	 Secundo	 nota 6204 	quod,	 quandoque 6205 	'infinitum' 6206 	attribuatur	 magnitudinibus	 sive 6207	
multitudinibus,6208 	potest	 capi	 dupliciter:6209 	categorematice	 vel	 sincategorematice,6210 	et	 utroque	
modo	tam	in	istis6211	quam	in	illis6212	erit6213	exponendum.	
	
<3>	 Tertio	 nota 6214 	quod	 in	 continuis 6215 	sive	 in 6216 	magnitudinibus	 capiendo	 'infinitum'	
categorematice6217 	tantum	 est	 dicere	 'infinitum'	 quasi 6218 	'extensum6219 	sine	 termino',	 ut 6220 	hic:	
'magnitudo	est	infinita',	i.e.	'extensa	sine	termino'.	Unde6221	patet6222	<quod>6223	si	sic6224	esset	aliquod	
infinitum,	 oportet	 quod	 ipsum	 secundum	 omnem	 dimensionem	 esset	 infinitum.	 Si	 enim	 secundum	
unam	 dimensionem	 esset	 infinitum,	 tunc6225	usque6226	unam6227	dimensionem6228	haberet	 terminum	
et6229	per	consequens	non6230		esset6231	sine	termino.	
	



































termino. 6238 	Unde	 |M	 57v|	 si	 aliqua	 linea 6239 		 esset	 infinita	 in	 longitudine	 diceretur	 extensa	
secundum6240	longitudinem	 |E	 66r|	 sine	 termino.6241	Proportionaliter	 describitur6242	'infinitum	 latum'	
et	'infinitum	profundum'.	
	
<5>	 Quinto	 nota 6243 	quod	 iste	 terminus 6244 	'infinitum',	 captus 6245 	sincategorematice	 in 6246	
magnitudinibus6247	consuevit	 sic	 exponi:	 'infinitum'6248	|Y	 114v|	 id	 est	 'aliquantum6249	et	 non	 tantum	
quin	 maius'.	 Sed	 haec6250	expositio	 videtur	 insufficiens,6251	nam	 secundum6252	eam	 oporteret6253	in	
aliquo	 casu	 concedere 6254 	quod	 aliquod	 corpus 6255 	<in> 6256 	infinitum	 augeretur 6257 	et	 tamen 6258	
numquam	attingeret	quantitatem	bipedalem.	Hoc	consequens	videtur	esse6259	inconveniens.	Quare6260	
sequitur	quod	non	sic	exponitur.6261	|W135v|	Consequentia	ultima	tenet.6262	Et	prima	declaratur,	quia	




































proportionales	 consequenter	 se	 habentes 6268 	ita	 quod	 primo	 adderetur	 'a'	 medietas,	 secundo	
secunda6269	pars	 proportionalis,6270	tertio	 tertia	 pars6271	et	 sic	 de	 aliis.6272	Constat	 quod	 in	 hac6273	





sibi	 additum	 eo	 quod	 non	 est	 advenire6293	ad	 ultimam	 partem6294	proportionalem,6295	ergo6296	in6297	











































accipientibus 6320 	semper	 restat	 aliquid 6321 	accipere	 ultra". 6322 	Et	 intelligitur	 sic:	 'infinitum'	
sincategorematice	 sumptum6323	est6324	quod	 in	 quantitate	 apprehensum	 ab6325	anima6326	numquam	
potest	 totum6327	apprehendi,	 sed	 semper	 restat	 aliquid6328	ultra,	 scilicet6329	maior6330	quantitas	 non	
apprehensa	ab	ipsa6331	anima.6332		
Vel	 aliter6333	est	 expositio6334	communis	 et	melior:6335	|Y	 115r|	 'infinitum'	 est	 quod6336	aliquantum6337	







































<7>	 Septimo6346 	nota6347 	quod	 'infinitum'	 in	 multitudinibus6348 	captum	 categorematice	 exponitur	
proportionaliter6349	sicut	 in	magnitudinibus,	 sicut6350	'infinita6351	multitudo'	 i.e.6352		 'multitudo6353	non	
habens	terminum'	-	et	sic	consuevit	regulariter	capi.	
Si	 quaeritur6354	utrum	multitudo	 partium	 continui6355	dicatur6356	hoc	 modo	 'infinitum',6357	dicatur6358	
quod	 sic	 etiam6359	infinita6360	in	 potentia	 vel	 in6361	unitatibus6362	|M	 58r|	 non	 discontinuis.6363	Sed	












































<8>	 <Octavo> 6376 	nota 6377 	quod 6378 	'infinitum'	 captum	 sincategorematice	 in	 multitudinibus	
consuevit6379	dupliciter	exponi.		
Uno	modo	 sic:6380	unum,6381	duo,	 tria,	mille,	 centum,6382	et	 sic	 sine	 termino	 in	 continuo	 sunt	 infinitae	
partes.	Probatur6383	quia	ibi6384	sunt	duae6385	partes,6386	tres,	centum,	mille6387	et	sic	de	aliis.6388	
Alio	modo	exponitur	sic:6389	'aliquot6390	et	non	tot	quin	plura'.6391	Et	sic	forte	probabiliter6392	potest6393	
negari	 quod	 in	 continuo	 essent	 infinitae6394	partes,	 quia6395	licet	 ibi6396		 sunt6397	aliquot,6398	tamen	










































<9.1>	 Nono 6409 	nota 6410 	quod	 quantum 6411 	ad 6412 	regulas	 generales 6413 	consequentiarum	 de 6414	
'infinito',6415	prima	 regula	 est6416	quod6417	arguendo6418	ab6419	existentia6420	infiniti	 in	 magnitudinibus	
categorematice	 capti,6421	sequitur6422	quaelibet	 eius	 partem	 quae	 denominatur6423		 -	 scilicet	 partes	
quae	aliquotiens	sumptae	reddunt	ipsum	totum6424	-		aliquotiens6425	esse	infinitam,6426	ut	sequitur:6427	
'infinitum	 est,	 ergo6428	|Y	 115v|	 medietas	 eius6429	est	 infinita,	 et	 tertia	 eius	 est	 infinita	 et6430	sic	 de	
aliis.6431	
	
<9.2>	 Secunda	 regula	 est:6432	arguendo6433	ab6434	existentia	 eius6435	sequitur	 suam	 partem	 non	 esse	

































<9.2>	 Tertia	 regula:	 arguendo 6438 	ab	 esse	 infiniti	 sincategorematice	 capti 6439 	ad	 esse	 infiniti	
categorematice 6440 	capti 6441 	est 6442 	bona	 consequentia,	 ut 6443 	probatur	 quia 6444 	bene	 sequitur:	
'infinitum	 est	 hoc	 lignum,6445	igitur6446	hoc	 lignum	 est	 extensum	 sine	 termino';	 et	 ultra:6447	'ergo6448	
est 6449 	infinitum', 6450 	capiendo	 'infinitum'	 categorematice.	 Quod 6451 	consequentia	 ultima 6452 	sit	
bona,6453	patet	quia	arguitur	a	definitione	ad6454	definitum.	Quod6455	prima	consequentia6456	valeat6457	
patet,	quia6458	sequitur:	'infinitum	est	hoc	lignum,	igitur6459	aliquantulum6460	et	quantumlibet6461	maius	
est	 hoc	 lignum',	 et	 ultra	 sequitur:6462	'ergo6463	est6464	extensum	 sine	 termino'.	 Nam	da6465	quod6466	sit	










































<9.4>	 Quarta	 regula:	 quod6472	arguendo6473	a	 posse	 esse	 'infiniti'6474	sincategorematice	 capti6475	non	
valet	 consequentia	 ad	 posse	 esse	 'infiniti'6476	categorematice	 capti.6477	Patet,	 quia6478	non	 sequitur:	
'infinitam	magnitudinem	Deus	potest	facere,6479	igitur	deus	potest	facere	infinitam	magnitudinem'6480	-		
et	 hoc	 capiendo	 'infinitum'	 categorematice.6481	Patet6482	quia	 antecedens	 est	 verum:6483	'infinitam6484	
magnitudinem	 deus	 potest	 facere', 6485 	quia	 aliquantam	 Deus 6486 	potest	 facere	 et	 quantumlibet	






Consequenter	 in	 octavo	 capitulo	 videndum	 est6495	de	 expositione	 propositionum	 in	 quibus	 ponitur	
































<1.1>	 Quantum	 ad	 primum	 nota6501	quod	 |M	 58v|	 |W136v|	 'comparativus'	 quandoque	 tenetur6502	
proprie,	 tunc	denotat6503	res	 inter	quas6504	fit6505	comparatio6506	convenire	 in6507	suo	 significato,6508	ut	
fortior	 in	 fortitudine,	doctior	 in	doctrina.6509	Ut	 'Sortes	est	 fortior|Y	116r|	Platone',	 iste	comparativus	
'fortior'	 denotat	 tam	 Sorti	 quam	 Platoni	 fortitudinem	 inesse.	 Et	 sic	 propositiones6510 	in	 quibus	
ponuntur6511	dictiones6512	comparativi	gradus	exponuntur	per6513	copulativam	trimembrem,	ut	'Sortes	
est	 fortior	 Plantone'	 exponitur	 sic:6514	'Sortes	 est	 fortis	 et	 Plato	 est	 fortis	 et	 Plato	 non	 est	 ita	 fortis	
sicut6515	Sortes'.	
Et6516	hoc	 modo	 haec	 esset	 falsa:	 'Deus	 est	 melius	 diabolo',	 eo	 quod6517	secunda	 exponens	 esset6518	
falsa,	scilicet	 'diabolus	est	bonus'.	Talia6519	tamen6520	in	praesentia	loicorum	non	debent6521	dici6522	eo	





































<1.1.2>	 Secundo	 est	 notandum 6535 	terminus 6536 	comparativi 6537 	gradus 6538 	confundit	 terminum	
communem	sequente6539	confuse	distributive.		









































sicut	deus'.6558	Et	 hoc	modo6559	locuntur	 communiter6560	vulgares.6561	Et	 hiis	modis	 comparativum6562	
preasuponit	 suum	 positivum	 saltem6563	de	 subiecto,6564	sed	 non	 de6565	ambobus	 inter	 quae	 fit6566	
comparatio,6567	ut	|Y	116v|	dictum	est.6568	
	
<1.3>	 Alio	 modo6569 	tenetur	 sic, 6570 	quod	 non6571 	denotat6572 	comparativi6573 	positivum	 de	 aliquo	
eorum6574	inter	 quae6575	fit	 comparatio	 verificari,6576	sed	 solum	 denotat	 oppositum	 positivi	 verificari	
cum	 hac	 adiunctione	 'minus'6577 	de	 subiecto	 tamen6578 	non	 verificatur6579 	de	 aliquo	 ad	 quo	 est	
comparatio,	ut	'fornicatio6580	est6581	melior	adulterio'	non	significat6582	quod	fornicatio	sit	bona	vel6583	
quod6584	adulterium	sit	bonum,	sed	quod	fornicatio6585	sit	minus	mala6586		adulterio.6587	Et	iste	modus	
est	 improprissimus,6588	et6589	tamen	 est	 |W137r|	 usitatus.	6590	Unde6591	dicimus:	 'equus	 est	 rationalior	






































per	 copulativam	 trimembrem6597	cuius	 duo6598	membra	 capiuntur	 per6599	positivum	 oppositum6600	
posito6601	comparativo6602	et	 tertium	 per	 comparatum	 oppositum.6603	Ut6604	'asinus	 est	 rationalior	
capra'	 exponitur	 sic:	 'asinus	 est	 irrationalis6605 	et	 capra	 est	 irrationalis6606 	et	 asinus	 est	 minus	
irrationalis6607	quam	 capra'.6608	Et	 isti	 non	 praesupponunt	 oppositum	positivi	 sed	 oppositum	 cum	 ly	
minus.6609	
Unde	 patet	 qualiter	 exponitur	 comparativus	 quocumque	 modo	 teneatur. 6610 	Iste	 modus6611 	non	
praesupponit	 posituvum	 suum	 sed	 positivum	 comparativi	 sui	 oppositi6612 	|M	 59r|	 et6613 	includit	
comparativus,	 qualitercumque	capiatur	habet	distribuere	 terminum	sequentem	 in	quem	 transit	 eius	
actus.	6614	
	
<2>	 Secundo6615	propter	 hoc	 nota6616	quomodo6617	exponendae	 sunt	 propositiones6618	negativae	 in	
quibus	 ponitur	 nomen	 comparativi	 gradus.6619	Exponuntur	 enim6620	per	 disiunctivam	 de	 oppositis	


































<disiunctivae> 6622 	et	 copulativae,	 erunt	 contradictoriae	 si	 conradictoriae;	 erunt	 contrariae,	 si	
contrariae.	Si	subcontrariae,6623	erunt	<subcontrariae>,6624	ut	dictum	est	de	aliis.6625	
	
<3>	 Tertio	 nota6626	quod	 si6627	ablativus	 quem	 regit	 comparativus	 praecederet6628	ipsum,6629	tunc	
non6630	confunderetur6631	distributive,	 et	 ideo6632		 in	 tertia6633	exponenente6634		 talis	 terminus6635	non	
debet	distribui	nec	sequi	negationem,6636	ut6637	'Sortes6638	homine	est	fortior',6639	exponitur	sic:	'Sortes	




































<5>	 Quinta 6646 	regula	 est: 6647 	arguendo 6648 	a 6649 	comparativo	 gradu	 posito	 ablativo	 casu 6650	
sequente 6651 	cum	 signo	 universali	 aut 6652 	aliqua	 determinatione 6653 	ad	 eundem 6654 	sine 6655 	ista	
determinatione	aut6656	isto	signo6657	non	oportet	consequentiam	valere.6658	Ut	non	sequitur:	'Sortes	est	
fortior	 omni	 homine,	 ergo6659	Sortes	 est	 fortior	 homine',	 quia	 in6660	prima	 propter	 ista6661	duo	 signa	















































<1>	 Quantum6682	ad	 secundum,	 scilicet6683	ad	 expositionem	 propositionum6684	in	 quibus	 ponuntur	
nomina6685	superlativi	 gradus,6686	est	 sciendum	primo	quod	 superlativus	quandoque6687	exponitur6688	
affirmative,	 ut	 'Sortes	 est 6689 	fortissimus	 hominum' 6690 	i.e. 6691 	'Sortes 6692 	<est> 6693 	omni 6694 	alio	







































Nam	 si	 superlativus	 teneatur6710	affirmative,	 exponitur	 per	 copulativam	 trimembrem,	 scilicet:6711	
'Sortes	 est	 fortis	 et6712	homines	 sunt	 fortes	 et	 Sortes	 omni	 homine	 alio	 a	 se	 est	 fortior'.6713	Sed	 si	
tenetur	 negative,	 exponitur	 sic	 per	 copulativam	 trimembrem	 ut:	 'Sortes	 est	 fortis	 et	 homines	 sunt	
fortes	et	nullus	alius	homo	est	fortior6714	Sorte'.6715	
Et	 hoc	 semper	 est	 verum	 quando	 genitivus	 rectus	 a	 superlativo	 ipsum6716 	sequitur,	 sed 6717 	si	
praecederet	 ipsum6718	-	 ut	 'Sortes	 est	 hominum	 fortissimus'6719	-	 	 tunc	 tertia	 exponens	 debet	 esse	
affirmativa,	 scilicet: 6720 	'Sortes	 aliquorum 6721 	hominum	 quolibet	 est	 fortior';	 et 6722 	negative: 6723	
'aliquorum	 hominum	 nullus	 homo	 est	 fortior	 Sorte'.	 Et	 causa 6724 	est 6725 	quia, 6726 	quando	 ly	
hominum6727	praecederet,6728	tunc	 non	 distribuitur;6729	quando	 autem	 sequitur,	 tunc	 distribuitur.6730	
|M	 59v|	 Et	 ideo	 oportet	 sic	 exponi.	 Quando	 autem	 sequitur,	 tunc	 distribuitur.	 Et	 ideo 6731	
convenienter6732	exponitur	sicut	dictum	est.6733	
	
































erunt6739	exponentes	 in	 quibus	 exponuntur6740	-	 copulativa	 et	 disiunctiva	 -	6741	subcontrariae.	 	 Si6742	







<5>	 Et	 sit6752	quinta6753	quod6754	arguendo6755	a	 superlativo	 ad	 comparativum	 terminis6756	eodem	
modo	retentis	non	oportet	consequentiam	valere.	Quia	non	sequitur:	'Sortes	est	fortissimus	hominum,	
igitur6757	Sortes6758	est	fortior	homine',6759	quia	in	prima6760	ly	hominum6761	distribuitur,6762	tamen	ista	









































Post	 hoc	 in	 nono	 capitulo	 considerandum	 est	 quomodo	 exponendae	 sunt	 propositiones	 in	 quibus	
ponuntur	signa	universalia	retenta	collective.	
Et	 primo6780 	considerandum	 est 6781 	quomodo6782 	exponantur; 6783 	secundo	 eius 6784 	quantitates; 6785	
tertio	 quomodo	 et 6786 	si 6787 	possint	 fieri	 universales;	 quarto	 quomodo 6788 	capiatur	 in	 eis	
contradictio;6789	et	ultimo	quomodo	ex6790	eis	consuevit6791	syllogizari.	
	





























itsa:	 'omnes	 apostoli	 Dei	 sunt	 duodecim',	 capiendo6799 	ly	 omnes	 collective.	 Exponitur	 enim	 sic:	
'maximus	 numerus	 apostolorum	Dei6800	est6801	duodecim';	 vel	 sic:6802	'tota	 collectio	 apostolorum	Dei	
est6803	duodecim'.	Similiter	exponuntur	omnes	aliae.	
	
<2>	 	 Quantum 6804 	ad	 secundum	 dicendum 6805 	est	 quod	 quaelibet	 huiusmodi	 est	 indefinita.	
Probatur, 6806 	quia	 in	 qualibet	 tali 6807 	subicitur	 terminus	 communis	 sine	 signo,	 ergo 6808 	est	
indefinita.6809	Consequentia	 tenet,	 et6810	antecedens	 probatur6811	quia	 licet6812	hoc	 totum6813	'omnes	
apostoli	 Dei'6814	non	 supponit	 in	 propositione	 de	 praesenti	 simul6815	pro	 pluribus,	 tamen	 successive.	
Unde6816	potuisset6817	supponere	 pro	 pluribus.6818	Nam	 quando	 Deus	 non	 habuit	 nisi	 undecim6819	
apostolos,	 tunc	 ly	 omnes	 apostoli	 supposuerat	 pro	 uno	 supposito,	 scilicet	 pro6820 	undecim.	 Et	








































videtur	 turpis6835	sonus	 dicendo:6836	'omnes	 omnes6837	apostoli	 Dei	 sunt	 duodecim'.	 Sicut	 tamen6838	




<4>	 Per	 hoc	 patet	 ad	 quartum,	 videlicet 6850 	quomodo 6851 	debet 6852 	contradictio 6853 	sumi 6854 	in	







































vel	 potest	 sic	 dici: 6861 	'quilibet	 omnes	 apostoli	 Dei	 non6862 	sunt	 duodecim',	 et	 sic 6863 	habentur	
contradictoria.	
	
<5>	 Quantum	 ad	 quintum	 est	 sciendum6864	quod	 si	 ponamus6865	instans	 indivisibile	 imaginari	 et	
respectu	 huius6866 	|W138v|	 omnes	 respicere6867 	locutiones	 nostras,	 tunc	 convenienter	 potest 6868	
syllogizari	 	 ex	 istis	 sicut	 ex	 singularibus	 eo	 quod	 subiectum6869	solum	 supponit6870	pro	 uno	 solo6871	
supposito.6872	Et	 argueretur:6873	'omnes	 apostoli	 Dei	 sunt	 duodecim,6874	Petrus	 et	 Paulus	 cum	hiis6875	
aliis	sunt	omnes6876	apostoli	Dei,6877	ergo6878	Petrus	et	Paulus	cum	hiis6879	aliis6880	sunt	duodecim'.	Sed	
si 6881 	tempus 6882 	praesens	 vellet 6883 	capere 6884 	divisibile, 6885 	ut 6886 	per 6887 	horam 6888 	unam,	







































'omnes	 apostoli	 Dei	 sunt	 duo6898 	et	 omnes	 apostoli	 dei	 sunt	 duodecim,6899 	ergo	 <duo>6900 	sunt	
duodecim'.6901	Conclusio	 est	 falsa6902	et	 premissae	 sunt6903	verae,	 ut	 patet	 intuenti.6904	Sed	 si	 tunc6905	




<1>	 Quantum	 ad 6912 	consequentias	 horum 6913 	sit	 prima	 regula	 haec 6914 	quod 6915 	arguendo	 a	
termino 6916 	stante	 collective	 ad	 suppositum	 termini 6917 	cui	 signum 6918 	additur	 non	 oportet	
consequentiam	 valere,	 |Y	 119r|	 ut6919	non	 sequitur:	 'omnes	 apostoli	 Dei	 sunt	 duodecim,	 igitur6920	
isti,6921	demonstratis6922	duobus,	sunt	duodecim'.	
	















































habens	 partes',	 et	 hoc	modo	 valet	 idem	 dicere:6948	'totus	 Sortes	 est	 homo'	 et	 'aliquid	 habens	 partes	





























significat	 quod	 'aliquid6952	habens6953	partes	 quod	 est6954	Sortes6955	sit6956	minus6957	Sorte'.	 Et6958	per	
consequens	significat6959	quod	idem	sit	minus6960	se	ipso,	quod	est	falsum.	
Si	 autem	 'totus'6961	capitur	 pure6962	sincategorematice,	 tunc	 'totus'6963	valet	 tantum6964	sicut	 haec6965	
oratio:	 'quaelibet	 pars'.	 Et	 sic	 idem	 est6966	dicere:	 'totus	 Sortes'6967	et6968	'quaelibet	 pars	 Sortis.'	 Et	
sic6969		modo6970	conceditur	 quod	 totus	 sortes	 sit6971	minor	 Sorte	 quia	 significat	 quod	 quaelibet	 pars	
Sortes	sit	minor	Sorte,6972		quia	ly	totus6973	ut	sic	non6974	capitur	nisi6975	pro	partibus	quantitativis,6976	
non	 autem6977	pro	 partibus	 essentialibus.6978	Ideo	 sic	 haec	 propositio6979	est	 simpliciter6980	|Y	 119v|	
vera.	
	





































sicut6985	'quaelibet	pars	 animae'.	Unde6986	sequitur	 corrolarie6987	quod	haec	est	 falsa:	 'in	 corde6988	est	
tota	anima',	|M	60v|	quia	valet	tantum6989	sicut	haec:	'in	corde6990	est	quaelibet	pars	animae',	quae	falsa	
est	 ex6991	eo	 quod6992	in	 nullo6993	corde6994	est	 quaelibet	 pars	 animae.6995	Sed	 haec	 est	 bene6996	vera:	
'tota	 anima	 est	 in	 corde':6997	quaelibet	 enim	 pars	 animae	 est	 in	 corde.6998	Sed	 secus6999	esset	 si7000	
terminus	 communis7001	praecederet	 hoc	 signum	 'totus',7002	ut7003	dicendo:	 'in	 corde7004	est	 anima	




Si	 autem	 ly	 totus	 capitur 7019 	partim	 categorematice 7020 	et	 partim	 sincategorematice, 7021 	tunc	







































-	 et	 intelligitur 7029 	sic: 7030 	quod	 punctum	 tangit	 punctum7031 	et	 quod	 nihil	 sit 7032 	unius 7033 	quin	
tangat7034	reliquum.	 	Sic7035	consuevimus	dicere	quod	tota	anima	intellectiva7036	est	 in	corde,7037	quod	





<3>	 Tertio7051	nota	 quod	 praeter	 tres7052	modos7053	'totius'	 invenitur7054	adhuc7055	unus	 modus,7056	










































<1>	 Tunc	 de	 consequentiis	 formandis7068	penes	 ly	 totus7069	sit7070	prima	 regula	 |Y	 120r|	 talis:7071	
quod7072	capiendo	ly	totum	categorematice7073	est	bona	consequentia7074	a	propositione	in	qua	ponitur	
ly	 totum	 cum	 aliquo	 termino	 ad	 eandem	 sine	 isto	 termino	 'totus'.	 Patet,7075	quia	 bene	 sequitur:7076	
'totus	Sortes	est	homo,7077	ergo7078	Sortes	est	homo'.	
	
<2>	Secunda	 regula	 est	haec7079	quod7080	capiendo	 ly	 totum	sincategorematice	 a	propositione	 in	qua	
ponitur	 ly 7081 	totus 7082 	sincategorematice 7083 	ad	 eandem	 dimisso	 ly	 totus, 7084 	non	 oportet	






















































































non	est	 ita	 fortis	 sicut	Plato'	 exponitur	 sic:	 'Sortes	 est	 fortis	 vel7126	Plato	non	est	 fortis7127	vel	 Sortes	










































sequentem	 se7165	stare	 confuse	 et7166	distributive	 ratione	 negationis	 in	 eis7167	inclusae.	 Et	 secudnum	
istos,	 quando	 post7168	ly	 sicut	 poneretur7169	terminus	 communis,	 tertia	 exponens	 deberet7170	esse	
universalis,	ut	 ista7171	'Sortes	est	 ita	 fortis	sicut	homo'	exponitur	sic:7172	'Sortes	est	 fortis	et	homo	est	
fortis	 et	 nullus	homo	est	magis7173	fortis	 quam	Sortes',	 vel	 loco	 istius	potest	poni	haec:	 'et7174	Sortes	





































stat	 in	modo	 loquendi	 de	 quo	quivis7181	posset7182	dicere	 quod7183	sibi	 placet.	 Scis7184	tamen	quod7185	
frequenter	in7186	omni	locutione	sic7187	non7188	utuntur.7189	Dicimus	enim:7190	'Sortes	est	ita	fortis	sicut	







propositione	 affirmativa	 in	 qua	 ponuntur	 haec7202	adverbia7203	'sicut'	 et	 'ita'7204	ad	 propositionem	 in	




































Plato,	 ergo	 Sortes	 est	 bonus	 et	 Plato	 est	 bonus'	 -	 et7213	intelligendo7214	regulam	 tenendo	 ly	 sicut	






Et	 respondeo	quod	non	 capiendo	 terminos	proprie:	 non	debet7226	tamen7227		 negari	 in	praesentia7228	





































Et	 sic	 est	 finis	 praesentis	 tractatus7242	consequentiarum	 magistri	 Marsilii	 de	 Inghen,7243	pro	 quo	
laudetur	Deus	noster	Jesus	Christus	sine	fine	in	saecula	saeculorum.	Amen.	Deo	gratias.7244	
	


















When	 approaching	 medieval	 theories	 of	 consequentiae,	 either	 from	 a	 philosophical	 or	
historical	point	of	view	(or	ideally	from	both),	inevitably	we	have	to	tackle	at	least	two	general	
directing	questions	looming	in	the	background:	a)	what	is	a	consequentia,	what	is	it	supposed	
to	 capture?	 And	 b)	 how	 does	 it	 relate	 to	 our	 contemporary	 notions	 of	 following	 logically?	
Furthermore	when	we	are	considering	if	and	how	a	consequentia	is	indeed	a	"consequence",	a	
third	underlying	question	 (methodological	 in	nature)	comes	 to	our	attention:	 c)	what	could	
the	study	of	medieval	theories	of	consequentiae	add	to	our	understanding	of	the	consequence	




logic,	 its	 relation	 to	 its	 own	 history	 and,	 deep	 down,	 on	 the	 forms	 and	 aims	 of	 human	
rationality.	 These	 issues	 appear	 to	 be	 deeply	 entangled	 and	 difficult	 (if	 not	 impossible)	 to	







At	 least	 in	most	cases,	how	to	obtain	reliable	conclusions	 in	an	argument7248	seems	to	be	at	
the	core	of	what	makes	a	logic	logic.	In	this	sense,	in	some	way	logic	is	"the	science	of	logical	
consequence".	 But,	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 this	 brings	 us	 back	 to	 our	 original	 problem	 of	
consequences	and	consequentiae.	On	the	other	hand,	to	quote	Curry,	"nobody	knows	exactly	
what	a	 logical	 consequence	 is".	 Firstly,	 a	 consequence,	 its	properties,	 and	what	 it	preserves	





In	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 two	 principal	 aims.	 Firstly	 I	 am	 going	 to	 reject	 the	 common	
historiographical	thesis	that	sees	Medieval	Logic	as	Logic	only	in	a	partially	equivocal	sense.	
Secondly	 I	 am	 going	 to	 try	 to	 briefly	 asses	 medieval	 theories	 of	 consequentiae,	 in	 their	



















Who	were	medieval	 logicians?	What	 is	 it	 that	 they	were	doing	 and	do	we	understand	 it	 as	
logic	(or,	sometimes,	do	we	understand	it	at	all?)?	How	did	they	define	"logic"?	pertaining	to	
the	 field	of	 logic,	would	we	 identify	 the	same	subjects	and	problems	as	 they	did?	These	are	
only	some	of	the	many	possible	questions	raising	around	Medieval	Logic	that	do	not	have	an	
easy	 or	 obvious	 answer	 and	 require	 venturing	 into	 some	 muddy	 methodological	 waters.	




and	 logical-philosophical	 positions	 over	 the	 span	 roughly	 of	 a	 thousand	 years,	 on	 three	
continents,	 and	 in	 very	 different	 contexts.	 It	 seems	 quite	 evident	 that	 generalising	 would	
likely	 yield	 incorrect	 	 results	 	 or	 at	 best	 would	 not	 be	 very	 informative.	 However,	 by	
circumscribing	a	more	restricted	area	of	study	we	might	be	able	to	outline	a	broad	picture	of	
what	is	going	on	"in	logic"	in	that	time	and	context:	this	picture	would	convey	some	relevant	
information	 to	 clarify	 our	 background	 issues.	 Therefore,	most	 of	my	 following	 remarks	 are	
referred	exclusively	to	the	Latin	world	and	having	in	mind	mostly	the	XIV	century.		
	













Cathedral	 school,	 studia	 and	 Universities	 throughout	 the	 Middle	 ages,7249 	to	 see	 almost	
immediately	 that	 logic	 is	 ubiquitous:	 loica/dialectica	 constitutes	 one	 of	 the	 backbones	 of	
medieval	 lower	and	higher	education	and	of	 the	medieval	way	of	 conceiving	and	producing	
knowledge.		
The	partition	of	disciplines	at	 the	basis	of	education	 through	the	Middle	Ages	(and	beyond)	







one	 hand	 the	 scientiae	 sermocinales	 (disciplines	 that	 have	 to	 do	 with	 language)	 under	 the	
trivium	 -	usually	counting	Grammar,	Logic	 (logica/dialectica)	and	Rhetoric	 -	 ;7250	and	on	 the	






quadrivium	 -	 counting	 Arithmetic,	 Geometry,	 Music,	 and	 Astronomy. 7251 	This	 kind	 of	
categorisation	 projects	 an	 image	 of	 logica-dialectica	 as	 primarily	 concerned	with	 language:	
this	seems	to	be	the	first	conception	of	logic	a	medieval	student	would	be	exposed	to.	
Once	 undergone	 his	 basic	 training	 in	 these	 liberal	 arts,	 a	 student	 would	 pursue	 his	
philosophical	studies	-	which,	in	the	later	Middle	Ages	means	enrolling	in	a	university.	At	this	
point,	 an	 average	 student	 would	 have	 acquired	 some	 developed	 competences	 in	 Latin	
grammar	 and	 rhetoric	 and	 some	 disputational	 proficiency.	 For	 example,	 already	 in	 the	 XII	
century,	William	Fitztephen	 (writing	 around	1170)	describes	 a	 group	of	 twelve	 to	 fourteen	
years	old	boys	in	a	London	churchyard	disputing	
...	 some	 in	demonstrative	 rhetoric,	 others	 in	dialectic.	 Some	 'hurtle	 enthymemes',	 others	
with	greater	 skill	 employ	perfect	 syllogisms.	Boys	of	different	 schools	 strive	 against	one	
another	in	verse,	or	contend	concerning	the	principles	of	grammar,	or	the	rules	concerning	
past	 and	 future.	 There	 are	 others	 who	 employ	 the	 old	 art	 of	 crossroads	 in	 epigrams,	
rhymes	and	metre.7252	
It	 is	 likely	 that	 teenagers	enrolling	 in	an	artes	university	programme	a	century	or	 two	 later	
would	still	have	a	similar	background	and	comparable	abilities	-	which	means,	from	the	looks	
of	 it,	 a	 solid	 education	 in	 Latin	 grammar7253	and	 rhetoric,	 and	 at	 least	 some	 competency	 in	
dialectica.	 If	 in	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	XII	 century	 the	best	 and	brightest	 students	had	 some	
level	of	mastery	over	syllogisms,	it	is	possible	that	such	skill	only	became	more	common	with	














to	explain	and	 justify	not	 just	 the	hows	but	also	 the	whys.	During	his	 time	 in	 the	artes,	 our	
student's	 logical	education	would	normally	involve	studying	Aristotle's	Organon	 -	or	at	 least	
his	masters'	 views	 about	 it	 -	 and	 some	 technical	 logical	 topics	 (suppositiones,	 ampliationes,	
appellationes,	 restrictiones,	 alienationes,	 consequentiae,	 obligationes,	 sophismata,	 insolubilia,	
expositiones...).	 In	 those	 years,	 he	 would	 read	 also	 about	 natural	 philosophy	 and	 physics,	
metaphysics	 and	 ethics;	 once	 their	 final	 exam	was	 completed	 (determinatio),	 by	 the	 age	 of	
twenty-one	(at	least	in	XIV	century	Paris)	he	could	undergo	his	inceptio	to	obtain	his	licentia	
docendi	 and	become	a	magister	artium.	At	 this	point,	 our	 freshly	 appointed	master's	 logical	
training	is	over:	he	is	now	a	professional	philosopher	and	starts	lecturing	and	composing	his	
own	works	-	as	far	as	logic	goes,	once	again,	mostly	on	the	Organon	and	the	technical	subjects	
that	we	mentioned,	 usually	 grouped	 under	 the	 heading	 of	 logica	modernorum.	 In	medieval	
universities,	 logic	 (and	 most	 other	 philosophical	 subjects)	 was	 normally	 taught	 by	 fairly	
young	 masters,	 freshly	 out	 of	 their	 artes	 programmes,	 while	 they	 where	 pursuing	 more	
"serious"	studies	in	the	higher	faculties	(Law,	Medicine,	Theology).7255	Senescere	in	artibus	(to	
grow	old	in	the	faculty	of	Arts)	was	generally	discouraged,	frowned	upon,	and	quite	rare	even	
if	not	outright	unheard	of	 -	 John	Buridan	 is	 the	most	well	 known	exception.	Most	medieval	






On	 the	 teaching	 of	 Logic	 in	 Bologna	 see	 Buzzetti	 -	 Ferrarini	 -	 Tabarroni	 (eds.)	 [1992];	 on	 the	 relationship	
between	Logic	and	Medicine	in	Italian	Universities	and	in	Bologna	in	particular	see	Agrimi	-	Crisciani	[1992]	
7256	One	 interesting	 and	 still	 mostly	 unexplored	 line	 of	 inquiry	 would	 be	 on	 the	 intellectual	 profiles	 of	 non-
professional	 logicians	 outside	 of	 late	medieval	 universities,	working	 in	 different	 cultural	 environments,	 as	 for	
example	 at	 secular	 courts,	 at	 the	 curia	 or	 in	 the	 legal	 practice-	 also	 to	 explore	 the	 impact	 (if	 any)	 of	 logic	 on	
different	 forms	of	 applied	knowledge	and	 in	 institutional	 contexts	other	 than	 the	 late	medieval	 academia.	 For	
some	suggestions	in	this	direction	see	for	example	Marenbon	[2008,	2]	and	Cameron	[2011]	
	 343	
It	 is	 not	 very	 common	 for	 these	 late	medieval	 authors	 dwelling	 in	 logic	 to	 call	 themselves	
loicus	or	dialecticus	or	even	philosophus:	 it	 is	quite	rare	for	them	to	call	themselves	at	all.	 In	







composed	 by	 some	 author	 who	 completed	 his	 theological	 studies	 only	 long	 after	 the	
composition	of	that	text.	
Dialecticus	 is	more	common	at	 first,	but	around	 the	middle	of	 the	XII	 century	 logicus/loicus	
takes	over	a	good	chunk	of	the	scene.	
Along	with	 dialecticus	or	 the	 generic	magister	 (artium),	 loicus	 (or	 its	 typographical	 variant	







apparently	 common	 already	 in	 post-Ciceronian	 Latin	 -,7257	that	 leaves	 a	 trace	 in	 the	 semi-
consonantal	 sound	"y"	explicit	 in	 the	alternative	spelling.	The	adverbial	 form	 logice	 is	 fairly	





appears	 here	 and	 there	 in	 late	 medieval	 texts,	 even	 if	 the	 form	 logicalis,	 -e	 is	 much	 more	
frequent;7258	loicus	 though	 is	 definitely	 predominant	 in	 the	 substantive	 use,	 referring	 to	
"logicians".	 However,	 loicus	 is	 also	 employed	 in	 a	 looser	 sense	 analogous	 to	 litteratus	 or	
clericus	-	which	is	both	something	like	"clerk"/"cleric"	and	simply	"literate".7259	We	would	not	
have	any	major	problems	so	far,	because	-	as	we	have	seen	-	to	be	literate	in	the	Middle	Ages	
usually	meant	 to	have	undergone	 logical	 training	 -	 and	 in	order	 to	 access	higher	university	
education,	 usually	 students	 had	 to	 take	 some	minor	 vows	 that	 formally	made	 them	 clerics.		
However,	 laicus	 comes	 into	 play:	 laicus	 (from	 the	 Greek	 term	 λαικóς)	 is	 the	 contrary	 of	
clericus	 and	 means	 not	 only	 an	 individual	 outside	 of	 the	 ecclesiastical	 hierarchy,	 but	 also	
something	 or	 somebody	 popular	 or	 illiterate,	 i.e.	 a	 layman.	 Probably	 because	 of	 the	 close	




their	 ignorance	 or	 to	 the	 "common	 way	 of	 speaking".	 Nevertheless,	 some	 late	 medieval	
loici/logicians	take	the	communis	modus	loquendi	philosophically	very	seriously	-	and	among	
them	our	Marsilius	of	Inghen	in	primis.7260		
To	 sum	up,	 late	medieval	 logicians	 seem	 to	be	 first	 and	 foremost	magistri	artium	operating	
within	the	university	institutional	context,	and	therefore	philosophers	because	of	the	way	that	
those	contexts	were	structured.	Both	their	basic	education	and	professional	training	include	a	

































2.	 In	 modern	 Philosophy:	 Specifically	 applied	 by	 Kant	 to	 the	 criticism	 which	 shows	 the	
contradictory	character	of	the	principles	of	science,	when	they	are	employed	to	determine	objects	
beyond	 the	 limits	 of	 experience	 (i.e.	 the	 soul,	 the	 world,	 God);	 by	 Hegel	 (who	 denies	 that	 such	














common	 Philosophy	 reference	works	 in	 English	 do	 not	 add	much	 to	 the	 OED	 lemmas7261	-	
when	 they	 even	 define	 these	 terms.7262	However,	 an	 usual	 (and	 at	 least	 partially	 artificial)	
distinction	 employed	 within	 philosophical	 circles	 sees,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 "logic"	 as	 "the	
systematic	investigation	of	the	relation	of	consequence	-	i.e.	which	conclusions	validly	follow	
from	 a	 premise	 or	 set	 of	 premises".7263 	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 distinction	 associates	
"dialectic"	with	"a	rational	multi-agent	debate",7264	usually	in	a	concrete	dialogical	setting.7265		
Overall,	 within	 both	 the	 ordinary	 and	 the	 philosophical	 contemporary	 uses	 of	 "logic"	 and	
"dialectic"	as	quasi-synonyms	we	can	still	hear	 the	echoes	of	 the	way	 the	semantic	 fields	of		
loica	and	dialectica	came	to	be	employed	in	the	in	the	Later	Middle	Ages.	
Both	 logica/loica	and	dialectica	 are	 calques	 from	 Greek	 already	 incorporated	 into	 Classical	
Latin,	which	mostly	uses	them	as	quasi-synonyms:	
(i)	logica/loica	derives	from	the	Greek	λóγος7266	via	the	mediation	of	the	adjective	λογικóς,	-ή,	
















In	 Classical	 Latin	 logica	 seems	 to	 maintain	 primarily	 the	 acceptation	 connected	 to	
rationality.7268	
(ii)	 In	 Classical	 Latin	dialectica	appears	 to	 be	more	 common	 than	 logica.	 The	 term	 derives	
from	the	Greek	adjective	διαλεκτικóς,	-ή,	-óν	(τέχνη),	i.e.	"the	art	of	discussion",7269	which	is	in	
turn	a	form	derived	from	διαλέγομαι,	i.e.	"to	converse	with,	hold	converse	with,	[...]	to	discuss,	
to	 argue	 [...]."7270	In	 Classical	 Latin,	 dialectica	 commonly	 signifies	 "the	 art	 of	 reasoning,	
logic",7271	however	the	emphasis	on	its	disputational	aspect	is	frequent.7272	
As	it	has	been	noticed,	while	the	modern	English	terms	"logic"	and	"dialectic"	have	a	primary	
substantival	 use,	 their	 Ancient	 Greek	 ancestors	 are	 primarily	 and	 mainly	 adjectives;7273	
however,	their	substantive	use	appears	already	in	Classical	Latin	and	is	consolidated	in	post-



























of	 the	 scope	 of	what	we	would	 call	 "logic".7281	Aristotle	 uses	 διαλεκτική	meaning	 the	 social	





Stoic	 philosophy,	 διαλεκτική	 looks	 like	 something	 very	 close	 to	 our	 use	 of	 "logic".7286	
Probably,	the	eclectic	tendencies	common	among	Hellenistic	and	Late	Ancient	authors	do	not	
help	 to	 clarify	 the	 picture.	 This	 patchy	 complex	 of	 philosophical	 influences,	 along	with	 the	
ordinary	etymological	semantic	uses,	seems	to	survive	in	the	ordinary	acceptance	of	loica	and	
dialectica	in	Latin.	Furthermore,	even	if	Classical,	Hellenistic	and	(at	least	in	part)	late	ancient	
Latin	 culture	 is	 fundamentally	 bilingual,7287		 to	 the	 constant	 flux	 of	 translations	 or	 "stolen	
words"	from	Greek	to	Latin	we	have	to	account	for	the	shifts	in	the	meaning	and	in	the	uses	of	
these	terms	that	we	have	already	mentioned	-	e.g.	the	nominalisation	of	the	Greek	adjectives	



















lexicon	 is	 conveyed	 by	Boethius'7288	works	 and	 by	 the	 early	Medieval	 encyclopaedists	 -	 e.g.	
Isidore	of	Seville	and	Cassiodorus.	
As	 for	 the	 medieval	 tradition,	 the	 use	 of	 dialectica	 to	 designate	 the	 discipline	 is	 still	







the	dialogical	 and	disputational	 aspect	 of	 logic	 (D1).	On	 the	other	hand,	 especially	with	 the	




appropriate	 materials	 for	 arguments	 -	 e.g.	 in	 a	 syllogistic	 context,	 the	 middle	 term	 or	
argumentum.	7292	





7289	On	the	history	of	 the	 technical	employment	of	 the	 two	terms	 in	 the	middle	ages	see	 for	example	Michaud-










• Is	 logic	rationalis	or	sermocinalis?	Which	means:	 is	 logic	primarily	about	 language	or	
about	the	forms	of	and	rules	for	correct	reasoning?7294	
• Is	 it	 a	 part	 of	 philosophy,	 conformingly	 to	 the	 Stoic	 tradition	 as	 the	medieval	 higher	
education	system	seems	to	assume?	Or	is	a	mere	instrument	(Organon),	as	in	Aristotle	
and	the	Aristotelian	tradition	-	which,	of	that	same	system,	is	the	backbone?	
• What	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 logic	 (subiectum	 logicae)?	 Is	 it	 second	 intentions	 (intentiones	
secundae,	 entia	 rationis)?	 Is	 it	 just	 syllogisms?	 Or	 is	 a	 "way	 of	 knowing"	 (modus	
sciendi)?	
In	the	Late	Middle	ages,	many	positions	try	to	reconcile	some	if	not	most	of	these	oppositions.	
The	 increasingly	 more	 common	 subdivision	 between	 logica	 docens	 or	 secundum	 quod	 est	
scientia	 and	 logica	 utens	 or	 secundum	 quod	 est	 ars	 is	 deeply	 permeated	 by	 this	 kind	 of	
attitude.7295	Logica	docens	is	the	doctrinal	corpus	that	is	thought	in	school,7296	the	theoretical	
aspect	of	logic	and	the	rules	of	good	reasoning	as	a	mental	habitus.	As	such,	logica	(docens)	is	a	
science,	 is	eminently	rationalis,	 and	shows	a	noticeable	emphasis	on	meta-logic.	 In	 this	 first	
sense,	 logic	 is	a	part	of	philosophy.	Logica	utens	 is	"applied"	logic,	dialectica	as	an	art	or	the	
practice	of	correct	argumentation,	it	 is	the	practice	resulting	in	disputationes	and	questiones,	
and	 grounding	 and	 articulating	 scientific	 arguments.	 As	 such	 logica	 utens	 appears	 to	 be	







7297	Some	 scholars	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 consider	 logica	utens	 to	 be	 logic	 at	 all.	 For	 example,	 Sten	 Ebbesen	writes:	
"...there	was	the	notion	of	logica	utens,	but	however	much	you	might	apply	your	logic	in	discussions	of	theology	











practices	 direct	 to	 distinguish	what	 is	 true	 from	what	 is	 false	 by	means	 of	 reason	 (notitia	
docens	 vero	 a	 falso	 per	 rationem	 discernere).	 In	 these	 distinctions,	 this	 part	 of	 	 logic	 is	
"artificial"	in	contraposition	to	logica	naturalis	and	logica	usualis.	The	former	is	both	the	soul	
itself	 as	 having	 a	 natural	 disposition	 (promptitudo)	 to	 make	 distinctions,	 definitions	 and	
arguments,	 and	 the	 "habit	 of	 the	 first	 principles"	 (habitus	 primorum	 principiorum).	 Logica	
usualis	 is	 the	 habitus	 resulting	 from	 the	 repeated	 (usualis)	 use	 of	 our	 natural	 rational	 and	
discursive	 faculties	 and	 it	 does	not	 require	 any	pre-existing	 "technical"	 logical	 competence;	
we	could	define	it	as	the	minimal	rationality	of	ordinary	reasoning,	held	also	by		a	layman.	




logica	 docens	 will	 analyse	 and	 regulate	 how	 and	 justify	 why	 those	 syllogisms	work,	 it	 will	
formulate	 a	 theory	 of	 syllogism,	 ask	 questions	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 the	
premises	 and	 the	 conclusion,	 and	 (at	 some	 point)	 reconnect	 syllogistics	 to	 a	more	 general	
																																																																																																																																																																																								
at	least.	As	for	the	specifics	of	Ebbesen's	thesis,	it	looks	like	it	stands	upon	a	passage	of	Boethius	of	Dacia's	Modi	
significandi	 q.	 18	 [Boethius	 of	 Dacia	 1969,	 68f]:	 "Dialecticus	 considerat	 communes	 intentiones	 et	 habitudines	
locales	 ex	 illis	 causatas,	 per	 quas	 confirmat	 suas	 argumentationes,	 sed	 ipsas	 speciales	 naturas	 rerum	 non	
cosniderat	 a	 quibus	 causantur	 illae	 habitudines	 locales.	 Unde	 si	 quaeratur	 a	 dialectico	 utrum	 sit	 bonum	
argumentum	'hoc	est	calidum,	ergo	non	est	frigidum',	dicit	quod	sic	proper	habitudinem	conrarii	ad	contrarium.	
Tamen	antequam	talem	habitudinem	inveniat,	necesse	est	quod	ipse	consideret	naturas	rerum	quae	per	termino	




theory	 of	 inference,	 etc.	 ...	 In	 other	 words,	 logica	 docens	 and	 logica	 utens	 represent	 two	
different	 approaches	 to	 the	 same	 subject	matter,	which	 is	 the	 subiectum	 logicae	 tout-court,	
whatever	that	turns	out	to	be.	
The	discussions	on	the	subject	of	logic	seem	to	be	more	intense	in	the	XIII	century,	especially	
at	 the	 level	 of	 a	 "higher	 theory	 about	 second	 intentions,	ways	 of	 knowing	 or	whatnot";7299	
however	 the	 standard	 explicit	 position,	 taken	 by	 most	 authors,	 sees	 logic	 as	 primarily	
concerned	with	distinguishing	what	is	true	from	what	is	false	by	means	of	argumentation	and	
syllogising.7300	Along	with	the	shift	from	an	almost	uncontested	predilection	for	syllogism	as	
the	 "most	 proper"	 and	 paradigmatic	 inferential	 form	 in	 favour	 of	 consequentiae	 tout	 court,	
generally	the	XIV	century	seems	to	also	lose	at	least	some	of	that	interest	for	the	question	of	
what	 logic	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 about,	 preferring	 to	 build	 and	 discuss	 specific	 doctrines.	
However,	overall	we	can	agree	with	Sten	Ebbesen:	de	facto	
...	 the	 questiones	 de	 subiecto	 logicae	 do	 not	 help	 much	 in	 delimiting	 what	 the	 field	 of	 logic	 was	








7300 	E.g.	 Lambert	 of	 Auxerre,	 Logica	 [1971,	 4-7]:	 "Logica	 est	 scientia	 discernendi	 verum	 a	 falso	 per	
argumentationem	 [....T]ota	 intentio	 logici	 est	 ut	 habeat	 syllogismum	 perfectum.”	 Roger	 Bacon,	 Summulae	
Dialectices,	 Prooemium:	 "Logica	 vero	 secundum	 quod	 est	 scientia	 est	 habitus	 discernendi	 verum	 a	 falso	 per	
regulas,	 quibus	 comprehendimus	 veritatem	 locutionis	 [...].	 Subiectum	 autem	 eius	 est	 argumentatio	 sive	















tradition	 available	 up	 to	 the	 XII	 century)	 is	 constituted	 by	 Porphyry's	 Isagoge,	 Aristotle's	



























































"extended"	 version	 of	 the	 Organon	 and	 count	 also	 Aristotle's	 Rhetorics	 and	 Poetics	 in	 the	
logica	 nova,	7304	qua	 properly	 logical	 works.7305	However,	 the	 "extended	Organon"	 does	 not	
seem	to	have	taken	a	hold	into	the	Latin	West:	in	most	XIV	century	Universities,	the	Rhetoric	
in	 particular	 will	 be	 read	 as	 a	moral	 text.7306	The	 logica	moderna	or	modernorum	 (Modern	
Logic	or	Logic	by	 the	Moderns)	 is	probably	 the	most	original	medieval	contribution	to	 logic	
and	it	includes	several	kinds	of	treatises	on	technical	topics.	Even	if	the	traditional	texts	of	the	
logica	vetus	and	in	particular	of	the	logica	nova	keep	being	commented	upon	through	the	later	
Middle	Ages	and	well	 into	 the	Early	Modernity,	 at	 some	point	 in	 the	XIV	 century	 the	 logica	
modernorum	 appears	 to	 reach	 a	 privileged	 status.	 Namely,	 some	 authors	 (such	 as	 John	
Buridan,	 Albert	 of	 Saxony,	 and	 Marsilius	 of	 Inghen)	 tend	 to	 explain	 away	 consolidated	
doctrines	of	the	logica	vetus	and	nova,	by	appealing	to	the	tools	and	conceptual	framework	of	









case	 of	 consequentia	 -	 see	 e.g.	 Stump	 [1989]	 and,	 for	 updated	 references,	 also	 Dutilh-Novaes	 [2016].	 This	
tendency	to	"explain	away"	also	concerns	general	principles	commonly	assumed,	as	for	example	the	dici	de	omnli	













territorial	 disputes	 over	 the	definition	 and	 the	 subject	 of	 logic.	However,	 these	borders	 are	
often	 uncertain	 and	 crossed	 over,	 especially	 those	 with	 the	 neighbouring	 domains	 of	
Grammar7308	and	 Metaphysics.7309	Medieval	 logicians	 are	 very	 careful	 to	 differentiate	 the	
logical	approach	from	the	way	of	speaking	and	the	interpretations	of	the	grammarians	or	the	
matters	and	questions	of	interest	for	the	metaphysicians.	Even	if	these	disciplines	are	taking	
the	 same	 objects	 under	 consideration,	 most	 "border	 disputes	 were	 settled	 amicably":7310	






As	 we	 have	 seen,	 medieval	 authors	 often	 disagree	 on	 how	 logic	 and	 its	 scope	 should	 be	
defined	 but,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 day,	 their	 contrasts	 tend	 to	 be	 reconciled	 in	 a	more	 general	
conception	of	logic	that	is	(mostly)	able	to	keep	together	the	previously	contrasting	positions.		
Moreover,	 the	 dimension	 of	 Medieval	 Logic	 as	 a	 textual	 corpus	 and	 its	 contextualisation	










However,	 there	are	 elements	 in	our	picture	of	Medieval	Logic	 that	 look	 like	oddities	 to	our	
modern	eye	which	we	struggle	to	understand.	There	seems	to	be	a	gap	between	what	we	take	
to	 be	 logic	 and	what	 our	medieval	 logicians	 took	 to	 be	 logic,	 and	 this	 gap	 could	 lead	 us	 to	
misinterpretations	-	either	by	keeping	us	from	really	making	sense	of	what	medieval	logicians	
were	trying	to	do	or	by	inducing	us	to	project	beyond	measure	our	conception	upon	theirs.	In	
order	 to	 contextualise	 medieval	 logical	 theories	 and	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 them	 from	 a	
philosophically	interesting	point	of	view,	we	should	assess	the	depth	and	breadth	of	this	gap.	
Historians	 of	 Medieval	 Logic	 seem	 to	 be	 at	 loss	 regarding	 both	 the	 big	 picture	 and	 some	
specific	doctrines.	The	problem	is	not	simply	the	existence	of	concurrent	definitions;	nor	the	
fact	that	in	many	medieval	logic	textbooks	we	find	more	things	than	should	actually	be	there	
even	 according	 to	 those	 medieval	 definitions. 7311 	More	 than	 that,	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 -	

















the	 puzzle	 poses	 some	 issues	 requiring	 some	methodological	 and	 historical	 considerations,	
but	they	do	not	seem	insurmountable.	
Spade's	puzzle	 is	built	on	some	of	 the	main	"genres"	within	the	 logica	modernorum:	Spade's	
examples	are	the	doctrines	of	obligationes,	exponibilia,	probatio	propositionum	and	suppositio	-	
but	this	is	not	an	exhaustive	list.	The	puzzle	goes	roughly	like	this:	we	have	a	good	picture	of	
what	 is	 on	 the	 table	 (texts,	 debates,	mechanics	 and	 details	 of	 the	 doctrines	 under	 analysis,	
respective	sides	taken	by	several	authors,	etc.)	but	we	cannot	really	make	sense	of	 it.7314	On	
the	 one	 hand,	 the	 point	 of	 these	 doctrines	 and	 debates	 still	 escapes	 us.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	











framing	our	 interpretations	 in	 the	wrong	way,	appealing	 to	concepts	 that	do	not	 fit.	A	good	
example,	where	this	second	kind	of	problems	seems	particularly	evident,	are	many	"classical"	
analyses	 and	 formalisations	 of	 supposition	 theory	 -	 if	 only	 for	 the	 amount	 of	 literature	
																																																								
7314	Spade	[2000]:	 "We	do	know	the	 important	 texts,	 in	most	cases.	We	know	the	mechanics	and	the	details	of	
many	of	 the	 logical	 theories	and	techniques	 that	emerged	during	 this	period.	We	even	know	of	 the	 theoretical	






theory	 split	 in	 two:7317	on	 the	 one	 side,	 we	 find	 something	 very	 much	 like	 a	 theory	 of	






doctrine	 that	 do	not	 fit	 the	quantification	 scheme	 can	be	 explained	 away;7322	or	we	 are	not	
dealing	with	a	theory	of	quantification	at	all.	The	third	way	looks	like	the	most	promising	one,	
but	it	is	not	straightforward	and	can	lead	us	in	several	diverging	directions.	Some	might	want	
to	 rest	 their	 case	and	embrace	 some	sort	of	quietism,7323	like	Markosian:	our	 interpretative	
schemes	fall	short	and	they	will	probably	keep	falling	short;	we	should	consider	suppositio	as	
a	description	of	 linguistic	phenomena	taken	as	primitive,	we	should	refrain	 from	explaining	
by	means	 of	 other	 concepts	 or	 in	 the	 light	 of	 different	 projects.7324		 Others	might	 prefer	 to	
explore	alternative	options:	 if	suppositio	 theory	 is	not	a	 theory	of	quantification,	 it	might	be	
something	 else	 -	 a	 viable	 candidate	 (if	 not	 the	 only	 one)7325	is	 some	 sort	 of	 theory	 of	
inference.7326	Overall,	 this	 last	 kind	 of	 approach	 seems	 advantageous	 because	 it	 spares	 us	
from	assuming	 that	 some	phenomena	 that	 the	medieval	 theories	 tackle	are	simply	 taken	as	
																																																								














primitive.	 It	 also	 saves	 us	 from	 being	 bound	 within	 the	 limits	 of	 a	 purely	 doxographcial	
recognition	 -	 and	 from	 the	 tacit	 presupposition	 that	 these	 medieval	 theories	 are	
incomprehensible	 or	 obsolete.	Mutatis	mutandis,	 reframing	 and	 recalibrating	 our	 questions	
would	seem	the	most	profitable	way	to	deal	both	with	the	pieces	of	Spade's	puzzle	and	with	
other	perplexing	aspects	of	Medieval	Logic.	
Overall,	as	far	as	Spade's	Puzzle	goes,	 it	 looks	like	we	can	deal	 in	philosophically	interesting	
ways	 with	 these	 disconcerting	 theories,	 as	 long	 as	 we	 are	 ready	 to	 undergo	 some	
historiographical	hands-on	work	in	the	field	to	try	to	fill	our	gaps,	and	to	tune	our	instruments	
in	 appropriate	 ways	 to	 the	 materials	 we	 are	 trying	 to	 explain.	 How	 do	 we	 tune	 our	




Overall,	our	 idea	of	 the	big	picture	appears	 to	be	at	best	 foggy:	we	can	ask	questions	 to	 the	
reference	 textual	 corpus,	 our	 historical	 data,	 and	 a	 fairly	 good	 number	 of	 logical	
commentaries	and	treatises	among	the	most	influential	at	the	time;	but	we	still	come	up	with	
shifting,	partial,	 and	 fragmented	definitions	of	what	Medieval	Logic	 is	and	how	 it	 should	be	
interpreted.	A	nice	synthesis	of	the	state	of	the	art	is	offered	by	Laurent	Cesalli:	
One	could	expect	that	the	complex	philosophical	discipline	we	call	medieval	logic	has	a	well-defined	
identity;	 in	 other	 words,	 one	 can	 legitimately	 hope	 that	 medievalists	 or	 at	 least	 historians	 of	










little	 to	 do	 with	 Medieval	 Logic:7329	(a')	 we	 are	 before	 a	 case	 of	 equivocation;7330	and	 (b)	
Medieval	Logic	per	 se	 is	not	an	unitary	discipline,7331	therefore	 (b'')	 to	answer	 the	question	









out	 in	 Contemporary	 Logic,	 such	 as	 symbolisation	 in	 an	 explicitly	 defined	 mathematical	






it	 is	 not	 obvious).7334	Generally,	we	 expect	 to	meet	 things	 as	 e.g.	 algorithmic	 or	mechanical	
features,	indifference	to	specific	objects		and	permutability	of	the	terms	involved,	etc..	On	the	
other	 hand,	 we	 are	 trained	 to	 expect,	 in	 particular,	 a	 fully	 fledged	 (mathematical-like)	














from	 our	 own	 logical	 background	 that	 we	 at	 first	 recognise	 something	 familiar,	 something	














are	 carrying	 on	 the	 same	kind	 of	 attitude	Ancient	Greeks	 showed	when	 they	met	 a	 foreign	
language	they	could	not	understand:	they	assumed	that	it	was	either	not	a	language	at	all	(βαρ	









Now,	 it	 is	possible	that	Logic,	 if	 there	 is	or	can	be	such	a	thing,	deals	with	some	meaningful	
fact	of	rationality	or	with	some	deep	reality	of	the	world	-	or	all	possible	worlds	etc.	...	But		it	
looks	like	we	do	not	really	work	with	this	Logic:	we	work	with	logics	that	are	different	in	their	




any	 other	 pale	 attempt	 to	 get	 where	 we	 are:	 modern	 logicians	 and	 philosophers	 of	 logic	
widely	 disagree	 on	 which	 of	 their	 common	 practices	 and	 systems	 count	 as	 genuinely	
logical. 7335 		 We	 ourselves	 are	 not	 even	 clear	 on	 what	 makes	 for	 a	 good	 criterion	 of	
logicality!7336.	
But	 -	 one	 might	 say	 -	 our	 version	 of	 logic,	 symbolic	 and	 formal,	 has	 some	 undeniable	
advantages	 of	 practicality,	 clarity	 and	manipulability,	 that	make	 it	 a	much	 better	 tool	 than	
other	 versions	 of	 logic	 such	 as	 Medieval	 Logic.	 Furthermore	 -	 the	 same	 opponent	 might	
continue	-	logic,	deep	down	and	however	you	might	want	to	look	at	it,	is	primarily	concerned	
with	 the	consequence	 relation,	 i.e.	with	granting	 the	 following	of	a	 conclusion	 from	a	 set	of	
premises.	On	the	one	hand	-	she	says	-,	this	seems	pretty	deep	and	at	the	roots	of	what	we	call	
																																																								










As	 for	 the	 first	objection,	contemporary	 formal	symbolic	 logic	 is	 indeed	an	unprecedentedly	
powerful	 tool	 and	 within	 it	 we	 can	 do	 things	 that	 were	 literally	 unthinkable	 before	 the	








logicality.	 Furthermore,	 because	 Contemporary	 Logic	 is	 "formalized"	 and	 symbolic,	 per	 its	
own	 nature	 it	 carries	 out	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 abstraction	 on	 the	 objects	 it	 aims	 to	model	 and	
grasp.	Despite	all	its	practical	gains,	any	operation	of	abstraction	implies	an	arbitrary	choice	
and	the	loss	of	some	features	that	get	 left	out.	But	 in	some	cases	-	at	 least	 for	some	matters	
and	under	certain	constraints	-,	a	less	"abstracting"	and	less	"invasive"	modelling	choice	might	












consequence	 relation	 is	 not	 defined	 in	 an	 univocal	 way,	 neither	 in	 medieval	 logic	 nor	 in	
contemporary	 logics.	 To	 quote	 Curry,	 "no	 one	 knows	 exactly	 what	 a	 logical	 consequence	
is".7339	In	general,	it	is	not	clear	how	the	notion	of	logical	consequence	and	its	validity	should	
be	 characterised,	 how	 narrow	 or	 permissive	 this	 characterisation	 should	 be	 (especially	
against	 other	 forms	 of	 linguistic	 entailment).7340	We	 might	 say	 that	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	
notion	 of	 consequence	 is	 defined	 is	 the	 main	 determiner	 of	 any	 specific	 logical	 system.	
However,	we	 do	 discuss	 on	 how	we	 should	 pick	 the	 "right"	 notion	 of	 consequence	 for	 our	
modelling	task.	On	the	one	hand,	which	kind	"following"	we	should	prefer	and	what	"makes	it	
follow"	 is	 as	much	discussed	 today	 as	 it	was	 in	 the	Middle	Ages.	On	 the	other	hand,	we	do	
discuss	even	of	what	should	be	preserved	-	e.g.	truth,	degrees	of	truth,	probability,	degrees	of	
probability,	 etc.	 ...7341	In	 summary,	 nothing	 in	 the	 centrality	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 consequence	
implies	that	logic	has	an	eternal	and	immutable	core	(other	than	some	kind	of	following)	that	





future	either	 -	 so	what's	 the	 rush?	Yet,	overall	 it	does	not	 look	 like	 logic	 is	 eternal	 (at	 least	
insofar	as	it	is	something	we	can	do):	both	our	lack	of	good	reasons	for	dismissing	Medieval	














fit".	 On	 the	 one	 side,	 if	 we	 accept	 that	 Medieval	 Logic	 has	 indeed	 "little	 to	 do	 with	
Contemporary	Logic",	we	might	want	 to	show	the	actual	extent	of	 that	"little"	and	Medieval	








from	 a	 contemporary	 point	 of	 view.	 In	 a	 measure,	 formalisations	 could	 be	 useful	 to	 make	
medieval	 doctrines	 accessible	 and	 understandable	 to	 a	 modern	 readership;	 however,	 they	
could	 also	 pose	 a	 high	 risk	 of	 unhealthy	 anachronism	 and	 misinterpretation.	 Before	
undergoing	 any	 formalisation	 of	 a	 past	 logical	 theory,	 we	 should	 reflect	 carefully	 on	 the	
import	and	the	purpose	of	our	operations.	
What	are	our	aims	when	we	are	formalising	a	given	fragment	of	Medieval	Logic?	Are	we	trying	
to	 better	 understand	 those	 theories?	 To	 make	 them	 clearer?	 To	 make	 them	 more	
philosophically	 interesting?	 (Can	 these	 goals	 be	 achieved	 at	 the	 same	 time?)	What	 are	 we	
trying	to	make	explicit	and	preserve?	Where	do	formalisations	become	more	of	a	hindrance	
than	 a	 useful	 tool	 for	 approaching	 Medieval	 Logic?	 How	 far	 does	 formalising	 serve	 our	






best	way	 to	 tackle	 them	 is	 "by	 doing",	 i.e.	 by	working	 on	making	 sense	 of	medieval	 logical	
theories	and	figure	out	what	is	going	on	in	fieri	by	proceeding	cautiously.	As	a	rule	of	thumb,	
we	should	be	careful	with	our	formalism,	how	we	go	about	formalising,	by	having	very	clearly	







In	 order	 to	 do	 so,	 in	 principle	 we	 should	 be	 very	 aware,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 of	 our	 source	
material	 -	which	requires	some	serious	historiographical	work	and	contextualisation	 -;	 and,	
on	the	other	hand,	of	our	operations	and	of	their	import.		
Usually	this	formalization	involves	some	sort	of	axiomatisation	and	symbolisation	in	addition	






















Therefore,	 we	 are	 saying	 that	 our	 T1	 does	 not	 have	 yet	 "its	 most	 intuitive	 and	 correct	
formulation"	and	is	not	shaped	in	its	"proper	deductive	structure".	However,	many	medieval	
logical	theories	come	already	with	their	explicit	principia	and	definitiones,	with	their	regulae	
and	 their	 conclusiones.	 Even	 taking	 for	 granted	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 these	 theories	 is	
deductive	 (which	 is	 not	 always	 a	 given),	 it	 would	 be	 very	 far	 fetched	 to	 assume	 that	 their	




the	 structuring	 of	 the	 theory.	We	 can	 certainly	 still	 reshape	 our	 theory	 in	 T2	 and	make	 it	











the	object	 level	and	 the	meta-logical	 level	 in	many	medieval	 logical	 texts	 is	 controversial	 at	
least, 7348 	making	 a	 clean	 split	 "from	 the	 outside"	 could	 yield	 some	 misinterpretations.	
Furthermore,	even	 the	choice	 for	axiomatics	per	se	could	be	 inappropriate.	By	axiomatising,	
we	are	stating	at	least	a	preference	on	how	we	should	intend	logic	and	its	purpose.	We	might	





statements	 by	 means	 of	 derivation.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 natural	 deduction	 systems	 are	
intended	as	 "a	 formalism	 that	 comes	as	 close	as	possible	 to	actual	 reasoning":7349	foregoing	
axioms	and	focusing	on	inference	rules	(a	natural	deduction	system	can	be	thought	of	as	just	a	
set	 of	 rules),7350	this	 kind	 of	 proof	 calculus	 tries	 to	 model	 the	 actual	 reasoning	 process,	
mirroring	 in	a	way	 "intuitive	and	 informal	 reasoning".7351	By	 its	own	nature	 then,	 a	natural	
deduction	system	looks	particularly	apt	to	preserve	the	original	main	structure	of	a	given	T1	
and	 it	might	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 an	 interesting	 and	not	 too	 invasive	 tool	 to	 tackle	 "the	 informal	
concept	 of	 logical	 deduction".7352 	However,	 either	 if	 we	 decide	 to	 prefer	 an	 axiomatic	
formalisation	of	our	medieval	 logical	 theory	or	 if	we	prefer	 to	 read	 it	 through	 the	 lenses	of	
natural	deduction,	we	are	making	a	precise	choice	on	how	T1	should	be	intended	in	the	first	















carry	 heavy	 over-interpretations	 that	 could	 certainly	 be	 anachronistic	 and	 blinding	 if	 our	
purpose	 is	 to	 attain	 a	 better	understanding	of	 our	medieval	 logical	 theory	per	se	 and	 as	 an	
interesting	term	of	comparison	against	our	contemporary	theories	and	issues.		
	
At	 first	 sight,	 symbolisation	would	seem	to	be	 less	problematic.	Symbolisation	concerns	 the	
language	 in	which	 the	 theory	 is	 formulated:	 as	 it	 is	 commonly	 done,	 it	 is	 the	 operation	 of	
transforming	a	set	of	symbols,	 i.e.	ordinary	(written)	words,	 into	another	set	of	symbols,	 i.e.	
special	 notations	 -	 abbreviations,	 schematic	 letters/placeholders/variables.	 Symbolisation	




and	syntax,	without	altering	relevant	portions	of	 the	starting	 language),	or	an	 improvement	
(the	arriving	language	has	the	same	properties	and	expressive	power	as	the	starting	language,	
but	 performs	 its	 tasks	 in	 a	more	 immediate	 or	 clear	 way),	 or	 a	 radical	 reformation	 of	 the	
																																																								
7353	At	 least	 in	principle,	 on	 the	one	hand,	natural	deduction	 systems	 seem	 to	be	particularly	 fit	 to	 treat	 some	
aspects	 of	 Medieval	 Logic	 as	 scientia	 sermocinalis	 et	 rationalis:	 Medieval	 Logic	 and	 natural	 deduction	 system	
share	 the	 same	 declared	 intent	 of	 dealing	 primarily	with	 the	 structures	 of	 rational	 thought	 in	 a	 natural	way.	
Moreover,	natural	deduction	systems	have	the	advantage	of	not	being	an	invasive	tool,	which	is	quite	important	
if	our	main	aim	 is	 to	obtain	a	historical	understanding	of	T1:	 far	 from	giving	T1	a	new	and	 improved	shape,	a	
natural	 deduction	 formalisation	would	 show	T1's	 own	 structure,	 just	 in	 a	 clearer	way.	 This	 has	 already	 been	
done	quite	extensively	by	scholars.	For	example,	a	famous	example	of	Natural	Deduction	readings	in	the	history	
of	 logic	 is	Corcoran	 [1972]	on	Aristotle;	 a	 further	example,	 as	 far	as	 it	 concerns	Medieval	Logic	 specifically,	 is	
Peter	King's	[2001]	analysis	of	XIV	century	consequentiae	as	natural	deduction	systems.	On	the	other	hand,	the	




starting	 language. 7354 	The	 pragmatic	 take	 on	 symbolisation	 into	 an	 artificial	 language	
(advocated	e.g.	by	Tarski)7355	stresses	the	gains	in	precision	and	brevity	that	it	offers.	This	is	
true	 at	 least	 up	 to	 a	 point,	 since	 sometimes	 we	 end	 up	 having	 to	 "sugar"	 our	 symbolised	
theories	 to	make	 them	 intelligible,	 i.e.	 partially	 going	 back	 to	 ordinary	words.7356	So	 far	 so	
good:	symbolising	the	language	of	our	T1	could	be	useful	and	make	it	both	easier	to	see	T1's	
structures,	 articulations	 and	 operations,	 and	 to	 do	 things	 within	 it.	 However,	 if	 T1	 is	 a	
medieval	logical	theory	we	should	keep	some	caveats	in	mind,	in	the	first	place	both	about	the	
starting	 language	 of	 T1	 and	 the	 way	 we	 think	 about	 the	 arriving	 language	 (extension,	
improvement,	reformation).	
The	 general	 context	 in	 which	 we	 think	 of	 symbolisation	 is	 that	 of	 a	 translation	 from	 an	
ordinary	 language	 to	 an	 artificial	 formal	 one.	 As	 Hansson	 argued	 for	 formalisations	 in	
philosophy,	this	is	a	form	of	idealisation	in	two	steps	or	-	we	may	add	-	crossing	through	three	


















although	 it	 still	 undergoes	evolutions	 in	 its	 syntax	and	 semantics	via	 feedback	 from	OD.7359	
MPL	is	a	regimentation	of	this	already	partially	artificial	language:	e.g.	it	brings	new	technical	
terms	into	the	vocabulary	and	restricts	the	use	of	some	of	those	terms	already	in	the	common	
use,	 e.g.	 by	 imposing	 some	 changes	 on	 their	 semantics.	 MLL	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 higher	
regimentation	on	MLL	and	MPL:	we	find	an	expansion	of	the	vocabulary,	a	further	restriction	
on	 ML	 and	 MPL's	 uses	 of	 some	 terms,	 and	 interventions	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	
grammatical	rules	of	ML	and	MPL.	For	example,	in	several	MLLs	we	find	the	use	of	schematic	
letters	 as	 placeholders;	 the	 addition	 of	 technical	 meanings	 to	 terms	 of	 common	 use	 in	
ML/MPL	(e.g.	consequentia)	or	a	revision	of	their	meaning;	technical	interpretations	of	the	so	
called	 syncategorematic	 terms	 (e.g.	 conjunctions,	 adverbs,	 adjectives	 of	 quantity,	 etc...);	
elements	that	look	like	special	notations	and	whose	use	is	at	least	semi-explicitly	regimented	
(e.g.	 ly),	 etc.	 Furthermore,	 there	 is	 an	 explicit	 and	 deliberate	 restriction	 on	 the	 positional	
flexibility	 of	 (Classical)	 Latin	 and	 partially	 of	ML/MPL.	 For	 example:	 negating	 negation	 (i.e.	
propositional	 negation)	 or	 infinite	 negation	 (i.e.	 term	 negation)	 of	 the	 predicate	 term	 are	
determined	by	their	position	before	or	after	the	copula;7360	the	supposition	of	a	comparative	
term	(which	is	a	logically	relative	term)	is	determined	by	the	term's	position	before	or	after	
the	oblique	 term	 (in	 the	 ablative	 case)	depending	 from	 the	 comparative,7361	and	 so	on.	The	














to	 interpret	 the	properties	of	 terms	and	 the	 relations	among	 the	 same	 terms	 in	a	 sentence,	
which	 can	 go	 against	 the	 grammatical	 conventions.7362	For	 example,	homo	est	blanca	 is	 not	
grammatically	 correct	because	of	 the	 lack	of	gender	agreement	between	 the	 subject	and	 its	
predicate	 term,	 but	 it	 is	 logically	 acceptable	 -	 and	 possibly	 true.	 At	 least	 some	 branches	 of	
Medieval	 Logic	 (e.g.	 suppositio,	ampliatio,	restrictio...),	 are	 concerned	 -	 among	other	 things	 -	
with	 how	 to	 regiment	 and	 interpret	 these	 properties	 of	 the	 terms	 in	 a	 specifically	 logical	
context	 beyond	 a	 grammatical	 one.	 For	 example,	 even	 if	 we	 take	 homo	 est	 blanca	 as	 an	
acceptable	and	well	formed	sentence	of	our	MLL,	we	will	also	accept	nullus	homo	est	foemina	
because	the	"nullus"	restricts	the	supposition	of	homo	to	males	only.7363	And	yet,	at	the	same	
time	we	will	 reject	 the	 consequentia:	 nullus	 homo	 est	 foemina	 ergo	 nulla	 foemina	 est	 homo,	
because	 the	 homo	 in	 the	 consequent	 does	 not	 fall	 under	 this	 restriction	 and	 hence	 the	
consequent	does	not	follow.7364	
Nevertheless,	 ML	 is	 deeply	 enrooted	 within	 ML/MPL.	 For	 example,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	
presence	of	meaningful	terms	from	ML/MPL,	taken	significatively	in	their	ordinary	meaning,	
seems	 to	 be	 quite	 important	 for	 the	 genesis	 and	 the	 articulation	 of	 some	medieval	 logical	
















have	no	problem	at	all	going	back	 to	 the	modus	communis	loquendi,	 i.e.	 the	common	way	of	




object	 language	 and	 the	meta-language,	 i.e.	 the	 language	 of	 the	 theory	 and	 the	 language	 in	
which	the	theory	is	analysed.7367		
How	 should	we	 collocate	MLL	 on	Hansson's	 Scale	 then?	 Probably	 somewhere	 between	 PL-
stage2	and	LL-stage3.		MLL	in	its	instantiations	and	MLL's	relation	to	ML	(and	MPL)	are	still	in	








-	 such	as	desemantification,	 for	 example	 -7370	which	might	be	undesirable	 in	 the	 analysis	of	
some	 aspects	 of	Medieval	 Logic.	 Under	 these	 constraints,	 we	might	 even	 give	 fully	 fledged	
symbolisations	of	 a	MLL	 fragment	 in	 a	 contemporary	 formalised	 language,	while	 remaining	














ML,	 but	 simply	 to	 implement	 ML	 with	 appropriate	 notations,	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 ML's	
manipulability.	 The	 idea	 behind	 this	 approach	would	 be	 to	 try	 to	 understand	 our	medieval	
logical	theory	as	from	within	as	possible,	or	from	an	"in	between"	stance.	As	with	the	issues	
emerging	with	 the	axiomatisation	of	medieval	 logical	 theories,	even	 in	 this	case,	 in	order	 to	
achieve	a	good	understanding	and	also	a	clear	and	philosophically	interesting	interpretation,	
the	best	option	would	probably	be	some	kind	of	third	way.	This	third	way	should	be	"in	the	
middle"	 enough	 to	 let	 us	 begin	 an	 interesting	 conversation	 between	 medieval	 and	
contemporary	logic	without	losing	sight	of	the	peculiarities	of	each	of	the	conceptions	of	logic	























of	 Medieval	 Logic),	 with	 very	 little	 conceptual	 projections,	 minimal	 loss	 and	 considerably	
fewer	 anachronisms	 than	most	 standard	 formalisations.	This	 kind	of	 articulation	 gives	us	 a	
way	 to	 deepen	 and	 test	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 of	 our	 medieval	
theory	 and	 to	 do	 so	with	 little	 recourse	 to	 extrinsic	 notions.	 Here	we	 do	 not	 have	 to	 drop	





Medieval	 logic	 has	 at	 least	 as	 much	 expressive	 power	 as	 Peano.	 Furthermore,	 by	 proving	
central	claims	of	mathematics,	it	shows	that	contemporary	logic	is	not	the	only	logic	in	town	





7373	Parsons	 [2014,	 269]:	 "Historically,	 symbolic	 logic	 did	 not	 come	 with	 a	 seal	 of	 approval	 on	 it.	 Instead,	 it	
achieved	 its	 present	 status	 by	 providing	 a	 system	 in	 which	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 formulate	 central	 claims	 of	
mathematics	 and	 (less	 evidently)	 science,	 in	which	 the	 valid	 derivations	 correspond	 to	what	mathematicians	








After	 having	 shown	 that	Medieval	 Logic	 is	 in	 some	 sense	 as	much	 logic	 as	 our	 own,	 let	 us	
consider	briefly	 the	 second	set	of	 concerns	 shared	by	many	historians	of	Medieval	Logic	as	









in	a	 sense	which	modern	 readers	would	embrace)	 features	and	 interests	which	are	at	 least	
unusual	from	a	certain	contemporary	perspective	-	e.g.	a	predominant	interest	for	semantics;	
a	 strong	 ontological	 interest;	 a	 deep	 rooting	 in	ML,	 and	 a	 reflection	 on	 ordinary	 reasoning	
processes	 and	 ordinary	 language	 "from	 within"	 (along	 with	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 clear	 distinction	
between	 logical	 and	meta-logical	 language);	 an	 emphasis	 on	meta-logical	 and	 philosophical	
questions;	 a	 centrality	 of	 dialectical	 procedures,	 etc.	 ...	 However,	 at	 least	 some	 of	 these	
features	 and	 interests	 have	 found	 their	 analogues	 in	 some	 recent	 (and	 not	 so	 recent)	














and	 features	 treated	 in	Medieval	 Logic	 (e.g.	 Jacobi's	Argumentationstheorie);7375	or	 they	 are	
conceptually	 "heavy"	 notions	 taken	 from	 contemporary	 projects	 that,	 because	 of	 their	
























As	 an	 autonomous	 genre	 in	 the	 textual	 corpus	 of	 the	 logica	 modernorum,	 treatises	 de	
consquentiis	 make	 their	 appearance	 in	 the	 XIV	 century,	 either	 as	 texts	 circulating	
independently	or	as	books	included	in	wider	summae	of	logic.7377		
Obviously,	discussions	on	what	 it	means	"to	 follow"	and	what	 it	 requires,	are	not	 limited	 to	
the	specific	 treatises	 in	 later	medieval	 times,	but	are	a	great	deal	older	 -	 starting	at	 least	 in	
Greek	ancient	philosophy,	with	Aristotle	on	the	one	hand	and	the	Stoics	on	the	other,	as	it	is	
well	 known.	Without	 going	 into	 the	 details,	 I	 am	 going	 to	 give	 a	 brief	 historical	 overview	
before	proceeding	with	a	 closer	 introduction	 to	 the	approaches	 to	 consequentiae	 in	 the	XIV	
century.		
If	we	were	to	sum	it	up	in	a	few	lines,	we	could	say	that	the	story	of	the	accounts	about	logical	
following	 amounts	 to	 the	 long	 and	 complicated	 tale	 of	 the	 tensions,	 the	 interactions,	 the	
clashes	 and	 the	 alternations	 between	 two	ways	 of	 conceiving	 validity	 and	 formality.	 As	 for	
validity,	 on	 the	 one	 side,	 we	 have	 a	 stronger	 notion	 of	 good	 following,	 requiring	 some	
connection	of	meaning	between	the	premises/antecedent	and	the	conclusion/consequent	-	i.e.	
requiring	 that	 the	 information	 in	 the	 consequent	 is	 contained	 in	 the	 antecedent	 in	 some	
relevant	sense.	On	the	other	side,	we	find	a	weaker	notion	of	validity	requiring	simply	for	it	




consequent	 is	 false.	 The	 question	 of	 formality	 is	 deeply	 interconnected	 with	 the	 issue	 of	
validity.	Roughly,	 the	split	goes	 like	 this:	on	the	one	hand,	 the	 following	 is	 formal	 if	 there	 is	
some	relation	of	containment	between	the	antecedent	and	the	consequent	-	be	it	ontological,	
semantic	or	epistemic.	On	the	other	hand,	the	following	is	formal	if	it	does	not	depend	on	the	
meaning	 of	 the	 categorematic	 terms	 in	 the	 antecedent	 and	 in	 the	 consequent,	 but	 on	 their	
structure	 given	 by	 their	 syncategorematic	 features	 -	 i.e.	 if	 the	 consequent	 follows	 from	 the	
antecedent	in	all	cases	when	the	same	propositional	form	is	maintained.		
Medieval	 authors	 reflecting	 on	 these	 matters	 find	 themselves	 in	 the	 position	 of	 having	 to	
interpret	 -	 and	 to	 reconcile	 in	 a	more	or	 less	 coherent	picture	 -	disparate	 ancient	 and	 late-
ancient	materials,	which	become	increasingly	available	at	various	stages.7378	These	materials	
are	articulated	in	different	systems	of	rules	(e.g.	Ciceronian	and	Boethian	Topics,	Aristotelian	
Topic,	 Aristotelian	 categorical	 and	 modal	 syllogistics)7379	characterising	 different	 sorts	 of	
"following"	in	different	terms.	However,	as	Normore	observes:	




A	 common	 (but	 controversial)7381	historiographical	 interpretation	 sees	 the	 development	 of	
medieval	 theories	 of	 consequentiae	 as	 a	 shift	 from	accounts	 of	 following	 in	 topical	 contexts	
and	topical	terms	(therefore	more	or	less	directly	grounded	on	semantic	connections	among	










Boethius	 (in	 particular:	 De	 topicis	 differentiis,	 De	 hypotheticis	 syllogismis,	 and	 his	
commentaries	In	De	Interpretatione)7383	seems	to	have	been	the	one	who	set	the	standard	for	
the	 discussion	 up	 to	 the	 XII	 century.7384		 In	 the	 XII	 century,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 debates	
among	 the	 Parisian	 philosophical	 schools,	 we	 see	 a	 resurgence	 of	 the	 interest	 in	 logic	 and	
hence	in	the	analysis	of	logical	following.	The	contributions	made	by	Peter	Abelard,	Alberic	of	
Paris,	 Adam	 of	 Basham,	 etc.	 do	 not	 represent	 only	 new	 conceptual	 developments	 on	 the	
subject,	 but	 also	 an	 explicit	 disagreement	 on	 how	 good	 inferences	 and	 true	 conditionals	
should	 be	 conceived	 and	 about	 what	 makes	 for	 a	 satisfactory	 account	 of	 logical	
validity.7385Abelard's	 account	 of	 true	 conditionals	 tried	 to	 reconcile	 some	 core	 features	 of	
Aristotelian	logic	with	some	intuitions	on	the	behaviour	of	sentential	connectives.7386	In	this	
account,	 for	 a	 conditional	 to	 be	 true,	 there	 has	 to	 be	 a	 semantic	 connection	 between	 the	
antecedent	 and	 the	 consequent,	 somehow	 analogously	 to	 Boethius'	 conditions	 for	 a	 good	




















consequentiae	 as	 such,	 but	 the	 subject	 is	 addressed	 by	many	 authors	 in	 several	 contexts	 -	
commentaries	 on	 Aristotle's	 Topica,	 Analytica	 Priora,	 De	 Sophisticis	 Elenchis;	 logical	
compendia;	 treatises	 on	 Syncategoremata	 (in	 particular	 in	 the	 chapters	 on	 si	 and	 quin),	
Sophismata,7390	Insolubilia,	Obligationes.7391	
Historians	still	have	to	work	out	the	details	and	there	is	still	much	to	be	done,	but	overall	it	is	
likely	 that	 XIV	 century	 consequentiae	 -	as	 theories	 and	 as	 a	 genre	 of	 treatises	 in	 the	 logica	
modernorum	-	stem	from	a	confluence	of	various	sources	and	influences.	It	looks	like	a	major	
role	 in	 this	 sense	 was	 played	 by:	 Boethius'	De	Hypotheticis	 Syllogismis;	 the	 Ciceronian	 and	
Boethian	topical	tradition	and	the	Aristotelian	Topics;7392	Aristotle's	Analytica	Priora;	treatises	
on	 Sophismata	 and	 Syncategoremata;	 and,	 in	 a	 measure,	 by	 the	 XII	 century	 debates	 on	
arguments	and	conditionals	-	even	if,	especially	as	far	as	Abelard	is	concerned,	this	influence	
does	not	seem	to	be	direct.7393	
XIV	 century	 theories	of	consequentiae	 are	not	 a	uniform	block:	 	we	have	a	 great	number	of	
treatises	 -	 many	 penned	 by	 anonymous	 authors	 and	 for	 the	 most	 part	 still	 unedited	 -,	




treatises.	The	 author	 of	 Quaestiones	 in	 Analytica	 Priora,	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 "Pseudo	
Scotus",	is	-	as	far	as	I	know	-	still	unidentified.	Wadding	(1639)	printed	these	Questions	in	his	
edition	 of	 Duns	 Scotus'	 Opera	 omnia,	 along	 with	 another	 misattributed	 commentary	 per	










latter	 should	 probably	 be	 identified	with	 John	 of	 Cornwall,	 with	 the	 support	 of	 an	 explicit	
attribution	in	a	manuscript	(Oxford,	Magdalen	250).7394	However,	not	only	do	we	not	have	any	
reasons	to	connect	the	Pseudo	Scotus	of	the	Priora	with	John	of	Cornwall,		but	it	seems	likely	
that	 this	 identification	 should	 be	 rejected.7395	The	 dating	 of	 Pseudo	 Scotus'	 Quaestiones	 in	
Analytica	Priora	appears	to	be	as	uncertain	as	the	identity	of	their	author.	As	for	Buridan,	the	
dating	 of	 his	 Tractatus	 de	 consequentiis	oscillates	 between	 the	 mid-1330s7396	and	 the	 mid-
1340s.7397	It	 is	 not	 clear	 which	 relation,	 if	 any,	 Buridan's	 and	 Pseudo	 Scotus'	 works	 on	
consequentiae	had	to	each	other:	on	the	one	hand,	there	are	some	strong	similarities	(e.g.	on	
what	 counts	 as	 a	 consequentia	 formalis);	 but,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 among	 the	 definitions	 of	
consequentia	bona	criticised	by	Pseudo	Scotus	(Sup.	I	Priorum,	q.	X)	we	find	also	one	that	looks	






12	F	XIX,	 ff.	 111ra-112rb,	 "Consequentia	 est	habitudo	 inter	 antecedens	 et	 consequens";	






7398	This	 kind	 of	 subdivision	 is	 quite	 common	 in	 studies	 on	 medieval	 theories	 of	 consequentiae;	 here	 I	 am	
referring	to	the	latest	instantiation	of	this	schema	as	offered	in	Dutilh-Novaes	[2016];	however,	to	maintain,	even	



















several	authors	belonging	 to	 the	other	groups	 (e.g.	Marsilius	of	 Inghen,7403	Peter	of	Mantua,	















treatises	 (e.g.	 Elementarium	 logicae);	 the	 anonymous	 Logica	 ad	 Rudium; 7406 	the	
anonymous	Liber	consequentiarum.7407	
These	 texts	 offer	 general	 definitions	 of	 consequentia,	 expositions	 or	 analyses	 of	 criteria	 of	
validity,	and	systematic	divisions	among	types	of	consequentiae.7408	Overall	the	characterising	
feature	of	 this	group	 is	a	 tendency	to	 justify	or	explain	 the	holding	of	a	consequentia	on	the	
ground	of	 intrinsic	or	extrinsic	middles	and	 to	appeal	 to	other	notions	closely	connected	 to	
the	topical	tradition.	
	
3.a The	 treatises	 representative	 of	 tradition	 on	 consequentiae	 commonly	 identified	 as	
"Parisian"	 or	 "Continental":	 Buridan's	Tractatus	 de	 Consequentiis;7409	Albert	 of	 Saxony's	
Perutilis	 Logica	 IV;7410 	Marsilius	 of	 Inghen's	 Consequentiae;	 and	 the	 Pseudo	 Scotus'	
commentary	on	the	Prior	Analytics.7411	
These	 treatises	 tend	 to	make	 away	with	 topical	 notions	 in	 their	 accounts	 of	 consequentiae,	
even	when	they	are	dealing	with	consequentiae	materiales	holding	in	virtue	of	the	relations	of	
meaning	 among	 their	 categorematic	 terms	 (e.g.	 this	 is	 particularly	 evident	 in	 Marsilius'	
treatment	 of	 the	 rules	 for	 material	 consequentiae	 and	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 some	 kinds	 of	
expositions	in	Book	II).	As	core	characterising	features,	the	treatises	in	this	group	embrace	the	






7408	Ochkam	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 the	 first	 to	 appeal	 explicitly	 to	 the	 distinction	 between	 formal	 and	material	
consequentia	(Martin	[2005]).	See	also	Crimi	[forthcoming].	
7409	Edited	 in	 Hubien	 [1976].	 See	 e.g.	 among	 others	 Bos	 [1976];	 d'Ors	 [1993];	 Dutilh	 Novaes	 [2005],	 [2007],	







and	 works	 by	 Robert	 Fland,7414 	John	 of	 Holland,7415 	Richard	 Billingham,7416 	Richard	
Levenham,7417	Ralph	Strode.7418	
Roughly,	the	texts	in	this	group	bring	back	a	requirement	of	a	connection	of	meaning	among	
its	 categorematic	 terms	 in	 order	 for	 a	 consequentia	 to	 be	 formal.	 In	 other	 words	 a	
consequentia	is	formal	if	the	consequent	is	somehow	contained	in	the	antecedent,	either	in	a	
semantic	 or	 in	 an	 explicitly	 epistemic	 sense	 -	 i.e.	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 consequent	 is	
contained	in	the	understanding	of	the	antecedent,	as	e.g.	in	Ralph	Strode.		
	




understanding	of	 the	 relationships	of	 influence	among	 the	great	number	of	 treatises	on	 the	
subject	 between	 the	 1340s	 and	 the	 end	 of	 the	 XIV	 century	 (including	 Marsilius'	 text),	 we	
should	 take	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 some	 of	 the	 main	 features	 that	 seem	 to	 be	 recurring	 in	 the	




7414	Edited	 in	 Spade	 [1976b].	 As	 argued	 by	 Read	 [2016],	 the	 author	 of	 the	 Consequentiae,	 Obligationes	 and	
Insolubilia	circulating	under	Robert	Fland's	name	should	be	identified	with	Elandus	Dialecticus.	
7415	Bert	Bos	edited	 John	of	Holland's	 treatises	on	Suppositiones,	Fallaciae,	Obligationes	 and	 Insolubilia	 (John	of	
Holland	 [1985]).	 As	 far	 as	 I	 know,	 John	 of	 Holland's	Consequentiae	 is	 still	 unedited.	 See	 Bos	 [1985];	 see	 also	
Dutilh	Novaes	[2008,	447]	











Syntactic	 def.	 of	 c.;	 def.	 of	 validity	 with	 analyses	 and	
rejections	of	alternative	positions	
	Short	syntactic	def.	of	c.	
Often	 c.	 is	 characterised	 primarily	 as	 propositio	
hypotetica	(plus	assertion	rules)	
Often	 c.	 is	 characterised	 primarily	 as	 illatio	 (with	 an	
emphasis	 of	 the	mental	 operation	 of	 the	 inferring)	 or	
the	 habitudo	of	 the	 following	 of	 the	 consequent	 from	
the	antecedent	
General	 (and	 special)	 rules	proven	 systematically	 and	
in	a	succession	of	dependence	from	each	other	













• Formalis	 =	 the	 (understanding	 of)	 the	
consequent	 is	contained	 in	 the	(understanding	of)	 the	
antecedent	
• Materialis	=	it	is	impossible	for	the	antecedent	
to	 be	 true	 and	 the	 consequent	 false	 -	 without	 any	




Syllogism	 is	 just	 a	 particular	 case	 of	 c.	 formalis	 but	 it	
seems	to	lose	its	paradigmatic	role	
Syllogism	 is	 taken	 as	 the	 paradigmatic	 case	 of	 c.	









not	 completely	 accurate,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 a	 useful	 navigation	 chart	 to	 broach	many	XIV	 century	
treatises.	 However,	 we	 find	 at	 least	 one	 puzzling	 exception	 among	 the	 main	 texts	 in	 the	
Parisian	 tradition.	 Furthermore,	 if	we	want	 to	 take	 seriously	 these	 features	 along	with	 the	
geographical	and	chronological	criteria,	we	should	probably	reconsider	the	division	between	
3.a	and	3.b	-	which	appears	to	be	partially	misleading	and	certainly	incomplete.	
Our	 puzzling	 case	 in	 3.a	 is	 indeed	 Marsilius	 of	 Inghen.	 Marsilius'	 theory	 is	 essentially	
"Parisian"	 in	some	of	 its	core	features	and	in	 its	spirit:	Marsilius'	account	of	validity	and	his	
account	of	 formality	are	both	Parisian;	his	 treatment	of	 the	ex	impossibili/ad	necessarium	 is	
very	close	to	Buridan's	and	to	Albert	of	Saxony's	-	as	it	is	his	own	articulation	of	most	of	the	
rules	 for	 consequentiae.7421 	However,	 Marsilius	 seems	 to	 move	 away	 from	 the	 Parisian	
"standard"	 account	 for	 several	 aspects	 of	 no	 little	 importance:	 for	 example,	where	 Buridan	
and	Albert	of	Saxony	define	a	consequentia	primarily	as	a	propositio	hypotetica	(supplied	with	
assertion	 rules),7422	Marsilius	 characterises	 a	 consequentia	 as	 an	 oratio,	 an	 illatio,	 and	 the	
habitudinem	 sequelae	 necessariam	 unius	 propositionis	 ad	 aliam7423	-	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	 more	
commonly	found	in	the	English	tradition.	Analogously,	in	line	with	many	authors	belonging	to	
3.b	 but	 against	 Pseudo	 Scotus,	 Buridan	 and	 Albert	 of	 Saxony,	 Marsilius	 rejects	 the	
consequentia	 ut	 nunc.7424	Furthermore,	 by	 taking	 a	 closer	 comparative	 look	 at	 Buridan's,	
Albert's	 and	 Marsilius'	 theories,	 we	 can	 notice	 that,	 for	 some	 aspects,	 a	 shift	 from	 the	
Buridanian	account	 is	 already	present	 in	Albert	of	Saxony	 -	 a	 shift	 that	appears	 to	be	more	
explicit	and	systematic	 in	Marsilius.7425	As	Marsilius	 is,	Albert	 is	also	a	member	of	 the	natio	









several	 cases	 masters	 belonging	 to	 this	 natio	 held	 philosophical	 theories	 often	 showing	 a	
stronger	 influence	 of	 their	 counterparts	 from	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 Channel	 than	 of	 their	
Parisian	 colleagues 7427 	-	 and	 this	 seems	 to	 be	 true	 also	 for	 the	 case	 of	 theories	 of	
consequentiae.	There	is	still	much	historiographical	work	to	be	done	to	take	the	measures	of	
this	"hybridisation",	both	in	its	conceptual	depth	and	extent,	and	on	the	role	that	institutional	
contexts	 and	 the	 circulation	 of	 texts	 played	 in	 its	 development	 and	 diffusion,	 especially	 for	
later	authors.7428	On	the	other	side,	also	in	3.b	we	find	some	logicians,	e.g.	John	of	Holland,7429	
who	 show	 some	 characteristics	 closer	 to	 3.a	 than	 to	 the	 standard	 "English"	 features	 -	 even	
when	 they	 are	 not	 particularly	 late	 authors	 and	 their	 controversial	 production	 is	 to	 be	
situated	mostly	 within	 the	 Oxonian	 context.7430	Overall,	 even	with	 the	 data	 available	 being	
only	partial,	it	looks	like	if	we	intend	the	split	between	"Parisian"	and	"English"	traditions	too	
rigidly,	we	would	not	do	 justice	to	several	major	authors	usually	placed	in	either	group	and	
we	 would	 have	 on	 our	 hands	 a	 bunch	 of	 (especially	 later)	 theories	 of	 consequentiae	 that	
appear	like	anomalies	in	this	classification.	Therefore,	the	split	itself	should	probably	undergo	
some	serious	reconsiderations.	On	the	one	hand,	we	should	pull	more	historical	data	on	the	
interactions	 among	masters	 and	 the	 circulation	 of	 texts	 between	 the	main	 centres	 of	 each	
tradition	(Oxford	and	Paris)	and	try	to	see	how	far	the	conceptual	split	can	be	retained.	On	the	
other	hand,	we	should	provisionally	expand	our	classification	with	a	3.c/4	group	of	texts	and	
theories	 blatantly	 showing	 some	 hybrid	 features	 -	 with	 elements	 characterising	 3.a	 or	 3.b.	
This	 group,	 should	 include	 authors	 roughly	 from	Marsilius'	 generation	 (3.b)	 and	 from	 the	
following	 one	 (4)	 and	 active	 either	 in	 England	 or	 on	 the	 Continent,	 with	 special	 regard	 to	
																																																								




















I	 gave	 an	 unavoidably	 partial	 tour	 of	 the	 general	 context	 and	 shape	 of	 Late	Medieval	 Latin	
Logic	 and	 of	 some	 historiographical	 issues	which	 come	up	when	 considering	 some	 specific	
medieval	 logical	 theories	 and	Medieval	 Logic	 itself.	 Furthermore,	 I	 gave	 a	 partial	 historical	
introduction	to	the	XIV	century	debate(s)	on	consequentiae,	touching	upon	some	of	the	issues	
that	I	will	examine	in	presenting	Marsilius'	theory.	
Much	 more	 work	 still	 needs	 to	 be	 done	 in	 filling	 our	 historical	 gaps	 by	 making	 medieval	
logical	 texts	 available;	 by	 clarifying	 the	 social	 and	 intellectual	 contexts	 (if	 any)	where	 logic	
was	practiced	and	developed	outside	 the	universities;	 and	by	 examining	 the	 logical	 aspects	




7431	The	 diffusion	 of	 English	 logic	 in	 Italy	 has	 been	 object	 of	 scholarly	 interest	 for	 quite	 some	 time	 -	 see	 e.g.	
Maierù	(ed.)	[1982]	
7432	See	Bertagna	[1994]	 for	an	analysis	of	Ferrybrodge's	 theory	of	 inferences,	 transcripts	of	passages	 from	his	
Logica	 and	Consequentiae	 and	 further	 bibliographical	 references.	 Part	 of	 the	Consequentiae	was	 also	 edited	 in	
Pozzi	[1978]	and	part	of	the	Logica	in	Del	Punta	[1982].	See	also	Bertagna	[1998]	
7433	Peter	of	Candia's	Consequentiae	 are	edited	 in	Bertagna	 [2008]	and	S.	Brown	 is	preparing	an	edition	of	 the	
Obligationes	 -	 studied	 already	 in	 Pozzi	 [1991].	 On	 Peter	 of	 Candia	 see	 also	 Donati	 Curuni	 [1996];	 Morissey	
[2000];	Pozzi	[1991];	Schabel	[2003].	
7434	R.	 Strobino	 is	 preparing	 a	 critical	 edition	 of	 Peter	 of	 Mantua's	 Logic;	 on	 his	 theory	 of	 consequentiae	 see	
Strobino	[2016];	Bertagna	[2000].	See	also	James	[1974];	Strobino	[2009/2010]	








deeply	 enrooted	 in	 philosophy	 (both	 in	 the	 curriculum	 and	 as	 its	 part	 and	 its	 instrument);	
that,	 in	many	 texts,	 it	 puts	 an	 emphasis	 on	meta-logical	 aspects	 and	 it	 entertains	 a	 special	
relationship	 with	 (quasi-)ordinary	 language.	 Medieval	 Logic	 has	 some	 distinguishable	
features	of	logicality	and	in	-	a	measure	-	of	formality;7437	it	is	a	logic	in	an	unequivocal	sense	
and	it	is	expressive	enough	to	reformulate	some	of	our	own	contemporary	logical	projects.	
In	 the	study	of	sections	of	Medieval	Logic,	 it	 is	desirable	 to	maintain	a	balance	between	the	





philosophical	 projects.	 It	 does	 not	 seem	 to	me	 that	 we	 necessarily	 need	 to	 undergo	 heavy	
reformulations	 or	 formalisations	 of	 medieval	 logic,	 i.e.	 to	 "multiply	 the	 howlers	 beyond	
necessity",	to	make	its	history	as	interesting	as	we	can.7438	In	some	cases	formalisations	into	
contemporary	logical	languages	are	useful	to	see	more	clearly	the	structures	of	a	given	logical	
theory	 or	 logical	 argument.	 But	we	 should	 take	 a	 rain	 check	 on	 extensive	 translations	 into	







Among	 the	 familiar	 features	and	 the	many	 interests	of	Medieval	Logic,	we	 find	notions	 that	
(mutatis	 mutandis)	 sound	 very	 much	 like	 analogues	 of	 our	 own	 and	 are	 the	 subject	 of	




on	 the	way(s)	 in	which	we	 intend	 the	 following	 in	 a	 logical	 context.	 The	 two	main	ways	of	
conceiving	 the	 validity	 of	 consequentiae	 that	 we	 have	 found	 in	 the	 Ancient	 and	 Medieval	
tradition	 could	 be	 put	 in	 conversation	 with	 contemporary	 relevantist	 approaches	 to	
consequence	and	with	other	permissive	or	"minimalists"7440	accounts	of	logical	following.	On	
the	 one	 hand,	 for	 their	 peculiar	 relation	 to	 natural	 language,	 Medieval	 theories	 of	
consequentiae	could	be	useful	to	better	grasp	the	difference	between	logical	consequence	and	
other	forms	of	linguistic	entailment.7441	Most	of	the	XIV	century	theories	of	consequentiae	do	
embrace	 the	 weaker	 notion	 of	 validity	 of	 a	 consequentia,	 often	 expressed	 in	 modal	 terms,	
implemented	 with	 some	 (different)	 restrictions.	 What	 the	 "English"	 and	 the	 "Parisian"	






with	 'events'	 but	 with	 'processes';	 that	 'processes'	 are	 things	 which	 do	 not	 begin	 and	 end	 but	 turn	 into	 one	
another;	 and	 that	 if	 a	 process	P1	 turns	 into	 a	 process	P2,	 	 there	 is	 no	dividing	 line	 at	which	P1	 stops	 and	P2	
begins	;P1	never	stops,	it	goes	on	in	the	changed	form	P2	and	P2	never	begins,	it	has	previously	been	going	on	in	





And	 P2	 is	 not	 opaque,	 it	 is	 transparent,	 so	 that	 P1	 shines	 through	 it	 and	 their	 colours	 combine	 into	 one.	
Therefore,	 if	 the	symbol	P1	stands	 for	a	characteristic	of	a	certain	historical	period	and	 the	symbol	P2	 for	 the	






could	still	be	valid	even	 if	 it	 is	not	 formal,	 i.e.	 there	would	still	be	a	consequential	 following	
and	 our	 medieval	 authors	 consider	 this	 sort	 of	 following	 to	 be	 enough	 for	 theories	 of	
consequentiae	 to	 be	 a	 part	 of	 Logic.	 In	 other	words,	 it	 looks	 like	 the	medieval	 accounts	 do	












own	changing,	by	 itself,	 affects	 the	way	we	 think	about	 it,	 and	 the	way	we	 think	about	 it	 in	
turn	determines	what	it	is.7444	Therefore,	reflecting	on	Medieval	Logic	itself	qua	logic	is	per	se	
relevant	for	the	way	we	do	understand	logic	-	in	our	own	context	or	in	general.	
In	 the	 previous	 two	 chapters	 I	 have	 given	 respectively	 a	 historical	 and	 institutional	






























he	 proceeds	 to	 justify	 it.	 Second,	 through	 the	 examination	 of	 several	 alternative	 positions,	
Marsilius	arrives	 to	give	a	definition	of	how	the	relation	of	 following	between	 the	premises	
and	the	conclusion	should	be	interpreted,	i.e.	he	proposes	a	criterion	of	validity.	
	




"necessary	 habitude	 of	 following"	 of	 the	 consequent	 from	 the	 antecedent	 (4.2).	 I	 am	 then	
proceeding	to	analyse	Marsilius'	overview	of	several	accounts	of	validity,	and	in	particular	of	
those	 which	 he	 deems	 satisfactory	 accounts;	 I	 will	 expose	 some	 relevant	 articulations	 of	
Marsilius'	 preferred	 accounts,	 once	 again	 in	 a	 comparison	 with	 Buridan's	 and	 Albert's	
	 394	









Consequentia	 est	 oratio	 habens	 antecedens	 et	 consequens	 et	 notam	 illationis	 consequentis	 ex	
antecedente	 tanquam	 principales	 partes	 sui,	 ut	 haec	 oratio:	 'Homo	 currit,	 ergo	 animal	 currit'.	
Antecedens	 huius	 propositionis	 vel	 orationis	 est	 haec	 propositio:	 'homo	 currit';	 consequens	 eius	
oratio	 'animal	 currit';	 et	 nota	 illationis	 consequentis	 ex	 antecedente	 est	 haec	 conuinctio	 'ergo'	 vel	
'igitur'.7445	
So,	taken	at	face	value,	for	Marsilius	a	consequentia	is	primarily	an	oratio.		
Oratio	 is	 one	 of	 those	 Latin	 words	 with	 a	 somehow	 ambiguous	 meaning:7446	both	 in	 its	
Classical	and	Medieval	uses,	in	its	general	acceptations	it	could	mean	an	aggregation	of	letters	
-	spoken,	written	or	thought	-	which	might	or	might	not	be	a	meaningful	word;	a	collection	of	
words;	 or	 a	 grammatical	 collection	of	words.	 In	 this	 sense,	 "expression"	 could	be	wide	 and	
neutral	enough	to	make	for	an	adequate	translation.		
Sometimes	 an	 oratio	 as	 a	 grammatical	 collection	 of	 words	 is	 taken	 to	 be	 meaningful,	 i.e.	
something	 like	propositio	 -	which	 in	 the	medieval	use	 is	 something	closer	 to	our	 "sentence"	











and,	more	 specifically,	 it	 could	mean	either	 the	 style	of	 speaking,	 eloquence,	 or	 a	prayer	or	
even	an	argument	-	although	in	a	general	sense.		
	
What	 does	Marsilius	mean	 by	oratio	 here?	 It	 seems	 a	 fairly	 important	 question,	 because	 it	
might	amount	 to	asking	 -	among	other	 things	 -	 if	Marsilius	 is	defining	a	consequentia	 in	 the	
first	 place	 as	 a	 propositio,	 i.e.	 if	 he	 is	 taking	 it	 to	 be	 primarily	 a	 conditional	 sentence	 -	 or	
something	very	much	like	a	conditional	sentence.		
We	 might	 be	 tempted	 to	 answer	 affirmatively	 and	 say	 that	 a	 consequentia	 is	 indeed	 a	
propositio,	because	of	 the	 "huius	propositionis	vel	orationis"	 specifying	 the	 term	antecedens	
and	 referring	 to	 the	 given	 example	 of	 consequentia	 ("homo	 currit,	 ergo	 animal	 currit").	
Furthermore,	in	this	passage,	Marsilius	uses	oratio	to	designate	also	the	consequens	("animal	
currit"),	while	its	counterpart,	i.e.	the	antecedens	("homo	currit"),	is	called	propositio.	Then,	it	
would	 look	 like	Marsilius	 is	 taking	oratio	 and	propositio	 to	 be	 interchangeable;	 therefore	 a	
consequentia,	per	se,	would	be	primarily	a	propositio	-	and,	as	such,	some	kind	of	conditional	
sentence.		




...	 propositio	 [add.	 categorica	V]	 est	oratio	habens	 subiectum	et	praedicatum	et	 copulam	
principales	partes	sui...7447	
Therefore,	every	propositio	is	an	oratio,	but	not	the	other	way	around.	In	this	sense,	an	oratio	
should	 be	 taken	 merely	 as	 some	 sort	 of	 linguistic	 construct	 that	 might	 or	 might	 not	 be	 a	





which	we	 should	 interpret	Marsilius'	 use	 of	 oratio	 -	 in	 particular	 in	 defining	 consequentia.	
Both	 the	 antecedens	 and	 the	 consequens	 are	 linguistic	 constructs,	 therefore	 orationes.	 Also,	
they	 are	 grammatically	well	 formed	 constructs	 in	 the	 Subject-Verb	 form,	which	 is	normally	
reducible	 to	 the	 Subject-Copula-Predicate	 form	 -	 e.g.	 respectively:	 "homo	 est	 currens"	 and	
"animal	est	currens".	Hence,	they	are	clearly	propositiones	and,	as	such,	they	can	be	either	true	
or	 false.	 Propositio	 keeps	 being	 the	 standard	 term	 to	 describe	 antecedens	 and	 consequens	





expression	 is	 not	 redundant,	 since	 -	 as	we	have	 seen	 -	 the	 two	 terms	 are	not	 synonymous:	
oratio	 has	 a	 wider	 meaning	 imposing	 fewer	 constraints	 on	 the	 entities	 it	 picks	 out.	 The	
occurrence	of	propositio	seems	to	be	consistently	supported	by	the	manuscript	tradition,	even	
if	not	unanimously	-	but	overall	the	"propositionis	vel	orationis"	appears	to	be	the	preferable	
reading	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 manuscripts'	 agreement. 7448 	Nevertheless,	 here	 this	
"propositionis"	remains	puzzling.	Through	Marsilius'	analysis,	generally	propositio	is	not	used	
again	to	refer	directly	to	the	consequentia	as	such,	but	only	to	its	sentential	parts	(antecedens	
and	 consequens)	 or	 to	 talk	 about	 the	 conditional	 sentence	 (propositio	 hypothetica	
conditionalis)	qua	conditional.7449	However,	here	propositio	is	used	side	by	side	with	oratio	 -	













to	 be	 closer	 to	 him,7450	namely	 Pseudo	 Scotus'	Quaestiones	 Super	 I	 Priorum,	 John	 Buridan's	
Tractatus	 de	 Consequentiis	 and	 Albert	 of	 Saxony's	 Perutilis	 Logica	 IV.	 When	 giving	 their	
analogous	 descriptive	 definitions,	 these	 authors	 define	 a	 consequentia	 primarily	 as	 a	
propositio	hypothetica.7451		
	
This	 identification	 of	 a	 consequentia	 with	 a	 propositio	 hypothetica	 both	 reflects	 a	 quite	
common	 take	 on	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 consequentiae	 and	 is	 characterising	 of	 the	
"Buridanian	School's"	treatment	of	at	least	the	syntactic	definition	of	consequentia.	
On	the	one	hand,	as	far	as	it	reflects	a	common	approach	to	consequentiae,	this	identification	
implies	 a	 measure	 of	 ambiguity	 between	 propositiones	 hypotheticae	 (conditionales)	 and	







est	 propositio	 hypothetica,	 composita	 ex	 antecedente	 et	 consequente	 mediante	 coniunctione	 conditionali	 vel	




Albert	 of	 Saxony,	 Perutilis	 Logica,	 IV,	 1	 (De	 consequentiis):	 "Consequentia	 autem	 est	 propositio	 hypothetica	
composita	 ex	 antecedente	 et	 consequente	 et	 nota	 consequentiae	 significans	 antecedens	 esse	 antecedens	 et	
consequens	esse	consequens...".	
7452	However,	 this	 implication	does	not	 go	 the	 other	way	 around,	meaning	 that	 theories	 having	 an	 ambiguous	




the	Dialectica	 usually	 attributed	 to	Garlandus	 Compotista	 (probably	 early	 XII	 century)	7454	-	
which	has	some	following.	The	emergence	and	the	persistence	of		such	identification	might	be	
both	 contributing	 to	 and	 reinforced	 by	 the	 ambiguous	 treatment	 of	 consequences	 and	
conditionals	seemingly	shared	by	several	medieval	theories.7455	Roughly,	making	an	educated	
guess,	it	would	seem	to	be	deep-seated	into	the	use	of	a	logical	language	that	looks	a	lot	like	
Medieval	 Latin,7456	into	 the	 emphasis	 that	 Medieval	 Logic	 puts	 on	meta-logic,	 and	 possibly	




Be	 that	 as	 it	 may,	 the	 ambiguity	 seems	 to	 persist,	 going	 beyond	 the	 stated	 equivalence	 or	




BN,	 lat.	 16130,	 ff.	 118va-120vb7458-	 which	 I	 called	 An.II)7459 	speaks	 casually	 of	 "falsam	
consequentiam".7460	Analogously	does	the	Liber	consequentiarum:7461	even	if	it	devotes	a	fairly	














conditionalis,7462	a	 few	 pages	 later	 the	 Liber	 consequentiarum	 talks	 about	 consequentia	 vera	
that	tenet.7463	So	does	Walter	Burley,	who	appears	to	be	the	core	figure	and	possibly	the	main	
influence	among	these	authors:	particularly	in	his	De	consequentiis,	where	he	talks	quite	freely	
of	consequentia	vera	vel	bona,	 and	even	of	conditionalis	bona	 or	 that	 tenet.7464	Furthermore,	
even	 if	 he	 does	 not	 explicitly	 give	 a	 syntactic	 definition	 of	 consequentia	 as	 propositio	
hypothetica,	in	the	longer	version	of	the	De	puritate	he	gives	the	rules	for	consequentiae	in	the	
section	devoted	to	propositiones	hypotheticae	conditionales.7465		
Therefore,	 even	 when	 these	 texts	 do	 tackle	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 equivalence	 between	
consequentiae	and	propositiones	conditionales,	occasionally	this	ambiguity	keeps	coming	up		
-	mainly	 through	a	quite	 imprecise	 lexical	shifting	between	 truth	and	validity	 -	and	 it	 is	not	
met	 with	 any	 further	 clarifications.	 However,	 as	 far	 as	 I	 could	 see,	 none	 of	 these	 authors	
explicitly	states	that	consequentia	est	propositio	hypothetica.		
On	the	other	hand,	this	sort	of	syntactic	definition	explicitly	identifying	a	consequentia	with	a	
propositio	hypothetica	 is	 to	be	 found	almost	 in	all	 the	most	prominent	authors	belonging	 to	
the	Parisian	"School"	-	with	the	exception	of	Marsilius	of	Inghen.	How	should	we	interpret	this	
kind	 of	 choice	 made	 by	 Pseudo	 Scotus,	 Buridan	 and	 Albert	 of	 Saxony?	 Is	 it	 some	 kind	 of	
charged	 theoretical	 statement,	 making	 explicit	 an	 issue	 that	 was	 already	 present	 also	 in	
several	 (mainly	English)	 treatises	 on	consequentiae	 from	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 century?	How	









textual	 evidence.	 Overall,	 while	 the	 distinction	 is	 well	 outlined	 in	 Burley,	 it	 is	 not	 as	 constant	 as	 it	 is	 e.g.	 in	
Ockham.	
7465 	Walter	 Burley,	 De	 puritate	 artis	 logicae	 Tractatus	 longior,	 Tr.	 II	 (De	 propositionibus	 et	 syllogismis	
hypotheticis),	pars	 I	 (De	propositionibus	hypotheticis	condicionalibus),	ch.	1,	p.	60:	"...	propositio	hypothetica	est	




propositio	 hypothetica,	 and	 that	 any	 differences	 between	 a	 consequentia	 and	 a	 propositio	
conditionalis	would	amount	 to	 superficial	 syntactic	 features	 -	e.g.	 the	use	of	ergo	before	 the	
consequent	rather	than	si	before	the	antecedent?	
These	 questions	 deserve	 some	 serious	 consideration,	 but	 in	 answering	 we	 should	 not	
overestimate	the	import	of	the	statement	under	examination.	In	fact,	generally	these	authors	
add	 further	 specifications	 or	 indicators	 making	 a	 consequentia	 into	 something	 else	 than	
merely	a	propositio	hypothetica		or	at	least	implying	some	conceptual	distinction	-	even	if	such	
distinction	 is	 not	 always	 unambiguous.	 For	 example,	 Pseudo	 Scotus	 is	 quite	 systematic	 in	
talking	 about	 consequentia	 bona,	 bonitas	 consequentiae	 and	 of	 a	 consequentia	 that	 valet	or	
tenet,	 instead	of	consequentia	vera	or	veritas	consequentiae.7466	As	for	Buridan,	he	talks	quite	
freely	of	consequentia	vera,7467	even	if	he	does	use	consequentia	bona	or	that	valet	as	well.7468	
However,	 Buridan	 appeals	 to	 something	 like	 an	 assertion	 rule	 and,	 by	 doing	 so,	 he	 can	
maintain	 a	 distinction	 between	 a	 hypothetical	 conditional/conditional-like	 sentence	 and	 	 a	
consequentia.7469		 Also	 Albert	 of	 Saxony	 -	 just	 after	 having	 defined	 a	 consequentia	 as	 a	
																																																								
7466	Pseudo	 Scotus,	 Super	 I	 Priorum,	 q.	 X,	 e.g:	 "...	 ista	 est	 bona	 consequentia	 ....	 quid	 requiritur	 ad	 bonitatem	
consequentiae...	tunc	consequentia	est	bona	et	si	non,	tunc	consequentia	non	valet..."	
However,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 such	 tendency	 to	 talk	 mostly	 of	 consequentia	 bona,	 that	 tenet	 or	 valet,	 is	
dominant	 also	 in	 those	 texts	 I	 mentioned	 a	 few	 lines	 above,	 where	 the	 ambiguity	 between	 consequentia	 and	
conditional	 appears	more	evident.	Furthermore	 -	 as	 far	as	 I	 could	 see	 -,	 also	William	of	Ockham	(SL	 III.3),	 the	
Tractatus	Minor	and	the	Elementarium	Logicae	are	fairly	consistent	in	their	talk	of	bonitas	or	tenere/valere	of	a	
















propositio	hypothetica	 -	 talks	 about	consequentia	bona	 and	 that	 tenet	 or	valet,7470	and	keeps	
doing	so	quite	consistently,	even	if	not	exclusively.7471	Furthermore,	as	Buridan	does	also	e.g.	
in	 his	 commentary	 on	 the	 Physics,7472	Albert	 mentions	 explicitly	 (even	 if	 not	 in	 detail)	 the	
issue	of	the	equivalence	between	consequentiae	and	conditionals	-	and	such	discussions	would	
not	have	reason	to	be,	if	consequentiae	were	simply	conditionals.7473	
These	 specifications	 and	 caveats	 are	 not	 always	 fully	 developed,	 but	 they	 do	 help	 to	
circumscribe	a	notion	of	consequentia	distinguished	from	that	of	conditional	or	of	some	other	
kind	 of	 hypothetical	 proposition,	 and	 therefore	 they	 might	 limit	 the	 actual	 weight	 of	 the	
identification	of	consequentia	with	propositio	hypothetica.		Furthermore,	some	encouragement	
to	give	a	preliminary	definition	of	consequentia	as	a	propositio	hypothetica	 could	have	come	
from	 Buridan's	 propositional	 tokenism	 if	 taken	 in	 combination	 with	 a	 conception	 of	
consequentia	 as	 some	 kind	 of	 inferential	 operation	 rather	 than	 some	 consequence-relation	
among	sentences.	If	a	consequentia	is	an	inference7474	that	someone	makes	and	if	we	want	to	
keep	propositional	tokenism,	then	not	only	do	the	antecedent	and	the	consequent	need	to	be	
stated	 but	 their	 being	 inferred	 from	 one	 another	 does	 as	 well,	 as	 one	 uttering.	 In	 this	
framework,	 it	 is	 then	easy	 to	 take	 the	next	step	and	 to	offer	a	 first	 identification	between	a	











The	 critical	 edition	 of	 Buridan's	 Quaestions	 on	 the	 Physics	 is	 still	 in	 progress;	 only	 the	 first	 two	 books	 are	
currently	available	-	Streijger	-	Bakker	-	Thijssen	-	Sylla	(eds.)	[2015].	
7473	Albert	of	Saxony,	Perutilis	Logica,	IV,	1.	See	§4.4	
7474	I	 am	adopting	 the	 common	distinction	between	 "inference"	 as	 some	 sort	 of	 act	 by	 a	 cognitive	 subject	 and	
"consequence"	as	a	relation.	See	e.g.	in	Lindström	-	Palmgren	-	Westerstål	[2012,	819]	
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or	 a	 way	 of	 making	 explicit	 an	 issue	 that	 is	 also	 present	 in	 the	 more	 recent	 tradition	 on	
consequentiae,	while	dealing	with	it	elsewhere.		
	
Nevertheless,	 even	 if	 -	 from	 the	 theoretical	 point	 of	 view	 -	 for	 these	 authors	 this	 very	
identification	 could	 end	 up	 being	 of	 little	 import,	 the	 definition	 itself	 seems	 to	 put	 the	
discussion	of	consequentiae	on	the	sentential	level	in	the	first	place;	and	this	makes	things	at	





in	 the	Parisian	context,	 in	 the	Summulae	de	Dialectica	(7.4.5.<3>),	Buridan	himself	gives	 the	
formulation	 "consequentia	 est	 oratio	 composita...."-	 but	 he	 does	 so	 only	 en	passant	 and	 not	
consistently.	 Furthermore,	Marsilius'	 choice	 of	 oratio	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	 analogous	quod	 sit	
definitions	given	 in	many	earlier	and	contemporary	 treatises	often	belonging	 to	 the	English	
tradition,	 which	 describe	 a	 consequentia	 as	 an	 aggregatum	 of	 (or	 simply	 as)	 andecedens,	
consequens	and	nota	illationis.7475	Moreover,	this	quod	sit	description	of	consequentia	as	oratio	
																																																								
7475	E.g.	 Liber	 consequentiarum	 (ed.	 Schupp	 [1988])	 I,	 p.	 109:	 "Est	 autem	 descriptio	 consequentiae	 quod	
consequentia	 est	 antecedens	 et	 consequens	 cum	 nota	 consequentiae";	 Anonymous,	 Consequentiae	
"Tractaturus...",	ms.	Vat.	Pal.	Lat.	1049,	f.	362:	"...	consequentia	est	aggregatum..."	(see	Green-Pedersen	[1985]);	
William	of	Osma,	De	consequentiis	I	(ed.	 Schupp	 [1991]):	 "Consequentia	est	quoddam	aggregatum...";	Martinus	
Anglicus	 (?),	 Consequentiae:	 "Consequentia	 est	 aggregatum	 ext	 antecedente	 et	 consequente	 et	 nota	
consequentiae."	(see:	Green-Pedersen	[1985]);	Richard	Billingham,	Tractatus	de	consequentiis	(ed.	Weber	2003)	
I:	 "Consequentia	 est	 quoddam	aggregatum	ex	 antecedente	 et	 consequente	 et	 nota	 consequentiae.";	William	of	
Sutton,	 Consequentiae:	 "...	 est	 autem	 consequentia	 antecedens	 et	 consequens	 cum	 nota	 consequentiae."	 (see	
Green-Pedersen	 [1985]);	 Richard	 Swineshead,	 De	 consequentiis:	 "...	 consequentia	 est	 totum	 aggregatum	 ex	
antecedente	 et	 consequente	 cum	 nota	 consequentiae."	 (see	 Read	 [2014,	 169]);	 Richard	 Levenham,	 De	
consequentiis	(ed.	Spade	[1974]):	"Consequentia	est	antecedens	et	consequens	ad	illud	formaliter	vel	materialiter	
sequens	cum	aliqua	nota	consequentiae";	Anonymous,	De	consequentiis	[ms.	Florence,	Bibl.	Nat.,	Cod.	Magl.	cl.	V	







the	 century	 and	 into	Early	Modernity	 -	 and	 this	 long	 echo	might	be	partially	dependent	 on	
Marsilius'	influence.7476	
	
Secondly,	 in	 Marsilius'	 passage	 under	 consideration	 (huius	 propositionis	 vel	 orationis),	 we	
should	not	 take	that	"propositionis"	 too	seriously,	because	the	 immediate	referent	of	"huius	
propositionis	 vel	 orationis"	 is	 a	 specific	 expression:	 "homo	 currit,	 ergo	 animal	 currit".	 	 The	
"propositionis"	 might	 be	 taken	 to	 apply	 to	 the	 specific	 example,	 but	 not	 to	 be	 necessarily	
extended	to	consequentia	in	general.	
We	 can	 support	 this	 "lighter"	 and	 more	 non-committal	 reading	 of	 the	 passage	 for	 the	
following	reasons.		
From	 the	 linguistic/grammatical/syntactic	 point	 of	 view,	 a	 consequentia	 is	 a	 construct	 of	





is	 composed	 by	 two	 categorical	 sentences	 and	 a	 note	 of	 illation.	 Depending	 on	 how	 we	
interpret	its	elements	-	and	the	note	of	illation	in	particular	-,	the	oratio	in	the	example	might	
as	well	 be	 taken	 to	 be	 a	propositio,	 and	 properly	 so.	 The	 antecedent	 (homo	currit)	 and	 the	
																																																																																																																																																																																								
secundum	modum	 Oxoniae:	 "Consequentia	 est	 quoddam	 aggregatum	 ex	 antecedente	 et	 consequente	 ad	 idem	
consequens	cum	nota	illationis."	
7476	See	e.g.	Gerardus	de	Harderwijk		(Gerardus	Harderwickensis,	de	Raedt,	de	Rota	m.	1503),	In	Parva	logicalia,	
p.	 105:	 "consequentia...	 est	 oratio	 continens	 porpositiones	 et	 denotans	 sequelam	 unius	 earum	 ad	 alteram,	
denotans	 quidem	 per	 signum	 illativum...";	 idem,	 Summ.	 4	 p.	 218	 A	 30:	 "...consequentia	 est	 oratio	 habens	
antecedens	et	consequens	et	notam	illationis	illative	tentam,	ita	quod	in	omni	consequentia	sunt	tria:	antecedens,	
consequens	 et	 notam	 consequentiae	 sive	 illationis.";	 Chrysostomus	 Javellus,	 De	 Consequentiis,	 p.	 98:	
"Consequentia	est	oratio	plures	continens	propositiones	coniunctas	per	notam	illationis	denotantem	sequelam	
unius	ad	alteram";	John	of	Glogovia	(end	XV	cent.),	Exercitium	super	omnes	Tractatus	Parvorum	Logicalium	Petri	




quod	 sit	 immediately	 following	 the	 passage	 we	 have	 been	 discussing.7477		 Then	 he	 spends	
several	lines	on	the	nota	illationis:	
Et	nota	illationis	consequentis	ex	antecedente	est	haec	coniunctio	'ergo',	vel	 'igitur',	vel	aliqua	alia	
eam	 includens	 vel	 ei	 aequivalens.	 Unde	 generaliter	 coniunctio	 significans	 habitudinem	 sequelae	
necessariam	unius	propositionis	ad	aliam	dicitur	nota	illationis.	Unde	apparet	quod	haec	coniunctio	
'si'	 est	 nota	 illationis,	 quia	 ipsa	 faciens	 propositionem	 conditionalem,	 significat	 habitudinem	
sequelae	unius	propositionis	ad	aliam.	Similiter	est	de	ista	coniunctione	'quia'	et	de	omnibus	aliis	si	
sint	praedictis	aequivalentes.7478	
Since	 here	 the	 nota	 illationis	 is	 a	 conjunction,	 this	 particular	 example	 "homo	 currit,	 ergo	




propositional	 form.	 If	we	 take	a	consequentia	 to	be	described	primarily	by	 the	word	oratio,	
then	it	might	as	well	be	in	argument	form	or	be	intended	primarily	as	an	argument,	e.g.	as	a	
syllogism,	while	still	conforming	to	the	given	syntactical	definition.	
Certainly,	 somone	 might	 make	 some	 solid	 objections	 on	 a	 textual	 basis.	 First	 -	 she	 might	
object	 -	 while	 giving	 his	 definition	 quod	 sit	 of	 antecedent,	 Marsilius	 says	 that	 it	 is	 a	
"propositio"	 (in	 the	 singular	 form)	 and	 does	 not	 add	 that	 the	 antecedent	might	 be	 a	 set	 of	
premises	instead	of	a	single	conjunctive	sentence.	Second,	the	definition	quod	sit	of	the	nota	
illationis	 describes	 it	 as	 a	 conjunction	 acting	 on	 categorical	 sentences	 in	 a	way	 that	makes	
them	into	a	compound	sentence:	if	si	"facit	propositionem	conditionalem",	and	si	is	a	note	of	
																																																								
7477	Marsilius	 of	 Inghen,	 Consequentiae	 I.1<1>:	 "Antecedens	 est	 propositio	 ex	 qua	 per	 notam	 illationis	 seu	
consequentiae	infertur	consequens,	ut	in	oratione	prius	posita	haec	propositio	'homo	currit'	dicitur	antecedens.	
Consequens	 vero	 est	 propositio	 quae	 per	 notam	 consequentiae	 infertur	 ex	 alia,	 scilicet	 antecedente,	 ut	 in	
oratione	|Y68v|	prius	posita	haec	propositio	'animal	currit'	dicitur	consequens."	
7478	Marsilius	 of	 Inghen,	 Consequentiae	 I.1<1>:	 "And	 the	 note	 of	 the	 illation	 of	 the	 consequent	 from	 the	
antecedent	is	this	conjunction	'therefore'	(ergo),	or	'hence'	(igitur),	or	another	one	including	it	or	equivalent	to	it.	
Whence,	 generally	 the	 conjunction	 signifying	 the	 relation	 (habitudinem)	 of	 the	 necessary	 following	 of	 one	
proposition	to	the	other	 is	called	note	of	 illation.	Whence,	 it	 is	evident	that	this	conjunction	 'if'	(si)	 is	a	note	of	




illation,	 then	 a	 consequentia	 would	 be	 primarily	 a	 propositio	 hypothetica	 -	 specifically,	 a	





the	 roles	 played	 by	 its	 relevant	 parts	 -	 starting	 from	 that	 example.	 Therefore,	 "propositio"	
could	be	there	not	to	mean	that	the	antecedent	is	always	simply	the	protasis	of	a	conditional	
sentence	nor	 that	 it	 should	be	defined	as	 such:	 it	 could	be	 justified	by	 the	 fact	 that	 -	 in	 the	
example	 Marsilius	 used	 to	 introduce	 his	 explanation	 -	 the	 antecedent	 is	 de	 facto	 just	 one	




speaking,	 grounded	 on	 the	 example.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 key	 element	 in	 this	 passage	 is	
what	 the	nota	 illationis	 signifies,	 i.e.	 that	which	makes	 it	 a	 note	of	 illation:	 the	 "habitude	of	
necessary	 following"	 (habitudo	 sequelae	 necessariae).	 As	 Marsilius	 states	 repeatedly	 in	 the	
following	pages,	this	habitudo	sequelae	necessariae	(or	illatio)	is	essential	to	the	consequentia;		




fundamentally	 a	 propositio	 hypothetica,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 see	 how	 all	 these	 conjunctions	 and	
adverbs	can	be	notae	illationis	equivalent	to	each	other:	for	example,	a	causal	sentence	(quia-
																																																								
7479	Consequentiae	 I.1.	 'In	oppositum':	"Omnis	consequentia	est	argumentatio,	 [...	 ]	ominis	consequentia	tenetur	
sub	aliqua	specie	argumentationis."	
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sentence)	 is	 not	 true	 under	 the	 same	 conditions	 that	 verify	 a	 conditional	 sentence	 (si-








causal/explanatory	 (and	 sometimes	 even	 temporal)	 meaning	 and	 their	 "broadly	 truth-
preserving"	 acceptance.7480	However,	 this	 causal	 meaning	 can	 be	 properly	 included	 within	
theories	of	consequentiae,	and	it	is	done	in	several	ways;	Marsilius	seems	to	take	these	quia-
cases	 as	 a	 subset	 of	 material	 consequences, 7481 	i.e.	 the	 class	 of	 consequentiae	 holding	
materially	in	virtue	of	the	meaning	of	terms	signifying	causes	and	their	effects.	The	following	
of	 a	 consequent	where	 for	 example	 a	 term	 signifies	 an	 effect,	 from	 an	 antecedent	where	 a	
term	signifies	 that	effect's	cause	-	or	viceversa	-,	counts	 for	Marsilius	as	a	proper	(material)	
consequence,	when	the	following	is	actually	there.	But	obviously	this	does	not	imply	that	the	







7481	Marsilius	 treatment	 of	 consequentia	materialis	 is	 certainly	 peculiar	 within	 the	 Parisian	 context.	 Marsilius'	











infer	 that	 a	 consequentia,	 qua	 consequentia,	 is	 a	 propositio	 hypothetica	 conditionalis	 or	










of	 the	 further	 developments	 of	 his	 theory,	 we	 should	 distinguish	 between	 the	 role	 of	 the	
conjunction	 on	 the	 grammatical/syntactical	 level	 of	 our	 oratio,	 i.e.	 what	 it	 does	 to	 the	
structure	of	 the	oratio	 it	 is	 in	 or	how	 it	 shapes	 it;	 and	 its	 semantic/referential	 function,	 i.e.	
what	it	"means"	or	what	it	picks	out:	the	habitudo	sequelae	necessariae	or	illatio.	
Grammatically,	 these	notae	 illationis	 are	 conjunctions	 or	 adverbs,	Marsilius	 says;	 then,	 they	
make	two	separate	grammatical	constructs	(orationes)	into	a	compound	one.	In	the	simplest	
case	-	appearing	in	Marsilius'	examples	-	these	two	separate	expressions,	 joined	together	by	
one	 of	 these	 conjunctions,	 are	 in	 the	 Subject-Copula-Predicate	 form,	which	means	 they	 are	
categorical	 sentences	 (propositiones	 categoricae).	 Therefore,	 the	 compound	 expression,	
resulting	 from	 their	 joining	 by	 means	 of	 one	 of	 these	 conjunctions,	 will	 be	 an	 expression	
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(oratio)	 which	 is	 grammatically	 a	 compound	 sentence	 (propositio	 hypothetica).	 Then,	
grammatically,	depending	on	the	conjunction	involved,	the	oratio	could	either	be	a	conditional	
hypothetical	 sentence	 (si-sentence),	 a	 causal	 one	 (quia-sentence),	 or	 a	 rational	 one	
(ergo/igitur-sentence).7482	Semantically/referentially,	 these	 notae	 illationis	 are	 notes	 of	 the	






notae	 could	 pick	 out	 (roughly)	 the	 same	 kind	 of	 following	 in	 different	ways,	 i.e.	 they	 could	
connote	it	differently	-	e.g.	si,	which	facit	propositio	hypothetica,	marks	its	hypothetical	nature;	
ergo	 or	 igitur	 (traditionally	 labelled	 as	 rationales	 conjunctions)	 make	 the	 propositio	 a	
propositio	rationalis	 and	emphasises	 an	assertive	aspect	 in	 a	way	 si	 does	not;	quia	 puts	 the	
stress	 on	 a	 cause/effect	 kind	 of	 following.	 But	 overall,	 a	 "note	 of	 illation"	 is	 a	 note	 of	 the	
illation	insofar	as	it	is	a	mark	or	a	sign	pointing	at	that	following.		
It	 looks	 like	 Marsilius	 would	 then	 consider	 inadequate	 a	 flat	 identification	 between	
consequentia	and	propositio	hypothetica	 in	general	-	or	propositio	hypothetica	conditionalis	in	
particular	 -,	 and	 that	we	 should	 stick	 to	oratio	 rather	 than	 to	propositio	hypothetica	 as	 the	
most	 adequate	 definition	 quod	 sit	 of	 consequentia.	 Not	 all	 consequentiae	 are	 grammatically	
propositiones	 hypotheticae;	 nor	 all	 consequentiae	 are	 grammatically	 propositiones:	 e.g.	 a	
consequentia	syllogistica	is	a	consequentia	formalis,	but	when	it	is	uttered	it	shows	something	





a	 propositio	 hypothetica.	 Furthermore,	 if	 -	 as	 Marsilius	 says	 -	 omins	 consequentia	 est	
argumentatio	 and	 omnis	 consequentia	 tenetur	 sub	 aliqua	 specie	 argumentationis,	 then	 the	
argument	 form	might	 be	 a	 more	 "immediate"	 expression	 of	 a	 consequentia/illatio	 than	 its	
propositional	counterpart.		
Overall,	 Marsilius'	 definition	 quod	 sit:	 "consequentia	 est	 oratio",	 is	 a	 good	 description	
(descriptio)	 of	what	 a	 consequentia	 looks	 like	when	we	 are	 looking	 at	 an	 actual	 uttered	 or	
written	consequentia.	However,	it	is	not	a	sufficient	definition	of	consequentia:	it	certainly	tells	






an	oratio;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 the	 "habitude"	 of	 necessary	 following	 lying	 beneath	 that	
oratio,	 the	 illatio	 itself,	 which	 is	 characterised	 very	 much	 as	 a	 consequence	 or	 entailment	
relation.	
Then,	 it	 looks	 like	 the	 oratio,	 rather	 than	 being	 the	 underlying	 consequentia/illatio,	 is	 its	
expression,	 i.e.	 it	 is	what	we	 read	 or	 see	when	 a	 consequentia	 is	 uttered.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	
oratio	 -	 insofar	as	it	 is	composed	by	the	required	parts	to	be	a	consequentia	(i.e.	antecedent,	
consequent	 and	note	of	 illation)	 -	 can	be	 equivalently	 formulated	either	 as	 a	 conditional	 or	
conditional-like	sentence,	or	in	argument	form.	Therefore,	the	oratio	works	like	a	description	
of	 the	 ongoing	 consequentia:	 it	 is	 a	 sort	 of	 "dummy	 inference"7483	or	 more	 precisely	 as	 a	







antecedens	 a	consequens	 and	a	note	of	 illation.	The	antecedens	is	described	as	 "the	sentence	
from	which	the	consequent	 is	 inferred	by	means	of	a	note	of	 illation	or	of	consequence."7484	
The	consequens	 is	described	as	 "the	sentence	which	 is	 inferred	 from	the	other,	 i.e.	 from	the	
antecedent,	by	means	of	a	note	of	illation."7485	And	the	note	of	illation	is	a	conjunction	or	an	
adverb	 -	 like	 "if",	 "hence",	 "therefore",	 "because",	 or	 anything	 in	 some	 sense	 equivalent	 -	
signifying	the	following	of	consequent	from	the	antecedent.7486	
It	 is	 immediately	clear	 that	we	are	going	 to	 face	some	worries	of	circularity	 -	and	Marsilius	
realises	 it	 too.	 In	 the	 first	 place,	 the	 issue	 concerns	 the	 definitions	 of	 antecedens	 and	
consequens:	 in	 the	 section	 that	 Marsilius	 devotes	 to	 the	 exposition	 of	 the	 instantiae	 and	
dubitationes	against	his	descriptio	quod	sit,	the	first	objection	contests	that	these	descriptions	
of	 consequentia,	 antecedens	 and	 consequens	 are	 "diminished"	 or	 "insufficient"	 (diminute	
positae),	because	they	are	circular	and	they	do	not	notify	what	they	are	supposed	to	define.		
Marsilius	 is	perfectly	ready	to	accept	that	his	descriptions	of	antecedens	and	consequens	are	
circular,	 but	 he	 refuses	 to	 infer	 that	 for	 this	 reason	 they	 are	 inadequate	 descriptions.7487	
Antecedens	and	consequens	are	 logically	relative	terms,	 i.e.	 they	are	relational	(ad	aliquid)	 in	
the	same	way	in	which	"father"	and	"son"	or	"genus"	and	"species"	are;	therefore	they	can	and	
should	be	defined	 relationally,	 i.e.	 by	 each	other:	 circularity	 between	 the	definitions	 of	 two	
relative	 terms	 is	acceptable.	However,	even	 if	 they	are	acceptable,	 these	circular	definitions	
raise	 another	 objection:	 they	 fail	 to	 notify	 that	which	 they	 are	 defining.	 The	 objection	 goes	
more	or	less	like	this:	since	these	two	definitions	refer	to	each	other,	someone	who	does	not	
																																																								
7484	Consequentiae	 I.1<1>:	 "Antecedens	 est	 propositio	 ex	 qua	 per	 notam	 illationis	 seu	 	 consequentiae	 infertur	
consequens."	












not	 understand	 what	 a	 man	 is,	 nor	 would	 someone	 who	 does	 not	 know	 what	 "animal"	
means.7489	Moreover,	since	we	are	dealing	with	quid	nominis	matters,	Marsilius	appeals	to	the	
way	 of	 understanding	 the	 quid	 nominis	 in	 the	 common	 way	 of	 speaking,	 by	 means	 of	 a	
"convertible	description".7490	It	is	true	-	Marsilius	says	-	that	these	definitions	do	not	notify	the	
quid	nominis	 of	 a	 term	 to	 those	who	 ignore	what	 that	 term	means:	 for	 these	 definitions	 to	
notify,	 the	 quid	 nominis	 needs	 to	 be	 already	 known.	 However	 these	 definitions	 also	 show	
(ostendentes)	 the	 quid	 nominis	 and	 they	 describe	 it	 convertibly.	 This	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 key	
move:		
Respondeo	 quod	 multi	 sunt	 qui	 bene	 cognoscunt	 ex	 communi	 usu	 loquendi	 quid	 sit	
consequens	 et	 quae	 propositio	 vocatur	 antecedens,	 qui	 tamen	 nesciunt	 convertibiliter	
describere	 antecedens	 vel	 consequens.	 Unde	 si	 hoc	 ab	 eis	 quaeretur,	 deliberarent	 sicut	
unus	puer	scit	quod	virum	matris	suae	vocatur	ex	usu	 loquendi	 'pater',	non	tamen	sciret	
convertibiliter	 describere	 patrem.	 Et	 talem	 definitionem	 convertibilem	 manifestat	
definitio	data.	Per	hoc	ad	confirmationem,	quando	dicitur	quod	oportet	ex	communi	modo	
loquendi	 praecognosci	 quid	 nominis,	 concedo;	 et	 quando	 dicitur	 quod	 tunc	 praesciretur	









Therefore,	 if	 they	 are	 asked	 this,	 they	 would	 deliberate	 as	 a	 child	 knows	 from	 the	 way	 of	 speaking	 that	 his	
mother's	 husband	 is	 called	 'father',	 but	 he	 could	 not	 convertibly	 describe	 a	 father.	 And	 such	 convertible	
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Therefore,	the	descriptions	Marsilius	gave	of	antecedent	and	consequent	(and	of	the	note	of	
illation)	 are	 not	 to	 be	 meant	 as	 exhaustive	 definitions	 nor	 as	 guidelines	 to	 "make"	 a	
consequentia	 -	or	to	decide	if	what	we	have	in	front	of	us	is	a	consequentia,	when	we	do	not	
already	 know	 if	 what	 we	 have	 in	 front	 of	 us	 is	 a	 consequentia	 or	 not.	We	 are	 in	 a	 similar	
position	to	the	child	in	Marsilius'	example:	on	the	one	hand,	when	we	have	a	consequentia	in	
front	of	us,	the	ordinary	way	of	speaking	is	enough	for	us	to	call	it	a	consequentia7492	and	we	
can	adequately	describe	 it;	but	we	cannot	do	much	more	 than	 that.	On	 the	other	hand,	 it	 is	
true	that	antecedens,	consequens	and	nota	illationis	are	relational	concepts	and,	therefore,	they	
can	 be	 inter-defined,	 but	 we	 still	 do	 not	 have	 any	 information	 to	 recognise	 when	 a	
consequence	 is	 there,	 i.e.	 when	 a	 sentence	 is	 actually	 antecedent	 to	 another	 which	 is	 its	
consequent.		
	If	we	 stay	on	 the	descriptive/sentential	 level,	 there	 is	no	way	out	of	 this	 circularity	among	
antecedens,	consequens	 and	nota	 illationis.	Overall,	 the	quid	sit	description	 lets	us	point	 at	 a	
consequentia	which	 is	 there	 and	which	we	know	 to	be	 there,	 like	 the	 child	 can	point	 at	 his	
father:	 the	description	 tells	us	what	a	consequentia	 looks	 like,	but	 it	does	not	 tell	us	what	a	
consequentia	is	-	we	still	do	not	have	anything	to	notify	that	to	us.	
Marsilius	has	a	threefold	way	out	of	this.	The	first	fold	is	conceptual:	there	is	something	that	
we	 recognise	 when	 we	 point	 at	 a	 consequentia,	 i.e.	 the	 illatio	 or	 the	 habitudo	 sequelae	
necessariae	consequentis	ex	antecedentis.	For	us	to	be	able	to	define	this	illatio	and	to	see	when	




foreknown	 in	what	way	 the	definitions	would	have	 to	 notify,	 this,	 I	 deny,	 because	 the	definitions	do	not	 only	
notify	the	quid	nominis,	but	they	express	and	show	convertibly	what	the	name	signifies,	and	this	does	not	have	to	
to	be	foreknown."	
7492	An	 interesting	 question	 to	 ask	 would	 be	 how	 the	 usus	 communis	 loquendi	 shapes	 the	 "intuitive"	 or	 "pre-
theoretical"	 notion	 of	 consequentia	 and	how	 this	 relates	 to	 the	 logical	 notion	 treated	 by	Marsilius	 theory.	 For	
reasons	 of	 space,	 here	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 focus	 on	 this	 interesting	 aspect,	 which	 is	 certainly	 worth	 further	
examination.	
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Marsilius	offers	(and	proves)	a	 long	 list	of	rules	helping	us	 to	distinguish	several	cases,	and	
granting	several	kinds	of	following.		
	
Then,	 to	 get	 to	 the	 core	 of	Marsilius'	 account	 of	 what	 a	 consequentia	 is	 and	 to	 see	what	 a	
consequentia	 is	beyond	its	first	description,	we	should	examine	how	Marsilius	conceives	this	



















structured	 conformingly	 to	 the	given	quod	sit	description	 is	 a	consequentia,	 i.e.	 that	being	a	
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that	 is	 there	 in	 a	 consequentia	 bona.	 However,	 Marsilius	 does	 not	 go	 down	 this	 road:	 his	
theory	cannot	be	open	to	accept	consequentiae	malae	qua	consequentiae.	
For	Marsilius,	the	nota	illationis	is	not	simply	the	grammatical	conjunction	(or	adverb)	joining	






the	consequens	 from	 the	antecedens	when	 there	 is	 an	 illatio	necessaria	 between	 them.7494	In	
other	words:	
...	 ad	 consequentiam	 proprie	 dictam	 requiritur	 illatio	 necessaria	 [...].	 Non	 enim	 esset	
consequentia	nisi	esset	illatio.7495	
...	 nihil	 vocatur	 proprie	 consequentia	 nisi	 oratio	 in	 qua	 est	 habitudo	 necessaria	
consequentis	ex	antecedente.7496	





ex	 antecedente	 [...]	 requiritur	 ad	 argumentationem	 esse	 bonam,	 nec	 e	 converso	 in	 consequentia	 mala	 est	
necessaria	 illatio;	 ista	 tamen	 requiritur	 ad	 omnem	 argumentationem,	 quocumque	 modo	 etiam	 acciperetur	
argumentatio."	








illatio,	 there	 is	 no	 consequence.	 This	 is	 a	 conclusion	 that	 stems	 directly	 form	 such	





thing	 as	 a	 consequentia	 mala.7499	That	 mala	 is	 a	 dictio	 abstrahens,	 which	 means	 that	 it	
abstracts	or	removes	 the	 terms	 it	applies	 to	 from	their	ordinary	meaning.7500	We	talk	about	
"bad	consequence"	only	improperly	and	similitudinarie,	but	what	we	are	talking	about	is	not	a	
consequentia	 in	 the	 proper	 sense: 7501 	all	 that	 we	 are	 saying,	 when	 loosely	 using	 this	
expression,	 is	 that	 there	 is	no	necessary	 illation,	 i.e.	 that	one	sentence	does	not	 follow	from	
the	other.7502	So,	also	the	elements	put	together	in	an	oratio	which	is	a	consequentia	mala,	are	
not	 in	 any	 proper	 sense	 antecedens,	 consequens	 and	 nota	 illationis,	 because	 there	 is	 no	




7499 	Consequentiae	 I.1,	 'In	 oppositum':	 "Et	 confirmatur	 hoc	 communi	 opinione	 modernorum,	 dicentium	
consequentiam	malam	non	esse	consequentiam,	cui	concordat	ratio	quia	sicut	similitudinarie	homo	pictus	hoc	
nomine	 'homo'	 significatur,	 non	 tamen	 est	 homo;	 ita	 videtur	 consequentiam	 malam	 similitudinarie	 nomine	
consequentiae	 significari,	 non	 tamen	 esse	 consequentiam;	 igitur	 videtur	 quod	 consequentia	 mala	 non	 sit	
consequentia."	




similitudinarie	 et	 ordinarie	 ad	 consequentiam	 bonam	 consequentiam	 malam	 nominatur	 consequentia.	
Consequentia	nota	est	de	se.	Antecedens	pro	prima	parte	notum.	Non	enim	esset	consequentia	nisi	esset	illatio.	
Pro	 secunda	 parte	 patet,	 quia	 in	 consequentia	 mala	 consequens	 non	 infertur	 ex	 antecedente	 sicut	 in	
consequentia	 bona.	 Secunda	 ratio	 sumitur	 ex	 communi	modo	 loquendi,	 nam	 communiter	 quando	 aliqua	mala	













and	 false;7505	on	 the	 other	 side,	 (b)	 others	 hold	 that	 one	 should	 speak	 only	 of	 consequentia	
vera.7506	Buridan	seems	to	consider	the	whole	discussion	quite	idle,	because	what	we	take	the	





Si	 dicatur	 primum,	 tunc	 statim	 sequeretur	 consequentiam	 malam	 habere	 antecedens	 et	 per	 consequens	
consequentiam	malam	esse	consequentiam	-	quod	est	contra	dicta.	Si	dicatur	secundum,	tunc	statim	dubitaretur	









hoc	debet	considerari	penes	 illationem:	si	enim	illatio	 fuerit	necessaria,	 tunc	talis	propositio	est	antecedens;	si	
autem	illatio	non	fuerit	necessaria,		tunc	talis	propositio	non	dicitur	antecedens."	
7504	Albert	of	Saxony,	Perutilis	Logica	IV,	1,	596-8:	"Consequentia	autem	est	propositio	hypothetica	composita	ex	
antecedente	 et	 consequente	 et	nota	 consequentiae	 significans	 antecedens	esse	 antecedens	et	 consequens	esse	
consequens.	Ex	quo	sequitur,	quod	omnis	 consequentia	est	bona	et	nulla	est	 consequentia	mala.	Patet,	nam	si	
aliqua	 propositio	 condicionalis	 est,	 per	 quam	 significatur	 antecedens	 esse	 antecedens	 et	 consequens	 esse	
consequens,	 et	 si	 ita	 est,	 tunc	 est	 consequentia,	 si	 autem	 signoficatir	 per	 eam	 antecedens	 esse	 antecedens	 et	






tamen	 hoc	 exprimamus	 improprie	 per	 istam	 orationem	 "Ista	 consequentia	 est	mala".	 Et	 ad	 istum	 intellectum	
amplius	 intendo	 uti	 istis	 orationibus	 "Talis	 consequentia	 est	 mala",	 "Consequentia	 talis	 est	 falsa",	 "Talis	
consequentia	non	valet",	etc."	
7505	Buridan,	 TC	 I.3.4:	 "Et	 aliqui	 dicunt	 quod	 omnis	 propositio	 talis	 hypothetica,	 scilicet	 coniungens	 plures	








talk	 about	 such	 cases.	 Albert's	 position	 appears	 to	 be	 trickier	 to	 be	 held,	 because	 he	 is	
committed	to	both	the	claim	that	consequentia	is	(at	some	level)	a	propositio	hypothetica	and	




it	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 arbitrary	 at	 all.	 Independently	 from	 the	way	 in	 which	 the	 illatio	 is	
characterised	 -	 i.e.	 independently	 from	the	account	of	validity	which	 is	 carried	out	by	some	
theory	 -	 there	has	 to	be	an	 illatio	 there,	an	habitudo	which	 is	necessary.	 In	which	sense	 the	
habitude	is	necessary	is	partially	a	matter	of	quid	nominis	and	partially	depends	on	someone's	
chosen	account	of	validity.7509	This	illatio	or	habitudo	seems	to	be	something	more	like	a	kind	
of	 logical	 entailment	 relation	 among	 sentences	 in	 the	 language,	 rather	 than	 an	 inferential	
operation	made	by	a	mind	or	a	hypothetical	sentence.	The	antecedent	is	an	antecedent	only	as	
long	as	the	consequent	is	in	a	relation	of	necessary	following	from	it;	mutatis	mutandis,	for	the	
consequent.	The	nota	illationis	marks	 the	presence	of	 this	 relation	between	 the	sentences	 it	
connects,	but	it	does	not	seem	to	be	essential	for	a	consequentia	to	be	a	consequence,	just	for	it	







7509	However,	Marsilius	 seems	 to	 take	 that	necessity	 in	 a	 stronger	 sense	 than	 the	one	underlying	 to	Buridan's	
account.	See	§4.3	
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just	 be	 stating	 an	 oratio	 or	 a	 propositio	 describing	 the	 consequentia,	 but	 as	 long	 as	 the	











constructed	 oratio	expressing	 it,	Marsilius	 still	 has	 to	 face	 another	 issue:	 nothing	 has	 been	
said	 yet	 about	 how	 one	 is	 supposed	 to	 know	when	 the	 illatio	 is	 necessaria	 and	when	 it	 is	
not.7511	This	 is	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 matter;	 Marsilius	 recognises	 it,	 as	 he	 recognises	 that	 the	








7510		 As	 Normore	 [2015]	 notes,	 a	 theory	 like	 Buridan's,	 instead,	 is	 going	 to	 have	 a	 problem	 of	 accounting	 for	
inferences	that	cannot	be	made	by	any	finite	mind.	








tunc	 illatio	 est	 necessaria	 quando	 antecedens,	 retenta	 significatione	 terminorum,	 non	
potest	esse	verum	nisi	consequens	sit	verum,	supposito	quod	ipsum	sit.7513		
This	looks	very	much	like	the	basic	Parvipontanian	modal	account	of	validity,	which	is	quite	
standard.7514	Marsilius,	 however,	 adds	 a	 requirement	 for	 the	 consequent	 to	 be	 uttered,	 in	
order	to	block	some	issues	which	would	come	up	if	one	accepts	propositional	tokenism	-	as	
Marsilius	himself	does	-,	e.g.	since	if	the	sentence	does	not	exist,	it	cannot	be	true.		
Before	 Marsilius,	 Pseudo	 Scotus,	 Buridan	 and	 Albert	 of	 Saxony	 had	 already	 stressed	 the	
inadequacy	 of	 versions	 of	 this	 account	 with	 different	 arguments. 7515 	In	 Marsilius'	
reconstruction,	supporters	of	V1	are	thinking	of	something	like	Peter	of	Spain's	treatment	of	
the	 equivalence	 between	 good	 consequentiae	 and	 true	 conditionals: 7516 	accepting	 this	
equivalence	 -	 as,	 in	 a	way,	Marsilius	 himself	 does	 -,	 they	 conclude	 that	 the	 account	 for	 the	
truth	of	a	conditional	is	a	good	account	also	for	the	validity	of	a	consequence.	
	But	this	position	does	not	hold.	If	V1	were	an	adequate	account	of	the	necessity	of	the	illation,	
then	 -	Marsilius	 then	argues	 -	 this	would	be	a	good	consequentia:	 "(α)	omnis	propositio	est	
negativa,	ergo	(β)	Deus	non	est".		
α	 is	 a	 contingent	 sentence:	 it	 is	possible	 that	 all	 stated	 sentences	 are	negative;	but	α	 is	not	
possibly	true:	by	being	stated,	it	brings	an	affirmative	sentence	into	existence.	Therefore	the	
																																																								




590-2.	 The	 accounts	 rejected	 by	 Pseudo	 Scotus,	 Buridan	 and	 Albert	 of	 Saxony	 are	 in	 the	 same	 line	 of	 V1	 but	
slightly	different.		
7516	Summulae	Logicales	 I:	 Tractatus	 suppositionum,	 17:	De	 veritate	 ypoteticarum:	 "Ad	 veritatem	 conditionalis	
exigitur	 quod	 antecedens	 non	 possit	 esse	 verum	 sine	 consequenti,	 ut	 'si	 homo	 est,	 animal	 est'.	 Unde	 omnis	
conditionalis	 vera	 est	 necessaria,	 et	 omnis	 conditionalis	 falsa	 est	 impossibilis.	 Ad	 falsitatem	 eius	 sufficit	 quod	
antecedens	possit	esse	sine	consequenti,	ut	'si	Sortes	est,	album	est'."	
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antecedent	will	 always	be	 false.	β	 is	 a	paradigmatic	 case	of	 impossibility	 in	Medieval	Logic.	




from	an	antecedens	probabile.	We	can	highlight	 the	 issue	by	 thinking	about	 it	 in	a	possible-
worlds	jargon.	There	is	no	possible	world	where	-	keeping	the	same	signification	of	the	terms	
-	 α	 is	 stated	 and	 it	 is	 true.	 However	 there	 are	 possible	 worlds	 where	 α	 is	 not	 stated	 and	
therefore	 it	 is	 still	 false	but	 the	 state	of	 things	described	by	α	 is	 verified	 -	 i.e.	 there	 are	 for	
example	only	negative	sentences.	But	there	is	no	possible	world	where	the	consequent	would	
be	 true	or	where	 the	 situation	described	by	 it	would	be	verified.	Therefore	 there	 are	 some	







consequentia	 bona	 et	 necessaria	 illatio	 sit	 quando	 ex	 opposito	 consequentis	 infertur	
oppositum	antecedentis.7517	
Marsilius	does	not	deny	that	the	(contradictory)	opposite	of	the	antecedent	follows	from	the	
(contradictory)	 opposite	 of	 the	 consequent:	 this	 is	 the	 first	 of	 his	 general	 rules	 of	
consequentiae.7518	This	 principle,	 which	 applies	 to	 all	 good	 consequentiae,	 derives	 directly	
from	the	Law	of	Non-Contradiction	and	from	the	illatio	 itself:	if	the	consequent	follows	from	
																																																								
7517	Consequentiae	 I.1	De	illatione	necessaria	<2>:	"a	consequence	 is	good	and	the	 illatio	 is	necessary	when	the	
opposite	of	the	antecedent	is	inferred	from	the	opposite	of	the	consequent."	
7518 	Consequentiae	 I.3.1<1>:	 "...	 in	 omni	 bona	 consequentia	 ex	 opposito	 consequentis	 infertur	 oppositum	
antecedentis..."	
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...	 antecedens	 bonae	 consequentiae	 est	 propositio	 praeposita	 notae	 illationis	 vel	 sibi	
apposita	 sic	 se	 habens	 ad	 aliam	 quod	 impossibile	 est	 sic	 esse	 qualitercumque	 est	
significabile	 per	 eam,	 stante	 impositione	 terminorum,	 quin	 ita	 sit	 sicut	 qualitercumque	
significatur	per	consequens.7521	
Marsilius	 considers	 this	definition	 to	be	magis	exquisita	et	elaborata,	 presumably	because	 it	
does	not	overlook	the	matter	of	the	realisability	of	the	signification	of	the	sentences	involved	-	
























like:	 "homo	currit,	 ergo	asinus	currit".	Marsilius	explains	 it	 like	 this:	 since	 significabile	 is	an	
"extending"	term	(dictio	ampliativa),	as	such	it	can	expand	the	signification	of	homo	to	include	
also	 the	 signification	 of	 asinus,	 without	 removing	 its	 normal	 meaning	 -	 and	 hence	 still	
conforming	 to	 the	 requirement	 of	 stante	 impositione	 terminorum.	 Therefore,	 for	 V3	 the	
consequent	would	follow,	since	what	it	signifies	can	be	included	within	what	the	antecedent	
can	signify.	
Similarly,	 V3	would	 take	 as	 a	 good	 consequence	 something	 like	 "omnis	 homo	 currit,	 ergo	
Sortes	currit",	even	when	Socrates	is	dead,	because	V3	allows	for	unrestricted	ampliation.	
	
However,	 V3's	 definition	 can	 be	 appropriately	 modified	 into	 definition	 V4	 (and	 an	 almost	





et	 per	 consequens	 antecedens	 esset	 propositio	 sic	 se	 habens	 quod	 impossibile	 est	 esse	
qualitercumque	 per	 eam	 significatur	 pro	 nunc	 secundum	 eius	 totalem	 significationem,	
quin	 ita	 sit	 qualitercumque	 pro	 nunc	 per	 consequens	 significatur	 et	 secundum	 eius	
totalem	significationem.7526	
																																																								
7524 	Consequentiae	 I.1	 De	 illatione	 necessaria	 <3>:	 "...	 sequeretur	 quod	 omnis	 consequentia	 mala	 esset	
consequentia	bona,	quod	esset	inconveniens."	
7525	Consequentiae	 I.1	 De	 illatione	 necessaria	 <5>:	 "Alia	 solutio	 datur	 communis	 quod	 consequentia	 bona	 est	
consequentia	cuius	antecedens	sic	se	habet	quod	impossibile	est	qualitercumque	per	ipsum	significatur	sic	esse	
secundum	 eius	 totalem	 significationem	 pro	 nunc,	 quin	 ita	 sit	 qualitercumque	 per	 consequens	 significatur,	
secundum	 eius	 totalem	 significationem	 pro	 nunc,	 per	 ipsum	 nunc	 significatur.	 Et	 ista	 definitio	 consimiliter	




things	to	be	howsoever	they	are	signified	to	be	by	the	antecedent	 in	accordance	with	 its	 total	signification	pro	
nunc	 without	 them	 being	 howsoever	 they	 are	 signified	 by	 the	 consequent	 in	 accordance	 with	 its	 total	
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Marsilius'	 V4	 and	 (in	 particular)	 V5	 are	 very	 close	 to	 Buridan's7527	and	 Pseudo	 Scotus'7528	
chosen	accounts,	 although	particularly	 in	V4,	Marsilius'	 formulation	shows	some	differences	
from	Buridan's	by	making	 some	 restrictions	more	explicit.	 For	example,	Marsilius	explicitly	
requires	that	the	signification	has	to	be	"total"	and	"pro	nunc".	
To	 block	 V3's	 (and	 Albert	 of	 Saxony's)	 issue	with	 the	 unchecked	 expansion	 of	 the	 possible	
meanings	of	the	antecedent	and	the	consequent,	in	V4	Marsilius	goes	from	significabile	-	which	
is	ampliative	 -	 to	 the	actual	 total	 signification	of	 the	antecedens	 and	 the	consequens	 -	which	
does	not	ampliate	-	and	with	a	restriction	to	pro	nunc.7529	
With	these	restrictions,	V4	can	answer	the	objections	undermining	V3.	Furthermore,	Marsilius	
also	 deals	 with	 an	 updated	 version	 of	 the	 previous	 objections.	 Someone	might	 say	 that	 V4	
would	 have	 to	 accept	 (γ):	 "homo	 est	 et	 asinus	 est,	 ergo	 homo	 est	 asinus"	 -	 where	 the	
consequent	is	simpliciter	falsum	-	as	a	good	consequence.	These	opponents	would	argue	that	
either	 (a):	 the	 consequent	 signifies	 only	 hominem	 esse	 and	 asinum	 esse;	 or	 (b):	 that	 the	
consequent	 signifies	 hominem	 esse,	 asinum	 esse	 and	 hominem	 esse	 asinum.	 If	 (a),	 then	 the	
antecedens	 and	 the	 consequens	 would	 signify	 the	 same.	 But,	 if	 (b)	 then	 it	 would	 be	
																																																																																																																																																																																								
signification	 pro	 nunc;	 and,	 consequently,	 the	 antecedent	 is	 a	 sentence	 s.t.	 it	 is	 impossible	 for	 things	 to	 be	
howsoever	 they	 are	 signified	pro	nunc	 in	 accordance	with	 its	 total	 signification,	without	 them	being	pro	nunc	
howsoever	they	are	signified	by	the	consequent	in	accordance	to	its	total	signification."	
7527	Buridan,	Tr.	Cons.	 I.3,	 22:	 "Ideo	 alii	 aliter	 diffiniunt,	 dicentes	 quod	 illa	 propositio	 est	 antecedens	 ad	 aliam	
quae	sic	se	habet	ad	illam	quod	impossibile	est	qualitercumque	ipsa	significat	sic	esse	quin	qualitercumque	illa	
alia	 significat	 sic	 sit	 ipsis	 simul	propositis.	Tamen	adhuc	 illa	descriptio	non	est	 vera	de	virtute	 sermonis,	 quia	
supponit	quod	omnis	propositio	vera	ex	eo	sit	vera	quia	qualitercumque	significat	 ita	est,	quod	prius	negatum	
est.	Tamen	dictum	fuit	quod	hoc	modo	loquendi	uteremur	ad	sensum	prius	datum;	ideo	sic	illam	descriptionem	
concedemus.	 Immo	etiam	 saepe	 feste	 improbatam,	quia	 ipsa	 in	paucis	 consequentiis	 habet	 instantiam.	Tamen	
quocumque	modo	loquendi	utemur	nos	intendemus	sensum	praetactum."	
7528	Pseudo	 Scotus,	 Super	 Pr.	 An.	 I,	 q.	 10:	 "Dico	 igitur,	 quod	 ad	 bonitatem	 consequentiae	 requiritur	 et	 sufficit	
ultimus	modus,	scilicet	impossibile	est,	antecedente	and	consequente	simul	formatis,	quod	antecedens	sit	verum	

















Marsilius,	 following	 the	Buridanian	rejection	of	complexe	significabilia,	deems	 this	 theory	 to	
be	 false	 and	 insufficient,	 and	 he	 offers	 a	 second	 answer	 which	 does	 without	 it	 but,		
interestingly,	appeals	to	imaginabilia.7530	His	first	step	is	to	reject	(a):	if	(a)	were	the	case,	then	
the	antecedent	and	the	consequent	would	indeed	signify	the	same	thing	and	there	would	not	
be	 any	 way	 out	 of	 accepting	 (γ).	 Then	 he	 makes	 clear	 that	 the	 total	 signification	 of	 the	
consequent	 is	 but	hominem	esse	asinum;	 against	 the	 first	 counter-objection	 in	 favour	 of	 V4,	
Marsilius	accepts	that	hominem	esse	asinum	is	nothing	and	that	it	cannot	be	anything:	there	is	
no	 such	 thing	 as	 a	 complexe	 significabile.	What	 he	 rejects	 is	 the	 objector's	 inference	 to	 the	
conclusion	that,	then,	homo	esse	asinum	does	not	signify.	It	signifies	just	fine:	for	it	to	signify	it	
is	enough	that	it	is	imaginable	(possit	imaginari).7531	For	a	sentence	to	have	signification	this	
signification	 does	 not	 have	 to	 be	 naturally	 possible,7532	because	 intellectus	 extendit	 se	 ad	
imaginabilia.	Therefore,	the	consequent	in	(γ)	does	signify,	but	it	does	not	signify	the	same	as	
the	antecedent	nor	from	the	antecedent's	total	signification	pro	nunc	follows	the	consequent's	












Parvipontanian	 account	 did,	 but	 it	 adds	 some	 further	 restrictions	 -	 analogous	 to	 those	
imposed	by	Buridan	-,	blocking	some	problematic	cases.		
As	it	is	the	case	with	Buridan's	TC	-	and	with	Albert's	Perutilis	logica	IV	-,	much	of	Marsilius'	
Consequentiae	 "is	 an	 articulation	 of	 this	 criterion",7533	and	 it	 is	 also	 an	 articulation	 that,	 for	
some	major	developements,	does	not	seem	to	diverge	too	much	from	Buridan's	and	Albert	of	










sequitur	 eadem	 conclusio,	 sine	 appositione	 illius	 necessariae	 vel	 illarum	 necessariarum.	 Probatio.	 Quia	 sit	 A	
propositio	ad	quam	cum	multis	necessariis	sibi	appositis	sequitur	conclusio	B;	dico	quod	ad	A	sequitur	B.	Quia	si	
B	 sequatur	 ad	 illas	 necessaries	 sine	 A,	 tunc	 ipsa	 est	 necessaria,	 ideo	 sequitur	 ad	 quamlibet.	 Si	 vero	 B	 non	
sequatur	 ad	 illas	 necessaries	 sine	 A,	 tunc	 vel	 A	 est	 impossibilis,	 et	 sic	 ad	 eam	 sequitur	 quaelibet,	 vel	 A	 est	
possibilis.	Et	tunc	vel	impossibile	est	A	stante	non	stare	B,	et	sic	adhuc	ad	A	sequitur	B,	vel	possibile	est	A	stante	
non	 stare	 B.	 Et	 si	 hoc	 ponat	 adversarius,	 tunc,	 quia	 non	 potest	 A	 stare	 quin	 simul	 stent	 omnes	 necessariae,	
sequitur	 quod	 possibile	 est	 A	 stante	 cum	 omnibus	 necessariis	 non	 stare	 B.	 Ergo	 B	 non	 sequitur	 ad	 A	 cum	
quibusdam	necessariis	sibi	appositis,	quod	est	contra	positum.	Et	eodem	modo	dicerem	quod:	Ad	quamcumque	
propositionem	 cum	multis	 veris	 appositis	 vel	 cum	 aliqua	 vera	 apposite	 sequitur	 aliqua	 conclusio	 ad	 eandem	




tunc	 sequitur	ad	A	 solum	per	 secundam	regulam,	quia	necessarium	sequitur	ad	quodlibet.	 Si	 autem	B	non	est	
necessarium,	vel	ergo	A	est	possibile	vel	 impossibile.	Si	dicitur	quod	A	sit	 impossibile,	 tunc	 iterum	ad	A	solum	
sequitur	B,	sicut	sequitur	ad	A	cum	necessaria	sibi	apposita	per	primam	regulam,	scilicet	'Ex	impossibili	sequitur	
quodlibet'.	 Si	 autem	 dicitur	 quod	 A	 sit	 possibile,	 tunc	 vel	 stante	 A	 impossibile	 est	 B	 non	 stare	 vel	 stante	 A	
possibile	est	B	non	stare.	Si	primum,	tunc	ad	A	solum	sequitur	B,	sicut	sequitur	ad	A	cum	aliqua	necessaria	sibi	









ad	 aliquam	 propositionem	 cum	 una	 necessaria	 copulativae	 adiuncta	 sequitur	 alia,	 ista	 eadem	 sequitur	 ad	













on	 the	 rules	ex	 impossibili	and	ad	necessarium,	which	 all	 of	 them	had	perviously	 stated	and	
																																																																																																																																																																																								
stat	alia;	et	si	sic,	tunc	alia	sequitur	ad	ipsam.	Ergo	regula	est	vera.	Vel	ipsa	potest	stare	alia	non	stante;	et	hoc	est	
impossibile,	 quia	 ea	 stante	 semper	 stat	 alia	 necessaria,	 et	 ex	 consequenti	 cum	 illa	 	 alia	 sequitur	 ad	 eandem	
sumptam	 cum	 alia	 necessaria.	 Sequitur	 quod	 alia	 semper	 stat	 stante	 prima	 propositione	 ex	 qua	 cum	 ista	
necessaria	alia	inferebatur.	Exemplum	huius	potest	poni	hoc:	ut	si	sequatur	'omnis	homo	est	risibilis,	Sortes	est	
homo,	 ergo	 Sortes	 est	 risibilis';	 ubi	 ista	 'Sortes	 es	 risibilis'	 infertur	 ex	 illa	 'Sortes	 est	 homo',	 coassumpta	 ista	
necessaria	 'omnis	homo	est	 risibilis',	quia	manifestum	est	quod	 ista	stante	 'Sortes	est	homo'	vel	 semper	simul	
oportet	stare	'Sortes	est	risibilis'	-	et	si	sic	tunc	sequitur	ad	istam	solam	'Sortes	est	homo'	ista	'Sortes	est	risibilis',	
quod	est	propositum	-	vel	quandoque	sine	illa	potest	stare.	Et	hoc	non,	quia	manifestum	est	quod	ista	'Sortes	est	
homo'	 stante,	 semper	 stat	 ista	 necessaria	 'omnis	 homo	 est	 risibilis',	 quia	 illa	 est	 necessaria	 et	 ex	 consequenti	
semper	 stat	 cum	 qualibet	 vera	 et	 cum	 ista	 necessaria	 et	 ista	 'Sortes	 est	 homo'	 semper	 stat	 quod	 Sortes	 est	
risibilis,	quia	ipsa	sequitur	ad	illam	quod	est	regula".	
7536	John	 Buridan,	 TC	 I.8.	 concl.	 7:	 "Septima	 conclusio	 est:	 Ad	 omnem	 propositionem	 copulativam	 ex	 duabus	
invicem	 contradictorius	 constitutam	 sequi	 quamlibet	 aliam,	 etiam	 consequentia	 formali.	 Ex	 dictis	 statim	patet	
quod	 ad	 talem,	 immo	 etiam	 ad	 omnem	 implicantem	 contradictionem,	 sequitur	 quaelibet,	 quia	 omnis	 talis	 est	
impossibilis.	 Sed	oportet	 videre	quomodo	hoc	 sit	 consequentia	 formali.	Dico	 ergo	quod	ad	 istam	copulativam:	










aliis	 terminis	dicta	 forma	nihil	 valet,	ut:'Tantum	deus	est;	 ergo	asinus	 stat	 in	 stabulo'.	Nec	est	verum	quod	 illi	




the	 same	 argument	 advanced	 by	 Alexander	 Neckham	 against	 Abelard,	 identified	 by	 Martin	 as	 "William's	
Machine".	See	Martin	[1986];	see	also	Normore	[2015,	366]	
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impossible	 for	 things	 to	be	as	 the	antecedent	 signifies	 them	to	be	while	 they	are	not	as	 the	
consequent	signifies	them	to	be.		
																																																								
7537	John	Buridan,	TC	 I.8	 concl.	 1:	 "Prima	 conclusio	 est:	Ad	omnem	propositionem	 impossibilem	omnem	aliam	
sequi	 et	 omnem	 propositionem	 necessariam	 ad	 omnem	 aliam	 sequi.	 Haec	 conclusio	 patet	 per	 quid	 nominis	
antecedentis	et	 consequentis.	Quia	 impossibile	est	aliquam	propositionem	 impossibilem	esse	veram,	vel	etiam	
qualitercumque	ipsa	significat	ita	esse.	Ergo	impossibile	est	qualitercumque	ipsa	significat	ita	esse	non	existente	
qualitercumque	 quaelibet	 alia	 significat.	 Similiter,	 omnem	 <propositionem>	 necessariam	 impossibile	 est	 non	
esse	 qualitercumque	 ipsa	 significat.	 Ergo	 impossibile	 est	 non	 esse	 qualitercumque	 significat	 existente	
qualitercumque	alia	significat.	Et	est	notandum	quod	de	consequentia	ut	nunc	modo	proportionali	ponenda	est	
conclusio,	 scilicet	 quod:	 Ad	 omnem	propositionem	 falsam	 omnis	 alia	 sequitur	 consequentia	 ut	 nunc	 et	 omnis	
vera	 ad	omnem	aliam	sequitur	 etiam	consequentia	ut	nunc.	Quia	 impossibile	 est	 rebus	 se	habentibus	ut	nunc	
propositionem	quae	est	vera	non	esse	veram.	Ideo	nec	possibile	est	ipsam	non	esse	veram	qualibet	alia	existente	
vera."	 (see	 also	 e.g.	TC	 I.4.11);	 Albert	 of	 Saxony,	Perutilis	 logica	 IV.2	 r.	 1-2,	 604-606:	 "Quantum	 ad	 secundum	
restat	 ponere	 regulas	 circa	 consequentias	 simplices,	 quarum	 prima	 est	 ista:	 Ad	 propositionem	 impossibilem	
sequitur	 qualibet	 alia.	 Probatur	 ex	 quid	 nominis	 antecedentis	 et	 consequentis	 posito	 in	 primo	 capitulo,	 nam	
aliqua	propositione	existente	impossibili	impossibile	est	sic	esse,	sicut	ipsa	significat	non	existente	sic,	sicut	alia	
propositio	 significat.	Ergo	propositio	 impossibilis	est	antecedens	ad	quamcumque	aliam	propositionem,	et	per	
consequens	ad	propositionem	 impossibilem	sequitur	quaecumque	alia,	 et	hoc	est,	 quod	communiter	 solet	dici	
'Ad	impossibilem	sequitur	quodlibet'.	Ideo	seuitur	'Homo	est	asinus,	ergo	homo	currit',	nam	ex	quo	antecedens	
est	 impossibile,	 ergo	 non	 existente	 sic,	 sicut	 significat	 consequens,	 impossibile	 est	 si	 esse,	 sicut	 significat	
antecedens.	 Secunda	 regula:	Ad	quamlibet	 propositionem	 sequitur	propositio	 necessaria.	 Probatur	 iterum	per	
quid	 nominis	 antecedentis	 et	 consequentis,	 nam	 impossibile	 est	 non	 esse	 sic,	 sicut	 significat	 propositio	
necessaria,	 ergo	 etiam	 impossibile	 est	 non	 esse	 sic,	 sicut	 significat	 propositio	 necessaria	 existente	 sic,	 sicut	
significat	quaecumque	alia.	Et	per	consequens	propositio	necessaria	consequens	est	ad	quamcumque	aliam.	Ex	
quo	sequitur	istam	consequentiam	esse	bonam	'Homo	currit,	ergo	asinus	est	animal'	vel	'Homo	currit,	ergo	deus	
est',	 supponendo	 cum	 Aristotele,	 quod	 haec	 est	 necessaria	 'Asinus	 est	 animal'.";	 Marsilius	 of	 Inghen,	
Consequentiae	1.3.2	<5|1>-<6|2>:	"Consequenter,	videndum	est	de	regulis	quae	vocantur	generales	-	non	tamen	
conveniunt	 omnibus	 consequentiis	 -	 quarum	 prima	 est	 haec	 (et	 quinta	 in	 ordine):	 quod	 omnis	 consequentia	
cuius	antecedens	est	simpliciter	impossibile,	est	bona.	Ista	probatur	ex	descriptione	bonae	consequentiae	prius	
posita,	 quia	 impossibile	 est	 qualitercumque	 pro	 nunc	 significatur	 per	 antecedens	 secundum	 eius	 totalem	
significationem	 sic	 esse,	 quin	 ita	 sit	 sicut	 significatur	 per	 consequens	 secundum	 eius	 totalem	 significatione,	
quodcumque	sit	illud,	ergo	consequentia	est	bona.	Consequentia	tenet	per	definitionem	bonae	consequentiae.	Et	
antecedens	patet,	quia	cum	antecedens	supponitur	esse	impossibile;	impossibile	est	sic	esse	qualitercumque	pro	






necessarium,	 suum	 contradictorium	 est	 simpliciter	 impossibile.	 Consequentia	 est	 nota	 de	 se.	 Et	 tunc	 ex	 isto	
sequitur	oppositum	antecedentis	per	regulam	praecedentem,	quia	quidquid	ex	eo	infertur,	sequitur	ad	ipsum	in	
consequentia	 bona.	 Exemplum	 primae	 regulae:	 'Deus	 non	 est,	 ergo	 homo	 est	 asinus'.	 Exemplum	 secundae	
regulae:	 'baculus	stat	in	angulo,	ergo	causa	prima	est'.	Dixi	notanter	in	ipsis	regulis	de	impossibili	simpliciter	et	
de	 necessario	 simpliciter,	 quia	 quidam	 loici	 dicunt	 propositionem	 de	 praeterito	 veram	 esse	 necessariam	 et	






two	 contradictory	 sentences	 taken	 conjunctively,	 any	 consequent	 follows	 by	 a	 formal	
consequentia.	The	idea	of	formal	following	that	is	at	play	here,	is	-	roughly	-	that	of	a	following	
holding	independently	of	the	meaning	of	the	categorematic	terms	involved,	but	in	virtue	of	the	
formal	 structure	 of	 the	 consequentia;	 therefore	 such	 consequentia	 will	 hold	 through	 any	
uniform	variation	of	the	categorematic	terms,	insofar	as	its	formal	structure	-	given	by	all	the	
syncategorematic	 features	 -	 stays	 the	 same.7539	This	 account	 of	 formality	 is	 shared	 by	 all	
																																																								







consequentia	 tenet,	nam	a	disiunctiva	 cum	destructione	unius	eius	partis	 ad	alteram	partem	est	 consequentia	
formalis,	 quia	 omnis	 propositio	 sibi	 similis	 in	 forma,	 si	 formaretur,	 esset	 consequentia	 bona.	 Ista	 regula	 solet	




quae	 formaretur	 esset	 bona	 consequentia,	 ut:	 'Quod	 est	 A	 est	 B;	 ergo	 quod	 est	 B	 est	 A'.	 Sed	 consequentia	
materialis	 est	 cui	 non	 omnis	 propositio	 consimilis	 in	 forma	 <quae	 formaretur>	 esset	 bona	 consequentia,	 vel,	
sicut	communiter	dicitur,	quae	non	tenet	in	omnibus	terminis	forma	consimili	retenta;	verbi	gratia:	'Homo	currit;	
ergo	 animal	 currit',	 quia	 in	 his	 terminis	 non	 valet:	 'Equus	 ambulat;	 ergo	 lignum	 ambulat'.";	 Albert	 of	 Saxony,	
Perutilis	Logica	 IV.1,	598-602:	"Consequentia	formalis	dicitur	illa,	cui	omnis	propositio	similis	in	forma,	quae	si	
formaretur,	esset	bona	consequentia,	ut	hic	'quoddam	B	est	A,	ergo	quoddam	A	est	B'.	[...]Et	prout	hic	loquitur	de	
forma	et	de	materia,	per	materiam	propositionis	vel	 consequentiae	 intelligitur	 termini	pure	categorematici,	ut	
sunt	 subiecta	et	praedicata	circumscriptis	 syncategorematicibus	sibi	appositis,	per	qae	 ipsa	coniunguntur	autr	
distribuuntur	aut	ad	certum	modum	suppositionis	trahuntur.	Sed	ad	formam	dicitur	pertinere	totum	residuum,	
videlicet	 copulae	 tam	 categoricarum	quam	hypotheticarum,	 similiter	 negationes	 et	 signa	 et	 ordo	 dictorum	 ad	
invicem	et	modi	signficandi	pertinentes	ad	quantitatem	propositionis,	ut	est	discretio	et	communitas	etc.	Verbi	
gratia	 de	 praedictus,	 propter	 diversas	 copulas	 modalium	 	 et	 de	 inesse	 propositiones	 modales	 dicuntur	 esse	
alterius	 formae	 quam	 affirmativae,	 et	 similiter	 poropositiones	 particulares	 dicuntur	 esse	 alterius	 formae	 ab	
universalibus.	 Et	 propter	 communitatem	 ad	 discretionem	 terminorum	 propositiones	 singulares	 dicuntur	 esse	
alterius	 formae	 a	 propositionibus	 indefinitis.	 Propter	 diversum	 autem	 ordinem	 istae	 sunt	 diversae	 formae	
'Omnis	 homo	 est	 animal'	 et	 'Animal	 est	 omnis	 homo',	 et	 similiter	 istae	 consequentiae	 'Omne	 B	 est	 A,	 ergo	
quoddam	A	est	B'	et	'Onme	B	est	A,	ergo	quoddam	B	est	A'.	Item	propter	relationem	istae	sunt	diversae	formae	
'Homo	 currit	 et	 homo	 non	 currit',	 'Homo	 currit	 et	 ipse	 non	 currit',	 propter	 quod	 secunda	 ex	 sua	 forma	 est	
impossibilis,	prima	vero	non.";		Marsilius	of	Inghen,	Consequentiae	I.2	<1>:	"Consequentia	formalis	est	quae	tenet	






eadem	quantitas	et	qualitas	et	eadem	copula.	Unde	 tria	 sunt	 in	propositione	se	 tenenda	ex	parte	 formae,	puta	
ipsa	 copula,	 qualitas	 et	 quantitas."	Marsilius'	 use	of	dispositis	 is	 analogous	 to	 the	use	 that	 later	 on	 e.g.	 Paul	 of	
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Parisian	 authors	 and	 it	 is	 considered	 one	 of	 the	 main	 characterising	 features	 of	 the	
Continental	 tradition	 on	 consequentiae	 in	 contrast	 with	 the	 English	 tradition.	 For	 authors	
belonging	 to	 the	 latter,	 a	 consequentia	 is	 formal	 iff	 there	 is	 some	 sort	 of	 relation	 of	 either	




One	 of	 the	 features	 of	 Parisian	 formal	 consequences,	 e.g.	 as	Marsilius	 remarks	 explicitly,	 is	
that	 the	 consequent	 can	 be	 derived	 from	 the	 atecedent	 by	 means	 of	 exclusively	 formal	
passages,	 i.e.	 a	 formal	 consequence	 can	 be	 proven	 by	 means	 of	 other	 intermediate	 formal	
consequences.7541	Buridan's,	 Albert's,	 and	 Marsilius'	 proofs	 of	 Met2	 run	 on	 formally	 good	




giving	 his	 version	 of	Met1	 in	 Rule	 9,	 in	 Rule	 10	 he	 goes	 on	 to	 claim	 that	 any	 consequentia	
whose	 antecedent	 is	 constituted	 from	 two	 contradictory	 sentences	 is	 a	 good	 consequence	
because	its	antecedent	is	impossible,	without	any	claim	about	its	formality	yet.7542	Marsilius'	
Rule	10	holds	simply	because	of	Rules	5	and	6,	and	on	Rule	1	(the	Law	of	Non	Contradiction):	







antecedenti	 potest	 deduci	 suum	 consequens	 vel	 consequentias	 intermedias	 formales	 nullo	 extrinseco	
coassumpto."	
7542 	Marsilius	 of	 Inghen,	 Consequentiae	 I.3.2	 <10|6>:	 "Decima	 regula	 est	 haec:	 omnis	 consequentia	 cuius	
antecedens	 est	 propositio	 copulativa	 composita	 ex	 partibus	 contradicentibus	 principalibus	 est	 necessaria.	
Probatur,	 quia	 eius	 antecedens	 est	 impossibile,	 igitur	 consequentia	 est	 bona.	 Consequentia	 tenet	 per	 quintam	






However	 Marsilius	 does	 make	 the	 claim	 that	 any	 consequent	 follows	 formally	 from	 a	
contradiction,	 but	 he	 does	 so	 later	 on,	 in	 his	 rules	 for	 formal	 consequentiae	 (Rule	 f9).7543	
Marsilus'	 proof	 of	 Rule	 f9	 runs	 exactly	 like	 Buridan's	 and	 Albert's	 proofs	 of	 Met2.	 Its	







supponitur	 quod	 omnis	 ista	 consequentia	 est	 formalis	 in	 qua	 ex	 posito	 antecedenti	 potest	 deduci	 suum	
consequens	 vel	 consequentias	 intermedias	 formales	 nullo	 extrinseco	 coassumpto.	 Patet,	 quia	 sic	 probat	
Philosophus	 <in>	 Primo	 Priorum	 syllogismos	 imperfectos	 esse	 formales.	 Ex	 hoc	 probatur	 regula	 quia	 ex	
copulativa	 composita	 de	 partibus	 contradicentibus	 sequitur	 formaliter	 copulativa	 cuius	 prima	 pars	 est	 una	
disiunctiva	composita	ex	prima	parte	sua	et	ex	consequente	ex	ea	illata;	et	secunda	pars	est	secunda	pars	sui.	Sit	
per	probationem	 	haec	consequentia	copulativa:	 'Sortes	est	et	Sortes	non	est,	 igitur	a	est';	 sequitur	 formaliter:	
'Sortes	 est	 et	 Sortes	 non	 est,	 igitur	 Sortes	 est	 vel	 a	 est	 et	 Sortes	 non	 est',	 quia	 prima	 pars	 copulativae	 illatae	
sequitur	 formaliter	ad	primam	partem	copulativae	 inferentis;	 secunda	sequitur	 formaliter	ad	secundam,	 igitur	
tota	copulativa	sequitur	formaliter	ad	totam	copulativam.	Tenet	consequentia.	Et	prima	pars	antecedentis	patet,	
quia	sequitur	formaliter:	'Sortes	est,	igitur	Sortes	est	vel	a	est',	quia	a	parte	disiunctae	ad	totam	disiunctivam	per	
secundam	regula	huius	capituli.	Et	 secunda	pars	 	patet,	quia	eadem	pars	est	 secunda	pars	 inferentis	et	 illatae.	
Modo	in	copulativa	illata	sequitur	formaliter	consequens	illatum	ex	prima	copulativa,	quia	haec	est	argumentum	




7544	Marsilius	 of	 Inghen,	 Consequentiae	 I.3.3	 <1>:	 "...	 arguendo	 a	 tota	 copulativa	 ad	 quamlibet	 eius	 partem	
principalem	est	consequentia	bona	et	 formalis.	Exemplum	ut	 'a	est	et	b	est,	ergo	a	est'.	Consequentia	est	bona.	
Probatur	 regula:	 impossibile	 est	 qualitercumque	 per	 antecedens	 significatur	 sic	 esse	 quin	 ita	 sit	 sicut	 per	
consequens	talis	consequentiae	significatur.		Et	cum	haec		tenet	in	omnibus	terminis	qualitercumque	dispositis,	
ergo	 	 sequitur	 quod	 talis	 	 consequentia	 est	 	 bona	 et	 formalis.	 Tenet	 consequentia	 per	 definitionem	 bonae		
consequentiae	 et	 formalis.	 	 Antecedens	 declaratur,	 quia	 	 ad	 veritatem	 copulativae	 requiritur	 sic	 esse		
qualitercumque	 per	 utramque	 partem	 principalem	 	 pro	 nunc	 	 secundum	 eius	 totalem	 significationem	
significatur.	 	 Modo	 	 non	 potest	 ita	 	 esse	 qualitercumque	 per	 utramque	 	 partem	 principalem	 	 significatur		
secundum	eius	 	 totalem	significationem,	 	nisi	 	 ita	esset	sicut	per	primam		eius	partem	 	secundum	eius	totalem	
significationem	significatur		et	nisi	 	ita	esset		sicut	per	secundam	partem	eius	principalem	pro	nunc		secundum	
eius	totalem	significationem	significatur.	Ergo		regula	est	simpliciter	vera.	 	Non	enim	potest		ita		esse		sicut	per	
antecedens	 	 significatur	 	 secundum	 eius	 totalem	 significationem	 nisi	 	 ita	 sit	 sicut	 per	 eius	 	 consequens	
significatur	 etc..	 	 Quod	 fuit	 probandum.	 	 Et	 etiam	 	 teneat	 in	 omnibus	 terminis;	 patet	 	 quia	 in	 nullis	 	 reperitur	
instantia	-	consimili		forma		in	omnibus	terminis	retenta."	
7545	Marsilius	of	 Inghen,	Consequentiae	 I.3.3	<2>:	"Secunda	regula	est	haec:	ab	una	parte	disiunctivae	principali		
ad	 totam	 disiunctivam	 est	 consequentia	 	 bona	 et	 formalis.	 Ut:	 'homo	 currit,	 	 ergo	 	 homo	 currit	 vel	 homo	 est		
asinus'.	 Pro	 declaratione	 	 regulae	 	 supponitur	 quod	 disiunctiva	 et	 copulativa	 	 compositae	 ex	 partibus	
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In	 the	 same	 conclusion	 where	 he	 proves	 Met2,	 Buridan	 then	 goes	 on	 to	 show	 that	 any	
consequentia	 having	 an	 impossible	 sentence	 as	 its	 antecedent	 can	be	 reduced	 to	 a	 formally	




sentence.7547	Albert	of	Saxony	offers	a	 similar	 reduction	of	 simple	material	 consequences	 to	
formal	 ones	 by	 means	 of	 the	 addition	 of	 a	 necessary	 sentence	 to	 the	 antecedent;7548	and,	
analogously,	 a	material	 consequence	as	of	now	can	be	 reduced	 to	a	 formal	one	by	adding	a	
true	 sentence	 to	 the	 antecedent.7549	Whereas	 Buridan	 and	 Albert	 add	 these	 specifications	
about	the	reducibility	of	a	consequentia	materialis	to	a	formal	one	already	in	their	definitions,	
Marsilius	 does	 not;	 furthermore	 he	 does	 not	 speak	 at	 all	 about	 reducing	 a	 material	
consequence	to	a	formal	one.	But,	in	Buridan	and	Albert,	such	reduction	is	per	se	only	a	tool	to	
show	more	 clearly	 the	 validity	 of	 a	material	 consequence:	 it	 does	 not	 add	 anything	 to	 the	
																																																																																																																																																																																								
contradicentibus	contradicunt,	ut	istae		contradicunt:	'Deus	est	vel		homo	est	asinus',	et	'nullus	Deus	est	et	nullus	
homo	est	 asinus'.	 Ista	 	 est	bona	 	 regula	 communis	 	 loicorum,	 et	 ideo	hoc	 	 supponitur.	Alibi	 	 declarabitur.	Qua	
suppositione	praemissa	probatur	regula		in	omni	consequentia	in	qua		arguitur	a	parte	disiunctivae	principali	ad	
totam	 disiunctivam	 est	 consequentia	 sic	 se	 habens	 	 quod	 ex	 opposito	 consequentis	 formaliter	 	 infertur	
oppositum	antecedentis.	 Igitur	 	omnis	talis	consequentia	est	bona	et	 	 formalis.	Consequentia	tenet	per	primam	
regulam.	Et	antecedens	declaratur,		nam	si		sit	ista		consequentia	proposita:		'homo	currit,	igitur		homo	currit	vel	
homo	 est	 asinus',	 et	 declaratur	 per	 suppositionem	 oppositum	 consequentis	 -	 scilicet	 copulativa	 de	 partibus	
contradicentibus,	ut	 'nullus	homo	currit	et	nullus	homo	est	asinus'	-,	tunc	 	sequitur	per	praecedentem	regulam	
formaliter:	'ergo	nullus	homo	currit',	quia	arguitur		a		copulativa	ad		partem	principalem.		Ergo	sequitur	quod	ex		




ergo	 	 homo	 est	 asinus	 et	 	 deus	 est	 vel	 homo	 	 non	 est	 asinus',	 	 constat	 quod	 consequentia	 non	 valeret.	
Proportionaliter		est		arguendo		a		copulativa	ad	quamlibet		eius	partem	principalem.	"	
7546	John	 Buridan,	 TC	 I.8	 concl.	 7:	 "Item,	 ex	 dicta	 conclusione	 apparet	 quomodo	 omnis	 consequentia	 ex	
antecedente	 impossibili	 reducatur	 ad	 consequentiam	 formalem	 per	 additionem	 alicuius	 necessariae.	 Quia	 si	
antecedens	est	impossibile,	suum	contradictorium	est	necessarium,	quo	sibi	addito	erit	consequentia	formalis	ad	










consequentia	 itself	 nor	 to	 its	 strength	 and	 it	 derives	 from	 the	 definition	 of	 validity	 as	 it	 is	
shown	in	Met1.	Then,	Marsilius	might	not	be	adding	any	specifications	about	such	reduction	in	
his	 definition	 of	 consequentia	 materialis	 simply	 because	 it	 does	 not	 add	 anything	 to	 the	
definition	and	it	is	not	a	definitional	matter.	
It	 is	evident	 that,	even	 if	 they	are	not	stating	 it	explicitely,	Albert	and	Buridan	are	bound	to	
accept	Met3.	They	take	the	reduction	of	a	non-formal	consequence	to	a	formal	one,	by	means	
of	 the	addition	of	an	appropriately	selected	premise,	as	a	confirmation	of	 the	validity	of	 the	




Angel	 d'Ors	 argues	 that,	 in	 Buridan's	 proof,	 Met1	 follows	 from	 the	 ex	 impossibili/ad	
necessarium:	this	is	explicit	in	Buridan's	argument	as	well	as	in	Albert's	and	Marsilius'.	D'Ors	
continues:	 since	 they	 are	 interdependent	 claims,	 Met1	 should	 then	 not	 be	 used	 to	 ground	
claims	about	the	ex	impossibili/ad	necessarium,	because	the	argument	would	be	circular	and	
beg	 the	 question.	 However,	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 our	 Parisian	 authors	 derive	 the	 ex	 impossibili	
indipendently	from	Met,	but	rather	from	their	definitions	of	validity;7551	therefore	Met	is	not	




same	 as	 the	 necessity	 of	 a	 non-formal	 one,	 i.e.	 we	 seem	 to	 be	 dealing	 here	 with	 univocal	
notions	 of	 necessity/impossibility	 and	 not,	 as	 D'Ors	 believed,	 with	 equivocal	 ones.7552	As	






consequential	 following	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 necessity	 of	 the	 following	 holding	 in	 a	 material	
consequentia	ut	nunc.7553	Albert	seems	to	share	this	kind	of	position	too,	but	Marsilius	cannot,	





Buridan,	 see	 TC	 I.4:	 "...	 consequentiarum	 materialium	 quaedam	 vocantur	 'consequentiae	 simplices',	 quia	
simpliciter	 loquendo	 sunt	 consequentiae	 bonae,	 cum	 non	 sit	 possibile	 antecedens	 esse	 verum	 consequente	




theologia	 est	 electus	 in	 papam'	 et	 si	 dico	 'Ego	 video	 unum	 talem	hominem',	 tu	 concludes	 'ergo	 certe	 tu	 vides	
unum	falsum	hominem'.	Haec	autem	consequentia	 reducitur	ad	 formalem	per	additionem	propositionis	verae,	
non	tamen	necessariae,	vel	aliquarum	verarum,	non	tamen	necessariarum,	ut,	in	exemplis	positis,	quia	Cardinalis	
Albus	 est	magister	 in	 theologia	 et	quia	 talis	homo	est	unus	 falsus	homo.	 Illo	modo	hic	 est	bona	 consequentia,	
supposito	 quod	 non	 sunt	 homines	 nisi	 Socrates,	 Plato,	 et	 Robertus:	 'Socrates	 currit,	 Plato	 currit	 et	 Robertus	
currit;	ergo	omnis	homo	currit',	quia	perficitur	consequentia	per	hanc	veram:	Omnis	homo	est	Socrates	uel	Plato	
vel	 Robertus.	 Et	 est	 sciendum	 quod	 de	 hoc	modo	 consequentiarum	 ut	 nunc	 sunt	 consequentiae	 promissivae.	
Verbi	gratia,	si	Plato	dicit	Socrati:	'Si	veneris	ad	me	dabo	tibi	equum',	haec	propositio	forte	est	vera	consequentia	
et	forte	est	falsa	propositio	non	consequentia.	Quoniam	si	antecedens	est	impossibile,	scilicet	quod	Socrates	non	




autem	 antecedens	 sit	 verum,	 scilicet	 quod	 Socrates	 veniet	 ad	 Platonem,	 tunc	 forte	 dicetur	 quod	 adhuc	
consequentia	est	bona,	quia	per	veras	sibi	appositas	potest	fieri	formalis,	scilicet	sic:	quidquid	Plato	unit	facere	in	
futurum	et	quod	volitione	durante	poterit	facere	(et	omnibus	circumstantiis	adhibitis	secundum	quas	illud	uniti,	
et	 ipso	 non	 impedito,	 ipse	 illud	 faciet	 quando	 et	 quomodo	 uult	 et	 poterit	 illud	 facere	 (et	 hanc	 propositionem	
modifices	taliter	quod	sit	vera	secundum	Aristotelem	9	Metaphysicae);	sed	Plato	uult	dare	equum	Socrati,	qui	ad	
se	 veniet,	 quando	 ad	 se	 venerit;	 ergo	 Plato	 debit	 equum	 Socrati.	 Si	 ergo	 hae	 propositiones	 de	 voluntate	 et	
potestate	Platonis	sunt	verae,	 ipse	Plato	dicebat	Socrati	veram	consequentiam	ut	nunc;	sed	si	non	erant	verae,	
tunc	 Plato	 dicebat	 Socrati	 falsum,	 et	 non	 consequentiam,	 et	 si	 Plato	 credebat	 has	 propositiones	 adiunctas	 uel	
consimiles	non	esse	veras,	 ipse	mentiebatur	Socrati."	On	the	distinction	 in	Albert	of	Saxony	see	Perutilis	logica	
IV.1,	 602:	 "Alia	divisio	 consequentiarum	materalium.	Quaedam	sunt,	 quae	vocantur	 consequentiae	 simpliciter,	
aliae	 sunt,	 quae	 vocantur	 consequentiae	 ut	 nunc.	 Consequentiae	 simpliciter	 vocantur	 consequentiae,	 quae	
simpliciter	loquendo	sunt	bonae	et	sic	se	habent,	quod	non	est	possibile	sic	esse,	ut	significat	antecedens,	quin	sit	
sic,	ut	significat	consequens.	Consequentiae	autem	ut	nunc	vocantur,	quae	simpliciter	loquendo	non	sunt	bonae,	
quia	possibile	 est	 sic	 esse,	 sicut	 significat	 antecedens,	 sine	hoc,	quod	sit	 sic,	ut	 significat	 consequens,	 sed	 sunt	
bonae	 ut	 nunc,	 quia	 impossibile	 est	 rebus	 omnino	 se	 habentibus,	 ut	 nunc	 se	 habent,	 sic	 esse,	 sicut	 significat	
antecedens,	quin	sit	sic,	ut	significat	consequens.	Et	 istis	consequentiis	vulgariter	saepe	utimur,	verbi	gratia,	si	
dicamus	 'Sortes	 currit,	 ergo	magister	 in	 artibus	 currit'	 supposito,	 quod	 Sortes	 sit	 magister	 in	 artibus,	 et	 ista	
consequentia	 reducitur	 ad	 consequentiam	 formalem	 per	 additionum	 alicuius	 propositionis	 verae,	 non	 tamen	
necessariae,	vel	aliquarum	verarum,	non	tamen	necessariarum,	ut	 'Sortes	currit,	Sortes	est	magister	 in	artibus,	





ut	 nunc	 se	 habent,	 non	 potest	 sic	 esse	 sicut	 per	 antecedens	 significatur,	 quin	 ita	 sit	 sicut	 per	 consequens	




as	 the	 consequent	 now	 signifies,	 it	 can	 be	 otherwise:	 "it	 is	 possible	 for	 things	 to	 be	 as	 the	
antecedent	 signifies,	 without	 it	 being	 so	 as	 the	 consequent	 signifies".	 If	 a	 material	
consequence	is,	by	definition,	a	consequentia,	and	if	a	consequentia	is	only	a	good	one,	then	a	
consequentia	ut	nunc	 is	not	a	material	consequence:	it	is	not	a	consequence	at	all.	Obviously,	
since	 the	 ex	 falso	 holds	 ut	 nunc,	 from	 Marsilius'	 point	 of	 view	 orationes	 which	 look	 like	
consequentiae,	having	a	merely	false	but	not	impossible	antecedent,	are	not	consequentiae.7555	
Marsilius'	 rejection	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 of	 the	 same	 kind	 of	 the	 rejection	 by	 the	 aliqui	
mentioned	by	Albert:	these	aliqui	refuse	the	consequentia	ut	nunc	claiming	that	otherwise	the	
impossible	 would	 follow	 from	 the	 possible.	 Here,	 between	 Marsilius,	 on	 the	 one	 side,	 and	
Buridan	and	Albert,	on	the	other,	we	seem	to	be	facing	a	deeper	conceptual	disagreement:	it	
looks	 like	 a	 disagreement	 about	 what	 counts	 as	 necessary,	 at	 least	 on	 a	 sufficient	 level	 to	
warrant	the	inference;	and	it	is,	consequentely,	a	disagreement	about	the	consequentia	itself.	
Also	Buridan	and	Albert	recognise	that,	strictly	speaking,	a	consequentia	ut	nunc	does	not	fulfil	
the	 requirements	 of	 their	 definitions	 of	 validity;	 however,	 for	 them	 the	 necessity	 of	 the	
present	is	enough	to	justify	the	inference	as	of	now	of	a	consequent	-	and	this	is	sufficient	to	
let	 them	 count	 such	 an	 inference	 as	 a	 consequentia.	 However,	 this	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	
sufficient	 for	Marsilius:	 the	 necessity	 of	 the	 present	 does	 not	 warrant	 the	 following	 of	 the	










argumenti	 quod	 aliquando	 erit	 sicut	 significatur	 per	 antecedens	 quando	 ita	 non	 erit	 sicut	 significatur	 per	
consequens,	 et	 tamen	 ista	 consequentia	 esset	 bona.	 Sed	 contra:	 tunc	 ex	 prima	 parte	 sequeretur	 quod	 si	 tunc	








not	 strictly	 speaking	 necessary,	 i.e.	 things	 could	 be	 otherwise;7556	the	 kind	 of	 necessity	




uttering	 a	 true	propositio	hypothetica.	 As	 both	 authors	 underline,	 in	 ordinary	 reasoning	we	





given	by	V4-5,	 therefore	there	 is	no	relation	there;	an	oratio	 in	 the	 form	of	a	consequentia	ut	
nunc	does	not	have	a	relation	to	pick	out	and	so	it	is	not	a	consequentia.	Does	this	mean	that	






speaking.	This	would	not	be	an	 instance	of	 reduction	 like	 the	one	 to	a	 formal	 consequence,	
which	we	have	seen	 in	Buridan	and	Albert:	here,	we	have	an	 initial	expression	that	 is	not	a	
consequentia,	there	is	no	valid	illation	to	be	shown	more	clearly	by	making	it	formal;	here,	the	
																																																								




rephrasing	 would	 make	 the	 consequentia.	 This	 seems	 to	 confirm	 that	 for	 Marsilius	 a	
consequentia	 is	 first	 and	 foremost	 an	 entailment	 between	 sentences	 in	 a	 certain	 relation	 to	
each	other,	that	these	sentences	have	to	be	formulated	in	such	a	way	that	the	relation	subsists	
between	 them,	 and	 that	 a	mind	 is	 authorised	 to	 infer	 a	 consequent	 from	 an	 antecedent	 in	
















We	have	 seen	 that	Marsilius'	 use	of	 consequentia	 is	 twofold.	On	 the	one	hand,	 at	 its	 core,	 a	





there	 is	 no	 necessary	 following	 of	 the	 consequent	 from	 the	 antecedent,	 then	 there	 is	 no	




quod	 sit	 of	 the	 note	 of	 illation.	 The	 issue	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 consequences	 and	
conditionals	is	introduced	since	the	very	beginning	of	the	treatise	and	it	emerges	explicitly	in	
the	section	on	Instantiae	and	dubitationes		and	in	Marsilius'	own	resolutions.	
As	 we	 have	 seen,	 in	 the	 history	 of	 medieval	 logic	 it	 is	 common	 to	 find	 some	 degree	 of	
ambiguity	 between	 consequentiae	 and	 propositiones	 hypotheticae	 conditionales.7557	Even	 if	
there	 is	 often	 a	 conceptual	 distinction	 between	 the	 two	 notions,	 it	 is	 not	 always	 neat	 nor	
explicitly	addressed.	However,	when	such	distinction	 is	explicitly	addressed,	 it	 is	usually	by	
stating	an	equivalence	between	cosequentiae	and	conditionals.	
In	a	measure,	such	equivalence	is	accepted	also	by	Marsilius.		





If	β	 is	a	consequence	of	Γ	⋃	{	α	},	where	α	 is	a	closed	 formula,	 i.e.	 if	Γ	⋃	{	α	}⊨	β;	 then	 the	






DT	within	 his	 theory,	 and	 therefore	 he	 could	 not	 only	 be	 stating	 the	 equivalence	 between	
consequentiae	and	conditionals,	but	he	could	prove	it	within	his	theory	of	consequentiae.	
Buridan	also	 assumes	 this	 equivalence,	 insofar	 as	 a	consequentia	 is	 a	propositio	hypothetica	
like	a	conditional	plus	the	assertion	of	the	antecedent,	binding	also	to	assert	the	consequent;	
in	 doing	 so,	 he	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 have	 any	 more	 issues	 other	 than	 possibly	 the	 kind	 of	
regression	 brought	 forth	 by	 Lewis	 Carroll7558	-	 and	 he	might	 have	 a	way	 of	 dealing	with	 it	
within	his	fundamentally	inferential	and	propositional	account	of	consequentia.	However,	for	
authors	as	Albert	and	Marsilius	 the	equivalence	between	consequentiae	 	 and	conditionals	 is	
going	 to	 be	 a	 trickier	 matter:	 since	 they	 assume	 that	 only	 valid	 consequences	 are	
consequentiae	 and	 that	 there	 is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 a	 consequentia	mala,	 they	will	 have	 some	
explaining	 to	 do	 in	 order	 to	 account	 for	 false	 conditionals.	What	 are	 these	 false	 sentences	
equivalent	to?	
Albert	of	Saxony	does	not	go	deeply	into	this	issue,	but	he	seems	to	mantain	both	that	the	only	
consequentia,	 strictly	 speaking,	 is	 the	consequentia	bona,	 and	 that	 conditionals	 as	 sentences	
can	be	true	or	false:	rather	than	something	equivalent	to	a	consequentia,	he	seems	to	treat	a	
conditional	 as	 a	 description	 of	 a	 consequentia,	 signifying	 that	 the	 antecedent	 in	 that	
consequentia	 is	 antecedent	 to	 its	 consequent	 -	 if	 things	 are	 not	 so,	 then	 the	 conditional	 is	
false.7559	But	 even	 if	 Albert	 manages	 to	 outflank	 the	 obstacle	 on	 the	 front	 of	 conditionals	
properly	meant,	he	is	still	going	to	face	a	similar	issue	about	consequentiae	themselves,	insofar	




7559	See	 e.g.	 Albert	 of	 Saxony,	 Perutilis	 logica	 IV.1,	 596-8:	 "...	 si	 aliqua	 propositio	 condicionalis	 est,	 per	 quam	
















could	 not	 be	 any	 other	 kind	 of	 hypothetical	 sentence	 but	 a	 conditional.	 And	 it	 is	 not	 a	
categorical	sentence,	because	it	is	not	in	the	simple	form	Subject+Copula+Predicate,	required	




a	 consequentia	 bona	 is	 a	 consequentia	 and	 then	 concludes	 that	 a	 false	 conditional	 is	 not,	
strictly	speaking,	a	conditional	at	all.	This	stance	yields	a	double	account	of	conditionals:	on	
the	one	 side,	 there	 is	 the	 conditional	properly	meant,	which	 is	 equivalent	 to	a	consequentia	
insofar	as	it	is	a	form	of	the	oratio	expressing	it,	and	therefore	it	can	be	only	true;	on	the	other	
																																																								




non.	 Si	 est	 conditionalis,	 sequitur	 quod	 est	 consequentia,	 cum	 ly	 si,	 ut	 dictum	 est,	 sit	 nota	 consequentiae	 vel	
llationis;	 et	 est	mala,	 	 ut	 notum	est;	 ergo	 consequentia	mala	 est	 consequentia,	 quod	 est	 propositum.	 Si	 autem	
dicatur	 quod	 non	 sit	 conditionalis,	 et	manifestum	 est	 quod	 non	 sit	 alterius	 speciei	 propositionis	 hypotheticae	




side,	 there	 is	 a	 conditional	 loosely	meant,	which	 is	 said	 to	be	 true	or	 false.7561	Authors	who	
wrote	about	true	and	false	conditionals	-	Marsilius	says	-,	like	Peter	of	Spain	(but	he	could	also	





beg	 the	 question,	 since	 we	 would	 still	 lack	 an	 appropriate	 characterisation	 of	 when	 a	
consequentia	is	valid.	Placed	as	it	is,	all	the	argument	does	is	deny	the	objector's	claim	because	
the	 claim	 is	 to	 be	 denied.	 Certainly,	 such	 denial	 is	 grounded	 on	 Marsilius'	 rejection	 of	
consequentiae	malae,	but	 this	 is	exactly	what	 the	disagreement	 is	about.	By	 introducing	V4-5	
defining	the	consequentia	as	a	kind	of	entailment	relation,	Marsilius'	claim	is	"filled	out":	the	








7561	Marsilius	 of	 Inghen,	Consequentiae	 I.1	 'Respondeo'	 <2.3>:	 "Ad	 tertiam	 rationem,	 quando	 dicitur:	 "sequitur	
quod	aliqua	esset	propositio	quae	nec	esset	categorica	nec	hypothetica",	negatur	 ista.	Ad	probationem,	quando	








7562	See	 e.g.	Buridan,	SDD	 I.7.3:	 "Condicionalis	 est	 illa	 in	qua	 coniunguntur	duae	propositiones	 categoricae	per	
hanc	 coniunctionem	 'si',	 ut	 'si	 homo	 est	 animal	 est'.	 Ad	 veritatem	 condicionalis	 exigitur	 quod	 antecedens	 non	
















We	 have	 seen	 how	Marsilius	 gives	 a	 first	 description	 quod	 sit	 of	 consequentia	 as	 an	 oratio	
composed	of	an	antecedens,	a	consequens	and	a	nota	illationis.	But,	at	its	core	a	consequentia	is	
a	 relation	 of	 illation	 or	 the	 habitude	 of	 necessary	 following	 of	 the	 consequent	 from	 the	
antecedent.	Therefore,	consequentia	as	an	oratio	is	an	expression	of	this	relation	of	entailment	
as	 it	 is	 defined	 by	 the	 semantic	 criterion	 of	 validity	 V4-5	 and	 holding	 between	 at	 least	 two	
existing	sentences.	
The	conception	of	consequentia	primarily	as	some	sort	of	sentential	relation,	emerging	from	
Marsilius'	 account,	 puts	 him	 apart	 from	 John	Buridan	 and	Albert	 of	 Saxony,	who	 give	 their	
accounts	primarily	in	propositional	terms	(consequentia	est	propositio	hypothetica)	and	seem	
to	 conceive	 a	 consequence	 first	 and	 foremost	 as	 an	 inferential	 operation	made	 by	 a	mind.	




like	what	 Normore	 calls	 Buridan's	Meta-Theorem	 and	 its	main	 results:	 the	 strength	 of	 the	










like	equivalences	or	relations	holding	 in	both	directions	are	really	 two	consequentiae	 rather	
than	one.	
Furthermore,	since	 it	 is	 the	relation	holding	between	the	members	of	 this	ordered	pair	 that	
makes	 them	a	consequentia,	 then	as	 long	as	antecedens	and	consequens	 exist	 -	Marsilius	 is	a	
tokenist	-	they	would	be	a	consequentia	even	if	nobody	bothers	to	say	so.	This	means	that,	on	
the	one	hand,	 the	note	of	 illation	 is	a	syntactic	convention	pertaining	 to	 the	expression	of	a	
consequentia:	 it	 makes	 the	 oratio	 describing	 or	 pointing	 at	 the	 relation,	 saying	 that	 the	
relation	is	there;	but	the	relation	would	still	be	there	even	if	the	nota	illationis	were	not	-	or	if	
we	changed	the	syntactic	conventions	for	its	employment.	
And	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 account	 implies	 that	 there	 are	many	 consequences	 that	 could	
possibly	never	be	stated,	nor	known	by	any	finite	(or	infinite)	mind,	which	can	help	Marsilius	
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to	 get	 around	 some	 of	 the	 issues	 raised	within	 accounts	 taking	 consequentiae	primarily	 as	
inferences,	like	Buridan's.7563	
Overall	 then,	Marsilius'	 treatment	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 consequentia	 presents	 a	 number	 of	 very	









Late	Medieval	 discussions	 about	 incipit	and	desinit	 are	 an	 interesting	 and	 complex	meeting	
point	of	physical,	ontological	and	logical	questions	and	concerns.	Even	if	we	are	going	to	focus	
on	 Marsilius'	 treatment	 of	 the	 exposition	 of	 incipit	 and	 desinit,	 these	 issues	 should	 not	 be	
completely	 overlooked.	 They	 are	 many,	 complex	 and	 quite	 extensively	 studied,7564	and	 go	
beyond	the	technicalities	of	the	expositio,	which	often	ends	up	being	affected	by	extra-logical	












where	 incipit	 and	 desinit	 are	 the	 main	 verb	 -	 or	 how	 to	 make	 good	 inferences	 with	 such	
sentences;	and	so	on.	
	
I	am	going	to	 focus	on	Marsilius	of	 Inghen's	 treatment	of	expositions	of	sentences	de	incipit	
and	de	desinit	in	Consequentiae	II.4-5.	
There	 are	 three	 principal	 possible	ways	 of	 treating	 incipit	and	desinit,	 depending	 on	which	
issues	 are	 put	 in	 the	 foreground	 and	 also	 determine	 the	 way	 the	 others	 are	 treated.	 One	




As	 I	 am	 using	 this	 distinction,	 I	 am	 thinking	 about	 these	 approaches	 as	 different	 ways	 of	
looking	 at	 the	 question,	 and	 to	 deal	 with	 a	 subject	 matter	 that	 is	 conceived	 differently.	






























The	physical	 and	metaphysical	 fact	 that	 time	 cannot	 be	 "gappy"	 is	 relevant	 for	 the	 issue	 of	
beginning	and	ceasing	to	be,	to	have	a	property,	to	move:	there	cannot	be	any	further	instant	
																																																								
7567	For	 example,	 for	Aristotle	 there	 is	no	motion	at	 an	 instant:	 the	very	question	about	 if	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 an	
object	 to	be	 in	motion	at	an	 instant	does	not	make	sense	 from	the	point	of	view	of	 the	Aristotelian	orthodoxy.	
However,	 many	medieval	 authors	 do	 not	 have	 any	 problem	 in	 asking	 the	 question,	 under	 the	 assumption	 of	












between	 the	 initial	 state	ceasing	 to	be	 the	case	and	 the	 final	 state	beginning	 to	be	 the	case.	
Therefore,	 in	 an	 Aristotelian	 framework,	 from	 the	 physical	 and	 the	 metaphysical	 point	 of	
view,		change	has	to	be	instantaneous.		
When	 our	 authors	 analyse	 sentences	 about	 incipit	 or	 desinit,	 most	 of	 them	 face	 a	 bit	 of	 a	
conundrum.	On	the	one	hand,	 if	 the	Law	of	Non-Contradiction	stands,	 the	 last	 instant	of	 the	





Therefore,	when	 dealing	with	 this	 kind	 of	 "limit	 decision	 problem",7574	of	 the	 four	 possible	
ways	 to	 go	 about	 the	 analysis	 of	 when	 the	 moment	 of	 change	 takes	 place,	 as	 they	 are	
categorised	by	Strobach,7575	most	medieval	authors	seem	to	prefer	an	either/or	approach:	at	
the	limiting	instant,	only	one	of	the	two	states	obtains.	For	some,	as	e.g.	Burley	in	his	De	primo	
and	ultimo	instanti,7576	this	seems	to	be	also	a	physical	 fact	 -	and	 in	Burley's	 theory	 it	yields	
some	 problems. 7577 	For	 some	 others,	 as	 e.g.	 Peter	 of	 Spain	 in	 his	 Tractatus	





















Be	 that	 which	 it	 may,	 both	 logical	 expositions	 of	 sentences	 de	 incipit	 and	 de	 desinit	 and	
physical-metaphysical	theories	aiming	to	account	for	motion,	beginning	and	ceasing,	have	to	
make	 a	 choice	 on	 how	 to	 split	 the	 time	 continuum	 at	 the	 moment	 of	 change	 to	 run	 their	
analyses.	If	we	want	to	keep	an	either/or	approach	-	as	most	of	our	medieval	logicians	do,	at	
least	on	the	 logical	or	on	the	meta-linguistic	 level	of	 their	analyses	-,	 to	use	a	contemporary	
jargon,	 here	 we	 have	 a	 limit	 decision	 problem	 insofar	 as	 we	 need	 to	 assign	 the	 instant	 of	
change	only	to	one	of	 the	relevant	adjacent	 intervals	on	the	continuum:	either	to	the	end	of	




state	and	an	external	or	an	 internal	 limit	 to	 the	 initial	one,	 as	 long	as	you	are	 consistent	 in	
your	 assignment.7580	This	 means	 that,	 from	 a	 purely	 logical	 point	 of	 view,	 i.e.	 if	 you	 are	
concerned	only	with	analysing	 some	sentences	and	not	with	modelling	or	explaining	actual	
physical	 phenomena,	 the	 limit	 assignation	 can	 be	 arbitrary,	 as	 long	 as	 it	 falls	 within	 the	
constraints	 that	 your	 logic	 might	 want	 to	 preserve	 -	 e.g.	 non-contradiction.	 This	 way	 of	







However,	 many	 medieval	 authors	 do	 have	 in	 mind	 some	 fact	 of	 the	 world	 needing	 to	 be	
explained	and	only	a	few	consider	analyses	de	incipit/de	desinit	to	be	an	arbitrary	matter,	as	
for	 example	 Ockham	 does:7581	the	 great	 majority	 of	 them,	 even	 when	 conducting	 a	 logical	
analysis	on	sentences	containing	incipit	and	desinit,	tend	to	assign	limits	on	the	basis	of	extra-
logical	reasons.	 In	 the	 first	place,	 these	are	ontological	considerations:	different	kinds	of	res	
get	 different	 assignments.	 But	 if	 we	 are	 trying	 to	 run	 a	 logical	 analysis	 by	 ontological	
considerations	 and	 to	 capture	 some	 fact	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 things,	 then	 the	 distinction	
between	physical	and	 logical	accounts	starts	 to	seem	feeble:	e.g.	on	 the	one	side,	 the	 logical	
account	cannot	pick	limits	arbitrarily	anymore;	on	the	other	side,	there	is	a	logical	necessity	in	
the	physical	impossibility	for	two	limits	to	be	of	the	same	kind.	
By	 developing	 some	 Aristotelian	 considerations	 on	 several	 different	 cases	 of	 first	 and	 last	
instants,	 the	 distinction	 between	 res	 permanens	 (permanent	 thing)	 and	 res	 successiva	
(successive	thing)	is	quite	standard	in	the	XIV	century	discussions	on	the	topic.		
A	res	permanens	is	a	thing	whose	parts	exist	wholly	at	a	time:	a	permanent	thing	is	all	there	at	
once,	 so	 to	 speak;	 this	 is	 the	 case	 of	 substantial	 things	 like	 a	 stone	 or	 a	 piece	 of	 wood;	
"Socrates"	 is	 a	 classical	 example.	 A	 res	 successiva	 is	 a	 thing	 whose	 different	 parts	 exist	 at	
different	 times,	as	e.g.	motion,	any	process	as	such,	 time	 itself:	by	 their	nature,	 these	 things	
cannot	be	all	there	at	once.7582	This	distinction	can	be	made	more	fine-grained:	for	example,	
according	 to	 authors	 like	 John	 of	Holland	 or	Walter	Burley,7583	a	 permanent	 thing	 could	 be	
instantaneous	or	durable	(i.e.	lasting	through	time);	and	a	durable	permanent	thing		could	be	
in	 some	 way	 dependent	 on	 a	 res	 successiva,	 for	 example	 (but	 not	 necessarily)	 by	 being	
involved	 in	 a	 process,	 as	 being	 a	 certain	 colour	 in	 a	 process	 of	 intensio/remissio	 formarum.	
																																																								
7581	SL	II,19	
7582	E.g.	 Walter	 Burley,	 De	 Pur.	 Tractatus	 brevior	 [1951,	 59]:	 "Res	 permanentes	 sunt	 quarum	 esse	 est	 simul	
secundum	omnes	earum	partes,	ut	 lapis	et	 lignum.	Res	successivae	sunt,	quarum	esse	non	est	simul	secundum	
omnes	 earum	partes,	 sed	 esse	 earum	 consistit	 in	 successionem	partium,	 ita	 quod	 eis	 repugnat	 habere	 omnes	
partes	simul,	cuiusmodi	sunt	tempus	et	motus."	




successive	 thing:	 for	example,	 "starting	 to	be	white"	could	be	considered	either	as	a	proper	
process	 of	 the	 acquisition	 of	 the	 property	 of	 being	 white	 (and	 the	 remission	 of	 the	
incompatible	property	of	being	some	other	colour);	or	"being	white"	could	also	be	considered	
as	 as	 the	 result	 of	 that	 process	 and,	 as	 such,	 as	 a	 properly	 permanent	 thing.7584	Therefore,	
many	authors,	 as	 e.g.	Peter	of	 Spain,7585	treat	 "being	white"	as	a	permanent	 thing;	 for	 some	
others,	 instead,	 as	 e.g.	 for	 Marsilius	 of	 Inghen,	 terms	 like	 "white"	 smuggle	 a	 "hidden	
succession"	into	the	analysis,	because	they	are	taken	to	be	connoting	a	process.	
These	 distinctions	 are	 relevant,	 because	 res	 permanentes	 and	 res	 successivae	 are	 generally	





generation/corruption	changes,	 in	a	more	or	 less	 lose	Aristotelian	framework	and	by	taking	
other	 factors	 into	 account	 -	 as	 e.g.	 causality.7587	As	we	 have	 said,	 a	 purely	 logical	 approach	
(like	Ockham's	in	SL	II,19)	would	consider	both	the	split	between	permanent	and	successive	
things,	 and	 the	 limit	 assignation,	 to	 be	 completely	 conventional.	 But	many	 theories	 do	 not	
consider	 neither	 the	 split	 nor	 the	 limit	 assignation	 to	 be	 a	 pure	 matter	 of	 convention;	 in	
principle,	 these	 theories	 show	 some	 kind	 of	 hybrid	 approach	 between	 the	 logical	 and	 the	
physical.	Even	when	they	are	primarily	concerned	with	a	logical	or	metalinguistic	analysis,	it	






7587	Spade	 [1994]	 underlines	 how	 the	 particular	 issue	 of	 accounting	 for	 instantaneous	 causation	 might	 be	
fundamental	to	make	sense	of	some	theories,	like	e.g.	Burley's,	that	seem	to	carry	more	problems	than	benefits.	
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Even	 if	 there	 is	 no	 standard	 limit	 assignation,	 it	 becomes	 fairly	 common	 to	 assign	 extrinsic	
limits	on	both	ends	of	successive	things	and	an	extrinsic	final	limit	to	permanent	things.		
On	the	one	hand,	this	kind	of	assignation	is	far	from	being	universally	accepted,	even	for	the	





On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 quite	 easy	 to	 see	 how	 such	 assignations	 immediately	 raise	 some	
problems	or	 -	better	 -	 they	make	some	problems	evident,	 since	 these	or	very	similar	 issues	
could	 still	 come	 up	 also	 with	 different	 assignations,	 but	 under	 the	 same	 kind	 of	 approach	
trying	to	"keep	a	 foot	 in	both	camps"	by	wanting	a	hybrid	theory	maintaining	that	 time	 is	a	
continuum,	isolating	an	instant	rather	than	an	interval	of	change	and	holding	that	only	one	of	
the	 two	adjacent	 incompatible	states	can	be	verified	at	 that	 instant.	For	example,	under	 the	
constraints	normally	assumed	and	with	the	most	common	kind	of	exposition,	you	cannot	have	
two	 adjacent	 successive	 things	 (as	 e.g.	motion	 and	 rest	would	 be)	 on	 the	 continuum,	 nor	 a	
successive	 thing	 could	 follow	 a	 permanent	 one	 -	 not	 to	 mention	 the	 issues	 relative	 to	
instantaneous	permanent	 things	 and	oscillatory	motion.7589	Then,	 it	would	 seem	 that	 either	
time	becomes	"gappy"	after	all,7590	or	 that	you	have	 to	opt	 for	another	kind	of	account	 than	












the	 first	 (II.4.1)	 is	on	 the	exposition	of	sentences	where	 the	subject	 is	a	discrete	substantial	
term	-	e.g.	'Sortes'	-;	the	second	(II.4.2)	is	on	the	exposition	of	sentences	where	the	subject	is	a	
common	or	a	connotative	term	-	e.g.	respectively	'homo'	and	'album'	-;	the	last	one	(II.4.3)	is	
devoted	 to	 the	 rules	 granting	 good	 inferences	 among	 the	 sentences	 to	 be	 exposed	
(exponendae)	and	their	exponents	(exponentes).	The	second	chapter	on	desinit	is	divided	into	








and	de	desinit,	mostly	by	 following	 the	structure	outlined	 in	 the	 index.	However,	among	 the	
analyses	 of	 the	 most	 common	 approaches	 to	 expounding	 sentences	 de	 incipit,	 II.4.1<4>	
includes	a	discussion	about	how	to	interpret	"now"	(nunc),	therefore	explicitly	touching	upon	
the	issues	of	the	acceptability	of	imaginary	indivisible	instants	and	of	the	temporal	continuum.	








substantial	 vs.	 common	or	 connotative	 subject),	Marsilius	 gives	 a	 second	 -	 quite	 standard	 -	
distinction:	 the	 verb	 incipit	 could	 be	 used	 either	 (-a-)	 with	 respect	 to	 terms	 signifying	
permanent	 things	 (res	permanentes)	 or	 (-b-)	with	 respect	 to	 terms	 connoting	 some	 kind	 of	
succession	(res	successivae)	-	either	(-b1-)	explicitly	or	(-b2-)	implicitly.		
Marsilius	does	not	articulate	-a-,	however	he	gives	two	examples:	"Sortes	incipit	esse	homo"	
and	 "Sortes	 incipit	 esse	 substantia;"	 then,	 -a-	 concerns	 the	 coming	 into	being	of	 substantial	
subjects.	Even	if	in	the	description	of	-a-	Marsilius	adds	a	"singulariter"	(respectu	terminorum	
pure	permanentium	singulariter)	and	both	examples	given	here	are	about	discrete	substantial	
subjects,	 -a-	 applies	 also	 to	 common	 terms	 picking	 out	 substances	 -	 e.g.	 "homo"	 in	 "homo	
incipit	 esse."	 These	 sentences	 do	 require	 a	 different	 exposition,	 but	 this	 is	 due	 to	 the	
supposition	of	common	terms	as	such,	which	is	an	independent	matter	from	the	permanent	or	
sequential	nature	of	any	of	the	terms	involved	in	the	split	-a/b-.7591	
-b1-	 concerns	 sentences	 having	 a	 term	 explicitly	 denoting	 a	 succession,	 either	 in	 subject	
position	or	in	predicate	position;	Marsilius	gives	two	examples	of	explicit	succession:	"motus	
incipit	esse"	and	"Sortes	incipit	currere."	
Then,	Marsilius	explains	 -b2-	a	bit	more	extensively	 than	either	 -a-	or	 -b1-:	 in	sentences	 like	
"album	 incipit	 esse	 nigrum"	 or	 "nigrum	 incipit	 esse"	 a	 succession	 is	 signified	 implicitly	
because	 they	mean	 the	 intensio	 of	 a	quality	 (and	 the	remissio	 of	 another	mutually	exclusive	
one)	within	some	subject	-	which	is	indeed	a	kind	of	succession.	Therefore,	 -b2-	seems	to	be	
"smuggled	 in"	 mostly	 by	 connotative	 terms,	 specifically	 by	 terms	 meaning	 some	 property	
which	 is	acquired	or	 lost	by	degrees,	 in	a	way	analogous	 to	 speed	or	movement:	 this	 is	 the	





Calculators.7592		 Contrary	 to	 what	 many	 other	 authors	 do,7593	Marsilius	 does	 not	 consider	
incipit	esse	album	as	the	result	of	a	process	and	therefore	as	a	proper	permanent	thing.	
What	can	we	make	of	 this	 first	distinctions	 introduced	by	Marsilius?	Not	much,	 I	 fear,	 since	
the	passage	does	not	offer	a	very	articulated	examination	and	is	quite	cursory	-	which	is	not	
surprising,	 since	we	 are	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 treatise	mainly	 concerned	with	 analysing	 valid	
consequences.	Nevertheless,	we	can	make	a	few	observations.	
In	 the	 first	 place,	 Marsilius	 mentions	 only	 a	 division	 about	 the	 subject	 terms	 (discrete	
substantial	 vs.	 common	 and	 connotative),	which	 is	 going	 to	 be	 relevant	 in	 the	 expositions;	
however	 this	 division	 is	 rooted	 in	 Marsilius'	 standard	 theory	 of	 supposition:	 we	 are	 not	
dealing	 with	 any	 exceptions	 in	 the	 behaviour	 of	 these	 terms	 in	 sentences	 de	 incipit	 or	 de	
desinit.	Furthermore,	Marsilus	does	not	even	mention	the	question	of	 the	supposition	of	 the	
predicate	 term	 in	 such	 sentences,	 which,	 for	 example,	 was	 the	main	 object	 of	 controversy	
between	Ockham	and	Bradwardine.7594	
Secondly,	even	if	Marsilius	is	speaking	here	primarily	of	terms,	it	is	a	relevant	factor	the	kind	
of	 entities	 picked	 out	 by	 these	 terms	 when	 the	 verb	 incipit	 is	 used	 with	 respect	 to	 them.	
However,	 this	 relevance	goes	only	up	 to	a	point	 and	 it	does	not	warrant	any	 finely-grained	
ontological	distinction,	since	Marsilius	does	not	even	mention	physically	and	metaphysically	
problematic	cases	as	instantaneous	entities.		
Moreover,	 another	 distinction	 -	 which	 seems	 fairly	 common	 in	 logical	 and	 metalinguistic	





































The	 form	 "EXP"	 will	 be	 used	 to	 label	 expositions	 of	 sentences	 de	 incipit	 with	 a	 singular	
substantial	subject	term;	"EXPD"	will	be	used	for	expositions	de	desinit.	I	am	going	to	call	the	
ways	of	expounding	an	affirmative	sentence	"EXP+"	and	 the	ways	of	expounding	a	negative	










EXP1a+	 expounds	 the	exponenda	 by	 a	 two-membered	 conjunctive	 sentence	where	 the	 first	
member	contains	a	positio	de	praesenti	 i.e.	 it	states	 that	 the	subject	of	 the	exponenda	 is	now	
whatever	the	predicate	states	it	to	be;	and	the	second	member	is	a	remotio	de	praeterito	i.e.	it	













e.g.	 "Sortes	 non	 incipit	 esse	 homo"	 =exp1a-	 "Sortes	 nunc	 non	 est	 homo	 vel	 Sortes	 immediate	
ante	hoc	fuit	homo"	
	
















Under	 this	analysis,	 "Sortes	 incipit	 esse	homo"	 is	 true	 iff:	 either	Socrates	now	 is	a	man	and	




possible	 for	 "Sortes	 incipit	 esse	 homo"	 to	 be	 true	 if	 both	 "Sortes	 nunc	 est	 homo	 et	 Sortes	
immediate	ante	hoc	non	fuit	homo"	and	"Sortes	nunc	non	est	homo	et	Sortes	immediate	post	
hoc	erit	homo"	are	true.	This	cannot	be	the	case	if	you	keep	Non-Contradiction	in	your	logic,	
since	"Sortes	nunc	est	homo"	and	"Sortes	nunc	non	est	homo"	would	have	 to	be	 true	at	 the	








EXP2-	:			 			exponenda			=exp2-	 	 	(remotio	de	praesenti	VEL	positio	de	praeterito)	ET	(positio	
de	praesenti	VEL	remotio	de	futuro)	
e.g.	 "Sortes	non	 incipit	esse	homo"	=exp2-	 	 "(Sortes	nunc	non	est	homo	vel	Sortes	 immediate	
ante	hoc	fuit	homo)	et	(Sortes	nunc	est	homo	vel	[Sortes]	immediate	post	hoc	non	erit	homo)"	
	
Marsilius	 calls	 EXP2	 a	 modus	 verus:	 apparently	 the	 account	 it	 yields	 is	 a	 correct	 one;	
moreover,	 it	 looks	 also	 like	 it	 is	 a	 complete	 and	 uniform	 account	 of	 any	 sentence	 having	 a	
singular	 non-connotative	 subject.	 EXP2	 is,	 for	 Marsilius,	 a	modus	moderatus.	 But	 in	 which	
sense	 is	 it	 "moderate"?	 Presumably,	 because	 it	 can	 treat	 disjunctively	 the	 affirmative	 cases	




However,	 later	 on	 (in	 II.4.2<1>),	 Marsilius	 mentions	 also	 a	 "second	 way	 of	 expounding"	
sentences	covered	by	EXP1a;	I	am	going	to	call	this	modus	exponendi	EXP3(a).	This	case	is	not		
analysed	 in	detail,	but	 the	 text	gives	us	enough	elements	 to	offer	a	reconstruction	of	how	it	
should	go.	We	have	the	output	given	by	EXP3(a)	 for	sentences	where	incipit	is	not	used	with	
respect	 to	 terms	 signifying	 a	 succession:	 it	 is	 identical	 to	 the	 one	 of	 EXP1b	 for	 sentences	
where	incipit	is	used	with	respect	to	successive	terms.	Therefore,	schematically:	
[EXP3(a)+]	:			 	exponenda	=exp3(a)+	remotio	de	praesenti		ET		positio	de	futuro	













However,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 for	 the	 exposition	 of	 permanent	 terms,	 we	 can	 say	 that	 EXP2	
covers	both	accounts	given	by	EXP1a	and	EXP3(a);	on	the	other	hand,	by	combining	de	facto	
both	 the	 accounts	 of	 EXP1,	 EXP2	 seems	 to	 offer	 an	 analysis	 that	 is	per	se	 indifferent	 to	 the	
permanent	or	substantial	nature	of	the	objects	referred	to	by	the	terms	involved	-	and	yet	it	




trying	 to	 capture	 some	 fact	 about	 res	 permanentes	or	 successivae.	 This	 would	 be	 the	 case,	




to	 give	 a	 complete	 sentential	 analysis,	 then	 EXP2	 is	 viable.	 Then,	 EXP2	 can	 be	 applied	 to	
classify	 systematically	 external	 facts	 or	 things,	 but	 -	 in	 a	 very	 Buridanian	 spirit	 -	 this	 is	 a	
matter	of	arbitrary	classification	that	does	not	depend	from	any	fact	of	the	mater.	
	
All	 these	 accounts	 hold	 for	 sentences	 with	 discrete	 substantive	 subjects,	 but	 -	 as	 I	 have	
mentioned	 -	 they	 fail	when	 the	subject	 is	either	a	common	or	a	connotative	 term.	 It	 is	 then	
necessary	to	add	a	third	member	to	the	exponens,	according	to	the	way	of	exposition	that	 is	
chosen,	in	order	to	extend	it	to	include	these	cases	too.	
EXP1a*+	:		 	 exponenda	 	 =exp1a*+	 positio	 de	 praesenti	 ET	 remotio	 de	 praeterito	 ET	
remotio	praeteriri	a	praesenti	
e.g.	 "homo	 incipit	 esse	 Sortes"7598	=exp1a*+	 "homo	nunc	 est	 Sortes	 et	 nullus	 homo	 immediate	
ante	hoc	fuit	Sortes	et	nihil	quod	nunc	est	homo	immediate	ante	hoc	fuit	Sortes"	





7598	Marsilius	 tends	 to	 read	 indeterminate	 sentences	 as	 particulars;	 therefore	 their	 contradictories	 usually	 are	
negative	universal	sentences.	
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Marsilius	 annotates	 that,	 when	 the	 subject	 is	 a	 common	 substantial	 term,	 the	 output	 of	





EXP1b*	 is	 EXP1's	way	 of	 analysing	 sentences	with	 a	 connotative	 term	 in	 subject	 position;	
these	sentences	obviously	require	a	type	-b-	exposition,	since	connotative	terms	smuggle	in	a	
hidden	succession.	
EXP1b*+	:		 exponenda	 =exp1b*+	 	 remotio	 de	 praesenti	 	 ET	 	 positio	 de	 futuro	 	 ET	 	 remotio	
praesentis	a	futuro	
e.g.	 "hoc	 album	 incipit	 esse	 Sortes"	 =exp1b*+	 "hoc	 album	 nunc	 non	 est	 Sortes	 et	 hoc	 album	
immediate	post	hoc	erit	Sortes	et	nihil	quod	immediate	post	hoc	erit	album	nunc	est	Sortes"	
[EXP1b*-]:		 exponenda	 =	 exp1b*-	 	 positio	 de	 praesenti	 VEL	 	 remotio	 de	 futuro	 VEL	 positio	
praesentis	a	futuro	
[e.g.]	"hoc	album	non	incipit	esse	Sortes"	=	exp1b*-	 	 "hoc	album	nunc	est	Sortes	vel	hoc	album	




and	 where	 incipit	 is	 used	 with	 respect	 to	 permanent	 terms,	 can	 be	 built	 analogously	 to	
EXP1b*.	Therefore,	we	would	have:	























Whereas	some	expositions	of	 incipit	distinguish	between	 the	exposition	of	 sentences	where	
incipit	 is	used	with	 respect	 to	 terms	signifying	permanent	 things	and	with	 respect	 to	 terms	
signifying	 a	 succession,	 this	 -	 according	 to	 Marsilius	 -	 is	 not	 the	 case	 with	 desinit.	 When	
exposing	 a	 sentence	de	 incipit,	we	 are	 (often)	making	 an	 extra-logical	 choice:	we	 are	 either	
saying	 that	 the	 things	 signified	 by	 the	 subject	 have	 a	 first	 instant	 (e.g.	 EXP1a),	 which	 is	
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commonly	 accepted	 for	 res	 permanentes;	 or	 we	 are	 saying	 that	 the	 things	 signified	 by	 the	
subject	 do	 not	 have	 a	 first	 instant	 (e.g.	 EXP1b),	 which	 is	 the	 common	 way	 of	 expounding	
sentences	where	incipit	is	used	with	respect	to	terms	signifying	res	successivae.	However	it	is	
commonly	accepted	that	no	substantial	thing	has	a	last	instant	either;	once	again,	this	is	due	to	
extra-logical	 reasons,	 but	 here	 there	 is	 no	 commonly	 accepted	 alternative	 choice,	 and	












EXPD+*	 :	 	 	 	exponenda	=expd*+	 	 remotio	de	praesenti	 ET	positio	de	praeterito	 ET	 	 	 remotio	de	
praesenti	a	praeterito.	







EXPD-*	 :	 	 exponenda	 	 =expd*-	 	 	 positio	 de	 praesenti	 	 VEL	 	 remotio	 de	 praeterito	 VEL	 	 positio	
praesentis	a	praeterito	








an	 extension,	 it	 might	 be	 desirable	 to	 abstract	 the	 extension	 from	 the	 extended	 thing	 and	
therefore	 to	 treat	 this	 abstracted	 extension	 as	 an	 object	 independent	 from	 the	 res	 extensa.	
Therefore,	we	can	take	"the	instant	in	which	the	rarefaction	of	something	begins"	to	coincide	
with	or	"to	be	the	last	instant	of	the	preceding	extension."		
Overall,	 such	 abstracted	 extension	 seems	 to	 be	 an	 imaginary	 entity,	 of	 the	 same	 sort	 of	
instants	 -	accepted	within	Marsilius'	 theory	as	 imaginabilia.7601	However,	Marsilius	does	not	
say	much	at	all	about	this	exception	and	what	he	does	say	is	not	very	clear.	To	what	kind	of	
extensions	 does	 this	 exception	 apply?	 What	 is	 its	 purpose?	 It	 looks	 like	 it	 might	 apply	 to	
spatial,	 numerical,	 or	 temporal	 extensions.	 Especially	 in	 the	 temporal	 extension	 case,	
abstracting	the	extension	occupied	by	a	certain	entity	on	the	time	continuum	and	limiting	it	




Marsilius	 gives	 some	 cursory	hints	 about	 terms	 referring	 to	 such	 imaginable	 things.	Once	 again	 going	 against	
Buridan	and	in	agreement	with	some	suggestions	in	Albert	of	Saxony,	also	contradictory	entities	as	a	chimera	or	
predications	"homo	esse	asinum"	are	 imaginabilia,	 they	can	be	 imagined	and	therefore	they	do	not	need	to	be	









from	the	 few	hints	about	 imaginabilia	 that	Marsilius	gives	us	 in	his	 treatises	on	supposition	







possit	habere	 locum	sic	dicendo:	 'haec	extensio	nunc	est	et	 immediate	post	hoc	non	erit'	
sed	 hoc	 non	 est	 in	 substantiis	 vel	 qualitatibus	 resistens	 de	 quibus	 communiter	
loquitur...7603	

















of	 incipit	with	respect	 to	 terms	signifying	permanent	 things	and	 terms	signifying	successive	
things.	I	will	call	them	EXP1ni		and	EXP2ni	.	
Whereas,	 in	 expositions	 accepting	 instants,	 nunc	 and	 immediate	 signify	 a	 single	 indivisible	
instant	 in	 time,7604		 EXP1ni	 and	EXP2ni	 take	 them	 to	 refer	 to	 extended	 intervals.	 For	EXP1ni,	
nunc*	and	immediate*	pick	out	the	entire	interval	of	time	during	which	the	thing	signified	by	










[e.g.]	 "motus	non	 incipit	 esse"	=exp1ni-	 "motus	nunc*	non	est	 vel	motus	 immediate*	 ante	hoc	
fuit"	







































[EXP1ni*+	 ]:	 	 	 	exponenda	=exp1ni+	 	 	positio	de	praesenti	ET	 	 	remotio	de	praeterito	ET	remotio	
praeteriti	a	praesenti	





[EXP1ni*-]	 :	 exponenda	=exp1ni*-	 	 	 	 remotio	 de	 praesenti	 VEL	 positio	 de	 praeterito	 VEL	 positio	
praeteriti	a	praesenti	
[e.g.]	 "hoc	 album	 non	 incipit	 esse	 Sortes"	 =exp1ni*-	 "hoc	 album	 nunc*	 non	 est	 Sortes	 vel	 hoc	
album	immediate*	ante	hoc	fuit	Sortes	vel	aliquid	quod	nunc*	est	album	immediate*	ante	hoc	
fuit	Sortes"	
[e.g.]	 	 "homo	 non	 incipit	 esse	 Sortes"	 =exp1ni*-	 "nullus	 homo	 nunc*	 	 est	 Sortes	 vel	 homo	
immediate*	 ante	 hoc	 fuit	 Sortes	 vel	 aliquid	 quod	 nunc*	 est	 homo	 immediate*	 ante	 hoc	 fuit	
Sortes"	
	
[EXP1Dni*+]:	 exponenda	=exp1dni*+	 	 	 remotio	de	praesenti	 ET	 positio	de	praeterito	 ET	 remotio	
praesentis	a	praeterito	
[e.g]	"hoc	album	desinit	esse	Sortes"	=exp1dni*+	"hoc	album	nunc*	non	est	Sortes	et	hoc	album		











[e.g.]	 	 "homo	 non	 desinit	 esse	 Sortes"	 =expd1ni*-	 "homo	 nunc*	 est	 Sortes	 vel	 nullus	 homo	
immediate*	 ante	 hoc	 fuit	 Sortes	 vel	 aliquid	 quod	 immediate*	 ante	 hoc	 fuit	 homo	nunc*	 est	
Sortes"	
	




[e.g.]	 "Homo	 incipit	 esse	 Sortes"	 =exp2ni*+	 "homo	nunc*	 est	 Sortes	 et	 nullus	 homo	nuper	 fuit	
Sortes	et	nihil	quod	nunc*	est	homo	nuper	fuit	Socrates"	
[EXP2ni*-]:	 	 	 exponenda	=exp2ni*-	 	 remotio	 de	 praesenti	 VEL	 positio	 de	 praeterito	 VEL	 positio	
praeteriti	a	praesenti	










[e.g.]	 "homo	desinit	esse	Sortes"	=expd2ni*+	 "nullus	homo	nunc*	est	Sortes	et	homo	nuper	 fuit	
Sortes	et	nihil	quod	nuper	fuit	homo	nunc*	est	Sortes"	













same	 problem	 arises	 with	 incipit:	 EXP1ni	 would	 concede	 that	 the	 city	 of	 Montpellier	 now	
begins	to	be,	since	it	is	true	that	Montpellier	now	is	and	it	was	not	immediately*	before	now.	
Similar	 issues	 also	 come	 up	with	 a	 somehow	 restricted	 interval	 like	 the	 one	 picked	 out	 by	















Overall,	 partially	 because	 of	 the	 issues	 arising	 from	 EXPni	 and	 EXPDni,	 Marsilius	 prefers	 to	
accept	the	use	of	imaginary	instants	within	his	theory,	even	if	they	do	not	exist	outside	of	the	
abstraction:	 they	 are	 but	 a	modus	 loquendi	 -	 and	 time	 remains	 a	 continuum.	 This	 use	 of	
instants	 as	 a	 convenient	 analytical	 tool	 falls	 in	 line	 with	 some	 other	 contemporary	 logical	
analyses7606	and	with	some	late	XIV	century	developments	in	natural	philosophy.7607	
For	Marsilius,	not	only	is	it	more	convenient	"to	speak	according	to	such	imagination",	but	it	is	
also	 a	 more	 philosophically	 subtle,	 complex	 and	 elegant	 way,	7608	with	 the	 advantage	 of	
allowing	to	elude	the	counterintuitive	interpretations	of	EXPni	and	EXPDni.		
These	 issues	 in	 EXPni	 and	 EXPDni	 are	 not	 dependent	 on	 any	 presupposition	 on	 how	 to	
interpret	the	beginning	or	ceasing	of	permanent	or	successive	things:	the	problem	is	simply	
that	these	interval	based	expositions	would	verify	sentences	which,	intuitively,	should	not	be	
true.	 Therefore,	 here	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 matter	 of	 semantics	 rather	 than	 of	 ontological	 or	
physical	concerns.	
																																																								
7606		 It	 is	 furthermore	 coherent	 with	 his	 treatment	 of	 terms	 signifying	 imaginabilia	 in	 his	 Treatises	 on	 the	
Properties	of	the	Terms.	See	also	e.g.:	Normore	[1976,	288]:	"There	are	a	number	of	advantages	to	having	instants	
available	as	indices	for	the	evaluation	of	sentences.	[...]	These	advantages	were	compelling	enough	to	encourage	





For	 the	diverging	expositions	of	 sentences	where	 incipit	 or	desinit	 are	used	with	 respect	 to	
terms	 signifying	 res	permanentes	or	 successivae,	 it	 is	 a	 different	 story.	 As	 Spade	 noticed,	 as	




presuppositions	 and	 concerns	 -	 and	 of	 how	 you	 choose	 to	 interpret	 some	 Aristotelian	




This	 impression	 emerges,	 for	 example,	 from	 the	 fact	 that,	 in	 his	 logical	 analysis,	 Marsilius	
seems	to	keep	the	-a-/-b-	division	at	least	to	a	degree,	but	also	and	especially	from	the	lack	of	
an	 alternative	 position	 accepting	 an	 intrinsic	 last	 instant	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 expositions	 de	
desinit.	
However,	 an	 interesting	 insight	 could	 come	 from	 the	 exceptional	 case	 of	 the	 exposition	 of	
sentences	 de	 desinit	 about	 extensions,	 which	 warrants	 further	 and	 more	 detailed	 studies.	
Nevertheless,	even	 if	 for	 this	exceptional	case	we	can	work	on	an	abstraction	and	therefore	
we	can	both	forego	the	standard	account	of	desinit	and	have	the	 last	 instant	of	the	previous	







Overall,	 Marsilius'	 account	 seems	 to	 be	 very	 Buridanian	 in	 its	 spirit,	 even	 if	 not	 in	 all	 its	
technical	choices:	 it	can	be	applied	 to	classify	 things	or	 facts,	but	 it	does	not	aim	to	capture	
some	objective	 fact	 of	 their	nature.	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	 account	 is	 a	matter	 of	 logical	 and	
linguistic	 analysis	 of	 the	 behaviour	 of	 sentences	 containing	 incipit	and	desinit;	 on	 the	 other	
hand,	it	does	not	require	nor	does	it	try	to	capture	any	objective	fact	of	the	matter.	
Besides,	 Marsilius	 seems	 to	 think	 that,	 ultimately,	 as	 long	 as	 we	 stay	 within	 logical	
considerations,	you	can	pick	whatever	exposition	you	prefer,	since	these	are	matters	of	quid	
nominis:	"Dicat	tamen	quivis	sicut	sibi	placeat,	quia	in	quid	nominis	non	est	fortis	ratio."	
Such	an	attitude	would	seem	to	 indicate	a	mostly	 logical	approach	 in	 the	background	-	or	a	
logical	way	of	looking	at	the	issue.	
Furthermore,	 	 in	 II.5.1<6>,	at	 the	end	of	his	analysis	of	 the	different	ways	of	EXP	and	EXPD	
expositions,	Marsilius	takes	a	preferred	position.	In	his	own	words:	
Credo	 tamen	 primam	 opinionem,	 scilicet	 positam	 in	 praecedenti	 capitulo,	 esse	magis	 logicalem	 et	
veram.	Et	ideo	in	eam	sto	contentus.7610		
But	 in	II.4	Marsilius	 listed	several	opinions,	so	which	one	is	he	referring	to?	The	most	 likely	
candidates	are	EXP1	and	EXP2.	EXP1	has	the	 features	of	 the	most	common	account	and	the	
advantage	 of	 being	 the	 first	 opinion	 presented	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter;	 EXP2	 is	 a	 logically	
interesting	"moderate"	and	correct	way	of	exposition,	according	to	Marsilius	himself.		
As	of	now,	I	do	not	think	we	have	sufficient	elements	to	give	a	definite	answer.	However,	at	
least	 the	most	 interesting	 choice	 appears	 to	 be	 EXP2,	 because	 it	 is	 a	 complete	 and	 flexible	
account.	 EXP2	 is	 per	 se	neutral	 to	 ontological	 presuppositions	 and	 it	 is	 capable	 of	 treating	
uniformly	 the	 analysis	 of	 any	 sentence	 de	 incipit,	 independently	 of	 the	 permanent	 or	
successive	nature	of	the	terms	involved,	while	still	allowing	you,	in	a	second	time,	to	"choose	













In	 this	 work	 I	 have	 given	 a	 first	 edition	 of	 Marsilius	 of	 Inghen's	 influential	 treatise	 on	
Consequentiae,	along	with	a	historical	and	philosophical	analysis	of	the	text	and	of	some	of	its	
relevant	 aspects.	 In	doing	 so,	 I	 have	 tried	 to	make	a	 tout	court	 contribution	 to	 the	 study	of	
Medieval	 logic,	 by	 engaging	with	 different	 types	 of	methods,	 questions	 and	 approaches	 (as	
those		are	outlined	e.g.	by	Cameron).7611		
From	the	historical	point	of	view,	my	aim	was	to	make	an	important	text	available	to	a	wider	
readership	 and	 to	 clarify	Marsilius'	 theory	 of	 consequences	 and	 the	 context	 of	 the	 debates	
within	which	 this	 theory	was	 formulated;	 I	 also	 intended	 to	 shed	some	 light	on	some	more	
general	aspects	of	 the	history	of	Medieval	 logic	 itself.	From	 the	philosophical	point	of	view,	
this	 project	 touched	 upon	 some	 underlying	 general	 questions	 about:	 the	 philosophical	
relevance	and	interest	of	fragments	of	Medieval	logic	and	of	the	history	Medieval	logic	itself;	
the	 nature	 and	 instances	 of	 what	 we	 count	 as	 Logic	 and	 the	 relation	 of	 Logic	 to	 its	 own	
history;	 the	 centrality	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 "consequence"	 and	 some	 of	 its	 articulations	 in	 a	
particular	moment	of	the	history	of	Logic.		

















structure	 of	 the	 treatise	 and	 its	 and	 manuscript	 tradition,	 highlighting	 some	 features	 of	
interest	 in	 the	manuscript	circulation	of	 the	Consequentiae	and	of	Marsilius'	other	works	on	
the	logica	modernorum	-	e.g.	their	frequent	association	with	logical	texts	belonging	mostly	to	
the	 English	 tradition.	 I	 situated	 the	 Consequentiae	 within	 the	 tradition	 of	 Marsilius'	 other	
works	 in	 the	 logica	 modernorum;	 I	 analysed	 the	 relations	 among	 these	 treatises	 and	
supported	 some	 hypotheses	 on	 their	 relative	 order	 of	 composition	 and	 the	 structure	 of	
Marsilius	project.	 I	was	able	 to	distinguish	 two	main	blocks	of	 text:	on	 the	one	side,	a	"core	
block",	more	unitary	both	in	content	and	circulation,	and	including	the	treatises	edited	by	Bos,	
all	 dealing	 with	 supposition	 and	 closely	 related	 theories;	 on	 the	 other	 side,	 a	 second	 less	
unitary	 block,	 grouping	 together	 Marsilius'	 treatises	 on	 Consequentiae,	 Obligationes	 and	
Insolubilia.	 Moreover,	 I	 proposed	 a	 tentative	 dating	 of	 the	 Consequentiae	 with	 some	





In	 Chapter	 III,	 I	 pursued	 two	principal	 aims.	 First,	 I	 rejected	 the	 common	historiographical	
thesis	that	sees	Medieval	Logic	as	logic	only	in	a	(partially)	equivocal	sense.	Second,	I	assessed	
	 476	
medieval	 theories	 of	 consequentiae	 in	 their	 historical	 development	 and	 conceptual	
framework,	in	order	to	have	a	frame	of	reference	for	my	analysis	of	Marsilius'	theory.	I	offered	
a	general	overview	of	 the	profile	of	medieval	 logic	and	of	 its	study.	Starting	 from	a	minimal	
definition	of	logic	as	"what	logicians	do",	in	the	first	place,	I	examined	who	medieval	logicians	
were,	in	which	institutional	and	cultural	contexts	they	worked	(especially	in	the	later	Middle	
ages),	 how	 they	 defined	 themselves	 and	 their	 practices.	 I	 briefly	 analysed	 those	 practices	
against	 the	 ways	 medieval	 logicians	 defined	 them.	 Then	 I	 outlined	 and	 evaluated	 some	
common	 approaches	 and	 issues	 in	 the	 historiography	 of	 Medieval	 Logic.	 I	 argued	 that	
Medieval	 Logic	 is	 logic	 in	 an	 unequivocal	 sense	 and	 that	 it	 does	 not	 require	 any	 extrinsic	
unifying	 notion.	 Furthermore,	 I	 discussed	 some	methodological	 questions	 and	 claimed	 that	
the	study	of	Medieval	Logic	qua	logic	is	philosophically	relevant	also	from	our	contemporary	
point	of	view.	Finally	I	gave	a	partial	historical	 introduction	to	the	XIV	century	debate(s)	on	
consequentiae.	 I	 examined	 the	 most	 common	 classification	 of	 XIV	 century	 theories	 of	
consequentiae	 and	 paid	 particular	 attention	 to	 the	 split	 between	 a	 Parisian	 and	 an	 English	





In	 Chapter	 IV	 I	 developed	 my	 analysis	 Marsilius'	 theory	 of	 consequentiae.	 I	 focused	 on	
Marsilius'	definition	of	consequentia	and	on	some	aspects	of	its	articulation	throughout	Book	I.	
I	started	with	an	analysis	of	Marsilius'	definitio	or	descriptio	quod	sit	of	consequentia	and	of	its	






satisfactory,	 and	on	 some	aspects	 of	 their	 articulation,	 proceeding	by	making	 a	 comparison	
with	 John	 Buridan's	 and	 Albert	 of	 Saxony's	 analogous	 discussions	 and	 by	 highlighting	
analogies	and	differences	between	 their	approaches.	Finally,	 I	 focused	on	Marsilius'	 take	on	
the	 relation	 between	 consequentiae	 and	 propositiones	 hypotheticae	 conditionales.	 Even	 if	
Marsilius	 rightfully	 belongs	 to	 the	 Parisian	 tradition,	 my	 analysis	 showed	 some	 relevant	
differences	with	Buridan	and	Albert,	most	evidently	about	 their	very	conceptions	of	what	a	




In	 Chapter	 V,	 I	 took	 a	 case	 study	 from	 Book	 II:	 Marsilius'	 analysis	 of	 the	 expositions	 of	
sentences	 containing	 incipit	 and	desinit.	 Late	Medieval	 discussions	 about	 incipit	and	desinit	
are	 an	 interesting	 and	 complex	meeting	 point	 of	 physical,	 ontological	 and	 logical	 questions	
and	concerns.	Therefore,	 I	gave	a	short	outline	of	these,	 issues	because	of	their	relevance	in	
shaping	an	author's	choice	 in	matters	primarily	concerning	the	 logical	analysis	of	sentences	
containing	 these	 terms.	Even	 if	 I	 focused	on	 the	 technicalities	of	Marsilius'	 treatment	of	 the	
expositio	 of	 sentences	 of	 this	 type,	 I	 contextualised	 this	 treatment	within	 the	more	 general	
framework	of	those	debates.	In	the	split	between	logical	and	physical	approaches,	Marsilius'	
theory	shows	some	hybrid	features,	but	-	as	I	argued	-	it	inclines	towards	the	logical	end	of	the	
spectrum	 and	 presents	 some	 elements	 of	 originality.	 Overall,	 Marsilius'	 account	 of	 the	
exposition	of	incipit	and	desinit	is	very	Buridanian	in	its	spirit:	it	does	not	seem	to	be	intended	





There	are	several	 lines	of	 inquiry	still	open	and	 to	be	pursued	 in	 future	studies.	 In	 the	 first	
place,	the	present	edition	should	be	expanded	with	a	more	complete	collation	at	least	of	some	
of	the	oldest	manuscripts	-	particularly		U.	Hopefully,	we	might	then	be	able	to	offer	a	better	




between	 the	 Parisian	 and	 the	 English	 approaches	 to	 consequentiae;	 such	 reconsideration	
should	both	undertake	 a	 systematic	 comparison	between	 some	key	 conceptual	 aspects	 and	
should	 pay	 close	 attention	 to	 the	 possible	 routes	 of	 influence	 -	 and,	 for	 example	 to	 the	
teaching	of	logic	in	the	Natio	anglicana	in	the	second	half	of	the	XIV	century	and	to	its	"minor"	
members.	
Marsilius'	 logical	 works	 have	 been	 only	 barely	 studied:	 we	 still	 lack	 an	 edition	 of	 his	
Obligationes	and	Insolubilia.	Such	editorial	work	would	be	very	helpful	-	or	even	essential	-	for	
a	 better	 understanding	 of	 Marsilius'	 Consequentiae	 too,	 e.g.	 in	 particular	 to	 offer	 a	 more	
complete	and	historically	grounded	account	of	Marsilius'	conception	of	the	relation	between	
consequentiae	and	conditionals.	
Here	 I	 could	 only	 scratch	 the	 surface	 of	Marsilius'	 theory	 of	 consequentiae,	 by	 choosing	 to	
focus	on	some	essential	features	concerning	the	definition	of	consequentia	and	its	articulation,	
and	on	a	philosophically	relevant	case	study	 like	 the	exposition	of	sentences	de	incipit	et	de	
desinit.	Much	work	 is	 still	 to	 be	 done.	 For	 example,	we	 need	 a	more	 systematic	 analysis	 of	






Natural	 philosophy:	 such	 study	 would	 be	 particularly	 important	 also	 to	 give	 a	 better	
understanding	of	the	developments	of	"Buridanian"	approaches	in	the	late	XIV	century,	both	
in	Logic	and	Natural	philosophy.	For	example,	one	interesting	starting	point,	which	emerged	
already	 in	 this	 study,	would	be	Marsilius'	 account	of	 imaginabilia.	As	 I	hope	 to	have	 shown	

















Ad	 Castrum	 infra	 duos	 pontes.7612	The	 room	 was	 full	 with	 all	 kinds	 of	 folks	 and	 a	 party	 of	
academics	 -	 even	 in	 the	 middle	 ages,	 academics	 had	 the	 same	 unmistakable	 features	 they	
would	 have	 centuries	 later	 -	 celebrating	 some	 joyous	 occasion	 or	 some	 impressive	
achievement.	They	were	discussing	 intricate	matters	quite	close	 to	 the	conundrum	that	had	
been	troubling	Achilles	for	more	than	a	millennium.	Around	the	third	glass,	he	began	to	pay	











"Let's	 reframe	 our	 problem,	 as	 these	 fellows	 are	 doing",	 suggested	 Achilles,	 while	 going	









Achilles	 shrugged,	 then	 pointed	 at	 somebody	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	 academic	 looking	 group:	
"Anyway,	that	chap	over	there	seems	to	think	that	it	does	not	matter	if	you	assert	A	and	B	or	








all	depends	on	how	you	define	 this	consequentia	bona	 among	your	 sentences,	but	once	you	
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